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INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR LAW: AN INTRODUCTION
VED P. NANDA AND JON M. VAN DYKE
I. INTRODUCTION
The papers in this Symposium were prepared for an important conference on
"Updating International Nuclear Law" held in Salzburg, Austria in October 2005.
The Austrians living in Salzburg and Upper Austria have long been distressed by
the risks created by the Temelin Nuclear Power Plant, situated in the Czech
Republic some 50 kilometers (31 miles) north of the Austrian-Czech border. That
plant was started by the Soviet Union, but had been only partially completed when
the Cold War ended. Under U.S. pressure, the Czech government agreed to
contract with Westinghouse to complete the plant, creating a hybrid plant utilizing
some Soviet and some Westinghouse technology. It is thus a unique plant,
creating unknown risks.
The Austrians have felt particularly beleaguered by their new nuclear
neighbor, because they had previously abandoned their own nuclear industry. In
1978, the Austrian population voted in a national referendum that its recently-
completed nuclear power plant at Zwentendorf should not go into operation, and in
that same year its legislature adopted the Atomic Energy Prohibition Act.
Austrians worked closely with anti-nuclear Germans in 1989 to prevent a nuclear
waste reprocessing plant from opening in Wackersdorf in Germany's southern
region of Bavaria. In 1992, Salzburg hosted the World Uranium Hearing to
document the health, environmental, social, and peace-destabilizing effects of
nuclear energy, and the 2005 conference on Updating International Nuclear Law
was a continuation of that effort. The Austrian people have pursued legal
challenges to the Temelin plant in Austrian, Czech, and other European courts,
and, although they have won procedural victories, these efforts have been unable to
stop the completion and operation of the Temelin plant. Frustrated that the law
seemed unresponsive to the genuine fears created by having to live next to an
unproved nuclear plant, the Salzburg activists suggested convening international
environmental law experts to address the inadequacies in the international law
principles governing nuclear activities.
The papers in this Symposium have emerged from that effort, and they
provide a clear explanation of the gaps in the treaty law and customary
international law principles governing nuclear power. Earlier versions of these
papers were published in a volume entitled UPDATING INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR
LAW, edited by Heinz Stockinger, Jon M. Van Dyke, Michael Geistlinger, Sarah
K. Fussek, and Peter Machart. That volume also contains numerous other essays
examining the scientific risks created by nuclear power and explaining the avenues
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that the residents of Upper Austria have pursued in their efforts to block the
operation of the Temelin plant. Selected for this Symposium are the central legal
papers, which explain the inadequacies of the present legal regime and offer
suggestions for new principles that could provide protections for the range of
transboundary injuries that could occur.
1I. SYMPOSIUM THEMES
In this symposium the authors address four general themes: 1) international
environmental norms applicable to nuclear activities; 2) liability and compensation
for harm caused by nuclear activities, with special reference to the nuclear liability
conventions; 3) human rights and the environment and the peaceful use of nuclear
energy; and 4) specific case studies-the Austrian law on third-party liability for
nuclear damage, the regulatory and institutional framework for nuclear activities in
the Slovak Republic, and the claims of the Enewetak People related to US nuclear
testing in the Marshall Islands between 1946 and 1958.
Professors Jon Van Dyke and Ved Nanda and the late Professor Alexandre
Kiss address the first topic. Van Dyke provides a comprehensive survey of
international environmental norms related to transboundary environmental disputes
in "Liability and Compensation for Harm Caused by Nuclear Activities." He
begins his review with the Trail Smelter Arbitration, which enunciated the no harm
rule-sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas-and the polluter pays principle, and
then discusses the principles of international responsibility found in the 2001 Draft
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts and earlier
in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) decision in the 1949 Corfu Channel
Case. Next, he notes Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration and
Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration, both of which reaffirmed the Trail Smelter
holding, and have developed, in the words of Professor Philippe Sands, into "the
cornerstone of international environmental law." In the language of the Stockholm
Declaration, this principle reads:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and
the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their
own resources pursuant to their environmental policies, and the
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control
do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Van Dyke then discusses the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention and the
International Court of Justice's 1996 Advisory Opinion on "Legality of the Threat
or Use of Nuclear Weapons," which embodied the no-harm rule. As to the polluter
pays principle, he cites several international decisions that have reaffirmed the
rule.
Next, Van Dyke studies several other relevant international law principles
applicable to transboundary environmental conflicts-the precautionary principle,
the duty to cooperate, and principles of equity. Following this, he examines, in a
historical context, the strict liability regime for activities that cause harm to other
countries. He starts with Rylands v. Fletcher, the 1868 House of Lords case that
enunciated the strict liability rule for hazardous activities. He then refers to the
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International Law Commission's work on the subject and discusses several cases
pertinent to nuclear activities, including the 1986 Chernobyl accident and the 1978
Cosmos 954 incident. This analysis is followed by a thorough discussion of the
existing international nuclear liability treaty regime and its inadequacies.
Finally, Van Dyke studies the issue of damages for anticipated health hazards
and fear of environmental harm from nuclear activities. Possible bases for damage
claims include emotional distress, claims for enhanced risk of disease, and medical
monitoring claims. He concludes by emphasizing the need for further work to
develop a comprehensive and authoritative regime to govern harm from nuclear
activities. In his words,
Although the underlying customary international law principles (the no-
harm principle and the polluter-pays principle) are clear, the actual
treaties that have been drafted are inadequate and they have not been
widely ratified.... The failure to develop a proper regime that would
ensure full restitution and compensation for harm resulting from nuclear
facilities constitutes a continuing subsidy to the nuclear industry and
distorts decisions regarding energy choices. The effort to update
international nuclear law must, therefore, continue until a proper
liability and compensation regime is established.
In his paper, "International Environmental Norms Applicable to Nuclear
Activities, With Particular Focus on Decisions of International Tribunals and
International Settlements," Professor Ved Nanda reviews the pertinent treaties and
customary international law principles, as well as newly emerging sources of
international law, that have made valuable contributions to international
environmental law by establishing "a core of fundamental legal principles that are
pertinent to nuclear activities." These new sources, sometimes termed "soft law,"
include declarations and resolutions adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly and other intergovernmental organizations, and the principles,
guidelines, and recommendations produced by intergovernmental organizations or
multilateral conferences.
The paper reviews the major weaknesses of the prevailing legal regime
governing liability and compensation for harm caused by nuclear activities. Nanda
especially highlights the limits on liability; the imposition of liability primarily on
the operator, exempting others; the short statute-of-limitation periods; and sparse
state participation as parties in these instruments. Examining both substantive and
procedural norms, he especially notes that, upon its ratification, the 2005
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism will fill
a huge gap, because the pertinent treaties do not provide coverage for terrorist
attacks.
Among the decisions of international tribunals and international settlements,
Nanda studies the Trail Smelter Arbitration, the 1973, 1974, and 1995 Nuclear
Tests Cases decided by the International Court of Justice, the Court's 1997
judgment on the Gabcekovo-Nagymaros Dam dispute, and the 1996 ICJ Advisory
Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, which explicitly
stated: "The existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities
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within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or of
areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating
to the environment." Next, he examines the decisions of the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea regarding the MOX Plant Case and the Case Concerning
Land Reclamation by Singapore In and Around the Straits of Johar. This is
followed by a discussion of the pertinent work of the International Criminal Court
on this topic.
Among international settlements, the 1978 Cosmos 954 Satellite settlement,
compensation by the United States for harm caused by in 1954 to the Japanese
fishing vessel Fukuryu Maru (Lucky Dragon), the Marshall Islanders' claims for
damages from U.S. atmospheric nuclear testing, and the payment regarding the
1966 B-52 accident at Palomares, Spain, are studied. Nanda suggests that those
involved in updating nuclear law should study the creation of ecocide or genocide
as a possible new norm.
The focus of Alexandre Kiss's paper, "State Responsibility and Liability for
Nuclear Damage," is the rules adopted by the U.N. International Law Commission
(ILC) on state responsibility insofar as they are applicable to violations of
customary law and treaty-based norms related to nuclear activities and damages
caused by such activities.
In addition to the customary international law principle of state responsibility
for transboundary harm, Kiss discusses the provisions of several treaties, including
the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the Moon Treaty, the 1996
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, the 1994 Vienna Convention on Nuclear
Safety, the 1991 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a
Transboundary Context, the 1998 Aarhaus Convention on Access to Information,
Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental
Matters, and several other conventions related to notification of nuclear accidents,
nuclear liability, and nuclear waste. He also notes the 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion
on the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons and the 1991 IAEA Code of Practice on
the International Movement of Radioactive Waste. Kiss concludes that several of
the International Law Commission's articles on state responsibility are in sync
with the principles of general international law gleaned from international custom
or the pertinent conventions as they apply to nuclear activities.
Kiss finds that much more needs to be done at the interstate level to ensure
that there are adequate and effective norms to provide reparations for damages
caused by a nuclear activity. Because the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) was initially created to help countries develop nuclear energy, and not to
provide for adequate surveillance and control of nuclear activities, this
international organization needs a new mandate to develop compulsory rules on
the responsibility and liability of states in the field of nuclear safety. Also, the
IAEA must accept the responsibility to ensure compliance with existing nuclear
safety regulations. Professor Kiss also concludes that: "States are responsible
under international law for any failure to exercise due diligence over the siting and
operation of nuclear facilities and the transport and disposal of nuclear wastes;"
there should be obligations erga omnes; even in the absence of injury, breach of a
treaty obligation regarding nuclear activities should allow another state party to
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invoke state responsibility; and strict liability should apply to operators of nuclear
facilities and shippers for any harm caused by their activities.
Duncan Currie, Esq., Barrister of the High Court of New Zealand, addresses
the second theme-liability and compensation for harm caused by nuclear
activities-with special reference to the nuclear liability conventions. In his paper,
"The Problems and Gaps in the Nuclear Liability Conventions and an Analysis of
How an Actual Claim Would be Brought under the Current Existing Treaty
Regime in the Event of a Nuclear Accident," Currie provides a comprehensive
analysis of the existing conventions and an equally thorough examination of the
mechanisms involved in bringing a claim in the event of a nuclear accident. He
aptly summarizes the current state of the international nuclear liability regime,
which he finds to be
... extremely patchy, complicated and featur[ing] sparse participation.
While the recent amendments to the Vienna and Paris Conventions are
much heralded, they are heavily hedged with exceptions and the
amended Protocols enjoy even more sparse participation than the
original Conventions. Others, such as the Convention on
Supplementary Convention, are not in force; and for those that are in
force, many major nuclear countries are not party to them. So
discussion of Conventions must take into account their membership.
Regarding the mechanisms involved in bringing a claim for damages resulting
from a nuclear accident, Currie finds the inadequacies of the system to include the
lack of a neutral tribunal, the general requirement that claimants are to file claims
in the courts where the nuclear installation is located, and concerns about the
neutrality of the applicable law and limitations on recoverable damages. He
further notes that the definition of damages is narrow and the existing treaties have
sparse participation.
Currie studies in detail the provisions of the International Atomic Energy
Association's Vienna Convention of 1963 and the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development's Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the
Field of Nuclear Energy of 1960, which was strengthened by the Brussels
Supplementary Convention in 1963; the 1988 Joint Protocol Relating to the Vienna
and Paris Conventions; the 1997 Vienna Protocol amending the 1963 Vienna
Convention; the 1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear
Damage; and the 2004 Paris Protocol. He also discusses the 1971 International
Maritime Organization (IMO) Brussels Convention Relating to Civil Liability in
the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material.
In a separate section, Currie examines in extensive detail the 1963 Vienna
Convention and its 1997 Protocol and the 1960 Paris Convention and its 2004
Protocol. Another separate section compares the 1997 Vienna Protocol with the
1963 Convention, discussing specifically the definitions of nuclear accident and
nuclear damage and individual categories of damage---economic loss,
environmental impairment, and preventive measures. Similarly, he compares the
revised Paris and Vienna Conventions related to several issues, such as
jurisdiction, limitation in time, standing, and exceptions.
2006
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Currie suggests the following essential elements for an effective and
comprehensive liability regime: absolute liability should govern; limitations should
be unlimited in amount; there should be a fair (and adequately long) time limit for
liability; all responsible parties should bear liability; there should be a backup
fund; claimants should be able to bring claims in a neutral tribunal; the applicable
law should be that of the claimant; there should be a broad definition of
recoverable damage; there should be broad provisions on standing and access to
justice; and there should be just rules on the burden of proof and causation. He
considers the membership of the conventions to be a critical issue to the
international liability system. To illustrate, many nuclear countries, including
Canada, the United States, China, India, and Japan, are not parties to any of the
liability conventions; other major nuclear states, such as the United Kingdom and
France are party only to the Paris Convention and Russia only to the Vienna
Convention. Furthermore, many of these are not party to the Joint Protocol.
Equally important, none of the countries in Asia, particularly China, India, Japan,
and South Korea where nuclear power generation is expected to increase, is a party
to any liability convention. This patchy participation, combined with differing
national legislation, means that it is impossible to ascertain precise liability for the
different kinds of nuclear incidents that might occur.
Currie also discusses selected national legislation on nuclear liability. The
countries included are the United States, Canada, Japan, Russia, Ukraine, China,
Austria, and Chile. He addresses current developments regarding international
liability aimed at developing a common understanding of the legal issues and thus
promoting adherence to the liability conventions and protocols. Finally, he
presents selected scenarios to provide examples of how the liability system may
work in practice. He recommends to states considering joining the Paris or Vienna
Conventions that they should take into account the criteria he had suggested earlier
for an effective and comprehensive liability regime.
On the third topic, human rights and the environment and the peaceful use of
nuclear energy, Professors Dinah Shelton and Luis Rodriguez-Rivera are the
contributors. Dinah Shelton begins her paper with the 1968 UN Tehran
Conference on Human Rights, which marked the 20th anniversary of the adoption
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. When the Tehran Conference
proclaimed the interdependence and indivisibility of all human rights, she suggests,
it "open[ed] the door for consideration of complex issues like environmental
rights." She explains that "a substantial practical reason for emphasizing
international human rights law," is that that law "currently provides the only set of
international legal procedures that can be invoked to seek redress for harm [due to
environmental degradation] that is the consequence of an act or omission
attributable to a state."
Shelton notes that it is at the regional level that most recent advances in
developing environmental rights have occurred. She finds four "principal and
complementary approaches" that characterize the relationship between human
rights and the environment: (1) international environmental laws use selected
human rights aimed at ensuring effective environmental protection, such as the
emphasis on procedural rights (freedom of association and the right of access to
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information related to potential threats to the environment); (2) human rights laws
interpret human rights to include environmental protection when environmental
degradation prevents the full enjoyment of human rights including the right to life,
to health, to culture, and to a family and a private life; (3) a new substantive human
right to a safe and healthy environment is now emerging; and (4) environmental
protection is being addressed as a matter of human responsibilities rather than
rights.
Shelton discusses procedural environmental rights at length, including the
right to environmental information; the right to public participation in
environmental decision making; the right to a remedy for environmental harm; the
rights to life and to health; the right to an adequate standard of living and the
fulfillment of basic needs; the right to privacy, home, and family life; freedom of
association; the right to property; and cultural, minority, and indigenous rights.
Her review is thorough and comprehensive, with reference not only to customary
international law and conventional law but also to judicial decisions in national
courts as well as in regional tribunals, including the European Court of Human
Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. She also refers to the
General Comments of the Human Rights Committees established under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
Shelton discusses the concept of a substantive right to a healthy and safe
environment, which was initially acknowledged by the U.N. General Assembly in
a resolution adopted in 1968. Although the topic has generated controversy and
debate, she suggests that
...the recognition that human survival depends upon a safe and healthy
environment places the claim of a right to environment fully on the
human rights agenda. Moreover, recognizing a right to environment
could encompass elements of nature protection and ecological balance,
substantive areas not generally protected under human rights law
because of its anthropocentric focus.
It is noteworthy that more than 100 national constitutions guarantee a right to
a clean and healthy environment, obligating the government to prevent
environmental harm, or specifying the protection of the environment or natural
resources. And, within federal systems, state or provincial constitutions also
protect environmental rights even when federal constitutions may lack any mention
of the environment. She also refers to the many national tribunals that have
considered the right to environment to be justiciable. Shelton explains that while
no global human rights treaty currently proclaims a general right to environment,
several regional instruments contain an explicit guarantee of environmental
quality, notably the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.
Shelton concludes that:
The interrelationship between human rights and environmental
protection is undeniable. Human rights depend upon environmental
protection, and environmental protection depends upon the exercise of
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existing human right such as the right to information and the right to
political participation.
She considers it important to balance the right to environment with other
human rights. She finds the most significant bridge between human rights and
environmental protection to be human health, which remains "a primary objective
of both areas of regulation." She offers several strategies for promoting
consideration of this topic by states and international organizations, such as
lobbying the U.N. Human Rights Council to adopt a Draft Declaration on Human
Rights and the Environment and continued litigation before national, regional, and
international human rights bodies whenever substantive or procedural
environmental rights are threatened because of resource use or pollution.
In his paper, "The Human Right to Environment and the Peaceful Use of
Nuclear Energy," Professor Rodriguez-Rivera recalls the 1959 Inter-American
Symposium on Atomic Energy and Law, which was hosted by the University of
Puerto Rico School of Law and the Puerto Rico nuclear reactor experience that
followed. He notes the divergent views expressed by speakers at that symposium,
some of whom minimized the risks related to the atomic energy industry and
others who provided a candid assessment that all the precautions that could be
taken may not suffice to eliminate totally and permanently the harm that could be
caused by disposal of hazardous waste.
Two months after the symposium, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission signed a contract "to construct a reactor of an advanced type, using
superheated steam." Operation of the reactor was eventually terminated in June
1968 "because of technical difficulties and the ensuing need for high-cost
modifications." Subsequently, it was reported that a radiation leak had forced the
shutdown and that Puerto Ricans had not been told of the health and environmental
risks related to the reactor facilities. The U.S. Department of Energy eventually
decided to decontaminate and decommission the Puerto Rico reactor facility site
because the site "contains an entombed reactor that requires long-term surveillance
and monitoring activities similar to the entombed reactors at Piqua and Hallam,
and the same DOE guidance for long-term surveillance and monitoring activities
apply." Rodriguez-Rivera notes that, although almost 50 years have passed since
the Inter-American Symposium, what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable
exposure risks remains debatable. In his words:
In essence, the same question that was pervasive at the 1959 Puerto
Rico Symposium remains salient today: Acceptable risk to whom? We
must ask ourselves, has anyone bothered to ask those whose lives and
dignity have been put at risk whether the risks are acceptable to them?
Next, Rodriguez-Rivera discusses the peaceful use of nuclear energy and how
it is related to the right to a safe and healthy environment. He suggests that the
nuclear energy industry has refused to pay attention to its capacity to impose
..untold human suffering" upon present and future generations and the environment
because of their potential exposure to significant radiation. He counts among the
new threats emanating from the peaceful use of nuclear energy the discovery of
radioactive pollution in the Arctic Ocean, the use of low-frequency active sonar to
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locate submarines by naval forces, and the shipment of ultrahazardous radioactive
materials between Europe and Japan.
Rodriguez-Rivera notes three broad categories of rights encompassed in the
expansive human right to environment: the right to environment, which means "a
human right to live in an environment of minimum quality that still allows for the
realization of a life of dignity and well-being;" the right of environment, which
"articulates the philosophical theory that the environment is entitled to rights based
on its own intrinsic value, separate and distinct from those attributed to it through
human use;" and procedural environmental rights, which are a prerequisite for
implementing the substantive components of the expansive right to environment.
This is followed by Rodriguez-Rivera's study of the sources of the human
right to environment. Here he refers to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, the 1981 African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights, and the 1988 San Salvador Protocol. He then refers to several
General Assembly resolutions linking environmental protection and human rights,
the work of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, the 2002 joint UNEP-
OHCHR Experts Seminar on Human Rights and Environment held in Geneva, and
the 1997 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case. He especially notes the 1999
International Seminar of Experts, jointly sponsored by UNESCO and the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights, which adopted the Bizkaia Declaration on the
Right to the Environment. This declaration has been supported by the Spanish
Lower House, the Basque Parliament, and the Congress of Legislative Assembly
of the Regions of Europe.
In conclusion, Rodriguez-Rivera asserts that currently it is not simply state
consent that should provide the source of human rights, but that "the source of
human rights must be the will of humanity." That will, he argues, must be
determined by taking into account the actions taken by civil society, because it is
only such actions that constitute evidence of the will of humanity. He considers
the application of the human right to environment to the peaceful use of nuclear
energy as "a natural and effective approach." And he finds that "both radiation
exposure and the risk of such exposure to humans would constitute a violation of
the human right to environment."
In the final section, offering case studies, Professor Monika Hinteregger's
paper entitled "The New Austrian Act on Third Party Liability for Nuclear
Damage," analyzes the 1998 Austrian federal law on civil liability for damages
caused by radioactivity. This law, which replaced the earlier 1964 Law on Civil
Liability for Nuclear Damage, governs the operation of nuclear plants, the carriage
of radioactive material, and the handling of radionuclide. It was after the
Chernobyl disaster that the inadequacies of the earlier law, which applied only to
nuclear installations situated in Austrian territory, became the subject of legal and
political debate in Austria and was eventually replaced. The irony was that under a
1978 referendum, Austrians had already prohibited the operation of nuclear power
plants for production of electrical energy, and in Austria there were only three
small research facilities in operation. Under the earlier law, only fault-based
liability and nuisance law applied to the hazards of foreign nuclear power plants.
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Also, under the old Austrian law, liability for nuclear damage was exclusively
on the operator of the nuclear plant, and thus every other person, especially the
supplier of services or products, was protected from liability. The new Nuclear
Liability Law is a complete departure from the approach toward nuclear liability
law under the Paris and Vienna Conventions. Under the new law, Austrian courts
have jurisdiction and Austrian law is applicable if nuclear damage occurs in
Austria, no matter where it was caused. Furthermore, the new law provides a
substantial expansion of the definition of nuclear damage in order to facilitate the
proof of causality.
Although Austria is not a party to either the Paris or the Vienna Convention,
the Austrian Parliament has shown a keen interest in the further development of
the international nuclear liability regime, as is evident by its resolutions to that
effect.
Hinteregger details in her paper the scope of liability under the new Austrian
Act, which subjects the operator of a nuclear plant and the carrier of nuclear
material to unlimited liability, irrespective of fault, and this liability does not
depend on the occurrence of a nuclear incident. The law allows for the possibility
of piercing the corporate veil, to prevent the practice of trying to exempt the
controlling company from liability by shifting the liability to an operating
company that is under-insured.
The Vienna and Paris Conventions exempt operators from liability from acts
of armed conflict, hostilities, civil war, or insurrection, but these exemptions are
not found in the new Austrian Act. The presumption is that even under such
circumstances adequate precautions need to be taken by the operator or carrier.
The Austrian Act also requires operators of nuclear power plants on Austrian
territory to carry sufficient insurance to cover all potential liability for nuclear
damage. The Act contains a presumption that the holder of radionuclides is liable
for any damage resulting from the radionuclides, and also contains provisions for
concurrent liability and multiple tortfeasors. The new law ensures that if nuclear
damage occurs in Austrian territory, even though it was caused in a foreign state,
the Austrian court will have jurisdiction and Austrian law will apply.
A study prepared with the cooperation of the Slovak authorities and entitled
"Regulatory and Institutional Framework for Nuclear Activities in the Slovak
Republic," discusses the 1998 Act on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy passed
by the Slovak National Council. The law provides a comprehensive framework for
the regulation of nuclear activities in the Slovak Republic. The highlights of this
enactment include the requirement of a permit for the procurement and use of
nuclear materials; regulations for the construction of nuclear installations and their
commission and operation; state supervision of nuclear safety at such installations;
management of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel; physical protection of
nuclear installations, nuclear materials, and radioactive wastes from nuclear
installations; and emergency planning. It also provides for emergency responses,
decommissioning of nuclear installations, and detailed provisions on nuclear
safety. The Act expressly includes a foreign importer of nuclear installations and
selected equipment or services to receive an authorization from the Nuclear
Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic. Transportation of nuclear materials
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also requires a transportation permit issued by the Authority. Nuclear third party
liability provisions under the Act largely reflect those of the 1963 Vienna
Convention, as the Slovak Republic acceded to the Vienna Convention and to the
1988 Joint Protocol; under the Act, liability for nuclear damage caused by a
nuclear incident is channeled to the operator.
In the final study, Davor Pevec, Esq., who serves as Legal Counsel to the
Enewetak People, presents the paper entitled "The Marshall Islands Nuclear
Claims Tribunal: The Claims of the Enewetak People." Pevec narrates the story of
nuclear testing by the United States in the Marshall Islands between 1946 and
1958. Forty-three of the 67 nuclear tests the US conducted during that period
occurred on Enewetak Atoll and 24 on Bikini Atoll. The Marshall Islands was
then a U.N. trust territory administered by the United States, under the U.S. pledge
to the United Nations to "'protect the inhabitants against the loss of their land and
resources." The Enewetak People were removed to the smaller and resource-poor
Ujelang Atoll in December 1947, purportedly for a short time, but in fact they
remained exiled for a period of over 33 years. In one of the U.S. atmospheric tests,
in 1954, radioactive fallout drifted in the wrong direction and irradiated the
inhabitants of Rongelap and Utirik Atolls. In another, in 1952, which was the first
test of a thermonuclear device, a crater one mile in diameter and 200 feet deep was
left in Enewetak. As Pevec states, "The devastation [in Enewetak] is so severe that
to this day... over half the land and all of the lagoon remain contaminated by
radiation. The damage is so pervasive that the Enewetak People cannot live on
their land without importation of food."
In the 1980s, the United States faced lawsuits by the peoples of Marshall
Islands in U.S. courts for property and other damages for more than $5 billion.
During the litigation, the government of the Republic of Marshall Islands signed
the Compact of Free Association with the United States. The Compact included a
subsidiary Section 177 Agreement, which established a $150 million Nuclear
Fund, income from which was earmarked for those who had brought the suit "as a
means to address past present and future consequences of the Nuclear Testing
Program." A Nuclear Claims Tribunal was also to be funded by the income, to be
established with "jurisdiction to render final determination upon all claims past,
present and future, of the Government, citizens, and nationals of the Marshall
Islands which are based on, arise out of, or are in any way related to the Nuclear
Testing Program." Based upon these provisions, the U.S. courts dismissed the
claims after the Compact went into effect, and the Enewetak People were
instructed to bring their claims to the Marshall Islands Nuclear Claims Tribunal,
which did issue an award of $386 million to the Enewetak People, but which
remains unpaid. Pevec notes that the Enewetak People are trying to use the
political process by petitioning the Congress to compensate them for the hardships
they have endured, and they have also filed a claim in the U.S. Claims Court,
which is now on appeal before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
III. CONCLUSION
The effort to address the risks created by transboundary nuclear radiation
remains as an unfinished agenda. The treaties that have been drafted are
inadequate and have not been widely ratified. The failure to establish an adequate
2006
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liability and compensation regime operates as a subsidy for the nuclear industry,
and thus interferes with efforts to evaluate energy options on a level playing field.
Austria, which was among the countries most affected by the radioactive
cloud that moved westward after the 1986 reactor catastrophe at Chernobyl,
enacted its own Nuclear Liability Law in 1998, as the paper of Professor Monika
Hinteregger explains. This comprehensive Austrian statute could serve as a model
for other national laws and international treaties. It is hoped that the essays in this
Symposium will encourage further debate on how nuclear power should be
regulated and how transboundary nuclear injuries and the risks created by nuclear
power plants should be compensated.
LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR HARM
CAUSED BY NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES
JON M. VAN DYKE1
I. INTRODUCTION
The body of customary international environmental law has its foundation in
cases such as the Trail Smelter Arbitration, 2 which utilized the no-harm rule and
the polluter-pays principle, and it is now drawing upon more specific norms that
build on these earlier rules, such as the precautionary principle and the principle of
sustainable development. The specific obligation to provide restitution and
compensation when nuclear activities cause injuries has been recognized
repeatedly and is now certainly part of customary international law. But problems
remain regarding how to measure damages, how to implement the duty to repair
the injuries, and what specific obligations exist to protect neighboring states from
transboundary pollution.
II. RESPONSIBILITY FOR TRANSBOUNDARY INJURY TO PERSONS, PROPERTY, AND
THE ENVIRONMENT
A. The No-Harm Rule (Sic Utere Tuo Ut Alienum Non Laedas - One Should Use
One's Property So As to Avoid Injuring Others)
Customary international law requires states to ensure that activities under
their jurisdiction do not cause damage to the resources, people, or environment of
other states. This principle was applied in the Trail Smelter Arbitration3 and has
been repeatedly embodied in later treaties, conventions, and international
decisions. The United States brought an action against Canada for sulfur dioxide
emissions produced by a smelter in Trail, British Columbia, which damaged
private timber and agricultural property in Washington State. The International
Joint Commission, established by the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 between
the two states, arbitrated the dispute. It held Canada liable for more than $350,000
in damages and ordered Canada to refrain from causing further damages. The
Commission examined international decisions as well as disputes between U.S.
states, because the arbitration agreement indicated that U.S. law could be
1. The author would like to thank Jamie Tanabe, Svitlana Campbell, and Sechyi Laui, law
students at the William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii at Manoa, classes of 2002,
2006, and 2007 respectively, for their assistance with some of the research in this paper.
2. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1938 & 1941) [hereinafter Trail Smelter
Arbitration] (no-harm rule at 1965; polluter-pays principle at 1980-81).
3. Id. at 1965.
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considered. Based on these precedents, the Commission concluded that "no State
has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause
injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein,
when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and
convincing evidence."
4
The responsibility of Canada in the Trail Smelter Arbitration did not result
from any intentional or invidious action taken by Canada, and wrongful intent was
not necessary for the activity to become "an internationally wrongful act."
Canada's responsibility flowed simply from its breach of a duty it owed to its
neighbor, a duty to prevent activities within its jurisdiction from causing harm to
persons, property, and the environment of the United States. One commentator
explained that the earlier efforts of the International Law Commission to
differentiate between lawful and unlawful acts were based on a false dichotomy
and led to a non sequitur:
The fact that operating a smelting plant is permitted by international law
does not necessarily mean that all acts committed in the course of that
activity are permitted by international law: the activity of operating a
smelting plant is lawful, but the act of discharging fumes from that
plant is not lawful. The discharge of fumes arises out of an activity
which is permitted by international law, but the discharge itself is an act
which is not permitted by international law. 5
In its more recent 2001 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, the International Law Commission has recognized
that international liability does not require wrongful intent, and it now defines
"internationally wrongful act of a Sta':e" in the following simple terms: "There is
an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or
omission: (a) is attributable to the State under international law; and (b) constitutes
a breach of an international obligation of the State." 6 The Commentary to this
article explains that "[c]ases in which the international responsibility of a State has
been invoked on the basis of an omission are at least as numerous as those based
on positive acts, and no difference in principle exists between the two."7
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) recognized state responsibility for
damage to one country caused by activities within the jurisdiction of another
country in the 1949 Corfu Channel Case.8 The United Kingdom brought a claim
against Albania when two of its warships were damaged by mines in the Straits of
Corfu within Albania's territorial waters. Albania was aware of the dangers but
did not announce the existence of the mines. In holding Albania responsible, the
4. Id.
5. M.B. Akehurst, International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not
Prohibited by International Law, 16 NETH. Y.B. INT'L. L. 3, 8 (1985).
6. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE
RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 81 (2002) [hereinafter ILC ARTICLES].
7. Id. at 82.
8. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
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ICJ held that it is "every State's obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to
be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States." 9 This case is particularly
significant because it speaks in terms of an "obligation" on the part of Albania to
ensure that others are not injured by dangers within its jurisdiction, and because the
United Kingdom vessels knew that dangers lurked in the Corfu Channel when they
sailed through. The Court ruled that the responsibility of Albania was not in any
way reduced because the U.K. ships may have been contributorily negligent in
sailing through these waters. 10
The 1972 U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, also known as the
Stockholm Conference, formally adopted the no-harm principle for environmental
damage. The purpose of the Stockholm Conference was to "serve as a practical
means to encourage, and to provide guidelines for, action by governments and
international organizations designed to protect and improve the human
environment, and to remedy and prevent its impairment, by means of international
co-operation. ' " It confirmed the Trail Smelter holding in Principle 21, stating
that:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and
the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their
own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 12
Principle 21 has developed into "the cornerstone of international
environmental law," 13 and was confirmed again in Principle 2 of the Rio
Declaration, which emerged from the 1992 Conference on Environment and
Development. 14  This principle has become important because "as it has been
applied in subsequent law-making, [it] requires states to do more than make
reparation for environmental damage. Its main importance is that it recognizes the
9. Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
10. Id. at 35-36; Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27)
(holding that the United States violated international law by failing to warn other states that it had
planted mines in Nicaragua's harbors).
11. G.A. Res. 2581, 2, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (Dec. 15,
1969).
12. U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, June 5-16, 1972, Declaration of Principles,
Principle 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 (June 16, 1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration] (emphasis
added).
13. PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 236 (2d ed. 2003).
14. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, Principle 2. U.N. Doe. A/Conf. 151/26/Rev. 1 (Jan. 1, 1993) [hereinafter
Rio Declaration] (Stating that, "States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and
the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their
own environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction").
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duty of states to take suitable preventive measures to protect the environment.' 15
This duty is thus one of exercising both due diligence and harm prevention.'
6
The obligation of due diligence "requires the introduction of legislation and
administrative controls applicable to public and private conduct which are capable
of effectively protecting other states and the global environment, and it can be
expressed as the conduct to be expected of a good government."' 7  The due
diligence standard has sometimes been criticized as elusive and too flexible, and it
necessarily is relative and responsive to the situation requiring "diligence." One
scholar has explained that "during the course of legal development," due diligence
"has been defined to mean what a responsible government should do under normal
conditions in a situation with its best practicable and available means, with a view
to fulfilling its international obligation."' 18 But, even though the response of a
government will vary depending on its abilities to respond, when the government
itself is involved in the risk-creating activity, either as initiator or as regulator of it,
its responsibility to protect the interests of its neighbors is necessarily at the
highest possible level: "When an activity bears a significant risk of transboundary
damage the government must take all necessary measures to prevent such
damage."19
The no-harm rule can be found in Article 194(2) of the 1982 U.N. Law of the
Sea Convention20 and in the Preamble of the 1992 U.N. Framework Convention on
Climate Change, which says:
Recalling also that States have, in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign
right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental
and developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction. 21
The International Court of Justice said explicitly in 1996 that "the general
obligation of states to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control
respect the environment of other states or of areas beyond national control is now
15. PATRICIA W. BIRNIE AND ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE ENVIRONMENT 11 l
(2d ed. 2002) (emphasis added).
16. Id. at 112.
17. Id.
18. XUE HANQiN, TRANSBOUNDARY DAMAGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 163 (2003).
19. Id. (emphasis added).
20. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 194(2), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 (art. 194(2) states: "States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their
jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to other States and their
environment, and that pollution arising from incidents or activities under their jurisdiction or control
does not spread beyond the areas where they exercise sovereign rights in accordance with this
Convention").
21. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Preamble, May 9, 1992, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107 (emphasis added).
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part of the corpus of international law relating to the environment., 22 Claims for
transboundary harm can be brought based on several distinct theories:
Nuisance, which refers to excessive and unreasonable hindrance to the
private utilization or enjoyment of real property... Trespass,... direct
and immediate physical intrusion into the immovable property of
another person... Negligence... [T]he doctrine of public trust... and
that of riparian rights... [N]eighborhood law (duty of owner of a
property or installation, especially one carrying industrial activities, to
abstain from any excesses which may be detrimental to the neighbour's
property)... 23
The claim brought by Australia and New Zealand against France in the early
1970s challenging the atmospheric testing in French Polynesia,24 for instance, was
based on a theory of trespass, i.e., that the radionuclides produced by the testing
entered into the airspace of Australia and New Zealand thereby causing harm to
persons and property.
B. The Duty to Control Sources of Harm
Professor Boyle has usefully explained that governing principles of customary
international law require countries "to take adequate steps to control and regulate
sources of serious environmental pollution or transboundary harm within their
territory or subject to their jurisdiction., 25 This principle is designed to protect not
only other states but also "common spaces including the high seas, deep sea-bed
and outer space, and also the atmosphere, from pollution."26
C. The Polluter-Pays Principle
It is a central principle of international law that when a state violates its
international obligations, it has a duty to make reparations for the wrongs
committed. This is a logical rule because "the function of any regime of allocation
of loss should be to provide an incentive for those concerned with the hazardous
operations to take preventive or protective measures in order to avoid damage; to
compensate damage caused to any victim; and to serve an economic function, that
is, internalize all the costs (externalities)."27 The Permanent Court of International
Justice (PCIJ) in the Factory at Chorz6w Case stated that "reparation must, as far
as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the
situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been
22. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 241-
42, (July 8). See also Gabcikovo Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 53 (Sept. 25).
23. International Law Commission, First Report on the Legal Regime for Allocation of Loss in
Case of Transboundary Harm Arising Out of Hazardous Activities, 123, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/531 (Mar. 21, 2003) (prepared by Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao, Special Rapporteur)
[hereinafter Rao].
24. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 99 (Dec. 20, 1974).; Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. France),
1973 I.C.J. 135 (Dec. 20, 1974).
25. Alan E. Boyle, Nuclear Energy and International Law: An Environmental Perspective, 60
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 257, 269 (1990).
26. Id. at271.
27. Rao, supra note 23, at 45.
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committed., 28 The ICJ also recognized in the Gabcikovo Case that "[i]t is a well-
established rule of international law that an injured State is entitled to obtain
compensation from the State which has committed an internationally wrongful act
for the damage caused by it." 29 This rule was reaffirmed by the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in its first full opinion, The M/V Saiga Case.3"
When addressing the question of damages, the Tribunal quoted from the venerable
Factory at Chorz6w Case3 1 for the proposition that every wrong requires a
remedy:
It is a well-established rule of international law that a State which
suffers damage as a result of an internationally wrongful act by another
State is entitled to obtain reparation for the damage suffered from the
State which committed the wrongful act and that "reparation must, as
far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and
reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if
that act had not been committed" (Factory at Chorz6w, Merits,
Judgment No. 13, 1928, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 17, p. 47).2
Pursuant to this standard, the Tribunal awarded $2,123,357 to Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines for damages resulting from the detention of the Saiga, the
damage to the vessel, and the injury to the crewmembers.33 This principle is also
codified as Principle 17 of the 1992 Rio Declaration:
National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization of
environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into
account the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost
ofpollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting
international trade and investment. 
34
1II. OTHER PRINCIPLES GOVERNING How COUNTRIES MUST DEAL WITH
ACTIVITIES THAT AFFECT THEIR NEIGHBORS
Among the other principles of international law relevant to transboundary
environmental conflicts are the duty to cooperate, stewardship, sustainable
development, the protection of biological diversity, the precautionary principle or
approach, intra-generational (social) equity, inter-generational equity, and
indigenous rights. Those particularly relevant to this discussion are addressed in
more detail below.
A. Precautionary Principle
The precautionary principle, which has evolved into a customary international
law norm, was confirmed in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, which states:
28. Factory at Chorz6w, (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47 (Sept. 13).
29. Gabcikovo Nagymaros Project, supra note 22, at 152.
30. M/V Saiga (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), 120 I.L.R. 143, 170 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea
1999).
31. Factory at Chorz6w, supra note 28.
32. M/V Saiga, supra note 30, at 170.
33. Id. at 175.
34. Rio Declaration, supra note 14, Principle 17 (emphasis added).
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In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be
widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack offull scientific certainty
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to
prevent environmental degradation. 35
The precautionary principle continues to develop and is presently seen as an
authoritative norm recognized by governments and international organizations as a
firm guide to activities affecting the environment. 36  It flows directly from the
responsibility of "due diligence" that is a component of the no-harm rule and it
constitutes "an obligation of diligent prevention and control. '37  The essential
components of the precautionary principle are:
- Developments and initiatives affecting the environment should be
thoroughly assessed before action is taken.
- The burden is on the developer or initiator to establish that the new
program is safe.
" Alternative technologies should be explored.
" The absence of full scientific certainty should not limit precautionary
measures to protect the environment.
- Whenever serious or irreversible damage is anticipated, the action
should be postponed or canceled.
The precautionary principle has been somewhat controversial, because some
commentators view it as being too vague,38 and others view it as unrealistic, but it
is a major presence at all international negotiations now, and it appears regularly in
treaties and documents because it reflects the view that it is necessary to be extra
vigilant in our stewardship of resources, especially in light of the many mistakes
we have made in recent years. 39  Although the content of the precautionary
principle is still the subject of discussion, at a minimum it serves to reverse the
burden of proving that a certain activity does not or will not cause damage onto the
35. Id. at Principle 15 (emphasis added).
36. See, e.g., Jon M. Van Dyke, The Evolution and International Acceptance of the Precautionary
Principle, in BRINGING NEW LAW TO OCEAN WATERS 357, 357 (David D. Caron and Harry N. Scheiber
eds., 2004).
37. BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 15, at 115.
38. See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, Scientific Uncertainty and the Precautionary Principle, 33 ENV'T
4, 8 (Sept. 1991) ("Although the precautionary principle provides a general approach to environmental
issues, it is too vague to serve as a regulatory standard because it does not specify how much caution
should be taken."). But see Daniel Bodansky, Remarks: New Developments in International
Environmental Law, 85 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 401, 413 (1991) ("Indeed, so frequent is its
invocation that some commentators are even beginning to suggest that the precautionary principle is
ripening into a norm of customary international law."). See generally James E. Hickey, Jr. & Vern R.
Walker, Refining the Precautionary Principle in International Environmental Law, 14 VA. ENvTL. L.J.
423 (1995) and Gregory D. Fullem, The Precautionary Principle: Environmental Protection in the Face
of Scientific Uncertainty, 31 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 495 (1995).
39. See generally Jon M. Van Dyke, Applying the Precautionary Principle to Ocean Shipments of
Radioactive Materials, 27 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 379 (1996).
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state seeking to initiate an environmentally sensitive activity. As Judge Wolfrum
expressed in his separate opinion in the MOX Plant Case:
There is no general agreement as to the consequences which flow from
the implementation of this principle other than the fact that the burden
of proof concerning the possible impact of a given activity is reversed.
A State interested in undertaking or continuing a particular activity has
to prove that such activities will not result in any harm, rather than the
other side having to prove that it will result in harm."
40
Certainly the inclusion of the precautionary standard in the 1996 Protocol to
the London Dumping Convention 41 and in the 1995 Straddling and Migratory Fish
Stocks Agreement 42 provides strong evidence that this approach is here to stay.43
The principle has been so universally included in recent treaties that it now appears
to have been accepted as a norm of customary international law that is formally
binding on all nations. 44  Several judges on the ICJ have recognized the
precautionary principle as an emerging concept in international law in cases such
as the 1995 Nuclear Tests Case45 and the 1996 Nuclear Weapons Case.46
B. The Duty to Cooperate
Another principle well-established in customary international law is the
requirement that states cooperate in making decisions that may substantially affect
shared environmental resources. As Professor Boyle has explained in simple and
direct terms, "States are required to co-operate with each other in controlling
40. MOX Plant Case (No. 10) (Ir. v. U.K.), 41 I.L.M. 405 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 2001) (opinion
of Judge Wolfrum) (emphasis added).
41. 1996 Protocol to the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of
Wastes and Other Matter art. 3, Nov. 7, 1996, 36 I.L.M. I (reversing the presumptions established in the
original convention, so that the dumping of all wastes is prohibited unless the item to be dumped is
explicitly listed in Annex I).
42. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the U. N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks art. 5(c) and 6, Sept. 8, 1995, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.164/37, 34 I.L.M.
1542 (listing the "'precautionary approach" among the principles that govern conservation and
management of shared fish stocks and elaborating on this requirement in some detail, focusing on data
collection and monitoring).
43. E.g., Western Pacific Regional Fishery Management Council, A 20-Year Report 26 (1998)
(stating proudly that the Council has established "a precautionary management approach to fishery
conservation and management" as evidenced by its establishment of a moratorium and then a limited-
entry program "in response to the rapid entry of longline vessels into the Hawaii-based fleet").
44. See generally Van Dyke, supra note 39.
45. Request for Examination of Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of Court's Judgment
of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. 288, 342, 412 (Sept. 22) (dissenting
opinion of Judge Weeramantry) (stating the precautionary principle is "gaining increasing support as
part of the international law of the environment") (dissenting opinion of Judge Palmer) (stating "the
norm involved in the precautionary principle has developed rapidly and may now be a principle of
customary international law relating to the environment").
46. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 240, 502
(July 8) (dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry) (stating "principles of environmental law, which
this Request enables the Court to recognize and use in reaching its conclusions, [include] the
precautionary principle").
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transboundary pollution and environmental risks. 47 Principle 24 of the Stockholm
Declaration states:
International matters concerning the protection and improvement of the
environment should be handled in a co-operative spirit by all countries,
big and small, on an equal footing. Cooperation through multilateral or
bilateral arrangements or other appropriate means is essential to
effectively control, prevent, reduce and eliminate adverse
environmental effects resulting from activities conducted in all spheres,
in such a way that due account is taken of the sovereignty and interests
of all States. as
This principle had earlier been utilized by the arbitral tribunal in the 1957 Lac
Lanoux Arbitration4 9 where it was held that, as a matter of customary international
law, a state that is engaging in behavior likely to impact the environment of
another state significantly is obliged to involve the affected state in discussions
regarding these activities.
The duty to consult includes the duty to notify other affected countries, the
duty to exchange information, the duty to listen to the concerns of affected
countries, the duty to respond to these concerns, and the duty to negotiate in good
faith. In some situations, countries also have the duty to reach an agreement, and a
duty to submit the dispute to third-party adjudication if they cannot resolve the
matter.
For instance, when an activity may have a significant transboundary affect on
ocean and coastal waters the Law of the Sea Convention requires the exchange of
information about the proposed activity and the preparation of an environmental
impact assessment to disclose the nature of the activity and the attendant risks.5 °
The Espoo Convention also requires an environmental impact assessment for
activities that are likely to cause a significant transboundary impact. 51 Along these
same lines, a state also has a duty to provide prior notification for transboundary
shipment of wastes. The Basel Convention 52 and the IAEA Code of Practice on
the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste 53 both require a
state to notify and obtain the consent of the sending, receiving and transit states in
accordance with their respective laws and regulations.
47. Boyle, supra note 25, at 278.
48. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 12, at Principle 24 (emphasis added).
49. Affaire du Lac Lanoux [Lake Lanoux Arbitration] (Fr. v. Spain), 12 R.I.A.A. 281 (1957).
50. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 20, art. 204-06.
51. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context art. 2.1, Feb.
25, 1991, 1989 U.N.T.S. 309 [hereinafter Espoo Convention] (requiring contracting parties to take all
appropriate measures to prevent, reduce, and control significant adverse transboundary environmental
impacts from proposed activities.).
52. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
Their Disposal art. 4, Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 649.
53. Int'l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Code of Practice on the International Transboundary
Movement of Radioactive Waste (IAEA Code), IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/386 (Nov. 13, 1990).
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The duty to cooperate played a central role in judgment of the International
Court of Justice in the Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam,5 4 which,
as described by Professors Birnie and Boyle, had "it]he effect of.. .requir[ing] the
parties to co-operate in the joint management of the project, and to institute a
continuing process of environmental protection and monitoring...., 55  These
distinguished commentators have explained that "[t]he Court's environmental
jurisprudence is not extensive but its judgments affirm the existence of a legal
obligation to prevent transboundary harm, to co-operate in the management of
environmental risks, to utilize shared resources equitably and, albeit less certainly,
to carry out environmental impact assessment and monitoring. 56
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea confirmed the importance
of the duty to cooperate in two recent cases. In the MOX Plant Case (Ireland v.
U.K.), the Tribunal ruled on December 3, 2001 that the duty to cooperate required
the two countries to exchange information concerning the risks created by the
plant, to monitor the effects of the plant on the marine environment, and to work
together to reduce those risks.5 7  Similarly in the Case Concerning Land
Reclamation by Singapore In and Around the Straits of Johor, the Tribunal issued
a ruling on October 8, 2003, stating:
[G]iven the possible implications of land reclamation on the marine
environment, prudence and caution require that Malaysia and
Singapore establish mechanisms for exchanging information and
assessing the risks or effects of land reclamation works and devising
ways to deal with them in the areas concerned (emphasis added). 58
To give teeth to this duty to cooperate, the Tribunal went on to prescribe
provisional measures that the parties had to comply with:
Malaysia and Singapore shall cooperate and shall, for this purpose,
enter into consultations forthwith in order to:
(a) establish promptly a group of independent experts with the mandate
(1) to conduct a study, on terms of reference to be agreed by Malaysia
and Singapore, to determine, within a period not exceeding one year
from the date of this Order, the effects of Singapore's land reclamation
and to propose, as appropriate, measures to deal with any adverse
effects of such land reclamation...
(b) exchange, on a regular basis, information on, and assess risks or
effects of Singapore's land reclamation works.. .(emphasis added). 59
54. Gabcikovo Nagymaros Project, supra note 22, at 147.
55. BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 15, at 108.
56. Id.
57. MOX Plant Case, supra note 40.
58. Concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore In and Around the Straits of Johor (No. 12)
(Malay. v. Sing.), 126 I.L.R. 487, 99 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 2003).
59. Id. at 106(1).
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Finally, the Tribunal directed "Singapore not to conduct its land reclamation
in ways that might cause irreparable prejudice to the rights of Malaysia or serious
harm to the marine environment, taking especially into account the reports of the
group of independent experts. 6 °
C. Principles of Equity
Principles of equity are also deeply rooted in customary international law.
The concept of inter-generational equity holds that "each generation is entitled to
inherit a robust planet that on balance is at least as good as that of previous
generations... As members of the present generation, we hold the earth in trust for
future generations. At the same time, we are beneficiaries entitled to use and
benefit from it."
61
IV. DOES INTERNATIONAL LAW IMPOSE STRICT LIABILITY ON HAZARDOUS
ACTIVITIES THAT CAUSE HARM TO OTHER COUNTRIES?
For most injuries under most legal systems, the person who caused the injury
is liable only if that person acted "negligently," i.e., did not engage in the "due
diligence" required by the activity or situation. But for some activities and
situations, which by their very nature are risky and raise the possibility of serious
injuries, a higher standard of liability is utilized, usually characterized as "strict
liability."
Strict liability emerged in Anglo-American jurisprudence from the 1868 case
of Rylands v. Fletcher,62 where the House of Lords ruled that a "person who, for
his own purposes, brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to
do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is
prima facie answerable for all damage which is the natural consequence of its
escape. 63 One commentator has recently explained that "strict liability is not a
recent legal development for tortious injury, nor is it uncommon... [S]trict liability
in one form or another is imposed in many legal systems for damage caused by
[ultrahazardous] activity., 64  Although some commentators seem reluctant to
recognize this principle as applicable in international law, it appears increasingly in
international treaties, 65 and does seem to govern international decision-making.
60. Id. at 106(2).
61. Edith Brown Weiss, Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the Environment,
84 AM. J. INT'L L.198, 199-200 (1990).
62. Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) 3 Eng. Rep. 330 (L.R.-P.C.).
63. Idat 339-40.
64. HANQIN, supra note 18, at 299-300.
65. See, e.g., Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to
the Environment, June 21, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1228; Basel Protocol, supra note 53; Convention on
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, March 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S.
No. 7762; Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear
Materials, Dec. 17, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 255, 11 I.L.M. 277; International Convention on Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution Damages, Nov. 29, 1969, 23 I.L.M. 177; Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for
Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, 1063 U.N.T.S. 265, 2 I.L.M.727; Convention on the Liability of
Operators of Nuclear Ships, May 25, 1962, 973 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on Third Party Liability in the
Field of Nuclear Energy, July 29, 1960, 956 U.N.T.S. 263; Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign
Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface, Oct. 7, 1952, 310 U.N.T.S. 181.
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One commentator has explained that "strict liability may result even though the
activity does not involve a high degree of risk if the risk carries with it the
possibility of such widespread harm that it becomes 'abnormally dangerous.'
66
Although countries have been reluctant to accept the unlimited range of
responsibilities that might flow from a strict-liability regime, nonetheless they have
tended to accept their obligations to others when their activities have caused
unforeseen harms. As Robert Q. Quentin-Baxter, the first Special Rapporteur to
the International Law Commission on this topic, explained, "at the very end of the
day, when all the opportunities for regime-building have been set aside - or,
alternatively, when a loss or injury has occurred that nobody foresaw - there is a
commitment, in the nature of strict liability, to make good the lOSS. ' ' 67 "In the
absence of any agreement, the source State, according to Quentin-Baxter, was
nevertheless liable to make reparation to the affected State in conformity with the
shared expectations entertained by them.",68  His successor, P.S. Rao, has
confirmed that "there is general support for the proposition that any regime of
liability and compensation should aim at ensuring that the innocent victim is not as
far as possible left to bear the loss resulting from transboundary harm arising from
hazardous activity." 69  Later in his report, he phrased this in terms of a duty:
"States have a duty to ensure that some arrangement exists to guarantee equitable
allocation of loss."' 70 In his conclusions, he explained that states normally prefer to
avoid direct responsibility and that "liability and obligation to compensate should
be first placed at the doorstep of the person most in control of the activity at the
time the accident or incident occurred.", 71 If the liability of the operator is limited
in any way, then "[t]he limited liability should be supplemented by additional
funding... from the principal beneficiaries of the activity or from the same class of
operators or from earmarked State funds. 72  And, perhaps most importantly,
"[t]he State should also ensure that recourse is available within its legal system, in
accordance with evolving international standards, for equitable and expeditious
compensation and relief to victims of transboundary harm."73
A. Nuclear Activities in Particular
The operation of a nuclear reactor for the purpose of creating energy is not an
inherently "wrongful act," but it can constitute an "internationally wrongful act" if
the operation of the plant causes harm to the persons, property, or environment of a
neighboring state. If a nuclear accident were to occur, the operator would be
strictly liable for the damage that resulted and the state with jurisdiction over the
plant would also be responsible for providing restitution and compensation for the
66. John M. Kelson, State Responsibility and the Abnormally Dangerous Activity, 13 HARV. INT'L
L. J. 197, 205 (1972).
67. Rao, supra note 23, at 18.
68. Id. at 8.
69. Id. at 44.
70. Id. at 151.
71. Id. at 153(d).
72. Id. at 153(g).
73. Id. at 153(i).
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resulting harm. Commentators appear to agree that nuclear activities are governed
by the strict-liability regime:
A good example of the special importance in international law is the
application of the doctrine of strict or absolute liability to operators or
agencies responsible for the manufacture, transportation, or use of
radioactive materials, activities that may result in injuries in the form of
pollution by radiation. 7
Professor Boyle has explained why strict liability is the logical standard to govern
nuclear activities:
The arguments for using a standard more demanding than due diligence
to shift the burden of unavoidable loss back to the polluting state remain
strong, particularly where the source is an ultra-hazardous activity, such
as a nuclear power plant. In the absence of reciprocal acceptance of
risk, making the victim suffer is not an attractive policy.
75
Several examples involving payments underscore the recognition that victims
who suffer injuries as a result of nuclear activities are entitled to restitution and
compensation, and that countries accept that they are strictly liable to provide such
remedies.
B. The Fukuryu Maru (Lucky Dragon) Fallout Exposure (19541
Because of errors in calculating the magnitude of the explosion and the wind
direction, the March 1, 1954 hydrogen bomb test conducted by the United States in
the Marshall Islands caused injury to islanders and Americans in the region, and
also to the 27 Japanese crew members on the fishing vessel Fukuryu Maru (Lucky
Dragon). One member of the crew died and the rest sustained serious sickness and
injuries because of their exposure to the radiation.76 A year later, even though the
United States defended its nuclear tests as lawful measures of security,7 7 it
provided Japan with an ex gratia payment of $2 million "for purposes of
compensation for the injuries or damages sustained... [and] in full settlement of
any and all claims against the United States of America or its agents, nationals or
juridical entities" caused by the test. 78
C. Payments to Marshall Islanders
The United States provide $185 million to the Marshall Island victims of the
U.S. nuclear testing during the 1950S.7 9 Although this amount is inadequate and
more compensation is being sought, the payment nonetheless provides further
74. J. BARROS AND DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION 75(1974).
75. Boyle, supra note 25, at 296; see also BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 15, at 188-89.
76. Myres McDougal and Norbert Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful
Measures for Security, 64 YALE L. J. 648, 652 (1955).
77. Id. at 682-94.
78. Personal and Property Damage Claims Agreement, U.S.-Japan, Jan. 4, 1955, 6 U.S.T. 1,
T.I.A.S. No. 3160.
79. See generally Davor Pevec, The Enewetak People: Nuclear Testing; Displacement;
Resettlement: and Land Damage Claims (published herein).
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recognition that restitution and compensation are required for harm caused by
nuclear activities.
D. The Palomares Nuclear Bomb Accident
After a U.S. B-52 containing four nuclear bombs collided in mid-air with a
refueling tanker and then crashed in the waters near Palomares, Spain on January
17, 1966, spreading plutonium dust over several hundred acres, 80 the United States
accepted responsibility to locate, remove, and dispose of the radioactive materials
in Spanish waters and pay compensation for the injurious consequences of this
act.81
E. The Cosmos 954 Incident
Commentators tend to examine the Cosmos 954 incident for guidance
regarding the obligations of states for environmental damage, even though that
matter was resolved through a negotiated settlement rather than by a third-party
tribunal. On January 24, 1978, a Soviet nuclear-powered surveillance satellite
called the Cosmos 954 left its orbit and crashed in western Canada, spreading its
debris widely over a remote area extending across Alberta, Saskatchewan, and the
Northern Territories.8 2 All but two parts of the satellite were radioactive, and
several pieces contained lethal levels of radioactivity.83 Canada conducted a
massive search across the area to find the pieces, with the help of the United States
and with limited assistance from the Soviets.84 Canada lodged a claim against the
Soviet Union based on the 1972 Convention on International Liability for
Damages Caused by Space Objects 5 and on general principles of international
law,86 asserting that international law imposed "absolute liability for space
activities, in particular activities involving the use of nuclear energy, 8 7 and that
"[t]he principle of absolute liability applies to fields of activities having in
common a high degree of risk.",8 8 Canada spent Canadian$14 million in the entire
clean-up operation, 89 but sought only about Canadian$6 million from the
U.S.S.R.90 for costs "reasonably related to the satellite debris and not including
administrative and other types of expense." 9' Canada did not assert any claim for
property or environmental damage, apparently because its prompt clean-up
80. National Atomic Museum, Broken Arrow, http://www.atomicmuseum.com/tour/cw4.cfm (last
visited Oct. 25, 2006).
81. BRIAN D. SMITH, STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 77, 117 (1988).
82. Claim Against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for Damage Caused by Soviet Cosmos
954, Feb. 8, 1978, 18 I.L.M. 899, 902 [hereinafter Canadian Claim].
83. Id. at 904.
84. Id. at 903.
85. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, supra note 65
[hereinafter Space Damage Convention].
86. Canadian Claim, supra note 82, at 905.
87. Id. at 907.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 904.
90. Id.
91. Eilene Galloway, Nuclear Powered Satellites: The U.S.S.R. Cosmos 904 and the Canadian
Claim, 12 AKRON L. REV. 401, 413 (1979).
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operation limited such damage. The U.S.S.R. agreed to pay Canada Canadian$3
million "in full and final settlement of all matters connected with the disintegration
of the Soviet satellite 'Cosmos 954,"' without admitting any liability. 92  Some
commentators have interpreted this settlement as confirming the obligation to
cover clean-up costs in common areas and wilderness areas. 93  The rule that
emerges from this situation is a bit ambiguous, however, because the final
settlement, reached through negotiations during the height of the Cold War, was
for less than the full amount of the damages.
94
F. The Chernobyl Accident April 1986
The catastrophic explosion of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant on April 26,
1986 was "one of the gravest technological disasters in history" 95 with
consequences "of incomparable scale, ' ' 96 and the impact of this event on the
development of customary international law must be examined.97 For ten days
after the explosion, some 50 million Curie (the amount that would have been put
into the atmosphere from "the simultaneous explosion of 500 A-bombs") was
spewed into the atmosphere. 98 Many millions were affected, and 350,000 were
obliged to abandon their homes, which was a "deeply traumatic experience" for
most. 9 9
Although Chernobyl was built and it exploded during the existence of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, its location after the breakup of the Soviet
Union-within Ukraine but only 12 kilometers from the border with Belarus 100
illustrates the inequity of siting dangerous facilities near international borders,
where one state derives all the benefits of the operation while the other state bears
all the risk. Nearly 70% of the radioactive dust fell on Belarus, and will remain in
the ground of Belarus for thousands of years.10' After the accident, the Soviet
government in Moscow withheld information about the explosion for several days
92. Protocol on Settlement of Canada's Claim for Damages Caused by "Cosmos 954," Can.-
U.S.S.R., April 2, 1981,20 I.L.M. 689.
93. BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 15, at 192-93.
94. Id. at 193.
95. HANQIN, supra note 18, at 22.
96. Id.
97. See generally Linda A. Malone, The Chernobyl Accident: A Case Study in International Law
Regulating State Responsibility for Transboundary Nuclear Pollution, 12 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 203
(1987).
98. HANQIN, supra note 18, at 22.
99. Press Release 2005/12, Int'l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Chernobyl: The True Scale of
the Accident (Sept. 5, 2005) [hereinafter IAEA Press Release], available at
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/PressReleases/2005/prn2005l2.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2006).
100. See BelarusGuide.com, Chernobyl Trace in Belarus,
http://www.belarusguide.com/chemobyll/ctrace.html [hereinafter Cherobyl Trace] (last visited Oct.
27, 2006) (providing more information on the damages suffered by Belarus as a result of transboundary
nuclear pollution from the Chernobyl plant in Ukraine).
101. Ivan A. Kenik, Belarus: a small country faces 70 percent of the fallout, DHA NEWS, Sept-
Oct. 1995, at 7, 7, available at http://chemobyl.undp.org/spanish/otherdoc/fallout.htm (last visited Oct.
27, 2006).
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instead of immediately notifying the Belarus government. 10 2  Today, 23% of
Belarus' agricultural land (as compared to 4.8% of Ukraine's and 0.5% of
Russia's) and 20% of its forest lands have been taken out of production as a result
of Chernobyl; 62% of pregnant women in Belarus currently suffer from nuclear-
related diseases; and the increase in the number of diseases among newly born
babies in Belarus was 60% over the period of 1986-1994 (after Chernobyl), versus
only 8% in 1981-1985 (before Chemobyl).
10 3
The effects of radiation may sometimes take years to manifest. Hence, claims
may be brought for monitoring future harms to human health, emotional distress,
and fear of developing nuclear-related diseases. Exposure to nuclear radiation
undoubtedly causes severe emotional distress as a result of the environmental
devastation, possible loss of life, and fear of developing life-threatening diseases.
The possibility of developing such a disease may cause a victim to spend hundreds
on doctor's fees and lab tests to monitor their health and detect the disease early
on.
Some commentators suggest that the failure of other nations to bring claims
against the Soviet Union is an example of state practice recognizing that
international law would not support such claims.'0 4 Professors Bimie and Boyle
suggest, for instance, that this incident leads to the conclusion that the strict
liability regime may not apply to damage resulting from nuclear activities:
Responses to the Chemobyl disaster provide the most telling evidence
of state practice so far. This accident caused widespread harm to
agricultural produce and livestock in Europe and affected wildlife, in
some cases severely. Clean-up costs were incurred and compensation
was paid by several governments to their own citizens for produce
which was destroyed as a precautionary measure, or which was
rendered unusable. Evidence of long-term health risks has yet to
emerge, but remains possible.
102. See Dr. Christine K. Durback, World Information Transfer, Chomobyl, Misinformation and
Ethics (Sept. 19-22, 2005), available at http://www.worldinfo.org/index.php?id=420 (last visited Oct.
27, 2006) (statement at the 7th Scientific and Practical Conference, Chomobyl Center, Slavutich,
Ukraine).
103. See Chernobyl Trace, supra note 100; Kenik, supra note 101.
104. See, e.g., VED P. NANDA, GEORGE PRING, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 37, 56 n.177 (2003) (characterizing "the affected European states' failure in
turn to make any claims" against the former Soviet Union for the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster
as a "notable exception to the state practice" contrary to the principles of international environmental
law, but later suggesting that "as there are diplomatic reasons why this may have occurred (other
nuclear states not wishing to create a precedent that could haunt them), it is not sufficient to deny the
general practice and opinion juris on this principle"). See also Justin Mellor, Radioactive Waste and
Russia's Northern Fleet: Sinldng the Principles of International Environmental Law, 28 DENV. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 51, 65-66 (1999) (stating that "Chernobyl has resulted in a 'polluter gets paid principle,' in
which the polluter becomes the recipient of aid rather than compensating those states that are harmed"
and also stating that the Ukraine had secured $2.3 billion from western nations to close the Chernobyl
plant and begin a full cleanup).
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Despite this provable loss, no claims were made against the Soviet
Union by any affected state, although the possibility was considered by
some governments. Uncertainty over the basis for such a claim,
reluctance to establish a precedent with possible future implications for
states which themselves operate nuclear power plants, and the absence
of any appropriate treaty binding on the Soviet Union are the main
reasons for this silence. It is also unclear whether liability would extend
to damage to the environment, or to the costs of precautionary measures
taken by governments. The Soviet Union made no voluntary offer of
compensation, and questioned the necessity of precautionary measures
taken by its neighbours, maintaining that they suffered little or no
damage. The failure to demand, or to offer compensation in this case
shows the difficulty of reconciling doctrinal support for any standard of
strict or absolute responsibility with the evidence of state practice,
limited as it is. It points to the conclusion that responsibility for a
failure of due diligence, that is for causing avoidable loss only, provides
a more convincing interpretation of the actual practice of states and the
present state of customary law in cases of accidental environmental
damage. 105
Professor Sands provided additional detail in his treatise, explaining that
Sweden asserted that "customary international law.. .principles exist which might
be invoked to support a claim against the USSR," but concluded that "[t]he issues
involved... are complex from the legal as well as the technical point of view" and
hence that "the Government has felt that priority should be given.. .to endeavours
of another nature." 10 6 The United Kingdom reserved its right to present such a
claim, 107 but ultimately declined to do so, perhaps in part because:
The position of the United Kingdom government was complicated by
outstanding disputes relating to the problem of acid rain in Scandinavia,
contamination of the Irish Sea by nuclear waste from the
Windscale/Sellafield nuclear plant, and alleged damage to Australian
territory, from the nuclear tests carried out by the United Kingdom in
the 1950s.1
08
West Germany and the United Kingdom paid compensation to their own
citizens for the losses they incurred after the Chernobyl explosion, and the list of
situations covered by the Germans under their own statute provides an interesting
model of the range of damages appropriate in such situations. Individuals received
payments when:
" Cattle were kept from grazing;
* Milk had to be transformed into cheese, leaving radioactive whey;
105. BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 15, at 474.
106. SANDS, supra note 13, at 887-88 (citing Correspondence with the Swedish Embassy in
London, Dec. 10, 1987).
107. Id. at 888.
108. Id.
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" Spring vegetables had to be destroyed or were seized;
" Some kinds of fruits were unsaleable, though they were not all
contaminated;
- The travel and transport industries specializing in Eastern Europe lost
clientele;
" Seasonal farm workers lost their jobs;
" Import restrictions were imposed;
" Sand in playgrounds was replaced;
" Open air meetings were cancelled;
" Recommendations to refrain from eating certain foodstuffs were issued;
- Filters of motor cars and of air-conditioning systems were replaced; and
-The changing conduct of customers led to a decline in turnover.
10 9
The international community did not sit idly by after the Chernobyl tragedy
and has worked to revamp the civil nuclear liability regime, adopting a host of
treaties and domestic legislation. 1 0 More importantly, in our effort to understand
the reactions of the international community to the Chernobyl disaster, it is vital to
recognize that the Soviet Union-and the Russian Federation after the Soviet
Union broke apart--did recognize a duty to provide compensation to the victims of
this tragedy. In fact, the Soviet Union spent $18 billion on Chernobyl
rehabilitation between 1986 and 1991, when the Union split apart. Of this, 35%
went on "social assistance to affected people" and 17% on resettlement. This aid
continued after the Soviet Union broke into 16 separate independent states:
After the Soviet Union broke up in 1991, Chemobyl became a key
factor in domestic politics and in relations between the three new states.
Belarus and Ukraine demanded compensation from Russia for the
effects of the accident... Especially in the case of Belarus and Ukraine,
Chernobyl benefits came to represent a heavy burden on the national
budgets and drained resources away from other areas of public
spending. By the late 1990s, however, scaling them down, or exploring
alternative strategies had become politically impossible."'
109. HANQIN, supra note 18, at 92 n.68 (listing the categories of payments made under Section 38
of the 1985 Atomic Energy Act of the Federal Republic of Germany).
110. See generally BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 15, at 452-99.
111. U.N. Dev. Program [UNDP] & U.N. Int'l Children Emergency Fund [UNICEF], The Human
Consequences of the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident: A Strategy for Recovery, 1 2.11, (Jan. 25, 2002)
[hereinafter Human Consequences Report] (emphasis added) available at
http://www.undp.org/dpa/publications/chemobyl.pdf.
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In 1991, Ukraine enacted The Law on Status and Social Protection of
Population Suffered from Chernobyl Catastrophe, 2 which recognized liability to
the following groups of people:
1. Immediate victims directly exposed to radiation, i.e., the "liquidators"
who worked on the site of the accident or in the exclusion zone in 1986 or
1987.
2. People affected by the accident (divided by three zones of radioactive
contamination: exclusion zone, mandatory relocation zone, and voluntary
relocation zone):
* Those evacuated from the exclusion zone in 1986
* Those who left a voluntary relocation zone after the accident (were
paid to resettle).
- Those who refused to leave and continued to reside in these two zones
- Those who returned and lived in the second zone for two years or in
the third zone for three years as of 1993.
- Those working or studying in any of three contaminated zones.
* Those who became ill because of radiation not connected to
Chemobyl accident such as improper disposal of radioactive waste
where no intent was established (causation had to be medically
confirmed)... This statute and other Ukrainian enactments recognized
the following types of injuries as being eligible for compensation:
- Harm to health or loss of ability to work, for those with a medically
confirmed disability traceable to Chemobyl accident; causation was
established upon physical exam after which a person received a
disability document; the medical examination had to be repeated every
three-to-five years to confirm disability and evaluate treatment results,
except for persons with unrecoverable health changes, senior persons,
or persons with Group I or II disability.
" Actual monetary losses caused by relocation or loss of property.
" Death of bread-winner.
The Ukrainian government also accepted responsibility for providing and
covering the expenses for timely medical examination, radiation tests, and medical
treatment of liquidators and other persons affected by the accident. Data on all
liquidators and other individuals affected by the accident have been listed in the
State Register maintained by the Defense Ministry, Internal Affairs Ministry, and
National Security Ministry and are made available to local medical institutions
assigned by the place of residence and to each person individually. The coverage
112. The Law of Ukraine, On Status and Social Protection of Population Suffered from Chomobyl
Catastrophe, Law No. 796-XII, Feb. 28, 1991, available at
http://www.welcometo.kiev.ua/iii/ilic.frame-law-result2.show?p arg-names=law-id&p-arg-values=3
25 (last visited Oct. 27, 2006).
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of these programs has been extensive: "benefits were offered to broad categories of
'Chernobyl victims' that expanded to seven million now receiving or eligible for
pensions, special allowances and health benefits, including free holidays and
guaranteed allowances.""13 Those eligible included individuals with a variety of
links to the disaster, and the types of programs established for them responded to
the range of injuries they suffered:
The system of compensation payments established after the accident
reflected a Soviet practice of, in effect, compensating exposure to risk
rather than actual injury. Belarusian and Russian legislation provides
more than seventy, and Ukrainian legislation more than fifty, different
privileges and benefits for Chernobyl victims, depending on factors
such as the degree of invalidity and the level of contamination. 114
The pensions provided for Chemobyl disability groups included the following
categories:
• Group I disabled person (liquidator) - $2,820/month
" Group II - $2,115/month
" Group III- $1,410/month
" Disabled child - $470/month
" Family that lost a bread-winner - $2,820/month
" Parents of a deceased person - $1,410/month
Compensatory programs also provided the following additional reimbursements
and privileges:
" Pensions to compensate harm to health (for persons capable of working)
" Payments in addition to earned wages and harmful-work-condition payments
to persons working in contaminated zones
" State housing provided to liquidators and evacuees
" Priority rights to state housing for other affected persons
" Paid medical examinations; mandatory irradiation tests; paid medical
treatment and medicines
" Paid social and psychological rehabilitation services
" Paid health holidays
" Priority admission to universities
" Paid public transportation for liquidators
Health holidays are paid health vacations or trips to sanatoria in addition to
normal vacation time:
Health holidays in sanatoria and summer camps are fully financed by
the authorities for invalids, liquidators, people who continue to live in
highly contaminated areas, children and adolescents... In
113. IAEA Press Release, supra note 99.
114. Human Consequences Report, supra note 111, 2.16 (emphasis added).
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Belarus.. children living in areas with contamination at a level above
5Ci/km2 (five Curies per square kilometer) have the right to two
months holiday.. .in the year 2000, 293,895 Belarussian children and
adults were provided with such holidays. A similar situation exists in
Ukraine. 1
The range and variety of these programs establish clearly that the Soviet
Union, and the Russian Federation as its successor, did accept the duty to
compensate the victims of this tragedy, at least in the (new) countries immediately
surrounding the event and those most immediately affected by it. Although no
offers of compensation were extended to victims in countries more distant from the
explosion, the amount and types of compensatory programs established for those in
the surrounding countries do reflect an acceptance of a strict-liability level of
responsibility by the Soviet Union and by the Russian Federation.
V. THE INADEQUATE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR LIABILITY TREATY REGIME 116
A patchwork of treaties has been drafted to address injuries resulting from
nuclear activities, but they are not widely ratified and they leave many questions
unresolved. The liability of the operator of a nuclear installation is well-
established by these treaties, but they do not address carrier, supplier or financier
liability. The treaty framework also imposes limits on liability and statutes of
limitations on claims arising out of nuclear accidents.
The two primary conventions that create a special regime of civil liability for
nuclear damage are the 1960 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field
of Nuclear Energy, 117 promulgated by the Organization of Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) and the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for
Nuclear Damage,"18 promulgated by the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA). The low liability limits in these treaties were increased somewhat in 1963
in the Brussels Supplementary Convention. " 9 These conventions were then linked
by the Joint Protocol of 1988,120 which combined the two Conventions into one
expanded liability regime. Parties to the Joint Protocol are treated as if they are
parties to both the Paris and Vienna Conventions. 121
115. Id. 1 2.21.
116. Duncan E.J. Currie, Limited Liability. Unlimited Risk: The Problems and Gaps in the Existing
Treaties (Vienna and Paris Treaties) and an Analysis of How an Actual Claim Would Be Brought
Under the Current Existing Treaty Regime in the Event of a Nuclear Accident, published herein
(discussing the issues concerning the inadequate international treaty regime).
117. Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 29, 1960, 956
U.N.T.S. 263 [hereinafter 1960 Paris Convention].
118. Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, 1063 U.N.T.S. 265,
2 I.L.M.727.
119. Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 29th July 1960 on Third Party Liability
in the Field of Nuclear Energy, Jan. 31, 1963, 1041 U.N.T.S. 358, 2 I.L.M. 685,
120. IAEA, Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris
Convention, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/402 (Sept. 21, 1988).
121. Id. at art. IV.
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These Conventions impose strict liability on the operator of the plant for
nuclear damage and require it to demonstrate financial security to cover costs
brought on by the accident, mainly in the form of insurance. This liability regime
has been criticized, however, as essentially immunizing the manufacturer and
supplier of the nuclear facility by holding the operator strictly liable. 122  The
Conventions have also been condemned for placing a statute of limitations of ten
years in most cases for injuries stemming from nuclear damage, which in reality
may take many more years to manifest. Another flaw in these early treaties was
that they did not cover environmental damage. The Vienna Convention held the
operator liable for "nuclear damage," which is defined simply as "loss of life, any
personal injury or any loss of, or damage to, property which arises out of or results
from... a nuclear installation."'
123
In September 1997, more than 80 countries signed a Protocol to Amend the
1963 Vienna Convention124 and also adopted a Convention on Supplementary
Compensation for Nuclear Damage 125 at the IAEA headquarters to address these
concerns, but these new documents have not been widely ratified. The Protocol
extended the definition of nuclear damage to include the concepts of
environmental damage and preventive measures. Under the Protocol, "nuclear
damage" now includes not only loss of life, personal injury, and loss of or damage
to property, but also:
each of the following to the extent determined by the law of the
competent court.., the costs of measures of reinstatement of impaired
environment, unless such impairment is insignificant, if such measures
are actually taken or to be taken, and insofar as not included in sub-
paragraph (ii) [regarding loss of or damage to property]... [and] the
costs of preventive measures, and further loss or damage caused by such
measures. 126
Although this language increases the range of compensable damages, one
commentator has pointed out that is still less generous than the West German
government was in providing compensation to its own citizens after the Chernobyl
explosion. 127 The Protocol increased the possible limit of the operator's liability to
not less than 300 million Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), which is equal to
approximately $400 million, and extended the statute of limitation governing
claims of loss of life and personal injury. In 2004, an additional protocol increased
122. 1963 Vienna Convention, supra note 118, art. I1, 5 (stating that "no person other than the
operator shall be liable for nuclear damage").
123. Id. at art. III, 1(k).
124. IAEA, Protocol to Amend the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage,
36 I.L.M. 1454, Sept. 12, 1997 [hereinafter 1997 IAEA Protocol].
125. IAEA, Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, IAEA Doc.
INFCIRC/567 (Sept. 12, 1997).
126. 1997 IAEA Protocol, supra note 124, art. II, 2 (emphasis added).
127. HANQIN, supra note 18, at 92 n.68 (listing compensable categories).
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the liability limits further to a total of 1.5 billion euros, which would be provided
by governmental funding sources.'
28
This limit is still grossly inadequate, as can be seen by comparison to the
estimate of 5,000 billion euros as the total damage of a reactor meltdown in
Germany. 29  After the 1986 Chemobyl accident, according to one estimate,
Belarus suffered economic damages of US$235 billion. 3 ° The International
Atomic Energy Agency has declined to identify a specific figure for the extent of
the Chernobyl damage, but has acknowledged that "[a] variety of estimates from
the 1990s placed the costs over two decades at hundreds of billions of dollars."131
For further comparison, the claims for damages after the breakup of the Prestige
oil tanker off the cost of Spain in November 2002 came to about 700 million euros
in Spain and another 100 million euros in France. 1
3 2
The Paris and Vienna Conventions, as supplemented by the Brussels
Convention and linked by the Joint Protocol, hold that the treaties ratified by the
country where the nuclear installation is located will govern. 133 These conventions
hold that an operator will be liable for damages occurring during the transportation
of nuclear material in two situations: (1) for material originating from its plant
before liability involving the material has been assumed by another operator, and
(2) for material being sent to its plant after it has assumed liability. 134 In the
second case, if the material is coming from a state that is not a member of the
treaty, the receiving operator will be liable after the material has been loaded on
the means of transport by which it is to be carried. 135  The Maritime Liability
Convention 116 exonerates anyone liable for damage caused by a nuclear accident if
the operator of the installation is held liable under the Paris or Vienna
Convention. 137 Many gaps exist in the current treaty framework for transportation
of nuclear materials. The definition of damage does not clearly include damage to
the environment and consequential losses (such as fisheries and tourism) and the
liability of other parties such as carriers, suppliers or financiers is not addressed.
128. Protocol to Amend the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of
29 July 1960, art. I(H), 2004 O.J. (L 97) 55.
129. H.J. Ewers & K. Rennings, Economics of Nuclear Risks - a German Study, in SOCIAL COSTS
OF ENERGY: PRESENT STATUS AND FUTURE TRENDS 150-66 (0. Hohmeyer and R. Ottinger eds., 1992).
130. Press Release, Embassy of the Republic of Belarus in the United States of America, Chernobyl
After 19 Years: Problems of Rehabilitation and Sustainable Development (Apr. 22, 2005),
http://www.belarusembassy.org/news/digests/pr042505.htm.
131. IAEA Press Release, supra note 99.
132. Louise Angelique de La Fayette, New Approaches for Addressing Damage to the Marine
Environment, 20 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 176 (2005).
133. 1963 Vienna Convention, supra note 118, art. lI(l)(b); 1960 Paris Convention, supra note
118, art. 4(a) & (b); IAEA Joint Protocol, supra note 120, art. 111(3); see also Jon M. Van Dyke, The
Legal Regime Governing Sea Transport of Ultrahazardous Radioactive Materials, 33 OCEAN DEV. &
INT'L L. 77, 81-82 (2002).
134. 1963 Vienna Convention, supra note 118, art. 11(1).
135. See id. at art. ll(l)(c).
136. Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material,
Dec. 17, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 255, 11 I.L.M. 277.
137. Id. at art. I.
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The failure of the international community to develop a comprehensive and
adequate liability and compensation regime is the equivalent of providing an
enormous subsidy to support the nuclear industry. It should be obvious that any
limits on liability are inconsistent with the polluter-pays principle.
A. What Does a Sound Liability Regime Require?
The patch-work and poorly-ratified treaties governing nuclear liability do not
constitute a sound liability regime on this topic. To provide appropriate coverage
for those put at risk by this activity, the regime would need to include:
" Strict liability as the governing standard
" No monetary limits on liability
" A broad definition of damages, that includes damages resulting from
perceived fears from an incident even if no measurable radioactivity has
yet been released
" Access to a neutral tribunal by those bringing claims
" Ability to bring claims against all contributing parties-operators,
suppliers, financiers, relevant governments, and, in the case of transport
situations, shippers and owners of the cargo
" No statute of limitations
" The establishment of an adequate compensation fund
B. The Challenge of Determining Damages
The acceptance by the international community of the no-harm rule and the
polluter-pays principle establishes that a country initiating an activity that causes
harm to its neighbors bears the responsibility to provide compensation for the
injuries suffered, but disagreements remain regarding how to define the "damage"
that requires payment. This question is crucial because a partial or inadequate
payment may leave the injured neighbor in a greatly weakened situation. Only if
the country where the harm occurred is required to pay for all the damages suffered
will the costs of the activity be truly "internalized." If less than complete
compensation is provided, the injured neighbors will essentially be subsidizing the
state conducting the harm-producing activity. The nuclear industry has historically
been subsidized by governments and, as a result of the failure to develop a
comprehensive liability and compensation program, by the international
community. Allowing the nuclear industry to be responsible for only some of the
damage it causes to neighbors who receive no benefit from the nuclear activity is
an enormous subsidy to this industry.
The International Law Commission's 2001 Draft Articles on State
Responsibility define the duty of the state with jurisdiction over the activity
causing the harm in the following language:
1. The responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation
for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act.
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2. Injury includes any damage, whether material or moral, caused by
the internationally wrongful act of a State. 1
3 8
As explained above, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in
the Chorzow Factory Case stated that "reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out
all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in
all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed."' 139 But the reality
has often been that less than full compensation has been provided after injuries
have been caused. What about losses of opportunity and lost profits? What about
the damages that result from fears, which may or may not be reasonable? What are
"moral" damages, and when must they be paid?
The Commentary to the ILC Draft Articles defines the operative terms as
follows:
"Material" damage here refers to damage to property or other interests
of the State and its nationals which is assessable in financial terms.
"Moral" damage includes such things as individual pain and suffering,
loss of loved ones or personal affront associated with an intrusion on
one's home or private life. 1
40
The Commentary offers the French attack on the Greenpeace vessel Rainbow
Warrior in Auckland, New Zealand as an example where moral damages had been
appropriately awarded because France's intentional and clearly unlawful assault on
the vessel "provoked indignation and public outrage in New Zealand and caused a
new, additional non-material damage... of a moral, political and legal nature,
resulting from the affront to the dignity and prestige not only of New Zealand as
such, but of its highest judicial and executive authorities as well." 141
The preferred form of remedy for an internationally wrongful act is "to re-
establish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed,
provided and to the extent that restitution: (a) is not materially impossible; (b) does
not involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit deriving from restitution
instead of compensation."' 142  Thus, what is called "specific performance" in
Anglo-American law is obligatory, rather than monetary damages, unless
reestablishing the previous situation is impossible or unless "there is a grave
disproportionality between the burden which restitution would impose on the
responsible State and the benefit which would be gained, either by the injured State
138. ILC ARTICLES, supra note 6, at 201 (emphasis added).
139. Factory at Chorz6w, supra note 28.
140. ILC ARTICLES, supra note 6, at 202.
141. Id. at 203 (quoting Rainbow Warrior Affair (N.Z. v. Fr.), 20 R.I.A.A. 217, 267 109 (1990)).
Some tribunals have viewed the award of punitive damages as appropriate under international law. See,
e.g., I'm Alone Case (Can. v. U.S.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1609, 1618 (where the Commissioners recommended
that, in addition to compensatory damages, the United States be required to pay $25,000 to Canada for
intentionally sinking a Canadian ship); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F.Supp. 860, 864 (D.N.Y. 1984)
(explaining that because Paraguay had failed to prosecute its official for his act of torture "the objective
of the international law making torture punishable as a crime can only be vindicated by imposing
punitive damages").
142. ILC ARTICLES, supra note 6, at 213.
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or by any victim of the breach."' 143 This language requires only "the situation that
existed prior to the occurrence of the wrongful act" be reestablished,'
44 but the
next article then confirms that if this restitution does not adequately cover all
damage, additional compensation must be provided "including loss of profits
insofar as it is established."' 145 The goal thus must be to ensure that the remedy
"should be commensurate with the loss, so that the injured party may be made
whole."' 146 The ILC Commentary points out that numerous tribunals have awarded
compensation for loss of profits. 1
47
Especially when injuries to environmental biodiversity and environmental
amenities are involved, it will be difficult to value such losses in monetary terms,
but "[d]amage to such environmental values... is, as a matter of principle, no less
real and compensable than damage to property, though it may be difficult to
quantify.' ' 148 In 1993, the Council of Europe negotiated the Lugano Convention
on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the
Environment, 149 but it has not yet been widely ratified. This treaty says that
"compensation for the impairment of the environment, other than for loss of profit
from such impairment, shall be limited to the costs of measures of reinstatement
actually undertaken or to be undertaken,"'150 and it further says that "measures of
reinstatement" are limited to "any reasonable measures aiming to reinstate or
restore damaged or destroyed components of the environment, or to introduce,
where reasonable, the equivalent of these components into the environment."'
' 5 1
The irony of this type of formula is that an operator or state that causes damage so
devastating that it is beyond repair-such as the vaporization of an island in a
nuclear test-would be left in a better position (because no attempt to reinstate the
lost island would be undertaken) than an operator or state that has caused damage
but has repaired it.
Most commentators appear to believe that "[flor legal recovery, damage must
be quantifiable and certain,"'152 and must thus be:
[M]easured in economic units as suffered by other States, e.g. loss of
tourism or damage to the fishing industry, or in terms of the costs of
removal and restoration. Environmental values are considered in each
particular context using a criterion based on the nature and extent of
143. Id. at 217.
144. Id. at 213.
145. Id. at218.
146. Id. at 219 (quoting Lusitania Cases (U.S. v. F.R.G.), 7 R.I.A.A. 32, 39 (1923)).
147. Id. at 228 (citing, e.g., Cape Hom Pigeon Case (U.S. v. Russ.), 9 R.I.A.A. 63 (1902); Sapphire
Int'l Petroleums Ltd. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., 35 I.L.R. 136 (1963)); Factory at Chorz6w, supra note
28, at 47-48, 53; Libyan American Oil Co. v. Libya, 62 I.L.R. 140 (1977).
148. Id. at 223.
149. Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the
Environment, June 21, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1228.
150. Id. at art. 2(7)(c).
151. Id. at art. 2(8).
152. HANQIN, supra note 18, at 252.
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human use as well as on the availability of the natural resource to
human society with the currently available and feasible technology. 1
53
Professor Sands has explained that "[in relation to environmental damage...
the liability rules are still evolving and in need of further development."' 154 This
effort is crucial because the goal of the polluter-pays principle-the internalization
of the true costs of any endeavor-can only be achieved if the real costs to society
are attributed to the activity that causes pollution and environmental degradation.
If environmental resources are viewed as "public goods" that can be polluted and
degraded without cost (the "free-rider theory"), then the public will be subsidizing
the operations destroying the environment. Only when the true costs of
environmental degradation are charged to the operator and the state involved will
they "tend to cut back on pollution in order to minimize production costs and enjoy
greater profits, thus internalizing social costs."1
55
One example of a court trying to address "the extremely difficult substantive
issues concerning damages" to the environment is Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 156 decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
in 1980. After carefully analyzing U.S. and Puerto Rican statutes, the court
concluded that the measure of damages was not limited "to the loss of market
value of the real estate affected,"157 and explained the proper measure as follows:
We think the appropriate primary standard for determining damages in a
case such as this is the cost reasonably to be incurred by the sovereign
or its designated agency to restore or rehabilitate the environment in the
affected area to its pre-existing condition, or as close thereto as is
feasible without grossly disproportionate expenditures. 158
This challenge was also faced by the United Nations Compensation
Commission, which was established by the Security Council 1991 to evaluate
claims against Iraq that arose out of the first Gulf War. " 9 This assignment was
daunting because "[t]here is hardly any direct international precedent for valuation
of similar environmental losses in international law." 160 The Commission received
153. Id. at 253.
154. SANDS, supra note 13, at 869 (for examples of efforts to determine and compensate for
environmental harm, see 918-22). See EDWARD H.P. BRANS, LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE TO PUBLIC
NATURAL RESOURCES: STANDING, DAMAGE AND DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (Kluwer Law International
2001) (for a comprehensive overview of this issue). See also HANQIN, supra note 18, at 93; Alan
Boyle, Reparation for Environmental Damage in International Law: Some Preliminary Problems, in
ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW: PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION
AND VALUATION 17-26 (Michael Bowman and Alan Boyle eds., 2002).
155. HANQIN, supra note 18, at 323.
156. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. The SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 670 (1st Cir. 1980).
157. Id. at 674.
158. Id. at 675.
159. S.C. Res. 692, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/692 (May 20, 1991); S.C. Res. 687, 18, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991); The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-general Pursuant to
Paragraph 19 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), 3-4, U.N. Doe. S/22559 (May 2, 1991).
160. Mojtaba Kazazi, Environmental Damage in the Practice of the UN Compensation
Commission, in ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW: PROBLEMS
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170 claims for environmental damage and depletion of natural resources, claiming
US$64 billion in damages.
Claims regarding nuclear activities generally fall into one of four categories:
(1) claims brought before the plant begins operation under equitable theories or for
failure to comply with treaties such as the Espoo Convention 161 and the Aarhus
Convention, 162 which require nuclear operators to provide information before
operation; (2) claims brought after a nuclear accident for physical harm or property
damage; (3) claims brought after a nuclear accident for damage caused to the
environment and consequential losses, such as a decline in tourism or fisheries;
and (4) claims brought after a nuclear accident, but before any physical injury, for
emotional distress or fear of developing a disease.
The 1997 Protocol to the Vienna Convention allows claims to be filed for
"damages to persons or property," "economic loss arising from the loss of life or
any personal injury or loss of or damage to property; the costs of measures of
reinstatement of impaired environment; loss of income derived from an economic
interest in any use or enjoyment of the environment incurred as a result of a
significant impairment of environment; the costs of preventive measures and
further loss of damage caused by such measures; and any other economic loss, if
permitted by the general law on civil liability of the competent court., 163 P.S. Rao
has summarized the law on damages as follows:
(j) The definition of damage eligible for compensation as we have seen
above is not a well-settled matter. Damage to persons and property is
generally compensable. Damage to environment or natural resources
within the jurisdiction or in areas under the control of a State is now
well accepted. However, compensation in such a case is limited to costs
actually incurred on account of prevention or response measures as well
as measures of restoration... Where actual restoration of damaged
environment or natural resources is not possible, costs incurred to
introduce equivalent elements could be reimbursed;
(k) Damage to environment per se, not resulting in any direct loss to
proprietary or possessory interests of individuals or the State is not
considered a fit case for compensation. Similarly, loss of profits and
tourism on account of environmental damage are not likely to get
compensated. 164
The costs incurred to restore the environment from the injuries suffered are
compensable under the 1997 Supplementary Compensation Convention if they are
"reasonable," "have been approved by the competent authorities of the State," and
are designed to "reinstate or restore damaged or destroyed components of the
OF DEFINITION AND VALUATION 111, 121 (Michael Bowman and Alan Boyle eds. 2002).
161. Espoo Convention, supra note 51.
162. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to
Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 517.
163. Rao, supra note 23, 88.
164. Id. 153(j)-(k).
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environment, or to introduce, where reasonable, the equivalent of these
components in the environment." 1
65
VI. CLAIMS FOR ANTICIPATED HEALTH HAZARDS AND FEAR OF ENVIRONMENTAL
HARM
Can claims be brought against nuclear operators based on fears presented by a
nuclear facility sited close to an international border, or based on fears presented
by vessels carrying ultrahazardous nuclear materials near fragile coastal areas, or
brought after a nuclear accident based on the fear of developing a nuclear-related
disease? Professors Birnie and Boyle have concluded that "states are not debarred
by international law from acquiring and using nuclear technology simply because
it poses a risk of injury to other states or to the environment, nor are they precluded
from siting nuclear installations near borders."' 166 They do recognize, however,
that "states must notify and consult their neighbours in cases of serious or
appreciable transboundary risk, with a view to ensuring reasonable regard for the
rights and legitimate interests of other states."' 16 7 And they go on to suggest that
the best approach-to balance the right of each state to govern activities within its
own territory with the need to protect neighboring states "from unilaterally
determined nuclear risks"168-would be to establish a requirement "comparable to
that which applied certain cases of dumping at sea, requiring prior consultation and
approval of the relevant international organization."'' 69 Other authors have issued
stronger opinions, stating that activities carrying the risk of catastrophic damages
should be impermissible unless there is "a special relationship between risk-
creating and risk-exposed states, such as reciprocity of risk creation or a sharing in
the benefits to be derived from the proposed activity."'
170
The Pacific Island countries concerned about the risks created by the
shipments of ultrahazardous nuclear cargos through their adjacent waters have
complained repeatedly about the inadequate liability regime governing potential
accidents. At the October 1999 meeting of the Pacific Island Forum, for instance,
the leaders specifically called for a compensation regime to be established that
would provide redress for all economic losses, including those that their tourism
and fishing industries might suffer as a result of an incident "even if there is no
actual environmental damage caused."'17' The islanders are concerned that tourists
165. Supplementary Convention, supra note 125, g.; David D. Caron, Finding Out What the
Oceans Claim: The 1991 Gulf War, the Marine Environment, and the United Nations Compensation
Commission, in BRINGING NEW LAW TO OCEAN WATERS 393, 399 (David D. Caron & Harry N.
Scheiber eds. 2004)(explaining the Commission recommendation that US$243,234,967 be awarded to
claimants for monitoring and assessing the impact of Iraq's activities on environmental resources
resulting from Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait).
166. BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 15, at 470.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Gunter Handl, An International Legal Perspective on the Conduct of Abnormally Dangerous
Activities in Frontier Areas: The Case of Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 35-36 (1978).
171. Thirtieth South Pacific Forum, Koror, Palau, Oct. 3-5, 1999, Forum Communique, 31,
available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/spacific/regionaIorgs/spf3o communique.html.
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would stop visiting their islands and consumers would stop buying their fish if
some event involving a nuclear cargo occurred, because of their fears of
contamination, even if no measurable radioactivity had been recorded. In 2004,
the Forum Communique repeated this concern:
Leaders reiterated their concerns about possible economic loss in a non-
release situation and sought an assurance from shipping States that
where there is a demonstrable link between the incident and economic
loss Forum countries would not be left to carry such a loss unsupported
by the shipping States. 172
Courts in the United States have analyzed these "fear of cancer" claims under
several theories: emotional distress, enhanced risk of disease claims, and claims for
medical monitoring.
A. Emotional Distress
In the United States, a claim can be brought for the negligent infliction of
emotional distress (NIED) where a defendant negligently causes one to suffer
emotional injuries. 173 Although a majority of courts in the United States hold that
a claim for NIED must stem from physical injury, many courts have abolished this
strict physical impact rule. 174
Most courts require proof of four essential elements: (1) the plaintiff must
have been exposed to toxic substances, (2) the fear of a certain disease must be a
result of a present injury, (3) the fear must be reasonable, and (4) the fear must be
causally related to the defendant's negligence. 75  In Metro-North Commuter
Railroad Co. v. Buckley, a case involving a railroad employee who brought a claim
for emotional distress as a result of asbestos exposure, the U.S. Supreme Court
identified the main policy consideration for denying recovery based on fear of
cancer claims - even if reasonable - absent physical injury. The Court stated that
"in a world of limited resources... a rule permitting immediate large-scale
recoveries for widespread emotional distress caused by fear of future disease
172. Thirty-Fifth Pacific Islands Forum, Apia, Samoa, Aug. 5-7, 2004, Forum Communique, 30,
available at http://www.forumsec.org.fj/news/2004/August/Aug_09.htm.
173. J.D. Lee & Barry A. Lindahl, 4 Modem Tort Law § 32.03 (2006) (stating that intentional
infliction of emotional distress (lIED) is a recognized cause of action where a plaintiff can prove: (1)
intentional or reckless conduct; (2) that is extreme and outrageous; (3) which causes severe emotional
distress.
174. See Taylor v. Baptist Med. Ctr., Inc., 400 So. 2d 369, 374 (Ala. 1981) (holding that patient
would not be precluded from recovering from physician for mental anguish caused by his failure to
attend patient's labor and delivery of child, even though no actual physical injury was claimed); Molien
v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 819 (Cal. 1980) (holding that the unqualified requirement of
physical injury is no longer justifiable); Rodrigues v. State of Hawaii, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (Haw. 1970)
(holding that serious mental distress may be found where a reasonable man, normally constituted,
would be unable to adequately cope with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the
case).
175. See Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 429-31 (1997); Potter v.
Firestone Tire and Rubber Co, 863 P.2d 795, 805-06 (Cal. 1993).
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[would] diminish the likelihood of recovery by those who later suffer from the
disease."
17 6
In those jurisdictions that require a showing of physical harm, however, many
courts have allowed recovery for NIED where the plaintiff could prove "an
objectively verifiable psychological condition, such as depression or anxiety
serious enough to require medical treatment."' 177  Thus, many courts adopt the
view that the physical impact rule, in the context of toxic torts, is flawed because it
ignores the fact that oftentimes the plaintiffs emotional harm is a true injury that
does not manifest itself physically.
In line with this trend, some courts now allow recovery for the fear of
developing a disease absent a showing of physical injury. In In re Moorenovich,
the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine held that an asbestos worker's
current fear that he would contract cancer in the future was a recoverable element
of damages where asbestos was a known carcinogen, the worker had had
prolonged exposure to asbestos, and his coworkers were dying at a higher than
normal rate from asbestos-related cancer. The court further required "that any
anxiety must have been proximately caused by plaintiffs exposure to asbestos.
Moreover, the anxiety must be reasonable. Finally, defendants must be legally
responsible for the plaintiff s exposure to asbestos." 78
In Mauro v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., a New Jersey appellate court
similarly allowed a plaintiff to recover for emotional distress from exposure to
asbestos absent any physical manifestations, noting that "mental and emotional
distress is just as real as physical pain." The court held that bodily injury or
sickness is not required to obtain damages for fear of cancer as long as there is a
reasonable basis for that fear. 1
79
In Lavelle v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., an Ohio court set forth a three-
part test for NIED in toxic tort cases: (1) the plaintiff must be aware that he in fact
possesses an increased statistical likelihood of developing a disease; (2) this
knowledge creates a reasonable fear; and (3) the apprehension manifests itself in
emotional distress. 180 In Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., the New Jersey court
established four factors that must be present in toxic tort NIED cases: (1) the
injured party must be currently suffering from serious fear or emotional distress or
176. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 521 U.S. at 435-36 (holding that an employee could not
recover under for negligently inflicted emotional distress unless he manifested symptoms of the disease
and a separate cause of action was not available to allow employee to recover lump-sum medical
monitoring costs).
177. Jason Yearout, Fear of Future Harm in Toxic Tort Litigation: The Appropriate Measure of
Damages, 22 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 639, 644 (1999).
178. In re Moorenovich, 634 F. Supp. 634, 637 (D. Mc. 1986).
179. Muaro v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 542 A.2d 16, 21-22 (N,J, Super. Ct. App. Div.
1988), aff'd, 561 A.2d 257 (N.J. 1989).
180. Lavelle v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 30 Ohio Misc. 2d 11, 11-14 (Ohio Com. P1. 1987)
(holding that a plaintiff suffering from asbestosis may not recover for the increased risk of cancer, but
may be compensated for increased fear of cancer where this knowledge springs a reasonable
apprehension which manifests itself in mental distress).
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a clinically diagnosed phobia of the future harm; (2) the fear was proximately
caused by exposure to the contaminant; (3) the plaintiffs fear of developing the
illness is reasonable; and (4) the defendants are legally responsible.' 
8
'
B. Enhanced Risk of Disease Claims
Many courts have resolved these claims under an enhanced risk theory by
adhering to the general requirement that the plaintiff must show a physical injury,
but adopting the view that the enhanced risk of disease itself is the present injury.
The Fifth Circuit has held, for instance, that, under Texas law, the "inhalation of
[asbestos] fibers and the invasion of his body by those fibers" caused him physical
damage and held that recovery may extend to fear of future conditions that will, in
medical probability, develop from presently existing injuries. 8 2  Similarly, in
Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., the federal district court allowed residents to
recover damages for emotional distress that stemmed from their ingestion and
contact with chemical wastes, which leached into the local aquifer, and for fear
which reasonably and naturally flowed from disclosure of the nature and possible
effects of those chemical wastes. 183 In that case, the court recognized that
enhanced susceptibility is an existing condition, and not a speculative future injury,
and courts have regularly upheld awards for such a claim.' 84 Other courts have
rejected this approach, however, and have adhered to the majority view that
enhanced susceptibility is not a compensable injury. 185
C. Medical Monitoring Claims
The best chance of recovery in a U.S. court would be a claim for medical
monitoring damages. In this line of cases, the plaintiff is allowed to recover
"anticipated costs of long-term diagnostic testing necessary to detect latent
diseases that may develop as a result of tortious exposure to toxic substances.'1
8 6
This compensation is available to plaintiffs who can establish liability based upon
a recognized tort, such as negligence, strict liability, trespass, and intentional
conduct.
In Bower v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia held Westinghouse liable for medical monitoring costs for
181. Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 495 A.2d 495, 499 (N.J. Super. 1985) (holding that asbestos
workers were required to show serious fear, emotional distress or clinically diagnosed phobia,
proximate cause, reasonableness of fear, and defendants' responsibility for exposure to recover for
emotional harm and that "fear of cancer" and "cancer phobia" are distinct injuries).
182. Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1137 (5th Cir. 1985).
183. Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303, 320-321 (W.D. Tenn. 1986).
184. Id. at 322.
185. See Friedman v. F.E. Myers, 706 F. Supp. 376, 379 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (stating that "there is
generally no cause of action in tort until a plaintiff has suffered identifiable, compensable injury");
Bums v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28, 31 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a claim for fear of
contracting an asbestos-related disease in the future without manifestation of bodily injury must fail); In
re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 734 F. Supp. 1563, 1569-70 (D. Haw. 1990) (holding that
"[r]ecovery for fear of cancer will not be granted for mere exposure to a known carcinogen (asbestos);
rather, a plaintiff must demonstrate a compensable harm").
186. Bower v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 429 (W. Va. 1999).
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negligently exposing plaintiffs to toxic substances contained in a pile of debris
from the manufacture of light bulbs. The court recognized that at least six other
states have recognized claims for medical monitoring and rejected the contention
that a claim for future medical expenses must rest upon the existence of present
physical harm.1 87  Instead, the court enumerated six elements of a claim for
medical monitoring:
(1) [The plaintiff] has, relative to the general population, been
significantly exposed; (2) to a proven hazardous substance; (3) through
the tortious conduct of the defendant; (4) as a proximate result of the
exposure, plaintiff has suffered an increased risk of contracting a
serious latent disease; (5) the increased risk of disease makes it
reasonable necessary for the plaintiff to undergo periodic diagnostic
medical examinations different from what would be prescribed in the
absence of the exposure; and (6) monitoring procedures exist that make
the early detection of a disease possible. 188
In 2006, the West Virginia Supreme Court followed and applied Bowers in
West Virginia Rezulin Litigation v. Hutchison, confirming that a "cause of action
exists under West Virginia law for the recovery of medical monitoring costs,
where it can be proven that such expenses are necessary and reasonably certain to
be incurred as a proximate result of a defendant's tortious conduct."' 8 9 In West
Virginia, the court explained, "the 'injury' that underlies a claim for medical
monitoring-just as with any other cause of action sounding in tort-is the
'invasion of any legally protected interest."" 90 Once plaintiffs can show that they
have "a significantly increased risk of contracting a particular disease relative to
what would be the case in the absence of exposure" and that "medical monitoring
is, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, necessary in order to diagnose
properly the warning signs of disease.. .even if the disease it is intended to
diagnose is not reasonably certain to occur," then the plaintiffs are entitled to
damages sufficient to cover the medical monitoring costs. 191
According to a 2000 article in the ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER, 18 states
then recognized a cause of action for medical monitoring, 192 but these courts were
split on whether plaintiffs must demonstrate a present physical injury or only that
they were exposed to a toxic material. The following year, the Supreme Court of
Nevada ruled that Nevada common law did not recognize a cause of action for
medical monitoring, but that "[a] remedy of medical monitoring may be available
for an underlying cause of action" based in tort and contract. 193 In 2005, a U.S.
district court explained that medical monitoring is still "novel" and that some
187. Id.
188. Id. at 432-33.
189. W. Va. Rezulin Litigation v. Hutchison, 585 S.E.2d 52, 73 (W.Va. 2006).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. James M. Garner, et. al., Medical Monitoring: The Evolution of a Cause of Action, 30
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER 10024, 10032 (Jan. 2000).
193. Badillo v. American Brands, Inc., 16 P.3d 435, 441 (Nev. 2001).
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courts treat it as an "independent cause of action," some as "a form of damages for
an underlying tort, such as negligence or strict liability," and that "[ojf the states
recognizing medical monitoring claims as an independent claim or form of
damages, some require a present physical injury."
19 4
VII. CONCLUSION
This survey of settled norms and unresolved issues demonstrates that further
work is needed to develop a comprehensive and authoritative regime to govern
harm from nuclear activities. Although it is clear that both the operators of nuclear
facilities and the states that have jurisdiction over them would be responsible to
provide restitution and compensation for such harm under a strict liability regime,
the types of injuries that must be compensated and the range of damages that must
be covered remain subjects of controversy. Although the underlying customary
international law principles (the no-harm principle and the polluter-pays principle)
are clear, the actual treaties that have been drafted are inadequate and they have not
been widely ratified. Victims of damage from nuclear activities would have
difficulty finding a neutral tribunal in which to bring their claims and would face
procedural obstacles including caps on liabilities and inappropriate statutes of
limitations as well as difficulties regarding proof of damages. The failure to
develop a proper regime that would ensure full restitution and compensation for
harm resulting from nuclear facilities constitutes a continuing subsidy to the
nuclear industry and distorts decisions regarding energy choices. The effort to
update international nuclear law must, therefore, continue until a proper liability
and compensation regime is established.
194. Foster v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 229 F.R.D. 599,602 (D.Minn. 2005).
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INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL NORMS APPLICABLE TO
NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES, WITH PARTICULAR FOCUS ON DECISIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS AND INTERNATIONAL
SETTLEMENTS
VED P. NANDA
I. INTRODUCTION
Treaties, customary international law, and general principles of law constitute
the primary sources of international environmental law as of international law in
general, while judicial decisions and scholarly writings comprise "subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law."'  However, the new sources of
international law that emerged during the second half of the twenty-first century
also include declarations and resolutions adopted by the United Nations organs and
other intergovernmental organizations, as well as principles, guidelines, and
recommendations produced by International Financial Organizations (IFOs), other
UN bodies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency 2 or intergovernmental
organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD),3 or multilateral conferences such as the 1972 UN
1. The International Court of Justice applies these sources of international law in deciding
disputes submitted to it. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945.
2. The Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency [hereinafter IAEA Statute] authorizes
the organization, the UN specialized agency responsible for regulating the peaceful use of nuclear
power for energy production, to establish or adopt "standards of safety for protection of health and
minimization of danger to life and property." IAEA Statute, art. III(A)(6), Oct. 26, 1956, 8 U.S.T.
1095, 276 U.N.T.S. 3. The IAEA has diligently carried out this activity in promulgating dozens of
"safety standards," including safety guidelines, safety practices, and codes of practice. However, since
the Agency has no enforcement authority, in practice the safety standards it promulgates are model
standards for states to modify and adopt to meet their own needs. See, e.g., IAEA, Safety Standards for
Protecting People and the Environment, http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2007);
Ann MacLachlan, Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources, 75 NUCLEAR L. BULL.
131 (2005). For a specific example, see IAEA, CODE OF CONDUCT ON THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF
RADIOACTIVE SOURCES (2004), available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Code-
2004_web.pdf.
3. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development is an intergovernmental
organization of 30 democratic industrialized countries. Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and
Development, About the OECD, http://www.oecd.org (last visited Sept. 4, 2008).
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Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment 4 and the 1992 UN Rio
Conference on Environment and Development.5
As these new sources come in the form of nonbinding statements, contrasted
with binding international law norms established by conventional and customary
international law, they are known as "soft law." But with frequent reiteration of
these principles, reflection in state practice, invocation before tribunals and
adoption by them, and incorporation by IFOs, they create expectations of similar
future conduct by states, and consequently acceptance as customary international
law. Through this practice and through the codification of these principles in
treaties, the "soft law" they embody may harden into binding legal obligations.
Hence, these new sources make valuable contributions to international
environmental law. Consequently, the discussion in this paper is confined not only
to the already accepted principles of international environmental law, but also to
those norms that are currently evolving and emerging through this ongoing
process.
All nuclear activities, and not just those confined to nuclear weapons, are
cause for serious concern because of their potential threat and harm. The April
1986 Chernobyl accident,6 the worst industrial disaster ever, has alerted the
international community that nuclear power plants pose a grave danger not only to
the region in which they are located but to distant lands, as well. In addition to
direct casualties of the catastrophe, 7 those affected by it include more than three
million victims in Ukraine and Belarus. 8 Chernobyl had taken an $11 billion toll
on Ukraine's economy by the year 1999. 9 The Soviet Union spent billions on
Chernobyl rehabilitation,10 and Ukraine has continued to provide compensation to
4. See U.N. Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, June 5-16, 1972, Report of the
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 and Corr. 1
(June 16, 1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
5. See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,
June 3-14,1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I)
(Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
6. On the Chernobyl accident, see generally Z. MEDVEDEV, THE LEGACY OF CHERNOBYL
(1990); CHERNOBYL LAW AND COMMUNICATION (P. Sands, ed. 1988); G. Handel, Transboundary
Nuclear Accidents: The Post-Chernobyl Multilateral Legislative Agenda, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 203
(1988); Richard E. Levy, International Law and the Chernobyl Accident: Reflections on an Important
but Imperfect System, 36 KAN. L. REV. 81 (1987); Linda A. Malone, The Chernobyl Accident: A Case
Study in International Law Regulating State Responsibility for Transboundary Nuclear Pollution, 12
COLUMB. J. ENVT'L L. 203 (1987); Ved P. Nanda & Jeffery C. Lowe, Nuclear Weapons and the
Ecology: Is International Law Helpless to Address the Problem?, 19 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 87, 96-
101 (1990); David R. Marples & Tatyana E. Cerullo, Symposium: International Nuclear Safety: The
Case of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station, 24 VT. L. REV. 1209 (2000); Jon Van Dyke, Liability
and Compensation for Harm Caused by Nuclear Activities. ... (published herein).
7. It is difficult to assess the direct casualties of Chernobyl, but it is estimated that direct deaths
are more than 4,000. See Marples & Cerullo, supra note 6, at 1210.
8. Chemobyl Union numbers the victims at 3.7 million. Id.
9. See Ukraine Says Chernobyl Blast Cost $11 Bln. So Far, REUTERS, Apr. 13, 1999, cited in id.
at 1211 n.ll.
10. See GREENPEACE, CHERNOBYL: TEN YEARS AFTER. CAUSES; CONSEQUENCES; SOLUTIONS
(1996), available at http://archive.greenpeace.org/comms/nukes/chemob/read25.html (follow Extended
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the victims of the disaster. Environmental damage occurred in many European
countries as the cloud of radioactive residue spread all over the northern
hemisphere. Thus, Chernobyl has sharpened our awareness of what severe
ecological and health impacts an unintentional release of radiation can have on
such a vast geographical area. 11
International efforts primarily under the auspices of the IAEA and the OECD
have been ongoing to prescribe environmental norms applicable to nuclear
activities "--obligating countries to meet nuclear safety requirements, establishing
guidelines and a legal framework in the form of conventions on early notification
of a nuclear accident and assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological
emergency, and developing rules on state responsibility and liability conventions.
However, Chernobyl provides a glaring example of the inadequacy of the
prevailing legal regime regarding liability and compensation for harm caused by
nuclear activities. 13
After briefly noting in the next part major international environmental norms
that are pertinent in the nuclear context, the discussion in subsequent parts will
focus on the decisions of international tribunals and international settlements, with
a concluding section on recommendations.
II. MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL NORMS PERTINENT TO NUCLEAR
ACTIVITIES
Although international environmental law is of relatively recent origin, it
already has established a core of fundamental legal principles that are pertinent to
nuclear activities.14 The sources of these principles are those mentioned above-
treaties incorporating these principles and thus creating binding "hard law,"
customary international law generally accepted by states, or still emerging "soft
law."' 15 Some of these principles are considered more substantive, that is, focused
text version of"Causes, Consequences, Solutions." hyperlink).
11. See generally ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD)
NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY (NEA),, CHERNOBYL: ASSESSMENT OF RADIOLOGICAL AND HEALTH
IMPACTS, 2002 UPDATE OF CHERNOBYL: TEN YEARS ON (2002), available at
http://www.nea.fr/html/rp/reports/2003/nea3508-chemobyl.pdf; CHERNOBYL FORUM, IAEA,
CHERNOBYL'S LEGACY: HEALTH, ENVIRONMENTAL AND SoCIo-ECONOMIC IMPACTS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF BELARUS, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND UKRAINE
(2nd. rev. version 2005), available at
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Booklets/Chernobyl/chernobyl.pdf.
12. See IAEA, International Conventions & Agreements,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Treaties/, and OECD NEA, Legal instruments and
documents, http://www.nea.ft/html/law/legal-documents.html.
13. For a thorough study of the pertinent legal developments in the aftermath of Chemobyl, see
OECD NEA & IAEA, INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR LAW IN THE POST-CHERNOBYL PERIOD (2006),
available at http://www.nea.fr/html/law/chemobyl/nea6146-iaea-chemobyl.pdf.
14. See generally Van Dyke, supra note 6; Alexandre Kiss, State Responsibility and Liability for
Nuclear Damage,. . . (published herein); Duncan E.J. Currie, Limited Liability, Unlimited Risk: The
Problems and Gaps in the Existing Treaties (Vienna & Paris Treaties) and an Analysis of How an
Actual Claim Would be Brought Under the Current Existing Treaty Regime in the Event of a Nuclear
Accident, . . . (published herein).
15. See generally VED P. NANDA & GEORGE E. PRING, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
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on outcomes, as the "no harm" rule, the "polluter-pays" principle, and state
responsibility and liability; while others are more procedural, with their focus on
means, such as the duty to notify, consult, and negotiate; the principle of effective
public participation in decision-making; and the precautionary principle. Still
others combine both substantive and procedural aspects, such as "good
neighborliness" and the duty to cooperate. Needless to say, however, there is
usually no bright line distinguishing substance from procedure.
While the focus of the discussion in this paper is primarily on the decisions of
international tribunals and international settlements, it is worth noting that several
conventions developed primarily under the auspices of the IAEA and the OECD
have established legal principles pertaining to safety and state responsibility and
liability. The goal is to ensure the safety of nuclear activities--encompassing
several subsidiary principles of protection, prevention, and precaution-and to
address the threat of transboundary radioactive pollution. Further elaboration of
these principles is likely to result as tribunals are called upon to resolve disputes
where these conventions apply.
The pertinent conventions establishing or incorporating these principles
include the Convention on Nuclear Safety, 16 under which responsibility for nuclear
safety rests on the contracting parties, and which obligates them to establish and
maintain effective safety measures in nuclear installations against potential
radiological hazards. 17  Major conventions on international liability for nuclear
damage are the Vienna Convention of 1963, developed by the IAEA, " the 1960
Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy,
developed by the OECD, 19 and the subsequent supplementary instruments
strengthening the reach of these conventions to include environmental damage and
preventive measures and augmenting the liability limits. The main instruments are
the 1963 Brussels Supplementary Convention to the Paris Convention,2 the 1988
Joint Protocol combining the Paris and Vienna Conventions,21 the 1997 Protocol to
FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY 17-62 (2003).
16. Convention on Nuclear Safety, Sept. 20, 1994, S. TREATY Doc. No. 104-6 (1995), 1963
U.N.T.S. 293.
17. Id. at art. I (ii). See also id. at art. 6 (the obligation to review as soon as possible the safety of
existing nuclear installations), art. 7 (the obligation to establish and maintain a legislative and
regulatory framework to ensure the safety of the nuclear installations, including a system of licensing
and inspection), and art. 11 (the obligation to establish and implement quality assurance programs to
satisfy specific requirements for all activities important to nuclear safety throughout the life of the
nuclear installations).
18. Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, 1063 U.N.T.S.
265(entered into force Nov. 12, 1977). For the status of the Convention, see LAEA, STATUS OF THE
VIENNA CONVENTION ON CIVIL LIABILITY FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/liability-status.pdf.
19. Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of July 29, 1960, 956
U.N.T.S. 251, as amended by the Additional Protocol of January 28, 1964, 956 U.N.T.S. 335, and by
the Protocol of November 16, 1982, 1650 U.N.T.S. 444.
20. Convention Supplementary to the 1960 Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of
Nuclear Energy, Jan. 31, 1963, 1041 U.N.T.S. 358.
21. Joint Protocol relating to the application of the Vienna Convention on civil liberty for nuclear
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22the Vienna Convention, the 1997 Supplementary Convention,23 and the two 2004
Protocols, 24 one amending the Paris Convention and the other the 1963 Brussels
Supplementary Convention.
The principle of strict responsibility applies to nuclear activities and the
primary responsibility lies on the operator of the nuclear plant. However, under
the instruments mentioned above, states parties are required under their national
laws to provide a minimum amount, as well, and the 1997 Supplementary
Convention, not yet in force, provides for the creation of a supplementary fid to
be created through collective contributions by states parties. Nuclear
transportation issues are addressed by the 1971 Brussels Convention Relating to
Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material.25 This
Convention was developed by the International Maritime Organization (IMO),
which also has other conventions applicable to nuclear activities, such as on
dumping and radioactive wastes. 26 The Convention holds the operator of a nuclear
installation liable for damage, while exonerating a person otherwise liable if the
operator is liable for such damage under either the Paris or Vienna convention.
Among the major weaknesses of the prevailing liability regime are: 1)
liability is limited; 2) liability is primarily imposed on the operator, exempting the
manufacturer, supplier, or carrier of the material or equipment; 3) the limitation
period to bring a claim is very short in most cases of damage caused by nuclear
activities, although long-term effects of radiation may not be known for a much
longer period; and 4) only a few states are parties to these supplementary
instruments.
damage and the Paris Convention on third party liability in the field of nuclear energy, Sept. 21, 1988,
1672 U.N.T.S. 302.
22. Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, Sept. 12,
1997, 36 I.L.M. 1454, 1462 (1997) (entered into force Oct. 4, 2003).
23. Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, Sept. 12, 1997, 36 I.L.M.
1454, 1473 (1997) (not in force).
24. Protocol to amend the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear
Energy, Feb. 12, 2004, available at http://www.nea.fr/htnd/law/paris-convention.pdf; Protocol to
amend the Brussels Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the
Field of Nuclear Energy, Feb. 12, 2004, available at
http://www.nea.fr/html/law/brussels-supplementary-convention.pdf
25. Convention Relating to civil liability in the field of maritime carriage of nuclear material, Dec.
17, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 255 (entered into force July 15, 1975).
26. See, e.g., International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection
with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, May 3, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1406, 1415
(1996); International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for
Oil Pollution Damage, Dec. 8, 1971, 1110 U.N.T.S. 57, as amended by the 1992 IMO Protocol to
Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 27, 1992, 23
I.L.M. 148, 177 (1984). For the IAEA recommendation regarding the movement of radioactive waste,
see IAEA, General Conference Resolution on Code of Practice on the International Transboundary
Movement of Radioactive Waste, Sept. 21, 1990, 30 L.L.M. 556, 563 (1991). See also Convention on
Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment, Lugano, 1993, 32
I.L.M. 1228, 1230 (1993) (a Council of Europe Convention).
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Following the Chemobyl tragedy, the IAEA prepared the texts of two more
conventions that were adopted within six months of the accident. One convention
is on early notification of a nuclear accident27 and the other is on assistance in the
case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency.28 Under the Notification
Convention, parties are obligated to notify without delay of any nuclear accident
and to promptly provide pertinent available information in order to limit the
radioactive consequences in other countries. 29 The Assistance Convention creates
a framework for cooperation among the States Parties and with IAEA.
The Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 30 also applies
among other activities to "[n]uclear power stations and other nuclear reactors
including the dismantling or decommissioning of such power stations or
reactors...; [i]nstallations for the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel." It
obligates the contracting parties to take the necessary legislative, regulatory, and
other measures to achieve its objectives. The Convention's principles applicable to
nuclear activities include the public's right to know and hence the state's
obligation to inform the public about the use of nuclear energy, and the public's
participation in the preparation of nuclear regulations.
The 1991 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a
Transboundary Context 31 obligates States Parties to take appropriate and effective
measures to prevent, reduce, and control significant adverse transboundary
environmental impact from proposed activities, which include nuclear power
stations and other nuclear reactors.32 Under a 2003 Protocol to the Convention,33
the Contracting Parties' obligations are expanded and a new procedure is
established for carrying out public participation and consultations in preparation of
an environmental report and plan or program.34
27. Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, Sept. 26, 1986, S. TREATY Doc. No.
100-4(A) (1987), 1439 U.N.T.S. 275 [hereinafter Notification Convention].
28. Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, Sept.
26, 1986, S. TREATY DOc. No. 100-4(B) (1987), 1457 U.N.T.S. 133.
29. Notification Convention, supra note 27, at art. 2.
30. UN Economic Commission for Europe (UN/ECE) Convention on Access to Information,
Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, annex I, para.
I, June 25, 1998, 2161 U.N.T.S. 447 (entered into force Oct. 30, 2001).
31. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Feb. 25, 1991,
1989 U.N.T.S. 309 (1991).
32. Id. at art.2(1).
33. Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment to the Convention on Environmental Impact
Assessment in a Transboundary Context, May 21, 2003, available at
http://www.unece.org/env/eia/documents/protocolenglish.pdf [herein after Kiev Protocol] (adopted by
an Extraordinary Meeting of the Parties to the Espoo Convention).
34. Id. at art. 2(6).
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III. DECISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS AND INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS
A. Tribunals
The starting point for discussing international environmental law principles is
the seminal Trail Smelter arbitral decision. 35  This will be followed by the
International Court of Justice's 1973, 1974, and 1994 decisions on nuclear testing,
its 1996 advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, and its 1997 judgment on the Gabcekovo-Nagymaros Dam dispute.
Next I will briefly discuss the work of two other tribunals before the concluding
section.
1. The Trail Smelter Arbitration
The United States had alleged that sulphur dioxide emissions from a smelter
located in Trail, British Columbia, were causing substantial damage to a number of
farms across the border in the state of Washington. An arbitral tribunal was
established under a convention between the United States and Canada36 to resolve
questions regarding damage, provide remedies, and prescribe measures to be
"adopted or maintained by the Trail Smelter. 3 7 The tribunal was to apply the
"law and practice followed.., in the United States of America as well as
international law and practice.,,
38
After examining available precedents under both international law and United
States law, the tribunal awarded monetary damages to the US. In doing so, it
announced two fundamental principles of international environmental law. First, it
concluded that a state has the duty not to harm the environment of another state or
persons or property in that state by activities within its own territory. This "no-
harm" (sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas) rule has become a cornerstone of
modern environmental law. Second, nearly as significant, the tribunal held that if a
state does cause damage to the environment of another state, the polluter should
pay.
This affirmation of the no-harm and good neighborliness principles set the
stage for the subsequent development by the international community of the norms
of state responsibility regarding transboundary pollution. To illustrate, Principle
21 of the Declaration adopted by the 1972 UN Stockholm Conference on the
Human Environment stated that
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and
the principles of international law ... the responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
35. Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1938 & 1941) [hereinafter Trail
Smelter decision].
36. Id. at 1907.
37. Id. at 1908.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1965-66, 1974-78.
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environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national
40jurisdiction.
The same language was included 20 years later in Principle 2 of the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, 41 adopted at the 1992 UN Rio
Conference. Several other international conventions addressing environmental
issues, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 42 and the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change, 43 have incorporated the same
principle. Finally, the International Court of Justice recognized in its 1996
advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons that this
principle, "the general obligation on states to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction and control" respect the environment of other states or of areas beyond
national control had by then become "part of the corpus of international law
relating to the environment.,
44
It should be noted that in the Trail Smelter Arbitration, the arbitral tribunal
imputed to Canada responsibility and liability for transboundary pollution on the
basis of an act that was not unlawful, the operation of a smelter on its territory.
That a lawful act may be considered an internationally wrongful act was
determined by the International Law Commission as it defined an "internationally
wrongful act" of a state in its 2001 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Intentionally Wrongful Acts in these words: it consists of an action or omission
attributable to the state and constituting "a breach of an international obligation of
the State."45  Thus some otherwise lawful nuclear activities may constitute a
breach of international obligations.
This principle, it may be noted, was recognized by the International Court of
Justice in its 1949 decision in the Corfu Channel Case,46 where it held that every
state is obligated "not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary
to the rights of other States."4 7  Reaffirming the sic utere principle, the Court
stated the rule that a state must warn others of imminent danger and imposing
liability on it for failure to disclose information that might have a harmful effect on
40. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 4, at Principal 21.
41. Rio Declaration, supra note 5, at art. 2.
42. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 396; 21
I.L.M. 1261 (1982), art. 194(2).
43. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, preamble, May 9, 1992, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 102-38 (1992), 1771 U.N.T.S. 165.
44. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 241-42
(July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Opinion]. See generally VED P. NANDA & DAVID KRIEGER,
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE WORLD COURT (1998).
45. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 76, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10), U.N. Doe.
A/56/10, (2001). See also Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, Draft
Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, 97, U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 10), U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) (reflecting the customary international law principle requiring
states to take all appropriate measures to minimize the risk of transboundary harm).
46. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. AIb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (April 9).
47. Id. at 22.
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other states.48 This was not a case involving environmental harm, but the
Restatement (Third), Foreign Relations Law of the United States has expanded this
rule by analogy to include transboundary environmental dangers or risks.49
2. The International Court of Justice
a. The 1973, 1974 and 1995 Nuclear Tests Cases
New Zealand filed an application with the ICJ on May 9, 1973, requesting
provisional (interim) measures of protection regarding the French government's
atmospheric nuclear testing in the South Pacific region, on the basis that these tests
violated rules and principles of international law. 50 New Zealand argued that
nuclear testing by France violated the rights of all members of the international
community, including New Zealand, as nuclear tests give rise to radioactive fallout
of the territorial, maritime, and aerial environment, and especially of that region's
environment, and caused harm, including "apprehension, anxiety and concern."51
It further contended that the testing violated New Zealand's right to "freedom of
the high seas, including freedom of navigation and overflight and the freedom to
explore and exploit the resources of the sea and seabed, without interference or
detriment resulting from nuclear testing."5' 2
New Zealand further claimed that as "any exposure to radiation may have
irreparable, and harmful, somatic and genetic effects," radioactive fallout which
reaches New Zealand is inherently harmful and that there is no compensating
benefit to justify New Zealand's exposure to such harm.53 It contended that "there
could be no possibility that the rights eroded by the holding of further tests could
be fully restored in the event of a judgment in New Zealand's favour in these
proceedings. 54
48. The Court stated:
The obligations incumbent upon the Albanian authorities consisted in notifying,
for the benefit of shipping in general, the existence of a minefield in Albanian
territorial waters and in warning the approaching British warships of the
imminent danger to which the minefield exposed them. Such obligations are
based ... on certain general and well-recognized principles, namely: . . . every
State's obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary
to the rights of other States. Id.
The Court concluded that:
Albania is responsible under international law for the explosions which occurred
on October 22nd, 1946, in Albanian waters, and for the damage and loss of
human life which resulted from them, and that there is a duty upon Albania to
pay compensation to the United Kingdom. Id. at 23.
49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §601 cmt. e
(1987).
50. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. F.), 1973 I.C.J. 135, 135-36 (Interim Protection Order of June 22).
51. Id.at 139.
52. Id. at 139-40.
53. Id. at 140.
54. Id. at 141.
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In response, France emphasized that it would take every precaution to ensure
"the safety and the harmlessness of the French nuclear tests."55  However, the
Court ordered France to cease all nuclear testing.56 The rationale for the Court's
order was its determination that the information provided to it "does not exclude
the possibility that damage to New Zealand might be shown to be caused by the
deposit on New Zealand territory of radio-active fall-out resulting from such tests
and to be irreparable. 57
The following year, the Court gave its judgment.5 8 As it determined that
France's public statements that it intended to cease all atmospheric nuclear testing
in the South Pacific region rendered the controversy with New Zealand and a
similar controversy with Australia moot, the Court declined to decide directly
whether to declare that France's nuclear testing violated New Zealand's
environmental rights. However, Paragraph 63 of the decision left open the
possibility that the Court might reconsider the case against France if it ever
decided to resume testing, stating that "if the basis of this Judgment were to be
affected, the Applicant could request an examination of the situation in accordance
with the provisions of the Statute." 59
In 1995, the New Zealand government requested an "examination of the
situation" because of France's statements regarding its underground nuclear
testing, and the Court determined that the ground for this reconsideration was
limited to France's atmospheric nuclear testing and thus would not serve as a basis
60to prevent any of France's nuclear actions outside of atmospheric testing.
Although the Court did not pass judgment directly on New Zealand's claim,
two positive developments must be acknowledged: 1) the court imposed interim
protections, and 2) it determined that public statements by a state's officials may
legally bind a state.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 141-42.
57. Id. at 141.
58. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457 (Dec. 20). The Court concluded that "the dispute
having disappeared, the claim advanced by New Zealand no longer has any object. It follows that any
further finding would have no raison d'itre." Id. at 476.
59. Id. at 477.
60. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. F.) 1995 I.C.J. 288 (Examination Order of 22 Sept.). The Court found
by twelve votes to three that New Zealand's request "does not fall within the provisions of the said
paragraph 63 and must consequently be dismissed." Id. at 307. It stated that its order was "without
prejudice to the obligations of States to respect and protect the natural environment, obligations to
which both New Zealand and France have in the present instance reaffirmed their commitment." Id. at
306.
61. The I.C.J. in its 1974 judgment did find that France's statement of intention to cease
atmospheric testing "may create commitments in international law." Nuclear Tests (N. Z. v. F.), 1974
I.C.J. 457, 473, citing Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.) 1961 I.C.J. 17, 31, 32 (May 26):
"Where . . as is generally the case in international law, which places the principal emphasis on the
intention of the parties, the law prescribes no particular form, parties are free to choose what form they
please provided their intention clearly results from it .... [T]he sole relevant question is whether the
language employed in any given declaration does reveal a clear intention ......
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b. The L C.J. 's Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons
The UN General Assembly requested the I.C.J. for an advisory opinion on the
question "Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted
under international law?",62 The Court determined that international law neither
specifically authorizes nor prohibits the threat or use of nuclear weapons. 63 But its
opinion contained a positive message for those interested in international
environmental law: it affirmed the status of the "no-harm" rule as customary
international law, and stated that the basic principles of international humanitarian
law for the protection of civilians and civilian objects similarly apply to protect the
environment.
Some states had asserted that any use of nuclear weapons would be unlawful
because of the existing norms relating to the safeguarding and protection of the
environment, coupled with widespread long-term and severe damage to the
environment such use would cause. Other states questioned the binding legal
quality of the pertinent environmental norms. Two conventions and two soft law
instruments were specifically cited. The two conventions are the Additional
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949,64 article 35, paragraph 3, which
prohibits the employment of "methods or means of warfare which are intended, or
may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural
environment,, 65 and the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any
Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD), which
prohibits under article 1(1) the use of weapons that have "widespread, long-lasting
or severe effects" on the environment. 66 The two soft-law instruments cited were
Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration and Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio
Declaration, both mentioned above, which obligate the states "to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national
62. G.A. Res 49/75 K, U.N. Doc. A/Res/49/75 K (Dec. 15, 1994), cited in Nuclear Weapons
Opinion, supra note 44, at 227-28.
63. Id. at 265-66.
64. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, Aug. 15, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144 (1977),
reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1409 (1977).
65. Article 55 of the Protocol states:
1. Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against
widespread, long-term and severe damage. This protection includes a
prohibition of the use of methods or means of warfare which are intended or may
be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and thereby to
prejudice the health or survival of the population.
2. Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are prohibited. Id.
at 1415.
Article 56 prohibits attacks on non-military dams, dykes, and nuclear power
plants if the attack might release dangerous forces causing severe civilian losses.
Id.
66. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques, May 18, 1977, 1108 U.N.T.S. 151, 153, T.I.A.S. 9614 (1977).
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jurisdiction., 67 Some states questioned the binding authority of the declarations
and argued that: 1) the cited treaties did not mention warfare in general and nuclear
warfare in particular; 2) certain states were not parties to the treaties or had made
reservations to them; and 3) these treaties and declarations applied only during
peacetime and their application to nuclear weapons would be "destabilizing to the
rule of law and to confidence in international negotiations. 68
The Court responded to these comments by initially recognizing that "the
environment is under daily threat and that the use of nuclear weapons could
constitute a catastrophe for the environment., 69 After further recognizing that "the
environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, the quality of life
and the very health of human beings, including generations unborn," the Court
explicitly stated: "The existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other
States or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international
law relating to the environment.,
70
In response to some states' claims that the norms did not apply in wartime,
the Court stated that, while states exercise their right of self-defense, they
... must take environmental considerations into account when assessing
what is necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military
objectives. Respect for the environment is one of the elements that go
to assessing whether an action is in conformity with the principles of
necessity and proportionality. 71
Thus the Court stated unambiguously that two basic principles of international
humanitarian law-necessity and proportionality-which apply to protect civilians
and civilian objects, apply in a similar fashion to protect the environment against
widespread, long-term and severe environmental damage and that armed attacks
that may damage the natural environment must comply with the principle of
proportionality.
c. The I. CJ 1977 Judgment on the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam Dispute
This dispute involved the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam Project between
Hungary and Slovakia to dam the Danube River and was the first dispute heard by
the Court which primarily addressed environmental issues.72 The Project's impact
on the environment was a major consideration in both sides' arguments. The basis
for Hungary's abandonment of the Project and unilateral termination of its treaty
67. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 4, at Principal 21; Rio Declaration, supra note 5, at art. 2..
68. Nuclear Weapons Opinion, supra note 44, at 241.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 241-42.
71. Id. at 242. The Court cited in support of its approach Principle 24 of the Rio Declaration,
which provides that "Warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development. States shall
therefore respect international law providing protection for the environment in times of armed conflict
and cooperate in its further development, as necessary." Id.
72. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 L.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25) [hereinafter
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project).
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with Czechoslovakia was "the existence of a state of [ecological] necessity; the
impossibility of performance of the Treaty; the occurrence of a fundamental
change of circumstances; the material breach of the Treaty by Czechoslovakia;
and, finally, the development of new norms of international environmental law."
73
Hungary asserted that the system would have caused, among other adverse
effects, impairment of the water quality, silting up of the riverbed, and the risk of
rising eutrophication and the extinction of the fluvial fauna and flora. 74 Hungary's
arguments involving impossibility of performance, fundamental change of
circumstances, and new norms of international environmental law all relied
primarily on environmental considerations. For example, Hungary contended that
the treaty into which it had entered was consistent with environmental protection
but was being transformed into "a prescription for environmental disaster.,
75
Similarly, regarding changed circumstances and new norms of international law, it
argued that
... subsequently imposed requirements of international law in relation
to the protection of the environment precluded performance of the
Treaty. The previously existing obligation not to cause substantive
damage to the territory of another State had... evolved into an erga
omnes obligation of prevention of damage pursuant to the
-'precautionary principle." On this basis... its termination was "forced
by the other party's [action]. 76
In sum, Hungary's position was that the treaty had become impossible to
perform because "the essential object of the Treaty-an economic joint investment
which was consistent with environmental protection and which was operated by
the two contracting parties jointly-had permanently disappeared., 77
Furthermore, a number of events had brought about a fundamental change of
circumstances, including new norms and prescriptions of international
environmental law, which had become obligatory.78
The Court did not accept Hungary's arguments, but on the environmental
issues it first acknowledged that "the concerns expressed by Hungary for its natural
environment in the region affected by the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project related to
an 'essential interest' of that State, within the meaning given to that expression in
Article 33 of the Draft of the International Law Commission., 79 The Court then
referred to the Commission's commentary regarding state practice that "it is
primarily in the last two decades that safeguarding the ecological balance has come
to be considered an 'essential interest' of all States. 8 0 It further referred to the
73. Id. at 58.
74. Id. at 35. For the Court's discussion of "ecological necessity," see id. at 36-46.
75. Id. at. 60.
76. Id. at 62.
77. Id. at 63.
78. Id. at 64.
79. Id. at 41.
80. Id., citing Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 35 U.N. Doc.
A/35/10 (1980), reprinted in [1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 39, U.N. Doc.
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Court's having already stressed "the great significance that it attaches to respect for
the environment, not only for States but also for the whole of mankind," citing
from its 1996 Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons.
81
In specific response to Hungary's arguments, the Court explicitly stated that
"newly developed norms of environmental law are relevant for the implementation
of the Treaty and that the parties could, by agreement, incorporate them through
the application of Articles 15, 19 and 20 of the Treaty., 82 As these articles lay
down general obligations regarding the environment, "the potential necessity to
adapt" the Project had been recognized.83
The Court held by thirteen votes to two that "Hungary and Slovakia must
negotiate in good faith in the light of the prevailing situation, and must take all
necessary measures to ensure the achievement of the objectives of the Treaty... in
accordance with such modalities as they may agree upon.,
84
In a separate opinion, the Vice President of the Court, Judge Weeramantry, 85
extensively discussed the principle of sustainable development, which, he said,
enables the Court to "hold the balance even between the environmental
considerations and the developmental considerations raised by the respective
Parties."86 He also elaborated on the principle of continuing environmental impact
assessment. 87
3. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
a. The MOXPlant Case
In November 2001, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS)
considered a provisional measures application brought by Ireland against the
United Kingdom 88 to prevent the UK from commencing operations at a nuclear
power plant until a specially constituted tribunal for the dispute under the
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) could complete a proper hearing
and decide the case. The Tribunal affirmed the duty to cooperate as a fundamental
principle in the prevention of pollution of the marine environment under part XII
of UNCLOS and general international law, 89 and prescribed specific measures for
the parties to implement that duty.
Ireland's request was for provisional measures, under which the UK would
immediately suspend the authorization of the MOX Plant or alternatively to take
A/CN.4/SER.A/1 980/Add. I (Part 2).
81. Gabeikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 72, at 41. For the language cited, see text, supra
note 70.
82. Id. at 67.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 83.
85. Id. at 88.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 91-97.
88. MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K.), Order, 41 I.L.M. 405, 406 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 2001).
89. Id. at415.
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the necessary measures to prevent its operation, and to "immediately ensure" that
no radioactive substances or materials or wastes associated with the operation of or
activities related to the operation of the MOX Plant would occur over the waters
under its sovereignty.90
The Tribunal ordered Ireland and the UK to
cooperate and.., for this purpose, enter into consultations forthwith in
order to:
(a) exchange further information with regard to possible consequences
for the Irish Sea arising out of the commissioning of the MOX plant;
(b) monitor risks or the effects of the operation of the MOX plant for
the Irish Sea;
(c) devise, as appropriate, measures to prevent pollution of the marine
environment which might result from the operation of the MOX plant.
91
b. The Case Concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits
of Johar
Two years after announcing the MOX Plant decision on October 8, 2003, the
ITLOS again ruled that disputing parties had the duty to cooperate. It prescribed
provisional measures, directing the two states, Malaysia and Singapore, to
cooperate and used similar language as in the MOX Plant case, that "Malaysia and
Singapore shall cooperate and shall, for this purpose, enter into consultations
forthwith.... ,,92 The object, it said, was to:
a. establish promptly a group of independent experts with the mandate
1. to conduct a study... to determine.., the effects of Singapore's land
reclamation and to propose, as appropriate, measures to deal with any
adverse effects of such land reclamation...
b. exchange, on a regular basis, information on, and assess risks or
effects of, Singapore's land reclamation works....93
It also called upon Singapore "not to conduct its land reclamation in ways that
might cause irreparable prejudice to the rights of Malaysia or serious harm to the
marine environment, taking especially into account the reports of the group of
independent experts.
90. Id. at410.
91. Id. at416.
92. Case Concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johar (Malay. v.
Sing.), Order, 106(1) (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 2003), available at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 106(2). See also MN Saiga (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), Order, 170 (Int'l Trib. L.
of the Sea 1999), cited in Van Dyke, supra note 6, at 106, in which the ITLOS reiterated the
international law rule that a state committing an intentionally wrongful act owes compensation to the
state suffering the damage.
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4. International Criminal Court
The infliction of environmental damage during war is a criminal act under the
statute of the International Criminal Court, 95 as article 8(2)(b)(iv) states:
For the purpose of this Statute, "'war crimes" means "... intentionally
launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause...
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment
which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
overall military advantage anticipated."
The language describing the elements of the environmental crime in this
article essentially tracks the language from articles 35(3) Protocol I of the Geneva
Convention and article 1(1) of the ENMOD Convention, which the International
Court of Justice had cited in its advisory opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons. The requirements here are "widespread, long-term and severe
damage to the environment,, 96 which has to be intentional and which does not
meet the proportionality test of the possible military advantage. It should,
however, be noted that the ICC's jurisdiction is limited to natural persons and
hence there is no room for state responsibility or liability or corporate liability.
Thus, for all practical purposes the reach of the ICC regarding environmental
crimes will be rather limited.
B. International Settlements
1. Compensation by the Soviet Union for Harm Caused by Nuclear Activities
On January 24, 1978, a Soviet Union's Cosmos 954 Satellite carrying a
nuclear reactor containing highly enriched uranium, disintegrated over Canada
after reentering the Earth's atmosphere and deposited radioactive debris over a
large area in the north of the country. 97 The Soviet Union had not notified Canada
of the satellite's possible reentry over Canadian territory.
98
Canada determined that most of the fragments it recovered of the space object
were radioactive, some lethally so.99 It claimed that the operations it undertook for
"locating, recovering, removing and testing the debris and cleaning up the effected
areas" cost it nearly $14 million, and it sought payment of $6 million from the
Soviets."10 The Canadian claim was based on Article Il of the Convention on
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,' 01 which imposes
95. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 94
[hereinafter Rome Statute]. The Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court was adopted in 1998
and the ICC entered into force July 1, 2002.
96. Nuclear Weapons Opinion, supra note 44, at 241.
97. Canada: Claim against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for Damage Caused by Soviet
Cosmos 954, 18 I.L.M. 899,902 (1979) [hereinafter Canada: Claim].
98. Id.
99. Id. at 904.
100. Id.
101. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972,
24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 (entered into force Sept. 1, 1972).
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absolute liability on a launching state to compensate for damage caused by its
space object on the surface of the Earth.
Canada sought damages for the deposit of hazardous radioactive debris from
the satellite over Canadian territory and the presence of that debris in the
environment, "rendering part of Canada's territory unfit for use."' 10 2 It asserted
that the absolute liability standard "for space activities, in particular activities
involving the use of nuclear energy, is considered to have become a general
principle of international law," and calculated the claimed compensation according
to general principles of international law. 103
The parties eventually settled for the payment by the Soviet Union of $3
million "without [its] admitting any liability.' 1 4  The settlement was reached
through negotiations and was paid ex gratia. Thus although it is not clear what the
basis for the settlement was and what law was applied, the principles implicated
are, as Canada claimed, that a state is obligated not to cause harm to another state's
environment and that absolute liability is imposed for activities involving the use
of nuclear energy and causing harm.
2. Compensation by the United States for Harm Caused by Nuclear Activities
a. The Fukuryu Maru (Lucky Dragon) Claim10 5
On March 1, 1954, eight years after nuclear testing by the United States in the
Marshall Islands began, the United States detonated a thermonuclear bomb
codenamed "Bravo" on Bikini Island, part of the Marshall Islands, a UN trust
territory administered by the US. Although the US had earlier issued a general
warning defining a danger zone around Bikini, there was no specific warming
regarding the timing or location of the various tests. A Japanese tuna fishing boat,
the Lucky Dragon, took on a large amount of Bravo's fallout. Fish were
contaminated in the area, and several crew members fell sick, while one died. 1
06
The US did not accept liability but it made a payment to Japan, ex gratia, of $2
million, "for purposes of compensation for the injuries or damages sustained...
[and] in full settlement of any and all claims against the United States..." caused
by the test. 107
b. Marshall Islanders' Claim
Between 1946 and 1958 the US conducted 67 such nuclear tests in the
Marshall Islands.'08 Radioactive fallout from the Bravo test drifted in the wrong
102. Canada: Claim, supra note 97, at 905.
103. Id. at 907.
104. Id.
105. See generally RALPH E. LAPP, THE VOYAGE OF THE LUCKY DRAGON (1958), referenced in
Lucky Dragon Incident, www.american.edu/TED/lucky.htm. The description here is based on this
work.
106. See Myres S. McDougal & Norbert A. Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective:
Lawful Measures for Security, 64 YALE L.J. 648, 652 (1955).
107. Agreement relating to compensation for personal and property damage as a result of nuclear
tests in the Marshall (Bikini) Islands, U.S.-Japan, Jan. 4, 1955, 6 U.S.T. 1.
108. See Davor Pevec, The Marshall Islands Nuclear Claims Tribunal: The Claims of the Enewetak
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direction and several inhabitants of Rangeley and Turk Atolls were irradiated. The
Eniwetok people claimed that they had suffered property damage from the nuclear
testing program. The United States and the Republic of the Marshall Islands
governments entered into a treaty, known as the Compact of Free Association,
under which a $150 million nuclear fund was established and a nuclear claims
tribunal with jurisdiction over the Marshall Islanders' claims was established.
Eventually, the Enewetak people were awarded $386 million for their damages, 109
which was an implicit acknowledgement that compensation is required for any
harm caused by nuclear activities.
c. Payment Regarding the B-52 Accident at Palomares, Spain
On January 17, 1966, a US B-52 carrying four thermonuclear bombs collided
with a KC-135 tanker while refueling over Palomares, Spain.'") The US and
Spanish governments were informed of the nuclear accident and dispatched
nuclear safety teams. Although three of the bombs that had landed on the shore
were located, the fourth could not be found for several days. Two of the bombs
had detonated on impact and spread plutonium dust over hundreds of acres of
land."' The United States paid compensation and assumed responsibility for
disposing of the radioactive materials in Spanish waters. 112
IV. CONCLUSION
This survey shows that several international environmental norms, including
state responsibility and liability, the sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (no harm)
rule, and the polluter-pays principle, are also especially pertinent to nuclear
activities.
This survey also shows that the current international civil liability regimes are
inadequate. 113  For example, many applicable treaties have not been widely
ratified, do not cover the issue of irreparable harm, as they limit compensation
primarily for personal injury and economic (including property) damage, and do
not provide for the remedy of cessation of harmful activity. Perhaps those
involved in updating nuclear law should study the creation of a new norm, such as
ecocide or geocide, that may be helpful.
On an especially urgent related topic, the International Convention for the
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which was adopted by the United
People (published herein).
109. See generally id.
110. National Atomic Museum, Historical Perspective: Broken Arrow,
http://www.atomicmuseum.com/tour/cw4.cfm (last visited September 9, 2007).
111. Id.
112. See BRIAN D. SMITH, STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT: THE RULES
OF DECISION 77, 117 (1988).
113. See generally Anne Daniel, Civil Liability Regimes as n Complement to Multilateral
Environmental Agreements: Sound International Policy or False Comfort?, 12 REV. OF EUR.
COMMUNITY AND INT'L ENVTL L. 225 (2003).
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Nations General Assembly on April 15, 2005,114 will upon its ratification fill a
huge gap that presently exists in the pertinent treaties as they do not provide
coverage for terrorist attacks.
114. G. A. Res. 59/290, U.N. Doc. A/Res/59/290 (April 15, 2005). See generally Odette
Jankowitsch-Prevor, International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 76
NUCLEAR L. BULL. 7 (2005).
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STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE 1
ALEXANDRE KISS
2
I. INTRODUCTION
States are responsible for violations of the rules of international law that can
be attributed to them. 3 As a matter of customary law, reaffirmed by the UN
International Law Commission, breach of an international obligation gives rise to
an independent and automatic duty to cease the wrongful act and to make
reparation.4 The question of state responsibility and liability for nuclear damage
raises specific questions which must be examined in the general framework of
international legal rules related to responsibility and liability. This paper will
discuss the most relevant rules adopted in this field by the UN International Law
Commission and analyzes first, the question of whether and how far such rules can
be applied to the violation of general, mostly customary rules of international law,
and second, breaches of treaties related to nuclear activities and damage caused by
such activities.
II. NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES AND OBLIGATIONS NOT TO CAUSE TRANSBOUNDARY
ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE
According to the International Law Commission, every internationally
wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State.5 A
wrongful act is defined as State conduct consisting of an action or omission
attributable to the State and constituting a breach of an international obligation of
that State.6 Thus, the first question to ask is whether nuclear activities can
constitute a breach of international obligations. Two hypotheses must be examined
in this regard. The first concerns the effects that such activities can produce outside
the territory of that State. The second question is whether international legal rules
prohibit or limit nuclear activities in the absence of any transfrontier effect.
The answer to the first question can be found in customary international law
rules, initially formulated in the 1941 arbitral sentence handed down in the Trail
1. Originally presented as part of the Conference on the Human Right to a Safe and Healthful
Environment and the Responsibility under International Law of Operators of Nuclear Facilities.
2. We regret Professor Kiss, one of the most distinguished international lawyers, passed away.
3. G.A. Res. 56/83, Annex art. 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001).
4. Id. at arts. 30(a), 31(1).
5. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83,
Annex art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles on State
Responsibility].
6. Id. at art. 2.
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Smelter Case between the United States and Canada. The arbitration tribunal
declared that:
[U]nder the principles of international law.., no State has the right to
use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury
by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons
therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is
established by clear and convincing evidence.
7
In 1949, the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel Case
affirmed that no State may utilize its territory contrary to the rights of other states.8
Finally, an arbitral award between France and Spain alluded to the violation of the
rights of other states that may result from pollution of boundary waters.9
Based on such precedents, the principle of state responsibility for
transboundary harm has been proclaimed by numerous international texts.
Principle 21 of the Declaration adopted by the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the
Human Environment stresses that states have the responsibility to ensure that
activities under their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other states or areas beyond national jurisdiction. 10  The
Declaration on Environment and Development, adopted by the 1992 Conference
held in Rio de Janeiro reaffirms the same principle" which can also be found in
various global environmental conventions including the 1982 Convention on the
Law of the Sea 12 and the Convention on Biological Diversity 13 to which virtually
all the States of the world are contracting parties. Finally, the International Court
of Justice recognized in its advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, "[t]he existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other
States or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international
law relating to the environment."
14
This statement was repeated in the judgment concerning the Gabeikovo-
Nagymaros Project, in which the International Court of Justice also recalled that it
has "recently had occasion to stress... the great significance that it attaches to
respect for the environment, not only for States but for the whole of mankind.'
' 5
7. Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1938 & 1941) [hereinafter Trail
Smelter decision].
8. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 36 (Apr. 9, 1949).
9. See generally Lake Lanoux (Spain v. Fr.), 12 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 281 (1957).
10. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5-16, 1972, Report of the
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Principle 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/REV.1
(Jan. 1, 1973) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
11. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Report
of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, vol. I, Principle 2, U.N. Doe.
A/CONF. 151/26/REV. l(VOL.I) (Jan. 1, 1993) [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
12. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 194(2), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3.
13. Convention on Biological Diversity art. 3, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79.
14. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 29
(July 8, 1996) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion].
15. Gab~ikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 53 (Sept. 25, 1997).
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Principle 13 of the Declaration of the Conference on Environment and
Development held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 calls on states to "cooperate in an
expeditious and more determined manner to develop further international law
regarding liability and compensation for adverse effects of environmental damage
caused by activities within their jurisdiction or control to areas beyond their
jurisdiction."'16 Several international conventions also invite states to cooperate in
the formulation and adoption of appropriate rules and procedures for the
determination of liability and compensation for damage resulting from violations
of obligations under their provisions. 17
In addition to general international law rules imposing the duty to respect the
environment in transfrontier relations, a series of international treaties either
prohibits certain nuclear activities or includes prescriptions concerning such
activities.
III. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES RELATED TO NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES
A. Prohibition or Regulation of Nuclear Activities
One of the oldest treaties prohibiting nuclear activities is the Antarctic Treaty
adopted in Washington, D.C., on December 1, 1959.18 Article V of the Antarctic
Treaty prohibits any nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste on
the sixth continent. 19 Still, the same provision leaves the door open under certain
conditions for the conclusion of international agreements concerning the use of
nuclear energy, including nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive
materials. Another general prohibition concerns outer space: placing objects
carrying nuclear arms on the moon or in orbit around the moon is forbidden by the
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies of December 5, 1979.20
Most international nuclear regulations concern nuclear weapons. In 1995, the
UN General Assembly asked the International Court of Justice for an advisory
opinion on the legality of the threat of use of nuclear weapons. 21 The Court
answered the request but reached its conclusions after some difficulty. First, it
found by a vote of 11-3 that neither customary nor conventional international law
prohibits nuclear weapons as such.22 According to the Court, however, "threat or
use of nuclear weapons should.., be compatible with.., the principles and rules of
16. Rio Declaration, supra note 11, Principle 13.
17. Comparable provisions are incorporated in several treaties concerning pollution. Convention
on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents art. 13, Mar. 17, 1992, 2105 U.N.T.S. 457.
However, other treaties such as the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
exclude the issue of responsibility and liability from their coverage. See Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 10,541, 1302 U.N.T.S. 217.
18. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794,402 U.N.T.S. 71.
19. Id. at art. V(1).
20. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art.
3(3), Dec. 18, 1979, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 1363 U.N.T.S. 21.
21. G.A. Res.49/75[K], U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/75 (Dec. 15, 1994).
22. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 14, 105(2)(B).
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international humanitarian law, as well as with specific obligations under treaties
and other undertakings which expressly deal with nuclear weapons. ''23
The Court noted that certain treaties prohibit the use of nuclear weapons in
specific geographic areas, but none of them prohibit the threat of use of nuclear
weapons.24 It added, however, that "the threat or use of nuclear weapons would
generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict
and, in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.",
25
The Court further recognized "that the use of nuclear weapons could
constitute a catastrophe for the environment" which does not represent "an
abstraction but... the living space, the quality of life and the very health of human
beings, including generations unborn.",26 Given this, the Court held that "States
must take environmental considerations into account when assessing what is
necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military objectives. 27 The
Court also referred to provisions of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, embodying "a general obligation to protect the natural environment
against widespread, long-term and severe environmental damage. 28
Nearly all states of the world are party to the oldest international treaty
prohibiting specific nuclear activities, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests
in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, adopted in Moscow on
August 5, 1963.29 Five years later, the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty) obliged each state having no such weapons to
ensure that nuclear materials, equipment, facilities and information are not used to
advance military purposes. 30 The Non-Proliferation Treaty requires the more than
175 contracting states to accept international safeguards under the supervision of
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), created in 1956 in order to
hasten and increase "the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and
prosperity throughout the world., 31  The IAEA Statute provides for reporting
requirements, installation of monitoring equipment, and on-site inspections.
32
More than 145 States have entered into bilateral safeguard agreements with the
IAEA.33 In addition, several regions of the world have declared themselves
23. Id. at 105(D).
24. Id. at 62, 63.
25. Id. at 105(E).
26. Id. at 29.
27. Id. at 30.
28. Id. at 31; see Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) arts. 35(3), 55, June
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
29. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water,
Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
30. Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons art. III(1), July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483,
729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT].
31. Id.; Statute of the Int'l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] art. II, Oct. 23, 1956, 276 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter IAEA Statute].
32. IAEA Statute, supra note 31, art. XII.
33. IAEA Safeguards and Verification, http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sv.html (last
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nuclear weapons-free zones. The use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is,
however, admitted.34
The adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty in New York on
September 10, 1996 provided an important step forward in international nuclear
regulatory law. Even though this treaty is not yet in force, practically all states
signed and a large majority also ratified it.35 The basic obligation it imposes upon
the contracting parties is not to carry out any nuclear test explosion and to prohibit
and prevent any such nuclear explosion under its jurisdiction or control.36
Furthermore, parties also must "refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way
participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other
nuclear explosion., 37  This treaty additionally established the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization in order to ensure the implementation of its
provisions. 
3 8
Many other international regulations of radiation aim to safeguard human
health and life. These regulations are mainly related to the security of nuclear
materials and of radioactive wastes. The LAEA Statute foresees that the Agency
must adopt norms for nuclear safety and codes of procedure which it then proposes
to member states. 39 These norms include radioactive waste management. 40 In the
execution of its mandate, the IAEA had adopted guidelines for monitoring and
preventing radiological contamination of personnel and the environment, safe
handling and the transport of radioactive materials, treatment of radioactive wastes,
and containment and safety of nuclear power plants.41 Unfortunately, not all
nuclear states have fully implemented these directives, which are recommendations
considered "soft law."
42
However, IAEA also sponsored legally binding treaties such as the
Convention on Nuclear Safety adopted in Vienna on June 17, 1994 which entered
into force two years later.43 The Convention reaffirms "that responsibility for
visited Oct. 16, 2007).
34. See, e.g., Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
art. 1, Feb. 14, 1967, 634 U.N.T.S. 326; South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty art. 4, Aug. 6, 1985,
1445 U.N.T.S. 177; Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone art. 4, Dec. 15, 1995, 35
I.L.M. 635; Treaty on the Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Africa art. 8, Apr. 11, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 698.
35. Status of signatures and ratifications by geographic region,
http://www.ctbto.org/sr/310707_sigratpdf.pdf (indicating that out of 195 total States, 177 States had
signed and 140 of those signatories had ratified as of Sept. 5, 2007) (last visited Oct. 16, 2007).
36. Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty art. I(1), Sept. 10, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1439.
37. Id. at art. I(2).
38. Id. at art. II(A)(1).
39. IAEA Statute, supra note 31, art. III(A)(6).
40. IAEA Safety Standards: Radioactive waste management, http://www-
ns.iaea.org/standards/documents/default.asp?sub=170 (last visited Oct. 16, 2007).
41. See Nuclear Safety and Security Publications, http://www-ns.iaea.org/publications/default.htm
(last visited Oct. 16, 2007).
42. See David B. Dixon, Transnational Shipments of Nuclear Materials by Sea: Do Current
Safeguards Provide Coastal States a Right to Deny Innocent Passage?, 16 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y
73, 84-87 (2006).
43. Convention on Nuclear Safety, June 17, 1994, S. TREATY DOC. No. 104-6 (1995), 1963
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nuclear safety rests with the State having jurisdiction over a nuclear installation. '"44
The general obligation of the contracting parties to this convention is "to establish
and maintain effective defences in nuclear installations against potential
radiological hazards," in particular by reviewing as soon as possible the safety of
existing nuclear installations.45 The Convention stresses the importance of the
legislative and regulatory framework which each party shall establish and maintain
in order to ensure the safety of the nuclear installations, including a system of
licensing, inspection and term of licenses.46 A regulatory body shall be established
or designated in each contracting party 47 and adequate financial resources made
"available to support the safety of each nuclear installation throughout its life."'48
State parties must establish and implement quality assurance programs for
satisfying specific "requirements for all activities important to nuclear safety
throughout the life of a nuclear installation.
'
"
49
The Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary
Context also includes nuclear activities. 50  This instrument was prepared in the
framework of the UN Economic Commission for Europe and adopted in Espoo,
Finland on February 25, 1991.51 The Convention obligates the state parties to take
either individually or jointly, "all appropriate and effective measures to prevent,
reduce and control significant adverse transboundary environmental impact from
proposed activities. 52  In particular, the party of origin of an activity listed in
Appendix I to the Convention shall ensure that "an environmental impact
assessment is undertaken prior to a decision to authorize or undertake a proposed
activity., 53 Nuclear power stations and other nuclear reactors must submit to the
procedure of an environmental impact assessment, with the exception of "research
installations for the production and conversion of fissionable and fertile materials,
whose maximum power does not exceed 1 kilowatt continuous thermal load.",
54
Appendix II gives the definition of the content of the environmental impact
assessment documentation.55 Appendix IV institutes an inquiry procedure and
foresees mixed inquiry commissions of experts. 56 Appendix V has a particular
importance since it provides for post-project analysis in order to monitor
"compliance with the conditions as set out in the authorization or approval of the
U.N.T.S. 293 [hereinafter Convention on Nuclear Safety].
44. Id. at pmbl. iii.
45. Id. at arts. l(ii), 6.
46. Id. at art. 7.
47. Id. at art. 8(1).
48. Id. at art. 11(1).
49. Id. at art. 13.
50. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context app. I(2)-(3),
Feb. 25, 1991, 1989 U.N.T.S. 309.
51. Id.
52. Id. at art. 2(l).
53. Id. at art. 2(3).
54. Id. at art. 2(2); id. at app. 1(2).
55. Id. at app. II.
56. Id. at app. IV.
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activity and the effectiveness of mitigation measures., 57 Furthermore, Appendix
V governs the "[r]eview of an impact for proper management and in order to cope
with uncertainties" and the "[v]erification of past predictions in order to transfer
experience to future activities of the same type. 58
In Kiev on May 21, 2003, a Protocol to the Espoo Convention was adopted on
Strategic Environmental Assessment, expanding the obligations of the contracting
parties. 59 This Protocol aims to establish a new procedure providing for a high
level of environmental protection by evaluating the likely environmental impacts,
including health effects. 60  The procedure "comprises the determination of the
scope of an environmental report and its preparation, the carrying out of public
participation and consultations, and the taking into account of the environmental
report and the results of the public participation and consultations in a plan or
programme. '6 ' Transboundary consultation with concerned authorities shall be
held for projects listed in Annex I to the Protocol, which includes decision-making
related to production and conversion of fissionable and fertile materials with
limited power. 62
The Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters requires the state
parties to take the necessary legislative, regulatory and other measures to achieve
the objectives of the Convention.63 The Aarhus Convention includes the following
in the list of activities which must be submitted to the Convention's requirements
when deciding whether to permit them:
Nuclear power stations and other nuclear reactors including the
dismantling or decommissioning of such power stations or reactors
(except research installations for the production and conversion of
fissionable and fertile materials whose maximum power does not
exceed 1 kW continuous thermal load); Installations for the
reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel....
As to the transport of nuclear material, the IAEA adopted a Code of Practice
on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste in 1991 .65
This Code has the character of a recommendation but has been actually adopted by
the UN and all other international organizations concerned with the transport of
57. Id. at app. V(a).
58. Id. at app. V(b)-(c).
59. United Nations Economic Commission for Europe [UNECE], Protocol on Strategic
Environmental Assessment to the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary
Context, pmbl., U.N. Doc. ECE/MP.EIA/2003/2 (May 21,2003).
60. Id. at art. 1.
61. Id. at art. 2(6).
62. Id. at art. 4(2); id. at Annex 1(2).
63. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to
Justice in Environmental Matters art. 3(1), June 25, 1998, 2161 U.N.T.S. 447.
64. Id. at art. 6(1)(a); id. at Annex I(1).
65. IAEA, Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste,
Gen. Conf Res. 530, IAEA Doc. GC(XXXIV)/RES/530 (Sept. 21, 1990) [hereinafter IAEA Code of
Practice].
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66hazardous materials, as well as by a large number of states. In general, the
regulation holds the shipper responsible for design safety and for the correct
assembly of the package, as well as for labelling and marking. 67 The carrier is
responsible for providing the necessary control measures during transport and
storage in transit. 68 In June 2001, amendments to the International Convention for
the Safety of Life at Sea sponsored by the International Maritime Organization
69
made mandatory an International Code for the Safe Carriage of Packaged
Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium, and High-Level Radioactive Wastes on Board
Ships. 70  The Code's provisions include a shipboard emergency plan for an
incident, training, cargo securing arrangements, notification in the event of an
incident, and damage stability.71
B. Notification of Nuclear Accidents and Assistance
In 1969, the IAEA published directives concerning procedures to be followed
in case of a nuclear accident.72 These directives were further developed in 1981
and 1985 but were not implemented, as demonstrated by the Chernobyl accident of
April 26, 1986 which released huge quantities of radioactive material into the air.
73
Although in the short term casualties were only observed in the Soviet Union,
foreign consequences were severe. The radioactive cloud moved to Scandinavia
first, then to the south, crossing Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Hungary and
Italy.74 No convention or other international regulation applied at the time the
accident occurred; the interpretation then given of the Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution excluded pollution by radioactive elements. 75 The
IAEA was requested to assist in fact-finding concerning the circumstances of the
accident and to prepare a text applicable in cases of nuclear accidents of
international scope.76 Two treaties were prepared with an unusual speed and both
were adopted on September 26, 1986. 77
66. Id. at art. 1; see, e.g., Prohibition of the Dumping of Radioactive Wastes, G.A. Res. 60/57, 3,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/57 (Dec. 8, 2005); ALEXANDRE Kiss & DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 624 (3d ed. 2004); WORLD NUCLEAR TRANSPORT INSTITUTE, FACT SHEET No.
1, SAFETY REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL, available at
http://www.wnti.co.uk/UserFiles/File/public/publications/factsheets/wnti fs 2007/FS-l.pdf.
67. KisS & SHELTON, supra note 66, at 624.
68. Id.
69. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea ch. VII (as amended June 2001), Nov. 1,
1974,32 U.S.T. 47, 1184 U.N.T.S. 278.
70. International Maritime Organization [IMO], International Code for the Safe Carriage of
Packaged Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium and High-Level Radioactive Wastes on Board Ships (INF
Code), IMO Doc. Resolution MSC.88(71) (May 27, 1999).
71. Id. at chs. 10,9,6, 11,2.
72. Kiss & SHELTON, supra note 66, at 618.
73. Id.
74. Id., supra note 66, at 619; LORRIS G. COCKERHAM & BARBARA S. SHANE, BASIC
ENVIRONMENTAL TOXICOLOGY 246 (CRC Press 1993).
75. KISS & SHELTON, supra note 66, at 619; Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air
Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 10,541; 1302 U.N.T.S. 217.
76. KISS & SHELTON, supra note 66, at 122.
77. Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, Sept. 26, 1986, 1439 U.N.T.S. 275,
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The first of the two conventions, relating to early notification of a nuclear
accident, establishes the essential obligation of states party to the convention to
give notice, without delay, of any nuclear accident and to rapidly furnish pertinent
available information in order to limit the radioactive consequences in other
countries as much as possible. Article 5 details the information to be furnished
to the extent the notifying state knows, which includes the exact time, location and
the nature of the accident, the installation or activity concerned, the presumed or
known cause, the likely evolution of the accident, and the general characteristics of
the radioactive discharge. 79 The notifying state should also provide information on
current meteorological conditions and measures taken or projected outside the
site.8 ° This information should be supplemented as new data becomes available.
8 1
The affected states can demand further information or consultations to limit the
radioactive consequences within their jurisdictions.8 2  Information furnished
confidentially should not be released to the public. 83 Each state should indicate to
IAEA which should also receive the information and transmit it to each state that
requests it - the responsible authorities and the points of contact capable of
furnishing the notification. 4
The second convention, adopted on the same day in Vienna, creates a general
framework for Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological
Emergency.85 This Convention aims at cooperation between the states themselves
and with IAEA. The details of this cooperation should be determined by bilateral
or multilateral arrangements, or a combination of these, for minimizing injury and
damage resulting from the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency.
8 6
If a state party needs assistance, "whether or not such accident or emergency
originates within its territory, jurisdiction or control, it may call for such assistance
from any other State Party... and from the Agency., 8 7 A "State Party to which a
request for such assistance is directed shall promptly decide... whether it is in a
position to render the assistance requested., 8 8 Thus, the Convention does not
impose concrete obligations on states, and the refusal of assistance cannot be
considered a violation of an international treaty implying international
responsibility.
25 I.L.M. 1370 [hereinafter Convention on Early Notification]; Convention on Assistance in the Case of
Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, Sept. 26, 1986, 1457 U.N.T.S. 133, 25 I.L.M. 1377
[hereinafter Convention on Assistance].
78. Convention on Early Notification, supra note 77, art. 2(b).
79. Id. at art. 5(1)(a)-(d).
80. Id. at art. 5(l)(e).
81. Id. at art. 5(2).
82. Id. at art. 6.
83. Id. at art. 5(3).
84. Id. at arts. 4, 7.
85. Convention on Assistance, supra note 77, at pmbl.
86. Id. at art. 1.
87. Id. at art. 2(1).
88. Id. at art. 2(3).
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C. Nuclear Waste
In many cases, the disposal of radioactive wastes is accomplished within a
state's borders. However, the level of international shipments appears to be rising,
which poses the problem of international transport and the immersion of
radioactive wastes in areas beyond national jurisdiction. Several international
conventions contain provisions aimed at the dumping of radioactive wastes. The
London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes
and Other Matter of December 29, 1972 forbids the immersion of "high-level
radioactive wastes or other high level radioactive matter... as unsuitable for
dumping at sea." 89 A non-binding resolution adopted by the Consultative Meeting
of the Convention established a moratorium on all dumping at sea of radioactive
materials pending scientific studies, but several states publicly opted not to
comply, including most states possessing nuclear weapons. 90  In 1994, the
International Maritime Organization made the ban obligatory. 91 All state parties,
with the exception of Russia, accepted this ban. Annex I, paragraph 9 now
provides that materials containing more than de minimis levels of radioactivity
shall not be considered eligible for the dumping. 92 The ban is subject to a 25 year
scientific review. 93
The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the
Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, adopted in Vienna on September 5,
1997 and binding upon more than thirty states, reaffirms "that the ultimate
responsibility for ensuring the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste
management rests with the State."94  National measures and international
cooperation should be enhanced to achieve and maintain a high level of safety
worldwide in spent fuel and radioactive waste management. 95 "This Convention
shall apply... when the spent fuel results from the operation of civilian nuclear
reactors" and civilian applications but not "to the safety of management of spent
fuel or radioactive waste within military or defence programmes" except "when
such materials are transferred permanently to and managed within exclusively
civilian programmes."' 96 "Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps
to ensure that at all stages of spent fuel management, individuals, society and the
89. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other Matter
Annex 1(6), Dec. 29, 1972, 1046 U.N.T.S. 120, 26 U.S.T. 2403 [hereinafter London Dumping
Convention]; KIss & SHELTON, supra note 66, at 531.
90. International Maritime Organization [IMO], Disposal of Radio-Active Wastes And Other
Radio-Active Matter at Sea, Seventh Consultative Meeting, IMO Doc. LDC 7/12, Annex 3 Resolution
LDC 14(7) (Feb. 1983); Steven D. Lavine, Russian Dumping in the Sea of Japan, 24 DENV. J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 417, 426-27 (1996).
91. IMO, Amendments to the Annexes to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping of Wastes and other Matter, Sixteenth Consultative Meeting, IMO Doc. LC 16/14, Annex 5,
Resolution LC.51(16) (1993).
92. London Dumping Convention, supra note 89, at Annex 1(9).
93. Id. at Annex 1(12).
94. Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive
Waste Management pmbl. vi, Sept. 5, 1997, 2153 U.N.T.S. 357.
95. Id. at art. I(i).
96. Id. at art. 1-3.
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environment are adequately protected against radiological hazards... in the
framework of its national legislation which has due regard to internationally
endorsed criteria and standards." 97 This legislative and regulatory framework also
provides for the establishment of national safety requirements and regulations for
radiation safety, a licensing system for spent fuel and radioactive waste
management activities and the prohibition of such facilities without a license.
98
Article 21 concerns responsibility, stating that each Contracting Party shall ensure
that the prime responsibility for the spent fuel or radioactive waste management
rests with the licence holder and each Party will take the appropriate steps to
ensure that each license holder meets their responsibility. 99 If there is no license
holder, or other responsible party, responsibility rests with the State having
jurisdiction over the spent fuel or radioactive waste. 100
IV. STATE RESPONSIBILITY
According to the articles of the International Law Commission,
Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international
responsibility of that State. There is an internationally wrongful act of a
State when conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) Is
attributable to the State under international law; and (b) Constitutes a
breach of an international obligation of the State. 1
0
'
Nuclear activities are included in the general obligation resulting from
customary international law, which entails State responsibility "to ensure that
activities within their [a State's] jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction." 10 2  Whether the damage needs to be the consequence of a fault
attributable to the State where the activities took place is the primary question to be
determined.
Specific obligations resulting from treaties impose upon the contracting States
the obligation to take the necessary measures through exercising due diligence in
order to prevent such damage, either by prohibiting or by regulating such activities.
The rule that the wrongful act should be attributable to the State is included in the
customary law principle that the State has the responsibility to ensure that such
activities do not cause damage.1 °3 In addition, most of the previously discussed
treaty provisions related to nuclear activities include specific obligations providing
for State control on such activities: licensing, surveillance, or even prohibition if
necessary. 10 4 In reality, it is hard to imagine that a State could ignore nuclear
97. Id. at art. 4(iv).
98. Id. at art. 19(2)(i)-(iii).
99. Id. at art. 21(1).
100. Id. at art. 21(2).
101. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 5, arts. 1-2.
102. See Kiss & SHELTON, supra note 66, at 84-85; Stockholm Declaration, supra note 10,
Principle 21.
103. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 601(1) (1987).
104. See discussion supra Part III.
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activities and transport within its jurisdiction, with the exception of very minor
activities such as isotopes used for medical treatment. Such exemptions are also
foreseen by several treaty provisions.
Articles 5 and 7 of the articles of the International Law Commission are quite
clear that the conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State but
"which is empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of the
governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State under international
law.... even if it exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions."' 0 5 The same
rule applies to persons or groups acting in fact on the instructions of, or under the
direction or control, of a State. 106
While international responsibility is founded on fault imputable to the acting
State, it is not necessary that a state intentionally or maliciously violates an
international obligation to attribute responsibility. Fault exists if the actor fails to
perform a duty or observe a standard, such as omitting to inform an organ
designated by a treaty for surveying the implementation of the treaty.
10 7
Generally, the applicable international rules and standards do not hold a state
responsible when it has taken necessary and practicable measures, by exercising
due diligence for the prevention of damage or for assisting the potential or real
victims. 108
The articles of the International Law Commission listed in Chapter V describe
circumstances precluding wrongfulness. 109 Most circumstances do not seem to be
applicable to illegal nuclear activities: self-defense, countermeasures in respect to
an internationally wrongful act, and situations of distress. 1 Article 23 precludes
the wrongfulness of an act in certain circumstances, namely if the act is due to
force majeure - if the "occurrence of an irresistible force or of an unforeseen event,
beyond the control of the State" led to a situation of necessity, "making it
materially impossible in the circumstances to perform the obligation.""' This
exemption does not apply, however, if the State has assumed the risk of such a
situation occurring, which can be linked with the siting of a nuclear installation. 1
2
Article 25, relating to necessity, is less likely to be invoked by a State as a ground
for precluding the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international
obligation, unless the act is "the only way for the State to safeguard an essential
interest against a grave and imminent peril" and "[d]oes not seriously impair an
essential interest of the State or States towards which the obligation exists, or of
the international community as a whole." 113 Furthermore, it cannot be invoked
105. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 5, at arts. 5, 7.
106. Id. at art. 8.
107. Kiss & SHELTON, supra note 66, at 320.
108. Id. at 320-21.
109. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 5, at ch. V.
110. Id. at arts. 21, 22, 24.
111. Id. at art. 23(1).
112. Id. at art. 23(2)(b).
113. Id. at art. 25(1).
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when the State has contributed to the situation of necessity." 4  All of these
principles of general international law may apply where nuclear activities are
involved.
Several treaties also include provisions related to State responsibility in this
field. The Vienna Convention on Nuclear Safety adopted on June 17, 1994,
reaffirms in its preamble that responsibility for nuclear safety rests with the state
having jurisdiction over a nuclear installation. 115 "Nuclear installation" means, as
formulated in Article 2(i), "any land-based civil nuclear power plant... including
such storage, handling and treatment facilities for radioactive materials as are on
the same site and are directly related to the operation of the nuclear power
plant."' 116 "Such a plant ceases to be a nuclear installation when all nuclear fuel
elements have been removed permanently from the reactor core and have been
stored safely in accordance with approved procedures, and a decommissioning
program has been agreed to by the regulatory body." 1
7
According to Article 1(1) of the 1986 Vienna Convention on Early
Notification of a Nuclear Accident, which governs the cooperation in this field
between the State parties, the Convention "shall apply in the event of any accident
involving facilities or activities of a State Party or of persons or legal entities under
its jurisdiction or control... from which a release of radioactive material occurs or
is likely to occur and which has resulted or may result in an international
transboundary release that could be of radiological safety significance for another
State." 118  The duty to make the notification is incumbent upon the state or
origin. 119
Principle 13 of the Declaration of the Conference on Environment and
Development held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 calls on states to "cooperate in an
expeditious and more determined manner to develop further international law
regarding liability and compensation for adverse effects of environmental damage
caused by activities within their jurisdiction or control to areas beyond their
jurisdiction."' 120 Several international conventions also invite states to cooperate in
the formulation and adoption of appropriate rules and procedures for the
determination of liability and compensation for damage resulting from violations
of obligations under their provisions. 121
114. Id. at art. 25(2)(b).
115. Convention on Nuclear Safety, supra note 43, at pmbl. vi.
116. Id. at art. 2(i).
117. Id.
118. Convention on Early Notification, supra note 77, at art. 1(1).
119. Id. at art. 2.
120. Rio Declaration, supra note 11, at Principle 13.
121. Such provisions are incorporated mainly in treaties concerning marine pollution, starting with
the 1978 Kuwait Regional Convention for Cooperation on the Protection of the Marine Environment
from Pollution. Kuwait Regional Convention for Cooperation on the Protection of the Marine
Environment from Pollution art. XIII, Apr. 24, 1978, 1140 U.N.T.S. 155.
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V. DAMAGE CAUSED BY A NUCLEAR ACTIVITY
At a relatively early stage of the period during which environmental concern
emerged, on May 21, 1963, a Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage
was adopted in Vienna. 22 Article I(1) of this Convention gave a first definition of
nuclear damage which could be considered of fundamental importance:
(k) 'Nuclear damage' means -
(i) loss of life, any personal injury or any loss of, or damage to, property
which arises out of or results from the radioactive properties or a
combination of radioactive properties with toxic, explosive or other
hazardous properties of nuclear fuel or radioactive products or waste in,
or of nuclear material coming from, originating in, or sent to, a nuclear
installation;
(ii) any other loss or damage so arising or resulting if and to the extent
that the law of the competent court so provides; and
(iii) if the law of the Installation State so provides, loss of life, any
personal injury or any loss of, or damage to, property which arises out
of or results from other ionizing radiation emitted by any other source
of radiation inside a nuclear installation.
(1) 'Nuclear incident' means any occurrence or series of occurrences
having the same origin which causes nuclear damage. 123
Although the 1963 Vienna Convention only concerns civil non-State liability
and so transfers the problem from interstate responsibility governed by public
international law to an inter-individual level of private international law, the
definition of nuclear damage can be used in both fields.
A Protocol of September 12, 1997, however, amended this text. 124 While the
principal treaty is ratified by more than forty states, the amendments have been
accepted only by five. It is thus interesting to compare the two texts. According to
the new version:
(k) 'Nuclear Damage' means -
(i) loss of life, any personal injury;
(ii) loss of or damage to property; and each of the following to the
extent determined by the law of the competent court -
(iii) economic loss arising from loss or damage referred to in sub-
paragraph (i) or (ii)...;
(iv) the costs of measures of reinstatement of impaired environment...;
122. Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, 1063 U.N.T.S. 265.
123. Id. at art. I(1)(k)-(l).
124. IAEA, Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage
Annex, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/566 (July 22, 1998).
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(v) loss of income deriving from an economic interest in any use or
enjoyment of the environment...;
(vi) the costs of preventive measures, and further loss or damage
caused by such measures;
(vii) any other economic loss.... 125
It must be stressed again that these provisions inserted in interstate treaties
should be considered only as models for the definition of environmental damage
and are not applicable by their own terms in relations between states.
VI. REPARATION FOR DAMAGE
According to the articles of the International Law Commission, "[f]ull
reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act shall take the
form of restitution," which means the re-establishment of the situation which
existed before the wrongful act was committed. 26  The application of this
generally recognized principle raises major problems for health and environmental
damages. Such damages are not easy to evaluate, and in some situations re-
establishment of the situation is not possible. The extinction of a species of wild
flora or fauna which had no commercial value provides an example. Nuclear
activities can also produce long-term effects on health which only appear after
years, so the establishment of the causal link with the activity can be very difficult
if not impossible.
The Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage
adopted in Vienna on September 12, 1997, uses the term "reinstatement" instead of
the usual word "reparation" of environmental damage.127 This might be explained
by the intention to avoid confusion with the concept of reparation in international
law since the Convention mainly concerns national procedures. Still, it can be
useful to quote the definition given:
'Measures of reinstatement' means any reasonable measures which
have been approved by the competent authorities of the State where the
measures were taken, and which aim to reinstate or restore damaged or
destroyed components of the environment, or to introduce, where
reasonable, the equivalent of these components into the environment.
The law of the State where the damage is suffered shall determine who
is entitled to take such measures. 
128
Although the Convention applies to nuclear damage for which an operator of
a nuclear installation used for peaceful purposes situated in the territory of a
Contracting Party is liable, the installation state shall ensure the availability of a
certain amount for the compensation of nuclear damage. 129 Such compensation
125. Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damages, supra note 122, at art. I(1)(k).
126. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 5, at arts. 34-35.
127. Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage art. I(g), Sept. 12, 1997, 36
I.L.M. 1473.
128. Id.
129. Id. at art. III(1).
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shall be distributed "without discrimination on the basis of nationality, domicile or
residence."' 130 The national law of the Contracting Parties should conform to the
provisions of the Convention providing for strict liability and requiring the
indemnification of any person other than the operator liable for nuclear damage.
131
It flows from the rules of international law that if a contracting party fails to
implement such provisions, its international responsibility can be invoked.
According to Article 46 of the articles of the International Law Commission,
"[w]here several States are injured by the same internationally wrongful act, each
injured State may separately invoke the responsibility of the State which has
committed the internationally wrongful act."' 132 This principle, which expresses
customary international law, could have been invoked by each State whose
territory was affected by the consequences of the 1986 Chernobyl accident. It is
characteristic that, owing to the difficulty of establishing the causal link between
the explosion and the damage to human health, to flora and fauna and to other
natural resources on the one hand and the time which could elapse between the
accident and the consequences which it produced on the other hand, the reaction of
the international community was the exceptionally rapid conclusion of the two
Vienna Conventions on information and assistance.
VII. CONCLUSION
The last remark summarizes the use of international legal rules related to State
responsibility and liability for nuclear damage. It is certain that these rules are
applicable to such damage. The definition of the damage itself and the conditions
of proof given the difficulty in establishing the causal link between the damage and
the act which is supposed to be at its origin make it, however, very difficult to
apply the rules of general international law to nuclear accidents and their
consequences. The principle of responsibility for nuclear damage is not denied,
but States have found it safer to transfer the solution to the problems raised by
responsibility from the inter-State level to that of individual claims brought in
national jurisdictions. This transfer is a way to replace inter-State relations
governed by international public law with inter-individual litigation, which means
using the rules of international private law.
At the inter-State level there remains much to do. IAEA was created during a
period where the dominating opinion believed that nuclear energy could solve an
important part of the problems of humankind by providing a reliable and long-term
source of energy. As a consequence, this institution was invested initially with the
task of helping countries develop nuclear energy. The evolution of our knowledge
in this field, but also the realities of international life, made us understand that the
major problem of nuclear activities was not their promotion, but their surveillance
and control. Such tasks can be ensured only by an agency having the exclusive
task to ensure nuclear safety. However, the failure of the recent attempt to reform
the United Nations showed that any proposal to completely change the mandate of
130. Id. at art. 111(2).
131. Id. at Annex art. 2.
132. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 5, at art, 46.
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the IAEA in this direction, or to create a new institution, might not be realistic. At
the same time, IAEA has successfully developed international legislation aimed at
the improvement of nuclear safety. IAEA has even demonstrated in several
situations its capacity to impose its control over certain nuclear activities and thus
contribute to the establishment of the conditions of international responsibility and
liability. Accordingly, one of the main conclusions of this presentation is the
importance of reinforcing the capacity of the institution of Vienna to control and
ensure compliance with existing nuclear safety regulations and developing new
compulsory rules in this field insisting on the responsibility and liability of States
in this domain.
Other conclusions include the following: the determination that States are
responsible under international law for any failure to exercise due diligence over
the siting and operation of nuclear facilities and the transport and disposal of
nuclear wastes; State parties are responsible for any failure to enforce the Paris and
Vienna liability treaties; operators of nuclear facilities and shippers are strictly
liable for any harm caused by their activities; and States are responsible for
transfrontier harm at least when it results from negligence or intentional pollution
and possibly even for harm resulting from accidents.1 33 Furthermore, the law of
state responsibility allows injured states to bring a claim, however, the problem in
defining what constitutes sufficient injury in this field should be further studied.
Even states only potentially affected, or that cannot prove injury, should be able to
claim obligations erga omnes. It should be understood that breach of a treaty
obligation regarding nuclear activities should permit another state party to invoke
state responsibility even in the absence of injury.
133. The current study of the International Law Commission on the latter issue should be followed
and supported with contributions to this work to the extent possible.
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THE PROBLEMS AND GAPS IN THE NUCLEAR LIABILITY
CONVENTIONS AND AN ANALYSIS OF How AN ACTUAL CLAIM
WOULD BE BROUGHT UNDER THE CURRENT EXISTING TREATY
REGIME IN THE EVENT OF A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT
DUNCAN E. J. CURRIE1
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper addresses the problems and gaps in the existing nuclear liability
conventions and conducts an analysis of how an actual claim would be brought
under the current existing treaty regime in the event of a nuclear accident.
The nuclear liability conventions have been described with some justification
as forming a very complex labyrinth. However since the Labyrinth was an
elaborate maze to hold the Minotaur, the description may mislead. In this case, it
could be said that the Minotaur largely constructed the labyrinth.
The international nuclear liability regime is extremely patchy, complicated
and features sparse participation. While the recent amendments to the Vienna and
Paris Conventions are much heralded, they are heavily hedged with exceptions and
the amended Protocols enjoy even more sparse participation than the original
Conventions. Others, such as the Convention on Supplementary Convention, are
not in force; and for those that are in force, many major nuclear countries are not
party to them. So discussion of Conventions must take into account their
membership.
Characteristics of the system include that no neutral tribunal is provided and
claimants are generally required to file claims in the courts where the nuclear
installation is located, even with respect to nuclear transports on the high seas, with
attendant costs, concerns about neutrality of the courts and law, and limitations of
recoverable damages. Liability is limited in time and in amount, amounting to a
subsidy of the nuclear industry; the definition of damage is narrow and likely to be
interpreted by the courts of the installation state; and the treaties that are there enjoy
very narrow participation.
The value of these features to victims of nuclear accidents and to non-nuclear
States is limited. While unlimited liability may lead to the ruin of the operator,
limited liability may lead to the ruin of the victim. Other arguments are that the
1. © 2005 Duncan E. J. Currie. Barrister of the High Court of New Zealand. Email
duncanc@globelaw.com. The author gratefully acknowledges the suggestions of Professor Jon van
Dyke. All errors are of course those of the author. All web references were as at Oct. 11, 2005 unless
otherwise noted.
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capacity of the insurance market is limited. Non-nuclear States and others may
question why they or the environment at large should be subjected to risks which
exceed the capacity of the insurance market. Similarly, with respect to the
limitation of time, the existence of radiation may not be known, consequences may
not be manifested until later generations, and even when they are manifested, the
causes may not be known or may be difficult to prove. Thus even a thirty year
time period may be too short for claimants, and ten years clearly would be too short
for claims for inter-generational injury.
Other barriers to justice exist, such as high legal costs, security for costs,
liability for costs of the opposing party, access to legal aid and standing
requirements, particularly to defend the environment, as opposed to property
interests. Groups acting in the general interest and to protect the environment
should have standing, as should groups representing fishing interest, farmers and
communities. The burden of proof and causation issues may place insurmountable
barriers on claims, as they have in past cases in the United Kingdom.
Three frequent concerns of non-nuclear States, being terrorist attacks,
environmental damage and pure economic loss, are all likely to fall within
exceptions. The 1997 Vienna Protocol introduces a poorly defined exception for
military installations. There are also some significant pitfalls in joining the
Conventions, in exposing Parties to low limits in other Conventions. The absence
of explicit provisions on standing raise questions on the ability of groups to act to
protect the environment.
The 1997 Vienna Protocol does explicitly extend the geographical coverage of
damage covered, covering damage 'wherever suffered', but leaves jurisdiction in
the Installation State; and while it extends the definition of damage, it leaves much
discretion to the laws of the Installation State. Economic loss arising from loss of
life, any personal injury or any loss of, or damage to, property is covered, but
economic loss other than that specified in the new definitions is only covered if
permitted by the law of the competent court, which will usually be the Installation
State. So economic loss to tourism and fisheries, for instance, which is not arising
from damage to property or personal injury as such, may well not be compensated.
So-called 'rumor damage', or economic loss caused by an incident without
necessarily being predicated on actual contamination, is no less real for the lack of
contamination.
The 1997 Vienna Protocol does introduce preventive measures, but if nuclear
damage has not yet occurred, these measures can only be taken where there is a
.grave and imminent threat'. Costs of reinstatement of the impaired environment
are covered, provided the impairment is significant and reinstatement measures are
actually taken. So where reinstatement is not possible, compensation may not be
forthcoming. The limitation of compensation to measures actually taken omits any
value of the impairment of the environment as such where reinstatement or
remediation is not possible, taking into account any impact on biodiversity and the
non-economic value of the environment including value to future generations.
Compensation for environmental impairment is limited to loss of income deriving
from an economic interest in any use or enjoyment of the environment, where the
environment was significantly impaired. The revised Convention extends the ten
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year time limit for claims to thirty years for loss of life and personal injury, as does
the 2004 Paris Protocol. On standing, the revised Vienna Convention does provide
that the State may bring an action on behalf of victims, but otherwise standing
provisions are extremely limited. Standing for groups to claim for economic loss
for environmental impairment would depend on whether they are entitled to claim,
leaving the matter to the lexfori.
The 2004 Paris Protocol has a more restricted geographical application, and
does not cover damage caused on the high seas or other areas beyond national
jurisdiction. It also does not include the Vienna Protocol residual definition of
economic loss. The Paris Protocol does allow a Party to subject passage through its
territory to increase the minimum amounts of liability.
A number of recommendations are made including criteria for a liability
regime where there is unlimited liability, a broad definition of recoverable damage,
absolute liability with few or no exceptions, all responsible parties bear joint and
several liability and a neutral tribunal for the adjudication of claims. Three damage
scenarios are postulated, to provide an opportunity to examine how the system may
work in practice.
II. INTRODUCTION TO THE LIABILITY TREATY SYSTEM
The Paris and Vienna Conventions have a number of features in common.
They both:
1. Limit liability to a certain amount and limit the period for making
claims
2. Require insurance or other surety by operators
3. Channel liability exclusively to the operator of the nuclear installation
4. Impose strict liability on the nuclear operator, regardless of fault, but
subject to exceptions. This is sometimes incorrectly referred to as absolute
liability.
5. Grant exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of one country, normally the
country in whose territory the incident occurs.
Of these, only the second and fourth offer significant benefits to victims of an
accident or incident, and even then, the strict liability is militated by various
exceptions.
The international liability regime is primarily contained in two sets of
instruments: the International Atomic Energy Agency's [IAEA] Vienna
Convention of 1963 which entered into force in 1977,2 and the OECD's Paris
Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 1960 which
2. Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, opened for signature May 21, 1963,
1063 U.N.T.S. 26, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1996/infSOO.shtml
[hereinafter Vienna Convention] (Status available at
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/liability-status.pdf. Status of Conventions
given in this paper are according to the latest information made available in the references cited).
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entered into force in 1968, 3 and which was bolstered by the Brussels
Supplementary Convention in 1963. The Brussels Convention 4 supplements the
very low liability levels starting with the Paris Convention of SDR 5 million, or C6
million, to SDR 175 million (about C210 million).5 Those levels were increased by
the 1982 Protocol to SDR 300 million.
Following the Chemobyl nuclear accident, the two main conventions were
linked by the 1988 Joint Protocol 6 which entered into force in 1992. However,
many important States have not ratified the Joint Protocol, including the United
Kingdom and France. Thus those countries are not linked by the treaty system to
Vienna Convention arties.
In 1997, the Vienna Protocol 7 and the Convention on Supplementary
Convention (CSC) 8 featured increased limits and introduced a somewhat broader,
but still limited, definition of nuclear damage to include preventive steps and
3. Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, opened for signature July
29, 1960, 956 U.N.T.S. 264, available at http://www.nea.fr/html/law/nlparis conv.htm [hereinafter
Paris Convention].
4. Convention of 31st Jan. 1963 Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 29 July 1960 on Third
Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, Jan. 31, 1963, 2 I.L.M. 685, available at
http://www.nea.fr/htmlaw/nlbrussels.html [hereinafter Brussels Supplementary Convention].
5. Id. at art. 3. (Parties to the Paris Conventions as of Aug. 31, 2005 were Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Turkey and the United Kingdom. All Parties are also party to the 1964 Additional Protocol and 1982
Protocol. None are parties to the Vienna Convention, although Spain and the United Kingdom are
signatories. Slovenia withdrew from the Vienna Convention on Nov. 12, 2002. Parties to both the Paris
and Brussels Conventions are: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands,
Norway, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom. Paris only: Greece, Portugal, and Turkey).
6. Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for
Nuclear Damage and the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy,
opened for signature Sept. 21, 1988, 1672 U.N.T.S. 302, available at
http://www.nea.fr/htmllaw/nljoint prot.html [hereinafter Joint Protocol] (Status is available at
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/jointprot~statuspd).
7. Protocol to Amend the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, Sept.
12, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1462, available at
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/protamend.htm [hereinafter Protocol]. (The
Protocol entered into force on Oct. 4, 2003, following the fifth ratification. According to IAEA
information provided at Aug. 31, 2005, there were five parties to the Protocol: Argentina, Belarus,
Latvia, Morocco, and Romania. Status available at
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/protamend-status.pdf).
8. Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, opened for signature
Sept.12, 1997, 36 I.L.M 1473, available at
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/supcomp.html [hereinafter CSC]. Pursuant to
Article XX, the Convention will enter into force on the ninetieth day following the date on which at least
five States with a minimum of 400,000 units of installed nuclear capacity have deposited an instrument
referred to in Article XVIII. After its entry into force, any State which has not signed the Convention may
accede to it. CSC, art. XX, 1, 2, opened for signature Sept. 12, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1482 - 83 available
at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/supcomp.html (Status available at
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/supcomp-status.pdf. As of Aug. 31, only
Morocco, Romania and Argentina had ratified the CSC, Argentina being the last to ratify on Nov. 14,
2000. Signatories are Australia, the Czech Republic, Indonesia, Italy, Lebanon, Lithuania, Peru,
Philippines, Ukraine and the United States).
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environmental reinstatement 9 and made some other changes, such as allowing
compensation to residents of non-Contracting Parties. The minimum amount State
Parties must make available under national laws was increased to 300 million
SDRs (about £360 million),' and the CSC would provide for a supplementary
fund." The CSC defines additional amounts to be provided through contributions
by State Parties collectively on the basis of installed nuclear capacity and a UN rate
of assessment. Any State may adhere to the CSC, whether or not they are Parties to
any existing nuclear liability conventions or have nuclear installations on their
territories. The CSC has not yet entered into force and is nowhere near entering
into force.12
In 2004, a Protocol to amend the Paris Convention and a Protocol to amend
the 1963 Brussels Supplementary Convention were adopted, 13 bringing total
liability amounts, including State backup funding, to £1.5 billion. 14  However,
those Protocols are not yet in force.
The Vienna Convention has by far the widest participation, with 33 Parties
15
compared to the Paris Convention's 15 Parties. There are no States party to both,
but there are 25 Parties to the Joint Protocol. 16
The 1971 IMO Brussels Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of
Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material is specifically addressed to nuclear
transports 17 and exonerates a person otherwise liable for damage if the operator is
9. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. II.
10. Protocol, supra note 7, art. VII. Approximately E357,000,000. On Oct. 18, 2005, 1 SDR =
approx. 1.20 Euros or 1.45 USD. International Monetary Fund, available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/fin/rates/rms-rep.cfm (last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
11. The fund is financed by nuclear generating States together with a small contribution from non-
nuclear States. CSC article 4. CSC, supra note 8, art. VI.
12. The CSC requires five States with a minimum of 400,000 units of installed nuclear capacity to
ratify or accede. CSC, supra note 8, art. XX (Status available at
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/supcomp-status.pdf. Current parties are
Argentina, Morocco and Romania).
13. Final Act of the Conference on the Revision of the Paris Convention and of the Brussels
Supplementary Convention, Feb.12, 2004, and see the accompanying Explanatory Report by the
Representatives of the Contracting Parties on the Revision of the Paris Convention and the Brussels
Supplementary Convention available at http://www.nea.fr/html/law/paris-convention.pdf (Status
available at http://www.nea.fr/html/law/paris-convention-ratification.html).
14. Protocol to Amend the Convention of 31 January 1963 Supplementary to the Paris Convention of
29 July 1960 on Third Party Liability in the field of Nuclear Energy, as amended by the additional protocol
of 28 January 1964 and by the protocol of 17 November 1982, art. 3, Feb. 12, 2004, available at
http://www.nea.fr/html/law/brussels-supplementary-convention.pdf.
15. Vienna Convention, supra note 2 (Status as notified by the IAEA on Aug. 31, 2005. The last
change of status was May 20, 2005, when Russia ratified the Vienna Convention).
16. Joint Protocol, supra note 6.
17. Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material,
Dec. 17, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 256, available at
http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/conven/carriagenuclear1971.html (The object of the Convention is
to channel liability to the operator of the nuclear installation. There are seventeen parties to this
convention: see http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic id=247. See also the earlier
Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, May 25, 1962, 57 AJIL 268.
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liable for such damage under either the Paris or Vienna Conventions, or by virtue of
a national law governing liability for the damage.
Convention Limitation Amounts
Convention Party Operator Liability State Combined States
Paris 1960 SDR 5 - 15
million
Paris 2004 and C 700 million E 500 E 300 million
Brussels (NIF)18
Brussels Supp. SDR 175 million SDR 300 million
1963
Vienna 1963 $ 5 million
Vienna 1997 SDR 150 million SDR 300 million
CSC (NIF) SDR 300 million
III. THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A LIABILITY REGIME
An effective and comprehensive liability regime must contain the following
essential elements. The international liability regime can be measured against these
standards.
An international regime on liability and redress should be based on the
polluter pays principle, according to Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration.' 9 They
should provide means to prevent or remedy environmental damage and should
directly and fully compensate victims.
20
18. NIF = Not in force.
19. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June 3 - 14, 1992, princ. 16, UN Doc.
A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I) (June 16, 31 ILM 874 (1992), available at
http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/environmental.development.rio.declaration. 1992/doc [hereinafter Rio
Declaration]. Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration provides that "National authorities should endeavor to
promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into
account the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to
the public interest and without distorting international trade and investment." This was reiterated in the
2002 Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development. World Summit on
Sustainable Development, Aug. 26 - Sept. 4, 2002, Johannesburg, South Africa, Plan of
Implementation, §§ 15(b), 19(b) (Sept. 10, 2002), available at
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD-POIPD/English/WSSDPlanlmpl.pdf., §15(b) and
19(b).
20. Rio Declaration, supra note 19, at princ. 13.
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A. Absolute Liability Should Govern
Any exception shifts the burden onto the victim, and amounts to a subsidy to
the nuclear industry. 21  Terrorist attacks are a common concern, yet the
Conventions exclude acts of armed conflict, hostilities, civil war, and insurrection.
Where damage has recently been caused by extreme weather events, and where the
IPCC has warned that climate change can increase the intensity of
storms,22 exclusions of grave natural disasters of an exceptional character will be of
concern. Discussions in the International Law Commission on international
23liability for transboundary harm arising out of hazardous activities are ongoing,
but disagreement between States on whether the topic should even be addressed
24
means that progress is likely to be difficult.
B. Limitation Should be Unlimited in Amount
There are unfortunately no limits on damage that can be caused to nations, the
population, other industries or the environment. Many claimants would argue that
it is, therefore, logical that liability must be unlimited; and the polluter pays
principle would bear this out. The IAEA's Explanatory Text commented about
limited liability in noting that the Vienna Convention does not establish a
maximum liability amount and the Installation State is free to impose a higher
amount of liability, or unlimited liability, as follows: "In practice, few States have
opted for unlimited liability, which could easily lead to the ruin of the operator
without affording any substantial contribution to the compensation of the damage
caused. Indeed, even where the operator's liability is unlimited in amount,
insurance cover cannot be unlimited.' '25  While it may lead to the ruin of the
operator, limited liability may lead to the ruin of the victim. It may also encourage
the operator to take additional measures to avoid such ruin. The conclusion implies
that nuclear operators are not well capitalized; an argument against exclusive
liability. Limited liability assists the nuclear industry to obtain insurance cover;
sets relatively low limits, making that insurance cover cheaper; and channels
21. Id.
22. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [hereinafter IPCC], Third Assessment Report:
Climate Change 2001:, Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, para. 12.1.5.3, available at
http://www.grida.no/climate/ipccztar/wg2/468.htm, para. 12.1.5.3.
23. International Law Commission Proposed draft principles on International Liability for
injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law (International liability in
case of loss from transboundary harm arising out of hazardous activities). U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/540
(March 15,) International Law Commission. Geneva 3 May-4 June and 5 July-6 August 2004) (written
by, Pemmaraju Sreenivaso Rao, Special Rapporteur), available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/271/28/PDF/N0427128.pdfOpenElement.
24. International Law Commission, Report of the 55' Session, R 154 - 55 (2003), UN Doc.
A/58/1 0, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/reports/2003/2003report.htm.
25. IAEA, The 1997 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the 1997
Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage Explanatory Texts, at, note 230, page
12, IAEA Doc. GC(48)/INF/5 (Sept. 2, 2004), available at
http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC48/Documents/gc48inf-5expltext.pdf [hereinafter IAEA
Explanatory Texts].
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liability to a single operator, thus relieving others in the nuclear industry, such as
suppliers of any liability.
Even if the later agreements were in force, and even if relevant Parties had
ratified the relevant agreements, the increased amounts are still nowhere near
amounts that could be incurred in the case of a nuclear incident. This means that
potential victims may not be fully compensated.
The cost of a serious nuclear accident can be immense, and many estimates of
damage vastly exceed the new limits. The total damage of a reactor meltdown in
Germany has been estimated to be over C5,000 billion.26  A 1994 Greenpeace
review of the costs of major nuclear accidents 27 has cited various estimates of costs
between USD 613 - 652 billion, 28 10.7 trillion (USD 6.8 trillion)(worst-case), 29
DM 4.5 - 83,250 billion,30 USD 21.34-695 billion, 31 and USD 67 million-
15.536 billion.32 The potential costs of an accident at sea have been estimated at
USD 7 billion.33 It can thus be seen that even the new limits in the 1997 Vienna
Protocol and 2005 Paris Protocol may well fall far short of actual damage suffered.
The potential shortfall is recognized in the revised Vienna Convention in that
priority in the distribution of the compensation shall be given to claims in respect
of loss of life or personal injury.34
The IAEA Explanatory text noted that "[t]he limitation of the amount of his
liability is clearly designed as an advantage for the operator, in order not to
discourage nuclear-related activities. 35 Not only does it not discourage them, it
acts as a subsidy. It has been estimated that means that nuclear operators enjoy
effective subsidies estimated at E20 billion a year for the EU-15.36 If a nuclear
operator were required to fully cover the potential cost of a nuclear accident, the
cost of operating a nuclear power plant would increase significantly. Studies have
26. H.J. Ewers and K. Rennings, Economics of Nuclear Risk - a German Study, in SOCIAL COST OF
ENERGY, PRESENT STATUS AND FUTURE TRENDS, 150, 157 (0. Homeyer and R. Ottinger eds., Springer-
Verlag, 1992).
27. Greenpeace International, Review of Estimates of the Costs of Major Nuclear Accidents,
prepared for the 9th Session of the Standing Committee on Nuclear Liability of the IAEA, Feb. 7-11,
1994.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Annex to the Protocol to Amend the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear
Damage, art. VIII(2), Sept. 12, 1997, available at
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/protamendannex.html.
35. IAEA Explanatory Texts, supra note 25, at 12.
36. Greenpeace International, Invest in a Clean Energy Future, 15 (July 2005) (written by Antony
Froggat and Sven Teske), available at
http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/intemational/press/reports/SubsidiesReport.pdf. The actual value
of the subsidy depends on variables including the probabilistic risk of an off-site release of radiation, the
location of a plant and its proximity to urban populations and the local meteorological conditions.
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suggested that if no ceiling were in place, insurance premiums to French operator
EdF would increase the cost of generation by around 300%, or 5 cE/kSWh. 7
Limits can be increased by two-thirds majority of Parties under a new
procedure,38 taking into account the risk of damage resulting from a nuclear
incident, changes in the monetary values, and the capacity of the insurance
market. 39 Of course, non-nuclear States and others may question why they or the
environment at large should be subjected to risks which exceed the capacity of the
insurance market.
C. Just Time Limit of Liability
Nuclear damage is insidious. The very existence of radiation may not be
known for some years. The consequences may not be manifested for generations.
When they are manifested, the causes may not be known or may be difficult to
prove. In many States, there is a thirty year time limitation period. The
Conventions, other than the revised Vienna Convention, shorten this time
limitation period considerably. Some damage may be latent and may take time to
develop or manifest itself, so it is essential that claims can be brought when the
damage is found, as well as when it is caused, and that there is a reasonable period
to bring a claim after the damage is found or caused. It is important that the time
should run from the time it becomes known or reasonably should have become
known by the claimant.
D. All Responsible Parties Should Bear Liability
Channeling benefits the nuclear industry and its suppliers, as it focus liability
on one party who can then insure, but it prejudices the victim as it limits the parties
against whom they may claim. In the case of nuclear shipments, for instance,
liability should be borne both by the owner and operator of the vessel and the owner
of the radioactive cargo being transported, who is ultimately responsible for
creating the risk that has produced the damage.
Liability should be bome by the parties involved, who should bear joint and
several liability. The IAEA Explanatory Text said:
Like the principle of strict liability, the principle of exclusive liability of
the operator facilitates the bringing of claims on the part of the victims
of a nuclear incident, since it relieves them of the burden of proving the
liability of parties other than the operator. But the principle also
obviously favors the manufacturer, supplier or carrier of the material or
equipment, since it obviates the necessity for them to take out insurance,
as well as any other person who may have contributed to the nuclear
incident.
40
37. Id. Even being required to insure to €420 million would increase EdF's cost of generation by
8%, increasing insurance premiums from 0.0017 ce/kWH to 0.019 cE/kWH.
38. Protocol, supra note 7, art. V D. The decision is still subject to an additional confirmation of
acceptance by 2/3 of Parties: art. V D(4).
39. Id. at art. V D(3).
40. IAEA Explanatory Texts, supra note 25, at 11.
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Of course, nuclear victims may not be quite as relieved as the IAEA suggests
at having the number of liable parties and potential deep pockets slashed by the
Convention. In fact, if relieving parties of the burden of proving the liability of
operators is the only advantage, it is of little benefit since claimant lawyers can
easily choose whether or not they want to accept that burden.
E. Importance of a Backup Fund
There are a number of reasons that compensation for damage from
contamination or some other occurrence may not be forthcoming. If a liable party
cannot, or does not pay, or if the liability regime fails for some other reason,
compensation must still be paid and/or the reparation for damage to the
enviromnent made. Sometimes, for instance, even if a party is found liable, the
company is insufficiently capitalized and cannot or will not pay. A multinational
may set up a shell company so that the local company has limited liability with few
resources, for instance. Secondly, a company may claim an applicable exemption,
and so escapes liability. However, in such a case, the victim is still out of pocket.
Thirdly, damage may be caused to the environment, but not necessarily to any
private interest. In short, a properly structured and well capitalized fund can ensure
compensation and remediation regardless of fault, exceptions or the capitalization
of defendants.
F. Claimants should be Able to Bring Claims in a Neutral Tribunal
The Vienna Convention grants exclusive jurisdiction to the Installation State,
thus preventing victims from claiming in their own State. 41 This is true even where
an incident occurs during transport of nuclear material outside the Installation
State, such as an accident occurring to a coastal State. 42
Legal regimes that require claims be brought in the operator state place
impecunious claimants at an immense disadvantage. The problems that may face
victims in bringing a claim in the UK courts can be illustrated by the following
cases. In Merlin v. British Nuclear Fuels, PLC,43 where the court refused to grant
any damages to plaintiffs whose house had been contaminated by radionuclides,
even though the house lost almost half its value as a result of the contamination, on
the basis that the house was not 'physically' affected.4 The owners decided to
move, as they did not want to expose their children to the health risk which they
believed would result from long term occupation of the house.45 They sold the
house for a considerably reduced sum. 4 6 The High Court held that that the mere
presence within the plaintiffs' property of alpha emitting radionuclides emanating
from waste discharged, which caused no physical damage to the fabric of the
41. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. XI.I.
42. Id. at art. XI.2. The 1997 Protocol amends this for Parties to that Protocol.
43. Merlin v. British Nuclear Fuels, PLC, [1990] 3 All ER 711, 720 - 21, [1990] 3 WLR 383.
44. Id. at 720 -21. Section 7 of the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 requires operators to ensure that
to ensure that no occurrence involving nuclear matter, or ionizing radiations emitted from any waste
discharged from their site causes "damage to any property of any person" other than the defendants.
45. Id. at 717.
46 Id. at 717 - 18.
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property, could not on its own constitute damage under the 1965 Act.47 It appears
that a 'floodgates' argument may have influenced the Court, finding that "it is in the
nature of nuclear installations that there will be some additional radionuclides
present in the houses of the local population., 48  The Court also found that "the
presence of alpha emitting radionuclides in the human airways or digestive tracts or
even in the bloodstream merely increases the risk of cancer to which everyone is
exposed from both natural and artificial radioactive sources. They do not per se
amount to injury."4 9 These findings starkly illustrate the difficulties victims of a
nuclear accident outside the UK claiming in UK courts would face.
In the later Blue Circle Industries plc v Ministry of Defence case,5 0 where
land was contaminated, damage was found to have occurred, but the Court of
Appeal explained the Merlin case by saying that the dust was in the house and the
Judge did not hold that the house and the radioactive material were so intermingled
as to mean that the characteristics of the house were altered. So in neither Merlin
nor Blue Circle were the courts willing to recognize that radioactive contamination
per se constitutes physical damage.
It is clear that victims need access to a tribunal that would be neutral and not
linked economically to the nuclear industry, and which is applying law and
procedure independent of the Installation State. This may be contrasted with the
IAEA's claim that "the principle of non discrimination and equal treatment of
victims is often considered to be one of the basic principles of the nuclear liability
regime. '"" While the Convention requires the national law be applied without
discrimination,5 2 the very application of the law of the nuclear operator, and the
requirement to go to the nuclear operator's State courts, may be seen as
discriminatory. The polluter pays principle and the duty to avoid damage to areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction 53 both require access to justice
47. Id.
48. Id. at 720 - 21.
49. Id.
50. Blue Circle Industries pic v Ministry ofDefence [ 1998] 3 All ER 385, [1999] Ch 289, where the
plaintiffs' land was contaminated by radioactive material from an overflowing pond on the Atomic
Weapons Establishment land, the land was held to be physically damaged by the admixture with the
topsoil of radioactive material, which required the expenditure of money to remove. Section 7 of the
1965 Act includes some alteration in the physical characteristics of the property, in this case the
marshland, caused by radioactive properties which render it less useful or less valuable. He had no doubt
that there was such an alteration in this case: the plutonium intermingled with the soil in the marsh to such
an extent that it could not be separated from the soil by any practical process. The level of contamination
was such that the topsoil of the marsh had to be excavated and removed from the site because the level of
radioactivity exceeded that allowed by the regulations.
51. IAEA Explanatory Texts, supra note 25, at 16.
52. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. XIII.
53. See Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.48/14 (1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972). Principle 21 provides for responsibility
to ensure that activities do not cause damage to the environment of other states or areas beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction. See generally Louis Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on the Human
Environment, 15 HARv. J. INT'L. L.423 (1973), and Michael Akehurst, International Liability for
Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by International Law, N.Y.J INT'L. L. 3
(1985). See also Rio Declaration, supra note 19, at princ. 2, and Restatement (Third) of Foreign
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administered impartially by States which do not have an economic interest to
protect.
If multiple cases are brought in different countries, forum non conveniens
arguments in common law countries may well result in primary jurisdiction being
found at the place where the damage was suffered. 54  In civil law countries,
jurisdiction is likely to stay where the case was first filed. 5
This decision may be made at the expense of obtaining greater damages in the
courts of a nuclear installation, but overall it is in the interests of States suffering
damage to ensure justice is obtained for the most cases possible at a reasonable
cost. Victims should not need to go to the courts of the operator causing the
damage for compensation; they should be entitled to have resort to their national
courts for protection. This is even more so when reinstatement of an impaired
environment 56 or preventive measures are claimed.
With respect to nuclear shipments, both the revised Paris Convention5 7 and
the revised Vienna Convention grant exclusive jurisdiction to the party in whose
Relations Law, Section 601 (1987). Philippe Sands in Principles ofInternational Environmental Law I at
186 (1995) concludes that taken together Principle 21 and Principle 2 "establish the basic obligation
underlying environmental law and the source of its further elaboration in rules of greater specificity." For
consequences for States of the breach of obligations, see the International Law Commission,
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N. GAOR,
56th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 18, 2002) available at
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/State-responsibility/responsibilityfra.htrm. See Article 3 of the Convention
on Biological Diversity signed at Rio de Janeiro on June 5, 1992, entered into force Dec.29, 1993, 31
ILM (1992) available at http://www.biodiv.org/doc/legal/cbd-en.pdf.
54. In England, the House of Lords in Spiliada Maritime Corporation v. Cansulex Ltd. [1987] 1
A.C.460 held that the defendant must show that there is another alternative forum, available and more
appropriate than the English forum, where the case will be more suitably tried in the interest of parties
and of the ends of justice. If this is shown, the court will grant a stay, unless the plaintiff can show that,
even though factors connect the case with the alternative forum, special circumstances exist to show that
substantial justice cannot be obtained there. However, see the ECJ ruling in Andrew Owusu v. Nugent
B. Jackson, Case C-281/02 holding that that theforum non conveniens doctrine was incompatible with
the United Kingdom's obligations under the Brussels Convention. See Ronald A. Brand, Balancing
Sovereignty and Party Autonomy in Private International Law: Regression at the European Court of
Justice (University of Pittsburgh School of Law, Working Paper Series # 25, 2005) available at
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1025&context-pittlwps. In the United States, under
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 250 (1981), the courts see whether an adequate alternative forum
exists and is available, and then weigh public and private interest factors, such as the interests of the
parties, such as access to evidence, judicial comity and the interests of the forum State.
55. Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters 1968, Article 21 on lis pendens available at
http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/brussels.jurisdiction.and.enforcement.of.judgments.in.civil.and.commercial.m
atters.convention. 1968/doc.html#137 [hereinafter Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction], and EC Council
Regulation No 44/2001, Regulation 27 of which requires the court other than the first seized court to
stay its proceedings until the jurisdiction of the first Court is established.
56. Revised Vienna Convention, art. 1(k). See also art. 1(m) and 1(n), which hold that the law of
the State where the damage is suffered shall determine who is entitled to take measures of reinstatement
and it is the competent authorities of the State where the measures were taken whose approval is required.
57. Revised Paris Convention, art. 13(b), which provides that coastal State must have notified the
Secretary-General of the EEZ.
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Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) a nuclear incident has occurred.58 This does not
apply where the incident occurs outside the EEZ but the damage occurs within it,
and thus can only apply when the shipment transits the EEZ. In contrast, with
respect to non-nuclear damage, the HNS Convention, concluded the previous year,
allows for jurisdiction in any State Party, including for damage caused within an
EEZ.59 The Oil Pollution Liability Convention allows for exclusive jurisdiction in
a country suffering damage.6 °
G. Applicable Law should be that of the Claimant
As with jurisdiction, applicable law should normally be that of the place of
damage, provided that jurisdiction can be obtained over those who are liable. As
one commentator has noted, two reasons militate for the law of the place where the
damage was suffered to be applied in the case of international nuclear transports:
6 1
First from the inherent risk of the transport of nuclear material, it is clear
that an incident can cause damage in distant countries. Any person
liable for the transport incident is and must be aware of that fact.
Secondly, most likely and most frequently, the place of damage will be
where the potential victim has his or her habitual residence, while the
place where the hypothetical incident occurs often will be quite
accidental and will depend only on the route of transport. Any potential
victim, however, relies and is justified to rely on the expectation that the
safety standards of his or her country are observed in order not to be
damaged.6 2
English courts, for instance, are likely to apply the lex loci delicti,6 3 although that
may be displaced by significant factors linking the tort or delict to another
country.64 Even with an accident on the high seas, the English courts are likely to
apply English law to a UK flagged vessel.65 Similarly, French66 and German67
58. Revised Vienna Convention, supra note 56, art. XI(lbis).
59. The Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of
Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, art. 38, 3(b), May 3, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1406 (1996) [hereinafter
HNS Convention].
60. International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for
Oil Pollution Damage, art. IX, Dec. 18, 1971, 11 I.L.M. 284, amended by 1992 IMO Protocol to Amend
The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1969 [hereinafter Oil Pollution
Convention].
61. See Ulrich Magnus, Intercontinental Nuclear Transport from the Private International Law
Perspective, in Reform of Civil Nuclear Liability: Budapest Symposium, at 282 (1999).
62. See id.
63. See Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, section 11, available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/actsl995/Ukpga.19950042 en l.htm, and Dicey and Morris, THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 257 (Lawrence Collins ed., 12 th e vlCONFICTOF S  e  li . 2ed., ol. 2, 1993).
64. Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, section 12.
65. See The Esso Malaysia [1975] QB 198. See also Stuart Dutson, The Conflict of Laws and
Statutes: The International Operational of Legislation Dealing With Matters of Civil Law in the United
Kingdom and Australia, 60 MOD. L. REv. 668, 687 - 88 (1997).
66. See Magnus, supra note 61, at 275, citing Cass. 25 May 1948 Rev. Crit. 1949.
67. See id. citing BundesgerichtshofBGHZ 57, 265 and BGHZ 119, 139.
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courts are likely to apply the lex loci delicti, as are Chinese,68 Indian,69 and Russian
courts.
7 0
Austria, on the other hand, has a choice of law rule for nuclear damage under
its 1999 Act. 71  The Lugano Convention 72 provides for jurisdiction where the
damage was suffered, where the dangerous activity was conducted, or where the
defendant has his habitual residence.
H There should a Broad Definition of Recoverable Damage
It is very important that the definition of damage is as broad and clear as
possible. Many jurisdictions do not allow for recovery of 'pure economic loss', or
loss which is not consequential on physical damage. An accident or incident
resulting in market loss caused by perception of contamination, for instance, which
may result in markets being closed due to no fault of the producer, is no less real to
those suffering the loss if there is no actual contamination that can be proven. An
effective international liability regime should cover property damage, economic
damage, damage to biodiversity, preventive measures, the cost of reinstatement and
reinstatement or remediation of an impaired environment.
Damages should include damages to the marine environment in areas beyond
national jurisdiction and damages resulting from perceptions of risk even if
damages or health effects are not measurable. Restricting the definition of damages
to damages that can be claimed in the operator's jurisdiction is indefensible. The
Merlin case 73 demonstrates the dangers for claimants of host State jurisdiction.
Even the expanded definitions of damages found in the 1997 Protocol do not
include damage to the marine environment and damages to tourism and the fishing
industry that may occur because of perceptions of risks by tourists and consumers
of fish regardless of actual damage caused. Damages should be defined broadly to
include all actual economic losses of all sorts and all losses to the marine
environment, as well as actual health damages and measurable property losses.
68. General Principles of Civil Law, §146(1), available at
http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=2696. Article 146 provides that the law of the place where
an infringing act is committed shall apply in handling compensation claims for any damage caused by the
act. If both parties are citizens of the same country or have established domicile in another country, the
law of their own country or the country of domicile may be applied. An act committed outside the
People's Republic of China shall not be treated as an infringing act if under the law of the People's
Republic of China it is not considered an infringing act. See also Magnus, note 61, at 280.
69. See Magnus, supra note 61, at 280, citing Paras Diwan, Private International Law (3 r ed.),
552ss, 570.
70. See id. at 281, citing Article 167 of the Basic Principles of Civil Legislation of the Russian
Union of May 31, 1991.
71. The Law on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Fission for Energy Generation in Austria:
Bundesgesetz tiber die zivilrechtliche Haftung fiir Schaden dutch Radioaktivitiit (Atomhaftungsgesetz
1999 - AtomHG 1999, BGB 1.1 No.
170/1998), § 23 permits claimants to opt for Austrian law for damage caused in Austria.
72. Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the
Environment, art. 19, June 21, 1993, not in force, 32 I.L.M. 1228 - 33.
73. See discussion supra p. 94.
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I. Just Standing and Access to Justice
An instrument should, therefore, have broad provisions on standing. Groups
acting in the general interest and to protect the environment should have standing,
as should groups representing fishing interest, farmers and communities. Also, the
wider issue of access to justice is not limited to the narrow question of standing
where legal costs can be a vital consideration. This applies to small farmers or
fishing groups as well as organizations. Some legal systems can require security of
costs, for instance, which can be a barrier. Many other legal systems dissuade
claims by having costs borne by the losing party; others provide for legal assistance
to bring environmental claims. Standing should not only be granted to those
affected by the damage, but also to those acting in the general interest. Groups
should have the right to protect environmental and social interests, which may be
wider than direct economic interest. Damage may be caused to the environment
and society without necessarily damaging private economic interests as such. This
includes so-called 'rumor damage' which may be caused by an incident which does
not release radioactivity, but which still causes considerable economic loss due to
lost market confidence directly attributable to the incident. 74
In addition, while capacity building to develop national regimes and
harmonization of laws are both important, many developing States would not have
the resources and capacity to lodge and pursue major claims in nuclear States.
Legal aid from a fund could be part of a solution, but an independent tribunal is
essential. Claimants should not be required to participate in the legal systems of
nuclear States to have claims resolved.
J Just Rules on Burden of Proof and Causation
Rules for liability for dangerous activities in place with other regimes
frequently require strict liability and shift the burden of proof. In the absence of a
regime, they allow unlimited liability and allow plaintiffs to file claims against
multiple defendants.
Proof of damage and issues of causation can put an unfair or even
insurmountable burden on victims. Slow-moving negative impact, in addition, may
be difficult to trace and to attribute. The relevance and importance of the
precautionary principle is also important in the context of shifting the burden of
proof of damage to nuclear operators and in the context of proving causation.
The problems of proving causality under English law were seen in Hope v
BNFL,75 where the court refused to recognize a causal link between the radio
nuclides released from the Sellafield nuclear facility and the increased cancers in
the surrounding area. Some eight years later, research published in the
International Journal of Cancer in 2002 found that children of men exposed to
radiation while working at Sellafield have twice the normal risk of developing
certain types of cancer such as leukemia and non-Hodgkins lymphoma.76 The
74. See discussion supra p. 91.
75. Hope v. BNFL and Reay v. BNFL (1994) 5 Med. LR 1
76. Heather 0. Dickinson & Louise Parker, Leukemia And Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma In Children
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theory of a link between radiation dose and cancers among the fathers' children
was first postulated in 1990.77
These causation difficulties obviously have implications for limitation
periods: if research takes 10 years to prove a link between radioactive emissions
and an intergenerational effect, then a 30 year limitation period, let alone 10 year
period, is clearly too short for claimants. A victim of radiation may well take ten
years to conceive and the child may not manifest symptoms for another ten years.
IV. MEMBERSHIP OF THE CONVENTIONS AND OUTLOOK FOR NUCLEAR POWER
A critical issue for the international liability system is the membership of the
Conventions. There are currently 440 nuclear power stations operating in 31
countries. However, many nuclear countries, including Canada, the United
States, Japan, India and China are not party to any of the liability Conventions.
Other major nuclear States such as the United Kingdom and France are party only
to the Paris Convention, whereas others, such as Russia which recently ratified, are
party only to the Vienna Convention. As noted earlier, many of these are not party
to the Joint Protocol, which links the Conventions for States party to the Joint
Protocol.
Developing countries account for 60% of the new reactors under
construction.79 In 2004, five new plants were connected to the grid in China,
Japan, Russia and the Ukraine. Of those, only the Ukraine is party to the Joint
Protocol. One laid up plant was reconnected in Canada, which is not a Party to any
of the Conventions, and construction began on a fast breeder reactor in India 80 and
a pressurized water reactor in Japan, 8' both of which are likewise outside the
system. Finland, which is in the Paris Convention system and which has ratified
the Joint Protocol, has begun work on a new reactor. The IAEA has estimated that
in 2020 there will be the equivalent of 127 more 1000 MW nuclear plants than in
2000.82 Belgium, Germany, and Sweden, all Paris Convention countries, are
planning to phase out nuclear power. Austria and Ireland, which are party to any
Convention, and Denmark, a Paris Convention country, all have policies against
Of Male Sellafield Radiation Workers, 99 INT'L J. OF CANCER 437, 437 - 44, May 2002, available at
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fultext/9201326l1PDFSTART. See also, Sellafield
Increases Cancer Risk, BBC, June 19, 2002, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/2054694.stm.
The researchers compared the records of 9,859 children fathered by men exposed to radiation at Sellafield
with those of 256,851 children born to other fathers in Cumbria between 1950 and 1991. Throughout the
whole of Cumbria, they found that the incidence of leukemia and non-Hodgkin's lymphoma was twice as
high among the Sellafield children.
77. Martin Gardner, Results of Case-control Study of Leukaemia and Lymphoma Among Young
People near Sellafield Nuclear Plant in West Cumbria, BRITISH MED. J. (1990).
78. International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Annual report for 2004, IAEA, at 1, GC(49)/5
(2005), available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Reports/Anrep2004/anrep2004_full.pdf. Twenty-
six more were under construction at the end of 2004, eighteen of them being in Asia.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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nuclear power.83 Most of the increase in nuclear capacity over the last decade has
come from plant life extensions.
84
The International Energy Agency (IEA) 85 has forecast that three-quarters of
existing capacity in OECD Europe will be retired by 2030, because reactors will
have reached the end of their life or because governments will have adopted
policies to phase out nuclear power. The IEA expects world nuclear capacity to
increase slightly until 2030, but the share of nuclear power in total electricity
generation to decline. 86 Nuclear power generation is expected to increase in Asia,
particularly China, South Korea, Japan and India.87 None of these are party to any
liability Convention. There are many obstacles to development of any nuclear
power station, including financial, environmental, waste, fuel, health, safety,
security, proliferation and political issues to name a few, but these developments
should frame a discussion of international liability issue.
The membership of nuclear liability Conventions is, therefore, likely to be a
critical issue if nuclear power continues to develop as the IAEA and IEA project
since the new plants are projected to be built in countries which are not members of
the Conventions. In addition, the proliferation of liability Conventions and the
many combinations of treaty relations that are possible between States, together
with differing national legislation, means that precise liability for the many
different kinds of nuclear incidents and their geographical permutations is virtually
impossible to ascertain.
V. AN EXAMINATION OF THE VIENNA AND PARIS CONVENTIONS
A. The 1963 Vienna Convention
The 1963 Vienna Convention generally followed the 1960 Paris Convention.
Unlike the 1960 Paris Convention, it does not limit itself to damage caused in the
territory of States Party. It defines nuclear damage as loss of life, any personal
injury or any loss of, or damage to, property arising from a nuclear incident,88 and
any other loss or damage so arising or resulting if and to the extent that the law of
the competent court so provides.89 The operator of a nuclear installation is liable
for nuclear damage upon proof that the damage has been caused by a nuclear
incident. 9
83. Id. at 2.
84. See generally Uranium Information Centre, Plans for New Reactors Worldwide, (Aug. 2006)
available at http://www.uic.com.au/nipl9.htm (chronicling plant life extensions in the United States,
United Kingdom and Russia) (last visited Oct. 17, 2006).
85. International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2004, at 34 available at
http://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/WEO2004SUM.pdf (last visited Oct. 17,2006).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 'Nuclear incident' is defined to mean "any occurrence or series of occurrences having the same
origin which causes nuclear damage." Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. I(l)(l).
89. Id. at art. I(l)(k).
90. Id. at art. II(1).
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Liability is strict, 91 but there is an exemption for nuclear damage caused by an
act of armed conflict, hostilities, civil war or insurrection, and, subject to the law of
the Installation State, damage caused by a grave natural disaster of an exceptional
character. 92 Insurance or other financial security is required to the specified limit,
which was as little as USD 5,000,000 in 196393 for any one nuclear incident. 94
B. 1997 Vienna Protocol
The 1997 Protocol entered into force in 2003, but its only Parties to date are
Argentina, Belarus, Latvia, Morocco, and Romania. 95 The 1997 Protocol contains
increased limits to either 300 million SDRs (about £360 million), 96 or from 5
million (about E6 million)97 to 150 million SDRs (180 million) where public
funds shall be made available by a State to compensate nuclear damage up to at
least 300 million SDRs. 9' A transitional period is permitted for 100 million SDRs
(£1.20 million) for up to 15 years from the date of entry into force of the
Protocol,99 potentially reducing the available compensation by two-thirds. The
paragraph also permits an operator to carry no liability insurance at all, as long as
the 100 million SDR is underwritten by public funds.00 There is no qualification
on this opt-out clause. This is a significant potential subsidy for operators.
The Protocol broadens the definition of nuclear damage and extends the period
during which claims may be brought for loss of life and personal injury. It also
provides for jurisdiction of coastal states over actions incurring nuclear damage
during transport if they occurred within the EEZ. 0'
Whether a person is entitled to a claim would most likely be determined by
the governing law applied by the courts of the Installation State after applying their
conflict of law rules and is likely to be the lex fori since the revised Vienna
Convention subjects the categories of damage under article I(1)(k) to the law of the
competent court, which is defined in paragraph (e) as the law of the court having
jurisdiction under the Convention, including any rules of such law relating to
conflict of laws.' 02 The category 'any other economic loss, other than any caused
by the impairment of the environment' is expressly allowed only if "permitted by
91. Id. at at. IV(l) which uses the term 'absolute.'
92. Id. at art. IV(3).
93. The United States dollar used is a unit of account equivalent to the value of the United States
dollar in terms of gold on Apr. 29, 1963, "[T]hat is to say US $35 per one troy ounce of fine gold." Id. at
art. V(3). The current price of gold is about $596/oz as of October 17, 2006.
94. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. V(1). These amounts are exclusive of interest and costs.
Id. at art. V(2).
95. Protocol, supra note 7.
96. Id. at art. 7(1). These amounts are exclusive of interest and costs. Id. at art. 7(2).
97. Id. at art. 7(1). This lower amount may be established having regard to the nature of the nuclear
installation or the nuclear substances involved and to the likely consequences of an incident originating
therefrom. Id.
98. Id. at art. 7(5).
99. Id. at art. 7(6).
100. Id.
101. Revised Vienna Convention, supra note 56, art. XI.
102. Id. at art. I(l)(k).
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the general law on civil liability of the competent court". This appears to intend a
direct reference to the lexfori, without application of the conflict laws of the forum,
and clearly subjects economic loss to the law to the Installation State. 103
A potential pitfall for Parties to the Protocol is in article 19 of the Protocol,
which provides:
A State which is a Party to this Protocol but not a Party to the 1963
Vienna Convention shall be bound by the provisions of that Convention
as amended by this Protocol in relation to other States Parties hereto,
and failing an expression of a different intention by that State at the time
of deposit of an instrument referred to in Article 20 shall be bound by
the provisions of the 1963 Vienna Convention in relation to States
which are only Parties thereto.
Nothing in this Protocol shall affect the obligations of a State which is a Party
both to the 1963 Vienna Convention and to this Protocol with respect to a State
which is a Party to the 1963 Vienna Convention but not a Party to this Protocol. 104
In other words, Parties which join the Protocol but not the Convention are
bound by the lower limits in the Vienna Convention unless they state otherwise at
the outset, but Parties which join the Convention but not the Protocol are not bound
by the higher limits of the Protocol in any event.
To date, this provision could only apply to Morocco, as other Parties to the
Protocol are also Party to the 1963 Convention. Parties considering joining the
1997 Protocol would be well advised to opt out of the 1963 Convention, since they
would find the liability of 1963 Convention State operators limited to the much
lower provisions of the earlier Convention, as well as by the more restrictive
provisions. 10 5  However, this must be done at the time of ratification or
accession. 106
There is a new dispute resolution provision, 07 which provides for binding
determination by arbitration or the International Court of Justice. 108
C. The Paris Convention
The Paris Convention covered damage to or loss of life of any person or of
any property0 9 "caused by a nuclear incident in such installation or involving
nuclear substances coming from such installation" 0 or "caused by a nuclear
incident outside that installation and involving nuclear substances in the course of
103. See id. at art. I.
104. Protocol, supra note 7, art. 19.
105. States already Party to the 1963 Convention would need to denounce that Convention under
article XXV, which requires twelve months' notice of intended termination before the end of the rolling
five year periods under that article. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. XXV(I).
106. Protocol, supra note 7, art. 19.
107. Revised Vienna Convention, supra note 56, art. XX A.
108. However, Parties can opt out. Id. at art. XX A(3).
109. Except the nuclear installation itself and property on the site. Paris Convention, supra note 3,
art. 3(a).
110. Id. at art. 3.
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carriage. ' ' I. Claims may only be made against an operator or its insurer.'1 2
Maximum liability is from 5-15 million SDR" 3 (about E6 million - £18 million).
Actions must be brought within ten years.114 There is an exception for damage
caused by a nuclear incident directly due to an act of armed conflict, hostilities,
civil war, insurrection or a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character."'
Operators must carry insurance or security to the maximum amount. "16 Jurisdiction
lies with the courts of the Contracting Party in whose territory the nuclear incident
occurred 1 7 or in whose territory the nuclear installation of the operator liable is
situated. 1 8 Judgments are enforceable in Convention countries." 9
D. The 2004 Protocol
The Paris Convention was revised in 2004120 to increase limits and broaden
the definition of damage. The 2004 Protocol would increase the minimum liability
to €700 million,' 2' although the Installation State could reduce that amount to £70
million for installations, "having regard to the nature of the nuclear installation
involved and to the likely consequences of a nuclear incident originating therefrom,
or E80 million for the carriage of nuclear substances, "having regard to the nature
of the nuclear substances involved and to the likely consequences of a nuclear
incident originating therefrom."'' 22 A Contracting Party may subject the transit of
nuclear substances through its territory to the condition that the maximum amount
of liability of the foreign operator concerned be increased if it considers that such
amount does not adequately cover the risks of a nuclear incident in the course of the
transit, provided that the maximum amount thus increased shall not exceed the
maximum amount of liability of operators of nuclear installations situated in its
territory12 3 except where, under international law, there is a right of entry in cases
of urgent distress into the ports of such Contracting Party or a right of innocent
111. Id. at art. 4(b).
112. Id. at art. 4.
113. Id. at art. 7(b).
114. Id. at art. 8(a).
115. With respect to the last exception, except in so far as the legislation of the Contracting Party in
whose territory his nuclear installation is situated may provide to the contrary. Id. at art. 9.
116. Id. at art. 10(a).
117. Id. at art. 13(a).
118. Id. at art. 13(b).
119. Id. at art. 13(d).
120. Protocol to Amend the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 29
July 1960, as Amended by the Additional Protocol of 28 January 1964 and by the Protocol of 16
November 1982, Feb. 12, 2004, 2004 O.J. (L 97) 55, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/l_097/l_09720040401 en00550062.pdf [hereinafter 2004 Protocol].
121. Id. at art. H, amending Paris Convention art. 7. Costs and interest are exempted under Paris
Convention, supra note 3, at 7(h).
122. Id. at art. 7(b).
123. Id. at art. 7(e).
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passage through its territory. 124 This provision is limited to transit through territory
and would not apply to passage through EEZs. 1
25
E. The Brussels Supplementary Convention
The Brussels Supplementary Convention 126  supplemented the liability
amounts under the Paris Convention of 15 million SDR (about E18 million) by
requiring contributions by the Installation State up to SDR 175 million and other
Parties to the Convention collectively on the basis of their installed nuclear
capacity to up to a total of 300 million SDRs (about C 357 million). 127 The revised
2004 Brussels Supplementary Convention 128 increased the State contribution to
E500 and the top tier to E300 million from public funds provided by all Contracting
Parties. The two revised Conventions, combined, bring total compensation
available under the revised Paris- Brussels regime to E1.5 billion. 1
29
F. The Joint Protocol
The Joint Protocol is in force, but of major nuclear states only Finland,
Germany, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Sweden and Ukraine are party to it. 3 0 The
United Kingdom and France are not.
The essence of the Joint Protocol is that the operator of a nuclear installation
situated in the territory of a Party to the Vienna Convention shall be liable in
accordance with that Convention for nuclear damage suffered in the territory of a
Party to both the Paris Convention and the Joint Protocol, and vice versa for the
Paris and Vienna Conventions.131 In the case of a nuclear incident occurring in a
nuclear installation, the applicable Convention is that to which the State is a Party
within whose territory that installation is situated. Otherwise, in the case of a
nuclear incident involving the transport of nuclear material, the applicable
Convention is that to which the State is a Party within whose territory the nuclear
installation is situated whose operator is liable. 1
32
124. Id. at art. 7(f)(i). A similar exception applies to carriage by air where there is a right to overfly
or land on the territory concerned at art. 7(f)(ii).
125. Ben McRae, The Compensation Convention: Path to a Global Regime for Dealing with Legal
Liability and Compensation for Nuclear Damage, 61 NUCLEAR LAW BULLETIN 25, 33 (1998).
126. Brussels Supplementary Convention, supra note 4, art. 3(b).
127. Paris Convention, supra note 3, art. 3(b). Interest and costs can be ordered above these
amounts. Id. at art. 3(f).
128. Protocol To Amend the Convention of 31 January 1963 Supplementary to the Paris Convention
of 29 July 1960 on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, as Amended by the Additional
Protocol of 28 January 1964 and by the Protocol of 16 November 1982, available at
http://www.oecdnea.org/html/law/brussels-supplementary-convention.pdf [hereinafter 2004 Brussels
Supplementary Protocol].
129. Id. at art. 3.
130. Id.
131. Joint Protocol, supra note 6, art. II.
132. Id. at art. III. Pursuant to either Article II(l)(b) and (c) of the Vienna Convention or Article
4(a) and (b) of the Paris Convention.
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This means that the Brussels Supplementary Convention is inapplicable where
the Joint Protocol applies, since the Joint Protocol will operate to make the Vienna
Convention applicable if the liable operator is a Vienna Convention operator.
G. The 1997 Supplementary Convention (CSC)
The Convention on Supplementary Convention, which is not in force, would
increase the limitation amounts under either Convention to 300 million SDR (about
E357 million), 133 supplemented by public funds according to a formula. 
134
It is only open to States party to the Vienna Convention or the Paris
Convention, or to a State which declares that its national law complies with the
provisions of the Annex to the CSC. 13 5 That Annex requires for instance that no
liability shall attach to an operator for nuclear damage caused by a nuclear incident
directly due to an act of armed conflict, hostilities, civil war or insurrection, or136
for a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character.1 37 It also has provisions to
allow the United States to join. 138
The CSC predicates its application 139 to Contracting Parties and their territory,
maritime zones, EEZs (but only in connection with the exploitation or the
exploration of the natural resources of EEZ or continental shelf), and nationals and
ships.
Jurisdiction except for incidents within EEZs 140 lies only with the courts of the
Contracting Party within which the nuclear incident occurs. 141 But where it is not
clear where the incident occurred, or where it occurs outside the territory of any
Contracting Party, rather than lying with the State where the damage was suffered,
jurisdiction lies only with the courts of the Installation State. 142 The applicable law
133. CSC, supra note 8, art. II. An Installation State may specify a greater amount. Id. at art.
1l1(1)(a)(i).
134. Id. at art. IV(1). The amount is calculated according to the installed nuclear capacity of the
Installation State and the United Nations rate of assessment.
135. Id. at art. XVIII.
136. CSC Annex art. 3(5)(a) available at
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/supcomp.html#Annex (last visited Oct. 21,
2006).
137. Id. at art. 3(5)(b), except if the law of the Installation State may provide to the contrary.
138. Id. at art. 2(1) provides that the national law of a Contracting Party is deemed to be in
conformity with the provisions of Articles 3, 4, 5 and 7 if it contained on Jan. 1, 1995 and continues to
contain provisions that provide for strict liability in the event of a nuclear incident where there is
substantial nuclear damage off the site of the nuclear installation where the incident occurs, require the
indemnification of any person other than the operator liable for nuclear damage to the extent that person
is legally liable to provide compensation; and ensure the availability of at least 1000 million SDRs in
respect of a civil nuclear power plant and at least 300 million SDRs in respect of other civil nuclear
installations for such indemnification.
139. CSC, supra note 8, art. V.
140. Id. at art. XIII(2) provides that the EEZ State has notified the Depositary.
141. Id. at art. XIII(l).
142. Id. at art. XIII(3).
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is in general the law of the competent court, subject to the Vienna or Paris
Convention provisions. 
143
VI. A COMPARISON OF THE 1997 VIENNA PROTOCOL WITH THE 1963 CONVENTION
The 1997 Protocol followed a widespread recognition that the liability
limitation amounts were too low, that an additional fund was required, that the time
limitation periods were too restrictive, that the definition of nuclear damage was
too restrictive, that a regime must address environmental damage and that the
geographical scope should be widened.1 44  Those advances call for a close
examination.
On State liability, the 1997 Protocol was a mixed step. The 1963 Convention
provided that the Convention "shall not be construed as affecting the rights, if any,
of a Contracting Party under the general rules of public international law in respect
of nuclear damage." 145 The 1997 Protocol amended this to provide that "This
Convention shall not affect the rights and obligations of a Contracting Party under
the general rules of public international law."'14 6 While the new provision avoided
the 'if any' language, it dropped the reference to rules "in respect of nuclear
damage". 147 On balance, this seems to be a step backwards as respondent States
may still deny the existence of any rules in respect of nuclear damage under
customary international law, whereas the earlier formulation cast doubt on the
rights instead of the rules themselves. 1
48
One advance in the Protocol is Article IA, which provides that the Convention
applies to nuclear damage 'wherever suffered', whereas the 1963 Convention was
silent as to the point. However, Parties may by legislation exclude damage
suffered in the territory of non-Party States or their maritime zones where that State
has a nuclear installation and it does not provide reciprocal benefits. 149 No change
is made to the lack of restriction in the Convention to incidents occurring in the
territory of non-Parties. 
1 50
Under Article XI of the 1963 Vienna Convention a claim can be brought "only
with the courts of the Contracting Party within whose territory the nuclear incident
occurred" and if that location cannot be determined "with the courts of the
Installation State of the operator liable." If an incident occurred on a UK flagged
vessel in an area outside the territorial sea of any nation, a claim could be brought
only in a British court.
143. Id. at art. XIV.
144. See Protocol, supra note 7, at Preamble, and discussion in the IAEA Explanatory Texts, supra
note 25, at 18 - 21.
145. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. XVIII
146. Protocol, supra note 7, art. 16.
147. Id.
148. See discussion of negotiations on State liability in the IAEA Explanatory Texts, supra note 25, at
25 -27.
149. Protocol, supra note 7, art. IA(2) and (3).
150. This is in contrast to the Paris Convention, article 2 of which excludes nuclear incidents
occurring in the territory of non-Parties or to damage suffered in such territory unless the national
legislation of the operator otherwise provides. Paris Convention, supra note 3, art. 2.
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Under the 1997 Protocol a new provision is to be added to Article XI that
provides:
Where a nuclear incident occurs within the area of the exclusive
economic zone of a Contracting Party or, if such a zone has not been
established, in an area not exceeding the limits of an exclusive economic
zone, were one to be established, jurisdiction over actions concerning
nuclear damage from that nuclear incident shall, for the purposes of this
Convention, lie only with the courts of that Party.
This will only help if the shipping nations ratify the 1997 Protocol and if the
country in which the incident occurs has also ratified the 1997 Protocol. It will
also not apply if the accident occurs outside the EEZ but the damage is suffered
within the EEZ. Installation States can exclude liability for damage in a non-Party
nuclear State or its EEZ where that State does not offer reciprocal benefits.1
51
This means that non-nuclear States need not necessarily join the revised
Convention to share in at least some of its benefits, though only the courts of a
Contracting Party expressly have jurisdiction over an incident occurring within an
EEZ.152 The Installation State may exclude damage suffered in the territory or
EEZ of a non-Contracting State for non-nuclear States which do not afford
equivalent reciprocal benefits. 153
The Protocol for the first time excludes military installations, despite silence
in the 1963 Vienna Convention on the application of the Convention to military
installations, 154 even though many delegates during the negotiations reportedly felt
that victims of all nuclear incidents should be compensated 155 rather than taking the
opportunity to clarify its application to all nuclear installations. A new article
provides that the Convention shall not apply to nuclear installations used for non-
peaceful purposes. However, this provision did not define 'non-peaceful purposes'
and, as defined, any 'non-peaceful purpose' could exclude the application of the
revised Convention. It is unfortunate that States were not required to notify non-
peaceful installations in order to gain an exemption. A nuclear installation that
produces weapons-grade plutonium as part of its civil reprocessing functions may
well be excluded from coverage.
A. Definition of Nuclear Incident
The 1997 Protocol defines 'nuclear incident' to mean "any occurrence or
series of occurrences having the same origin which causes nuclear damage or, but
only with respect to preventive measures, creates a grave and imminent threat of
151. Revised Vienna Convention, supra note 56, art. 1 A(2).
152. Id. at art. XI.
153. Id. at art. IA.
154. The Vienna Convention Preamble does state that the Parties recognize the desirability of
establishing some minimum standards to provide financial protection against damage resulting from
certain peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but otherwise is silent on military installations. Vienna
Convention, supra note 2, at Preamble.
155. IAEA Explanatory Texts, supra note 25, at 29.
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causing such damage."1 56 The latter phrase is an addition to the 1963 Convention.
There is no definition of 'grave and imminent threat', but it seems clear that it must
both be a grave and an imminent threat of causing 'nuclear damage.' Being
imminent would not then suffice. Nor is it clear who must determine whether a
threat is 'grave and imminent'. A grave threat in the view of a coastal State may
not be viewed as grave by another State or its courts, and the 'grave' may be
determined under the lex fori, although 'reasonable measures' were taken.
However, preventive measures are subject to the approval of competent authorities
where the measures were taken,15 7 which may give rise to an argument that the law
of that state should decide what preventive measures constitute a grave and
imminent threat. This, however, is countered by the definition of 'reasonable
measures' which are to be found as such by the 'law of the competent court,' 1
58
which is to mean the law of the court having jurisdiction under the Convention,
including any rules of such law relating to conflict of laws.
This could have been addressed by the 1997 Protocol but was not: 'preventive
measures' are defined to mean reasonable measures taken after a nuclear incident
has occurred, subject to the approval of competent authorities by the law of the
State where the measures were taken. 159 'Reasonable measures' are defined to
mean measures which are found under the law of the competent court to be
appropriate and proportionate, having regard to all the circumstances.1
60
So the revised Convention is in the curious position where 'nuclear incident'
is to include occurrences which create a threat of causing nuclear damage, with
respect to preventive measures, but where preventive measures are defined in terms
of measures taken "after a nuclear incident has occurred." While a commonsense
interpretation may be that a 'nuclear incident' includes a series of occurrences
which create a grave and imminent threat which preventive measures are aimed at
preventing, this seems to be a potential 'catch-22' where a State faced with a threat
will have to decide to take measures without any certainty of compensation, in a
case where the only nuclear damage is the damage that is threatened.
Likewise, whether a threat is 'grave and imminent' may give rise to dispute.
Whether a drifting radioactive cloud drifts a particular direction or distance could
give rise to such a dispute as to whether an incident is likely to give rise to
radioactive release at all. Whether a radioactive transport which is encountering
difficulties such as a collision, fire or terrorist attack constitutes a 'grave and
imminent threat' is another area where conflicts may well arise. An operator may
argue a threat was not imminent, or if it was, fhat it was not grave in the sense of
threatening great harm.
156. Revised Vienna Convention, supra note 56, art. I(l)(1).
157. Id. at art. I(l)(n).
158. Id. at art. I(1)(e).
159. Id. atart. 1(n).
160. Id. at art. I(o).
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The Paris 2004 Protocol uses the 1963 wording, 161 whereas the Paris
Convention qualifies it by adding
provided that such occurrence or succession of occurrences, or any of
the damage caused, arises out of or results either from the radioactive
properties, or a combination of radioactive properties with toxic,
explosive, or other hazardous properties of nuclear fuel or radioactive
products or waste or with any of them, or from ionizing radiations
emitted by any source of radiation inside a nuclear installation. 
162
The Revised Vienna Convention is thus the most advanced in terms of
definition. With the above caveats in mind, the definition of nuclear damage will
now be examined.
B. Definition of Nuclear Damage
The definition of nuclear damage in the 1963 Convention is simply "(i) loss of
life, (ii) any personal injury or any loss of, or damage to, property" to the extent
that the loss or damage arises out of or results from ionizing radiation emitted by
any source of radiation inside a nuclear installation, as well as any other loss or
damage so arising or resulting if and to the extent that the law of the competent
court so provides. 163 Economic loss and environmental damage is not specifically
defined, except to the extent national legislation so provides. The Protocol now
includes a far more extensive definition, but each head of damage is conditioned
and, more significantly, each new type of damage is allowable only 'to the extent
determined by the law of the competent court.'
(iii) economic loss arising from loss or damage referred to in sub-
paragraph (i) or (ii), insofar as not included in those sub-paragraphs, if
incurred by a person entitled to claim in respect of such loss or damage;
(iv) the costs of measures of reinstatement of impaired environment,
unless such impairment is insignificant, if such measures are actually
taken or to be taken, and insofar as not included in sub-paragraph (ii);
(v) loss of income deriving from an economic interest in any use or
enjoyment of the environment, incurred as a result of a significant
impairment of that environment, and insofar as not included in sub-
paragraph (ii);
(vi) the costs of preventive measures, and further loss or damage caused
by such measures;
(vii) any other economic loss, other than any caused by the impairment of
the environment, if permitted by the general law on civil liability of the
competent court 164
161. Paris Convention, supra note 3, art. (a)(i).
162. Id.
163. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 11(k)(i)&(ii).
164. Revised Vienna Convention, supra note 56, art. 2(k)(iii - vii).
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This means that those types of damage are compensable only if the law of the
nuclear Installation State permits it. This then is largely an illusory advance. A
victim in another State will only be able to recover damage if the law of the nuclear
State allows it. 165 This proviso was added after considerable wrangling within the
Drafting Committee, and developed from a proposal by Germany, which is phasing
out nuclear energy, to condition entitlement to 'pure economic loss' related to
environmental impairment to this proviso. This suggestion was progressively
widened until a proposal by France, a major nuclear energy State, to subject all
except the original three heads to this proviso. 166 While these claims are in theory
admissible, obviously if the Installation State allows zero recovery, then the claim
would be academic. The head of other economic loss in (vii) is further
conditioned: "(vii) any other economic loss, other than any caused by the
impairment of the environment, if permitted by the general law on civil liability of
the competent court." So the very admissibility of that head is conditioned on 'the
general law.' The much-touted aim of harmonization of nuclear liability laws is
entirely missed by this formulation.
The limitation of compensation to measures actually taken omits any value of
the impairment of the environment as such where reinstatement or remediation is
not possible, taking into account any impact on biodiversity and the non-economic
value of the environment, including value to future generations.
The difficulties of the victim do not stop there. Article 11.6 of the Protocol
provides that:
No person shall be liable for any loss or damage which is not nuclear
damage pursuant to sub- paragraph (k) of paragraph 1 of Article I but
165. See id. at art. 2(k)(i - vii). "Nuclear damage" means - (i) loss of life, any personal injury; (ii)
loss of or damage to property; and each of the following to the extent determined by the law of the
competent court -
(iii) economic loss arising from loss or damage referred to in sub-paragraph (i) or (ii), insofar as not
included in those sub-paragraphs, if incurred by a person entitled to claim in respect of such loss or
damage;
(iv) the costs of measures of reinstatement of impaired environment, unless such impairment is
insignificant, if such measures are actually taken or to be taken, and insofar as not included in sub-
paragraph (ii);
(v) loss of income deriving from an economic interest in any use or enjoyment of the environment,
incurred as a result of a significant impairment of that environment, and insofar as not included in sub-
paragraph (ii);
(vi) the costs of preventive measures, and further loss or damage caused by such measures;
(vii) any other economic loss, other than any caused by the impairment of the environment, if permitted
by the general law on civil liability of the competent court,
in the case of sub-paragraphs (i) to (v) and (vii) above, to the extent that the loss or damage arises out of
or results from ionizing radiation emitted by any source of radiation inside a nuclear installation, or
emitted from nuclear fuel or radioactive products or waste in, or of nuclear material coming from,
originating in, or sent to, a nuclear installation, whether so arising from the radioactive properties of such
matter, or from a combination of radioactive properties with toxic, explosive or other hazardous
properties of such matter.
166. See IAEA Explanatory Texts, supra note 25, at 36 - 37, n.101.
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which could have been determined as such pursuant to the provisions of
that sub-paragraph.
This rather oddly worded provision, added at the suggestion of Sweden, 167 is
apparently intended to absolve any person other than the operator of liability under
the channeling principle. It is presumably intended to mean that if damage could
(in theory) have been determined to be damage by an applicable law, but was not,
then there is no liability for any other person.
There must in any case be an "emission of ionizing radiation" 168 for all except
preventive measures, 169 and the damage will be compensable 'to the extent that"
the loss or damage arises out of or results from ionizing radiation emitted by any
source of radiation inside a nuclear installation. The qualifying words clearly
restrict the ambit of compensation: 'to the extent that' implies a restriction.
C. Individual Categories of Damage
1. Economic Loss
(iii) economic loss arising from loss or damage referred to in sub-paragraph
(i) or (ii), insofar as not included in those sub-paragraphs, if incurred by a person
entitled to claim in respect of such loss or damage,
This is economic loss arising from loss of life, any personal injury or any loss
of, or damage to, property - and to the extent that the loss or damage arises out of
or results from ionizing radiation emitted by any source of radiation inside a
nuclear installation. Loss of income arising from personal injury or death, or lost
income from damaged property would be covered, provided it is not already
included in the main categories of damage.
This is important, as the economic loss is predicated on the injury, death or
damage to property. Economic loss arising in other ways, such as loss to businesses
such as tourism or fisheries, where the area or product is not directly damaged,
would not be compensable. This is an ongoing issue with coastal States, who are
very concerned that if an incident occurred in or near their waters, then tourists
would stop coming or fish would not be purchased due to fear of contamination,
actual or real. The very real economic loss would not be arising from actual
damage to property. Conceivably, one resort may receive compensation where
there are measurable increased radiation levels but a nearby one may not, where
there are no measurable increased levels.
The group of Small Island States, comprising over forty-two States in the
Caribbean, the Pacific, and the AIMS (Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and Mediterranean
167. Id.
168. Revised Vienna Convention, supra note 56, art. 1.1(k)
169. Id. This extended the 1963 Convention, which requires in article I(1)(k) nuclear damage to arise
out of or result from the radioactive properties of nuclear fuel or radioactive products or waste in a
nuclear installation, or of nuclear material. In other words, damage from, "other ionizing radiation emitted
by any other source of radiation inside a nuclear installation" is now covered. This was already the case
in the 1960 Paris Convention under article I (a)(i).
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and South China Seas) regions adopted a Mauritius and strategy 170 to implement
the Barbados Programme of Action 171 for their sustainable development. That
statement noted that their concerns with nuclear transports include the further
development and strengthening, within the appropriate fora, of international
regulatory regimes to enhance safety, disclosure, liability, security and
compensation in relation to such transport.
The Pacific Island Forum 2004 Communiqu6 172 stated that:
30. Leaders reiterated their concerns about possible economic loss in a
non- release situation and sought an assurance from shipping States that
where there is a demonstrable link between the incident and economic
loss Forum countries would not be left to carry such a loss unsupported
by the shipping States. Leaders agreed that further work be undertaken
on the case for a region-specific Environment Impact Assessment
including the extent to which the IAEA and shipping States' EIAs
adequately take account of region-specific dimensions and on any
examples of claims being made for rumour-type damage.
This year the Secretary-General of the Pacific Island Forum, Mr Greg Erwin,
during the passage of a shipment of High Level Waste through the Pacific, stated
that the Forum remains concerned that present international arrangements for
liability and compensation do not adequately address the risks posed by shipments
through the region. He said:
We have a real worry about possible economic loss in the event of an
incident involving a nuclear shipment, whether or not that incident
results in a radioactive release. The fragile economies of Forum Island
Countries depend heavily on industries involving our ocean, such as
fisheries and tourism. We continue to seek assurances from the
shipping states that where there is a demonstrable link between an
incident and economic loss, Forum members will not be left to carry
such a loss unsupported. 
173
170. International Meeting to Review the Implementation of the Programme of Action for the
Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States, , Jan. 10 - 14, 2005, Mauritius Strategy
for the Further Implementation of the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small
Island States , U.N. Doc A/CONF.207/CRP.7 (Jan. 13, 2005), available at
http://www.un.org/smallislands2005/pdf/sids strategy.pdf.
171. Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States,
Bridgetown, Barbados, Apr. 25 - May 6, 1994, Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development
of Small Island Developing States, U.N. Doc A/CONF. 167/9 (Oct. 1994)
172. The Forum Communiqu6, Thirty Fourth Pacific Islands Forum, (Aug. 14 - 16, 2003) stated
that "34. Leaders reiterated their continuing concerns over the shipment of radioactive materials through
the region. It welcomed the recent assurance by shipping States to take all practicable action to assist in
the management of an incident, whether or not such an incident involved the release of radioactivity, and
to cooperate effectively with any state concerned, particularly states close to where any accident had
taken place. Leaders called on shipping States to continue the dialogue with Forum members and in
particular, to progress the proposals that Forum members had developed for innovative arrangements
and assurances."
173. Press Statement, Thirty Fourth Pacific Islands Forum, "Forum Expresses Concern on Nuclear
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Clearly coastal States are most concerned at the possibility of economic loss
from an incident which may occur without direct physical damage or loss.
2. Environmental Impairment
(iv) the costs of measures of reinstatement of impaired environment,
unless such impairment is insignificant, if such measures are actually
taken or to be taken, and insofar as not included in sub-paragraph (ii);
This is a clear advance from the 1963 Convention. However, it is limited to
costs of reinstatement. The subparagraph is silent as to compensation where
reinstatement is not practicable or possible, as may well be the case with
widespread contamination, particularly of the marine environment. Some measures
could be envisaged, such as replacement of soil, replanting and reintroduction of
species, although these measures may substantially exceed the limitations of 300
million SDRs.
The European Directive on Liability Directive 2004/35/EC' 74 excludes
damage covered by specific nuclear liability Conventions; but, by way of
comparison, it requires Operators to take restorative measures where environmental
damage has occurred 175  and to take preventive measures where environmental
damage has not yet occurred but there is an imminent threat of such damage
occurring, 176  failing which, Authorities are to take preventative or restorative
measures. 177 Environmental damage means damage to protected species and
natural habitats, water damage and land damage creating a risk to human health. 178
This is clearly wider than the requirement to pay for reinstatement where
measures are actually taken unless such impairment is insignificant, and requires
operators to take steps concerned - the costs of which could exceed the applicable
limits.
(v) loss of income deriving from an economic interest in any use or
enjoyment of the environment, incurred as a result of a significant
impairment of that environment, and insofar as not included in sub-
paragraph (ii)
Again, this head is predicated on actual damage to the environment. It is an
advance as it does not require property damage by the person affected, so a
fisherman without property interest in the fish can still claim damages. However,
the IAEA Explanatory Text suggests that a tourist operator may have a claim
because tourists stay away for fear that the beach may be contaminated. 7 9 The
Shipments," available at http://www.forumsec.org.fj/news/2005/April/Ol.htm.
174. Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2004/35/EC, on environmental liability
with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage, art. 4, 2004 O.J. (L 143/56),
available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/1-143/1-1432004043oen00560075.pdf.
175. Id. at art. 6.
176. Id. at art. 5.
177. Id. at arts. 5(3) & 6(2).
178. Id. at art. 2(l)(a)(b)(c).
179. IAEA Explanatory Texts, supra note 25, at 38. The Text does go on to observe that if a ship
with nuclear substances sinks, but there is no emission, there is no coverage for economic loss suffered
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Text does not condition that statement on an assumption that there was some sort of
radioactive contamination somewhere causing the public fear, as opposed to an
incident which did not result in the release of radiation. Even if the premise is
added that there is some sort of contamination somewhere from the incident, this is
still unlikely to be correct as it seems likely that the beach must actually be
contaminated-'a significant impairment of that environment'-to the extent that
the loss or damage arises out of or results from ionizing radiation emitted by any
source of radiation inside a nuclear installation. Thus, if a nuclear carrier sinks
causing localized contamination in the marine environment, but that contamination
does not reach the beach, it is likely the Operator would claim that the loss or
damage did not arise out of or resulting from ionizing radiation and that there is not
a significant impairment of 'that' environment.
Additionally, there is no definition of 'significant'. In the context of ionizing
radiation this is a 'significant' omission. As there is always a certain of level of
background radiation, Operators are likely to argue that a very small level of
increase in background radiation is not 'significant', even to the extent of requiring
actual or potential damage from that increase, as opposed to an increase in concern
by potential tourists, for instance.
3. Preventive Measures
(vi) the costs of preventive measures, and further loss or damage caused by
such measures;
It is clear from the definition of 'preventive measures' that that the preventive
measures need to have been taken;1 80 the definition requires that the preventive
measures must be taken after an 'incident' has occurred, 81 but can be taken before
the damage has occurred. However, since 'nuclear damage' is part of the
definition of 'nuclear incident', this could be argued to be a catch-22, where the
only 'nuclear damage' is that being prevented. 182 The converse argument is that a
grave and imminent threat can form part of the definition of nuclear incident, but
thus does run into the difficulty that preventive measures can only be taken after
the nuclear incident has occurred. 1
83
A difficult question may arise where the preventive measure caused, for
instance, loss of tourism or fisheries markets, and there was no actual
contamination, whether because the preventive measure prevented contamination
or because no contamination eventuated. Ironically, if the loss or damage was
caused by the preventive measure 84 rather than the incident itself, the loss or
damage may be recoverable, but only to the extent determined by the law of the
competent court.
by public fear of contamination.
180. Revised Vienna Convention, supra note 56, art. 2(4)(n).
181. Id.
182. See IAEA Explanatory Texts, supra note 25, at 42, n. 118.
183. Revised Vienna Convention, supra note 56, at art. 2(4)(n).
184. Id. at art. (2)(k)(vi). This section includes further loss or damage caused by preventive
measures.
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Another question which may arise is whether measures taken must be taken
within the jurisdiction. Where a radioactive shipment threatens an EEZ, for
instance, even if it is outside the EEZ, can preventive measures be taken in or
outside the EEZ? The I-NS Convention 185 and the 1969 Oil Liability Convention,
as amended, 186 applies to preventive measures 'wherever taken.'
(vii) any other economic loss, other than any caused by the impairment of the
environment, if permitted by the general law on civil liability of the competent
court,
This residual head is potentially applicable to pure economic loss, as it is not
predicated on actual damage or injury. However, it is only 'if permitted' by the
'general law on civil liability of the competent court' in which the nuclear
installation is operated. "Law of the competent court" is defined in article I(1)(a)
to mean the law of the court having jurisdiction under the Convention, including
any rules of such law relating to conflict of laws. However, it seems that 'general
law on civil liability' is intended to be different and to refer to the substantive law
of the forum Court, rather than the substantive law applied under the conflict of
laws.187 If so, this would be inequitable as it would subject the claim of a victim in
another State to the laws of the Installation State which caused the damage. This
residual head of damage does not appear in the 2004 Paris Protocol.
VII. A COMPARISON OF THE REVISED PARIS AND VIENNA CONVENTIONS
The revised Vienna Convention is of wider territorial application. It applies to
nuclear damage wherever it is suffered, 188 whereas the revised Paris convention
applies mainly to nuclear damage occurring on the territory of contracting Parties
as well as on the territory of revised Vienna Convention Parties, which are also
parties to the Joint Protocol.' 89 It also applies to damage suffered in the territory of
non-nuclear States and other non-Contracting States which have in force reciprocal
nuclear liability legislation. 190 The Paris Convention, therefore, excludes damage
caused on the high seas or otherwise beyond areas of national jurisdiction, other
than EEZs. As one commentator has noted, "[f]rom an environmental point of
view this is an important difference with the Amended Vienna Convention as it
leaves the natural resources of the high seas and the international seabed area
uncovered, which cannot but be deplored."' 9'
185. HNS Convention, supra note 59, at art. 3(d).
186. Oil Pollution Convention, supra note 60, at art. 4(b).
187. See IAEA Explanatory Texts, supra note 25, at 38 - 39 n.106. (quoting Report of the Standing
Committee, Annex III, SCNL/17/INF.4, pp. 16 - 18, and explaining that this wording was inserted at the
request of the United Kingdom).
188. Revised Vienna Convention, supra note 56, at art. I A
189. Paris Convention, supra note 3, at art. 2. This is provided that the Paris Contracting Party is
also a contracting Party to the Joint Protocol.
190. Revised Paris Convention, supra note 57, at art. 2(a)(iv).
191. See Johan G. Lammers, International Responsibility and Liability for Damage Caused by
Environmental Interferences, ENVTL. POL'Y & LAW (2001), at 99 available at
http://iospress.metapress.com/media/2gurmhtuxnOjtcj2cb9q/contributions/q/5/6/p/q56pjg9bw6qy6pq7.pdf.
VOL. 35:1
2006 PROBLEMS AND GAPS IN THE NUCLEAR LIABILITY CONVENTIONS 117
Secondly, the new definition of nuclear damage in the two Conventions is
very similar, although the definition of nuclear damage in the revised Paris
Convention does not include catch-all 'any other economic loss'.1
92
Thirdly, the liability amounts differ. The revised Paris Convention provides
for minimum liability to €700 million, with various exceptions. 193 The revised
Vienna Convention provides for 300 million SDRs (about €357 million).194 The
revised Paris Convention provides for maximum liability of €700 million, whereas
the Vienna Convention does not set a maximum. 1
95
The revised Paris Convention 196 permits a Contracting Party to subject the
transit of nuclear substances through its territory on the condition that the
maximum amount of liability of the foreign operator concerned be increased if it
considers that such amount does not adequately cover the risks of a nuclear
incident in the course of the transit, provided that the maximum amount thus
increased does not exceed the maximum amount of liability of operators of nuclear
installations situated in its territory. This may provide a mechanism for transit
States to protect themselves by increasing required liability considerably. There is
no comparable provision in the Vienna Convention.
A. Jurisdiction
As is noted below, both the revised Paris Convention 197 and the revised
Vienna Convention grant exclusive jurisdiction to the Party in whose EEZ a
nuclear incident has occurred. 198 However, if the incident occurs outside the EEZ
but the damage is within the EEZ, jurisdiction is with the Installation State. 99
The Brussels Supplementary Protocol applies to damage suffered in an EEZ
or on the continental shelf of a Contracting Party, but only in connection with the
exploitation or the exploration of the natural resources of the EEZ or continental
shelf, and where the operator is liable under the Paris Convention. 200 This means
192. Revised Paris Convention, supra note 57, at art. l(vii). Revised Vienna Convention, supra note
56, at art. 2(2)(k)(vii).
193. See Revised Paris Convention, supra note 57, at art. 7.
194. Revised Vienna Convention, supra note 56, at art. 7(1)(a).
195. See Revised Paris Convention, supra note 57, at art. 7(e). See Revised Vienna Convention,
supra note 56, at art. 7(l)(a).
196. Revised Paris Convention, supra note 57, at art.7(e).
197. Revised Paris Convention, supra note 57, art. 13(b). The coastal State must have notified the
Secretary-General of the EEZ.
198. Revised Vienna Convention, supra note 56, at art. XI(lbis).
199. Revised Paris Convention, supra note 57, at art. 13(c)
200. The Brussels Supplementary Protocol applies to nuclear damage for which an operator of a
nuclear installation used for peaceful purposes situated in the territory of a Contracting Party to the
Convention is liable under the Paris Convention, and which is suffered either (i) in the territory of a
Contracting Party or (ii) in or above maritime areas beyond the territorial sea of a contracting Party and
(1) on board or by a ship flying the flag of a Contracting party, or on board or by an aircraft registered in
the territory of a Contracting Party, or on or by an artificial island, installation or structure under the
jurisdiction of a Contracting Party, or by a national of a Contracting Party, excluding damage suffered in
or above the territorial sea of a State not Party to the Convention; or in and above the EEZ of a
Contracting Party or on the continental shelf of a Contracting Party in connection with the exploitation or
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that if an incident occurs in an EEZ, reinstatement of the environment or preventive
measures may be compensable under the BSP if it is in connection with the
exploitation or exploration of natural resources or continental shelf. Clearly, this is
intended to be narrower than protection of the marine environment per se.
B. Limitation in Time
The Vienna Convention 20 1 imposes a ten-year time limitation from the date of
the nuclear incident on the filing of claims. The 1997 Protocol would extend this
limit to 30 years, but only "with respect to loss of life and personal injury.' 2 °2
Such short limits are unacceptable because it may take many more years for the
true nature of the risks to be determined. The provision should include a period
following discovery of the injury, even if is more than 30 years from the incident.
Genetic damage, for instance, may take more than 30 years to manifest itself in
future generations.
The IAEA Explanatory Text explained the Vienna Convention's ten year
period after the incident (or even three years of knowledge of the damage20 3 )
limitation period - in contrast with the more common 30 years - in terms of "the
need not to put a prohibitive burden on persons engaged in nuclear activities; it was
felt that operators and their guarantors should not be obliged to maintain over long
periods commitments that might prove to be merely theoretical., 20 4 This is despite
the fact that radioactive contamination may last for hundreds of years, and
consequent genetic damage may be passed down through generations.20 5
Subsequent generations are likely, thus, to be excluded.
The 1960 Paris Convention has a limitation period of ten years.20 6 However,
the period is increased to twenty years in the case of date of the theft, loss, jettison
or abandonment.20 7 A two year period may be established from the date at which
the person suffering damage has knowledge or from the date at which he ought
reasonably to have knowledge.20 t
The 2004 Protocol increases the period to thirty years from the nuclear
incident with respect to loss of life and personal injury, or ten years with respect to
other nuclear damage. 209
the exploration of the natural resources of that EEZ or continental shelf, provided that the courts of a
Contracting Party have jurisdiction pursuant to the Paris Convention. 2004 Brussels Supplementary
Protocol, supra note 128, at art. 2.
201. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, at art. Vl(1)(a).
202. Protocol, supra note 7, art. VI(l)(a).
203. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. VI.3. Provides for three years from the date on which the
person suffering damage had knowledge or ought reasonably to have had knowledge of the damage and
of the operator liable for the damage.
204. IAEA Explanatory Texts, supra note 25, at 14.
205. A longer period is possible if the operator's liability is covered by a financial security or State
funds for a longer period. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. VI(4).
206. Revised Paris Convention, supra note 3, art. 8.
207. Id. at art. 8 (b).
208. Id. at art. 8(c).
209. 2004 Protocol, supra note 120, art. 1.
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The CSC Convention provides for a ten year limitation period,21° or twenty
years from the date of the theft, loss,jettison or abandonment.2"'
C. Standing
The revised Vienna Convention has very limited provisions on standing,
providing only that the State of jurisdiction shall ensure that a State may bring an
action on behalf of persons who have suffered nuclear damage. 12 This would assist
victims in access to foreign courts, but does not go far enough. It is only a small
mitigation of the disadvantage of having to seek compensation from other courts
and does not, on the face of it, extend to environmental damage.
Economic loss may be claimed only if incurred by a person entitled to claim
in respect of such loss or damage.2 13 Thus, there is a significant question mark on
whether environmental groups could sue for the costs of measures of reinstatement
of impaired environment, of income deriving from an economic interest in any use
or enjoyment of the environment incurred as a result of a significant impairment of
that environment, or the cost of preventive measures.214
The revised Paris Convention has similar provisions, 215 also limiting
economic loss to a person 'entitled to claim', without defining what constitutes
such entitlement, thus leaving it to the lexfori. However, it does provide 216 that the
legislation of the State where the nuclear damage is suffered shall determine who is
entitled to take reinstatement measures and that preventive measures are taken
subject to the approval of competent authorities in the law of the State where the
measures were taken.217
D. Exceptions
Under the Vienna Convention, 2 8 damages resulting from "an act of armed
conflict, hostilities, civil war or insurrection" or from "a grave natural disaster of
an exceptional character" are exempt from any liability or recovery. The latter
exception has been removed from the 1997 Protocol, which is an advance, but the
other exceptions remain in the Revised Convention. The 1997 Vienna Protocol
provides that "No liability under this Convention shall attach to an operator if he
proves that the nuclear damage is directly due to an act of armed conflict,
hostilities, civil war or insurrection."2 19  Thus, the burden of proof is on the
operator.
210. CSC, supra note 8, art. 9. "The law of the competent court may establish a period of extinction
or prescription of not less than three years from the date on which the person suffering nuclear damage
had knowledge or should have had knowledge of the damage and of the operator liable for the damage,
provided that the period established pursuant to paragraphs I and 2 shall not be exceeded."
211. Id. at art. 9.
212. Revised Vienna Convention, supra note 56, art. XIA.
213. Id. at art. 1(k)
214. Id.
215. Id. at art. l(a)(vii)(iii)
216. Id. at art. l(a)(viii)
217. Revised Paris Convention, supra note 57, art. l(a)(xi).
218. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. IV(3).
219. Protocol, supra note 7, art. 6.
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
This means that under either Convention, in case of a threat of a terrorist
attack on an installation or vessel, the burden is borne by peoples and nations other
than the nuclear industry or nuclear State. The 2004 Paris Protocol provides that
"the operator shall not be liable for nuclear damage caused by a nuclear incident
directly due to an act of armed conflict, hostilities, civil war, or insurrection.,
220
So in both treaty systems, damage caused by an attack or terrorism may well be
borne by the victim.
VIII. SOME NATIONAL LEGISLATION ON NUCLEAR LIABILITY
A. United States
The United States is not party to any nuclear liability convention. The Price
Anderson Act, which was recently extended for 20 years, 221 instead provides a
nuclear liability regime. The Act requires individual operators to be responsible
for two layers of insurance cover: each operator is required to purchase USD 300
million cover from private insurers, and a second layer is funded through payments
of up to USD 96 million per reactor, collected in annual installments of USD 15
million per reactor.222 The total provision comes to over USD 10 billion paid for by
the utilities. If funds are depleted by accidents, Congress is required to consider
covering excess claims.223 USD 70 million was paid out after the Three Mile
Island incident. 224  As with international conventions, Price-Anderson, with its
limitations of liability and channeling provisions, 225 amounts to a subsidy to the
nuclear industry, estimated from USD 366 million 3 billion per year
nationwide.226
B. Canada
The 1976 Nuclear Liability Act 227 establishes the operator's liability to a limit
of C$75 million per nuclear installation and requires insurance to that level.228
220. 2004 Protocol, supra note 120, art. J.
221. The Price Anderson Act was signed into law in 1957 as an amendment to the Atomic Energy
Act of 1955. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 et seq. (1994), available at http://www.gc.doe.gov/price-anderson/public-
comments/Nuclear%/20Energy%20Agency/paa-appb.pdf [hereinafter Price Anderson Act]. It was
renewed on Aug. 8, 2005 in the Energy Policy Act 2005, to cover licensed nuclear power plants and other
facilities through Dec. 31 2005.
222. Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-408, § 2(b) (1988).
223. Price Anderson Act, supra note 221, § (e)(2).
224. Jason Zorn, Note: Compensation in the Event of a Terrorist Attack on a Nuclear Power Plant:
Will Victims Be Adequately Protected?, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1087, 1128 n.310 (2003).
225. Anyone liable is covered: 42 U.S.C. § 2014(t).
226. See testimony by Anna Aurilio of the U.S. Public Interest Group to the Committee on Energy
and Commerce available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/hearings/0627200l Hearing3O5/Aurilio492print.htm. See also
Renewable Energy Policy Project, July 2000, "Federal Energy Subsidies: Not all technologies are created
equal," available at http://www.crest.org/repp-pubs/pdf/subsidies.pdf.
227. Nuclear Liability Act, 1985, c. N-85, available at http:////lois.justice.gc.ca/en/N-28 [hereinafter
Nuclear Liability Act].
228. Id. at § 15. "Damage" is defined to mean any loss of or damage to property, whether real or
personal, and, for the purposes of any other provision of this Act, includes any damage arising out of or
attributable to any loss of or damage to that property.
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Liability is strict,22 9 and there is an exemption for an act of armed conflict in the
course of war, invasion or insurrection.23 °
C. Japan
Japan is not party to any liability convention. Its Law on Compensation for
Nuclear Damage 23  provides for strict, exclusive and unlimited liability for
operators, and operators must provide financial security such as 12 billion yen for
the Tokai-mura uranium conversion plant.232  An Indemnity Law provides for
indemnification by the government in exchange for an indemnity fee.233
Following the 1999 Tokai-mura plant accident, insurance covered 1 billion
234 th vr235yen. Sumitomo, the parent company, paid the balance of over 12 billion yen,
of which 3.86 billion was to foodstuffs manufacturers, 2.86 billion to tourist
operators, 1.76 to food retailers and 1.26 billion to agriculture interests.
236
D. Russia
Russia, which operates 29 nuclear reactors, this year ratified the Vienna
Convention and has bilateral agreements to cover entities working under safety
assistance programs. Russia signed the Vienna Convention in May 1996, more
than 10 years after the Chernobyl accident.237  However, whether any Ukrainian
victims of the Chernobyl accident will be able to claim remains to be seen. 238 The
limitation period for loss of life or personal injury under the 1997 Protocol is thirty
years following the date of the nuclear incident, 239 but neither Russia nor Ukraine
has ratified it to date. Processing of plutonium from decommissioned Russian
weapons has been delayed due to disputes between the United States and Russia on
229. Id. at § 4.
230. Id. at § 7.
231. Law on Compensation for Nuclear Damage, Law No. 147 of 17 June 1961, as amended. See
Nuclear Energy Agency [NEA], Tokai-Mura Accident, Japan: Third Party Liability and Compensation
Aspects, at 7, Nuclear Law Bulletin No. 66 (Dec. 2000), available at
http://www.nea.fr/html/law/nlb/Nib-66/013-022.pdf [hereinafter Tokai-Mura Accident Article]. See
also Omer F. Brown, Nuclear Liability: A Continuing Impediment To Nuclear Commerce, 1999,
available at http://www.world-nuclear.org/sym/1999/brown.htm.
232. Tokai-Mura Accident Article, supra note 231, at 7.
233. Law on the Indemnity Agreement for Compensation for Nuclear Damage, Law No. 148 of 17
June 1961, as amended.
234. Tokai-Mura Accident Article, supra note 231, at 7.
235. Some €87 million at today's rates. Barkley's EURO Conversion Calculator at
http://www.oasismanagement.com/eurodesk/eurocalc.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2006).
236. OECD, op. cit., 4 and Annex II.
237. NTI, .Russia: International Organization Membership available at
http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/intorgs/intorgs.htm. (last visited Oct. 17, 2006).
238. Ukraine is a party to the Vienna Convention. International Atomic Energy Agency, (1998),
available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1998/infcirc566-567al .shtml.
239. Protocol, supra note 7, art. 8.
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liability provisions. 240 There are some bilateral agreements in place,2 4 1 such as the
2000 France-Russian agreement on third party liability for nuclear damage.242
E. Ukraine
Ukraine is Party to the Vienna Convention and the Joint Protocol, and has
signed the CSC. Its 1995 Nuclear Liability Law, revised in 1997 following its
accession to the Vienna Convention,243 has been followed by a Law on Civil
Liability for Nuclear Damage and its Financial Security in 2001.244 The Chemobyl
Shelter Implementation Plan (SIP) 245 covered participants in the Plan.
F. China
China is not party to any international liability convention. 46 China to date
has only a 1986 interim domestic law on nuclear liability, devised for the Daya
Bay nuclear power plant.247 The law provides for exclusive jurisdiction of Chinese
courts and liability limited to 30 million RMB, or about USD 36 million. 248 It
excludes massive natural disasters, hostilities, armed conflict or riot, and has a ten-
year limitation period, and a three-year limitation period from the date the victim
knew or should have known of the nuclear damage.249
G. Austria
Austria in 1999 passed an Act on Civil Liability for Damages Caused by
Radioactivity. 250  The Act covers environmental impairment, defined as any
interference with the environment, which lastingly alters the latter in such a way
that it differs noticeably from natural processes either in quantity, in quality or in
the temporal respect, and the cost of preventive measures.2 1' No sudden incident is
required, and damage in the ordinary course of operation is covered. 25 2 Liability is
240. See NTI, Reducing Excess Stockpiles: Russian Plutonium Disposition at
http://www.nti.org/e-research/cnwm/reducing/rpdispose.asp_(last visited Oct. 17, 2006).
241. See Mark Hibbs, Safety of Civil Nuclear Installations, Part I: Safety of Civil Nuclear
Installations, Apr. 10, 2003, available at http://sung7.univ-lyon2.fr/article.php3?id-article=l 26.
242. See NEA Nuclear Law Bulletin No. 66, Dec. 2000, available at
http://www.nea.fr/html/law/nlb/Nlb-66/welcome.html.
243. See NTI, Ukraine Profile: Nuclear Safety Related Treaties available at
http://www.nti.org/e-research/profiles/Ukraine/index_4986.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2006).
244. NEA, Law on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and its Financial Security, Dec. 13, 2001,
available at http://www.nea.fr/html/law/nlb/nlb-69/Ukraine.pdf.
245. See IAEA, Shelter Implementation Plan: Chernobyl Shelter Fund, at
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Features/Chernobyl-I 5/shelter-fund.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2006).
246. NEA, Julie A. Schwartz, International Nuclear Law in the Post-Chernobyl Period, available
at http://www.nea.fr/html/law/chemobyl/SCHWARTZ.pdf.
247. See Brown, supra note 231.
248. Id.
249. See IIAS, Environmental Law of the People's Republic of China, Nov. 29, 2002, available at
http://www.iias.or.jp/old/research/research-e_top.html.
250. NEA, Federal Act on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Radioactivity (Atomic Liability
Act 1999 - Atom HG 1999), Oct. 7, 1998, available at http://www.nea.fr/htmlllaw/nlb/NLB-
63/austria.pdf.
251. Id. at § 11.3 and IV.11(2).
252. Id. at § 11.7.
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strict and unlimited; there are no maximum liability amounts. There is no
channeling of liability, so suppliers and contractors can be liable. Insurance is
required to be carried by nuclear carriers and any operators in Austria. 253 Claimants
can require the application of Austrian law to claims for damage caused in
254Austria , regardless of where the damaging event occurred.
H. Chile
Chile's Law for Nuclear Safety is an interesting law applicable to the transport
of nuclear substances and radioactive materials through Chile's EEZ.255 The Law
provides 256 that any transporter of nuclear substances or radioactive material who
uses the territorial sea, surrounding sea and the Chilean exclusive economic zone
will be considered as an operator, which must put up insurance or guarantees.257
The maximum liability is set at USD 75 million. 258 On the issue of causation, if
together with nuclear damage, damage occurs due to another different or
concurrent cause or resulting from a nuclear accident without it being possible to
make a distinction, all is deemed to be nuclear damage. 25 9 There is an exemption
for external armed hostilities, insurrection or civil war, but not for force majeure or
unforeseeable circumstances.260 There is a ten-year limitation period.26'
I. International Liability Discussions Under Way
The International Expert Group on Nuclear Liability (INLEX) was established
following the International Conference on the Safety of Transport of Radioactive
Material in Vienna in 2003.262 Instead of exploring ways to progress the
international liability regime, consensus for which was blocked by some nuclear
States, the IAEA established INLEX to prepare an explanatory text to develop a
common understanding of the legal issues and thereby promote adherence to the
liability instruments. The text on the Vienna Convention 263 runs to some 107
pages.
Negotiations are under way to develop rules and procedures on liability in
redress under the Biosafety Protocol. The first meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on
Liability and Redress took place in May 2005 in Montreal, Canada, following a
meeting of Technical Group of Experts on Liability and Redress, which took place
from 18 to 20 October 2004 in Montreal.2 4
253. Id. at § II.4,.5,.6(), .7(1).
254. Id. at § V.23.
255. BCN, Law for Nuclear Safety, 18.302, Apr. 16, 1984, (amended Oct. 1 2002) available at
http://www.bcn.cl/portada.html.
256. Id. at art. 54.
257. Id. at art. 62.
258. Id. at art. 60.
259. Id. at art. 55.
260. Id. at art. 56.
261. Id. atar. 66.
262. See IAEA, Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, GOV/INF/2004/9-GC (48)/INF/5, (Sept. 2,
2004) at http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC48/Documents/gc48inf-5.pdf.
263. IAEA Explanatory Texts, supra note 25.
264. See description of the process at http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/issues/liability2.aspx. See also
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IX. CASE STUDIES
Some possible scenarios are postulated to provide examples of how the
liability system may work in practice.
A. The French company Cogema sends a shipment of nuclear waste to a
nuclear operator in Japan onboard PNTL vessel Pacific Pintail, which flies a
UKflag. A nuclear incident occurs on the high seas near Federated States of
Micronesia, releasing radiation in areas, which results in a collapse of the
FSMfishing and tourist industries and which also causes loss to Japanese,
Marshall Islands and Palau tuna fishingfleets who hold licenses to fish in
FSM's EEZ. There is no direct evidence that any tuna have been
contaminated, but fish caught in or near FSM's EEZ can't be sold. Tourists
stay away even though there are no increased levels of radioactivity on nearby
beaches.
Both the UK and France are Paris and Brussels Supplementary Convention
parties. FSM, Palau, Marshall Islands and Japan are not party to any liability treaty.
Fishing operators will have three options: either they can sue in the United
Kingdom or in France or in their own countries. If they sue in their own countries,
they will want to be sure they can enforce any judgment, either through a
265
multilateral agreement, bilateral reciprocal judgment enforcement treaty or
otherwise. The prospect of success is not good, since the damage is arguably pure
economic loss because there is no evidence that fish that cannot be sold are
contaminated.
It is questionable whether fishing industries in any of those countries improve
their chances if States joined any of the liability Conventions. Since neither France
nor the UK a party to the Joint Protocol, the only option is to join the Paris
Convention. Since the Paris Convention Protocol is not in force, the only
applicable Convention will be the Paris Convention. There would most likely be
no recovery since the claim is not for damage to property caused by a nuclear
incident involving nuclear substances in the course of carriage. If there was
recovery, claims would be limited to the £140 million provided under the Nuclear
Installations Act 1965, beyond which the Paris/Brussels system applies. Recovery
under the Brussels Convention is limited to damage suffered in an EEZ or on the
continental shelf of a Contracting Party, in connection with the exploitation or the
exploration of the natural resources of the EEZ or continental shelf, and where the
Report of the Open-Ended Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts on Liability and
Redress under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety available at
http://www.biodiv.org/doc/meeting.aspx?mtg=BSWGLR-01.
265. See Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction, supra note 55. See also Lugano Convention (Sept.
16, 1988),at http://www.jura.uni-sb.de/convention-bruxelles/en/c-textes/_lug-textes.htm.
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operator is liable under the Paris Convention.266 There would be no compensation
for restoration of the marine environment.
B. A terrorist cell crashes an airliner onto Cogema's reprocessing plant at La
Hague, causing a radioactive releases of Cs-137from a cask storage facility
and causing the release of radioactivity across northern Europe and across
the English Channel. Damage and economic loss are measured in the
hundreds of millions or billions of dollars. Hundreds die and thousands suffer
from radiation poisoning.
France is a Paris and Brussels Supplementary Convention party, as is the
United Kingdom, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Belgium.
Claimants in those countries would lodge claims in French courts. They would be
subject to claims by the operator or its insurers that the exception in Article 9,
being 'armed conflict, hostilities, civil war, insurrection' applied. Claims would be
subject to a maximum of about €357 million under the BSC.
Claimants in States which are not Paris Convention or Joint Protocol
countries, including Austria, could file claims in their own Courts. They would not
be faced with exemption arguments and would be free of limitations. Russia and
Serbia and Montenegro, which are Vienna Convention but not Joint Protocol
countries, would be in the same position.
Claimants in Portugal, which is a Paris Convention but not Brussels
Supplementary Protocol party, would be subject to the Paris Convention limits of
E17.85 million. Claimants in the Czech Republic, Lithuania, and Slovakia and
Ukraine which are Vienna Convention and Joint Protocol countries, would also be
subject to the Paris Convention limits.
C. An accident at a nuclear power station in Germany causes low, but
elevated levels of radiation to be detected in Austria, the Czech Republic,
Switzerland and Italy. Dairy producers and other farmers find they cannot
sell their produce.
Germany is a Paris Convention country and party to the Brussels
Supplementary Convention as well as the Joint Protocol. The narrow definition of
recoverable damage would apply, so compensation would be restricted to damage
266. NEA, Convention of 31st January 1963 Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 29th July
1960, as amended by the additional Protocol of 28th January 1964 and by the Protocol of 16th
November 1982, art. 2 (explaining that the system of this Convention applies to nuclear damage for
which an operator of a nuclear installation used for peaceful purposes situated in the territory of a
Contracting Party to the Convention is liable under the Paris Convention, and which is suffered either (i)
in the territory of a Contracting Party or (ii) in or above maritime areas beyond the territorial sea of a
contracting Party and (I) on board or by a ship flying the flag of a Contracting party, or on board or by an
aircraft registered in the territory of a Contracting Party, or on or by an artificial island, installation or
structure under the jurisdiction of a Contracting Party, or by a national of a Contracting Party, excluding
damage suffered in or above the territorial sea of a State not Party to the Convention; or in and above the
EEZ of a Contracting Party or on the continental shelf of a Contracting Party in connection with the
exploitation or the exploration of the natural resources of that EEZ or continental shelf, provided that the
courts of a Contracting Party have jurisdiction pursuant to the Paris Convention).
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to or loss of life of any person and damage to or loss of property. Farmers would
have to prove actual damage to their property in order to establish liability.
X. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
While the minimum limits have been increased by the 1997 and 2004
Protocols, non-nuclear States may wish to consider whether agreeing to limitation
of liability is in their best interests. While it clearly benefits nuclear operators and
nuclear States, it is less clear that it benefits potential victims. Where those victims
are required by the respective Conventions in most cases to commence litigation in
the courts of the Operator State, the quantum and very availability of categories of
damage is restricted by the law applied by those courts; and even where it is
available, will be limited by the applicable limitations. In the case where claims are
in the billions of Euros, they would be at a clear disadvantage.
The revised Vienna Convention applies to damage wherever suffered. Non-
nuclear States should consider carefully whether they join the revised Vienna
Convention. Particularly if the limitation of claims in time and amount concerns
non-nuclear States, they may wish to think carefully about joining the revised
Vienna Convention. Joining the CSC seems to provide little improvement, since it
is not in force, and, even so, still provides for jurisdiction in the Installation State.
Non-nuclear States at least may find the requirements of compliant national
legislation, such as exempting installations from terrorist attacks or grave natural
disaster of an exceptional character, objectionable.
The CSC does not require a minimum liability be established,2 67 but must
provide that the maximum amount of liability of the operator shall be governed by
the national law of the Installation State.268 It does require that the nature, form,
extent and equitable distribution of compensation for nuclear damage caused by a
nuclear incident be governed by the law of the competent court.2 6 9
If a State does join the revised Vienna Convention, it must upon ratification
or accession make a declaration under article 19 of the Protocol stating its intention
not to be bound with respect to States that are party only to the unamended Vienna
Convention, since they risk limiting their rights to compensation to the lower levels
in the unamended Vienna Convention. The omission of coverage for terrorist
attacks is a significant omission as this is an oft-cited concern by States.
A regime should clearly cover all nuclear installations; all nuclear incidents
wherever they should apply, and their effects anywhere in the world; damage to the
environment per se; should not carry exemptions, particularly for terrorist attacks;
should provide for an international tribunal; should provide for a backup fund for
providing compensation where a liability regime fails; should not limit liability to
an operator and should not provide for limits on liability amounts.
A fund which ensures compensation for damage, rather than one which
provides backup funding but still predicates compensation on rigid criteria, would
267. CSC Annex, supra note 136, art. 4.
268. Id. at art. 6.
269. Id. at art. I],
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go some distance towards providing some certainty of compensation. The HNS
Convention 2 7 provides for a fund which shall pay compensation to any person
suffering damage if such person has been unable to obtain full and adequate
compensation for the damage because no liability exists for damage under other
provisions of the Convention, as well as because the owner liable for the damage is
financially incapable of meeting the obligations under this Convention in full,
financial security has failed, or because the damage exceeds the owner's liability.
'Expenses reasonably incurred' or 'sacrifices reasonably made by the owner
voluntarily to prevent or minimize damage' are compensable under the Fund. l2 7
The Fund, for instance, specifically covers excluded cover for damage resulting
from a *natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character'
to a specified limit.a72 Contributions to the Fund are made according to a formula
which calculates, for example, the amount of oil or gas received in a given year.273
States considering joining the Paris or Vienna Conventions should measure
the provisions against the criteria discussed, including the importance of a backup
fund; that absolute liability should govern; that limitation should be unlimited in
amount; that there should be a just time limit of liability; that all responsible parties
should bear liability; that claimants should be able to bring claims in a neutral
tribunal; that the applicable law should be that of the claimant; that there should a
broad definition of recoverable damage; and that there should be just rules on
standing, access to justice, and burden of proof and causation.
270. HNS Convention, supra note 59, art. 14.
271. Id. at art. 14(2).
272. Id. at art. 14(5)(b).
273. Id. atarts. 18, 19.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: WHAT SPECIFIC
ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS HAVE BEEN RECOGNIZED?*
DINAH SHELTON**
As early as the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment,
efforts were made to explore and attempt to understand the interrelationship
between human rights and environmental protection. Preparations for the
Stockholm Conference coincided with the 1968 United Nations Teheran
Conference on Human Rights, the first international conference organized by the
United Nations, and marking the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Teheran Conference, overcoming a
long-standing political debate that led to the adoption of two human rights
covenants1 rather than a single instrument, proclaimed that all human rights are
interdependent and indivisible, opening the door for consideration of complex
issues like environmental rights. The Teheran Conference also addressed concerns
about economic development and human rights, proclaiming the interdependence
of peace, development and human rights.2 Resource depletion fit within this
agenda and stimulated interest among developing states in the Stockholm
Conference, which culminated in the Declaration recognizing environmental
protection as a pre-condition for the enjoyment of many human rights.3 Almost
twenty years after the Stockholm Conference, in resolution 45/94, the UN General
Assembly recalled the language of the Stockholm Declaration, stating that it:
Recognizes that all individuals are entitled to live in an environment
adequate for their health and well-being; [and] [c]alls upon Member
* Revised draft, presented at the Conference on the Human Right to a Safe and Healthful Environment
and the Responsibility Under International Law of Operators of Nuclear Facilities, Salzburg, October
20-23, 2005.
** Patricia Roberts Harris Research Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School.
1. The two Covenants divide human rights into categories of civil and political rights, on one
hand, and economic, social and cultural rights, on the other hand. See International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESC].
2. International Conference on Human Rights, Apr. 22-May 13, 1968, Teheran, Iran,
Proclamation of Teheran, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 32/41.
3. United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, June 5-16, 1972, Stockholm, Switz.,
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, princ. 1, 11 I.L.M. 1416,
1417-18. Principle 1 of the Final Declaration reads: "Man has the fundamental right to freedom,
equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and
well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and
future generations."
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States and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations.., to
enhance their efforts towards ensuring a better and healthier
n 4environment.
There is a substantial practical reason for emphasizing international human
rights law. For those whose well-being suffers due to environmental degradation,
human rights law currently provides the only set of international legal procedures
that can be invoked to seek redress for harm that is the consequence of an act or
omission attributable to a state. The inclusion of inaction is significant because
most environmental harm is due to non-state activity. Human rights law makes
clear that while its primary objective is to protect individuals from abuse of power
by state agents, including legislative representatives of the democratic majority,
each state is also obliged to exercise due diligence to ensure that human rights are
not violated by non-state actors. Due diligence requires measures to prevent
abuses where possible, investigate violations that occur, prosecute the perpetrators
as appropriate, and provide redress for victims. Thus, while no international
human rights procedure allows a direct action against private enterprises or
individuals who cause environmental harm, a state allowing such harm may be
held accountable, as the following discussion indicates (litigation can be
commenced in certain instances against non-state actors in national courts, for
example under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)).
I. INTRODUCTION: INTER-RELATING HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
From Stockholm to the present, most advances in developing environmental
rights have occurred first, and almost exclusively, at the regional level. Four
principal and complementary approaches have emerged to characterize the
relationship between human rights and the environment:
1. International environmental laws incorporate and utilize those human
rights guarantees deemed necessary or important to ensuring effective
environmental protection.
2. Human rights law re-casts or interprets internationally-guaranteed
human rights to include an environmental dimension when environmental
degradation prevents full enjoyment of the guaranteed rights.
3. International environmental law and international human rights law
elaborate a new substantive right to a safe and healthy environment.
4. International environmental law articulates ethical and legal duties of
individuals that include environmental protection and human rights.
The first approach selects from among the catalogue of human rights those
rights most relevant to the aims of environmental protection, independent of the
utility of environmental protection to the enjoyment of the full human rights
catalogue. The approach thus emphasizes procedural rights such as freedom of
4. Need to Ensure a Healthy Environment for the Well-Being of Individuals, G.A. Res. 45/94, at
paras. 1-2, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/94 (Dec. 14, 1990).
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association, which permits the existence and activities of non-governmental
environmental organizations, and the right of access to information concerning
potential threats to the environment, which may be used for nature protection not
necessarily related to human health and well-being. The potential for improving
environmental protection through effective guarantees of procedural rights is solid,
but the absence of complaint mechanisms or other recourse in international
environmental agreements is a limiting aspect.
5
In contrast, human rights law seeks to ensure that environmental conditions
do not deteriorate to the point where the substantive right to life, the right to
health, the right to a family and private life, the right to culture, and other human
rights are seriously impaired. As Judge Weeremantry of the International Court of
Justice expressed it:
The protection of the environment is... a vital part of contemporary
human rights doctrine, for it is a sine qua non for numerous human
rights such as the right to health and the right to life itself. It is scarcely
necessary to elaborate on this, as damage to the environment can impair
and undermine all the human rights spoken of in the Universal
Declaration and other human rights instruments (emphasis added).6
With a focus on the consequences of environmental harm to existing human
rights, this approach serves to address most serious cases of actual or imminently-
threatened pollution. The primary advantage over the first approach is that
existing human rights complaint procedures may be employed against those states
whose level of environmental protection falls below that necessary to maintain any
of the guaranteed human rights. Using existing human rights law has its own
limits, however, because it cannot easily resolve threats to other species or to
ecological processes if these are not directly and immediately linked to human
well-being. The third possibility is to formulate a new human right to an
environment that is not defined in purely anthropocentric terms, an environment
that is safe not only for humans, but one that is ecologically-balanced and
sustainable in the long term. Some international success has attended the various
efforts undertaken in this direction, as discussed below.7 The notion of a right to
environment has met resistance from those who claim that the concept cannot be
given content and who assert that no justiciable standards can be developed to
enforce the right, because of the inherent variability of environmental conditions. 8
5. Johanna Rinceanu, Enforcement Mechanisms in International Environmental Law, 15 J.
Envt'l L. & Litig. 147, 149 (2000).
6. Gab9ikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 92 (Sept. 27) (separate opinion
of Judge Weermantry).
7. Far more success has been achieved among national constitutions. As discussed infra, more
than 100 constitutions presently proclaim a right to an environment of a specified quality or impose
duties on the government to protect the environment. See infra, note 171.
8. See, e.g. Gunther Handl, Human Rights and Protection of the Environment: A Mildly
'Revisionist' View," in HUMAN RIGHTS, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION 121-22 (Antonio Augusto Cancado Trindade ed. 1992).
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Finally, the fourth approach prefers to address environmental protection as a
matter of human responsibilities rather than rights. Draft declarations of human
responsibilities such as the Earth Charter focus on duties toward the environment. 9
Many proponents of this approach posit ecological rights or rights of nature as a
construct to balance human rights, attempting to introduce ecological limitations
on human rights. "The objective of these limitations is to implement an eco-centric
ethic in a manner which imposes responsibilities and duties upon humankind to
take intrinsic values and the interests of the natural community into account when
exercising its human rights."
10
This paper provides a current assessment of environmental rights. It
discusses how environmental law has encompassed procedural human rights and
how human rights law recognizes the consequences of environmental degradation
on the enjoyment of human rights. The merger of the two fields through
elaborating a human right to the environment is then considered, as well as the
special recognition given the rights of indigenous peoples.
II. PROCEDURAL ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS
The lack of state support at the Stockholm Conference for pronouncing a
substantive right to environment (proposed by the United States) led scholars" and
activists during the following decade to consider human rights in a more
instrumental fashion, to give content to environmental rights by identifying those
rights whose enjoyment could be considered a prerequisite to effective
environmental protection. They focused in particular on the procedural rights to
environmental information, public participation in decision-making and remedies
in the event of environmental harm. Various international instruments, particularly
in Europe, built upon this concept to give content to Stockholm Principle 1.12
The texts adopted in connection with the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development ("UNCED") contain few references to human
9. See The Earth Charter, princs. 4-5, Mar. 2000, available at
http://www.earthcharter.org/files/charter/charter.pdf (encouraging the protection and restoration of
ecological systems and taking action to prevent future environmental harm).
10. Prudence Taylor, From Environmental to Ecological Human Rights: A New Dynamic in
International Law?, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVT'L. L. REV. 309, 310 (1998). See also Catherine Redgwell,
Life, the Universe and Everything: A Critique of Anthropocentric Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS
APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 71 (Alan E. Boyle & M. Anderson eds. 1996) (stating
that "there has been an increasing recognition in international environmental law of the intrinsic value
of animals and nature which goes beyond merely an incidental spill-over effect.").
11. See, e.g., A.-Ch. Kiss, Peut-on definir le droit de l'homme 0 l'environnement? 1976 REV.
JURIDIQUE DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT 15; Kiss, Le droit la conservation de l'environnement, 2 REV. UNIV.
DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 445 (1990); Alexandre Kiss, An introductory note on a human right to
environment, in ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: NEW CHALLENGES AND
DIMENSIONS 199 (Edith Brown Weiss ed. 1992) (arguing that "the right to environment is as concrete in
its implications as any other right guaranteed to individuals and groups.").
12. See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-14, 1992, Rio de
Janeiro, Braz., Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 10, U.N. Doe.
A/CONF.151/26 (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration]; Convention on Biological Diversity,
art. 14, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818.
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rights. Working Group III of the UNCED Preparatory Committee considered
numerous proposals to include a right to a healthy environment in the Rio
Declaration. In the final meetings prior to Rio, however, the participants failed to
reach consensus on including such a right.
The Rio Declaration states that human beings are "entitled to a healthy and
productive life in harmony with nature."' 3  The Rio Declaration accepts the
importance of a role for the public, but - consistent with its avoidance of rights
language - calls for including it on the ground of efficiency: "Environmental
issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens at the
relevant level" (Principle 10). Principle 10 adds that:
[E]ach individual shall have appropriate access to information
concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, including
information on hazardous materials and activities in their communities,
and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. States
shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by
making information widely available. Effective access to judicial and
administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be
provided. 14
Numerous environmental instruments now contain the three procedural rights,
which are also guaranteed by human rights instruments. The various international
efforts to promote procedural rights in environmental instruments produced a
landmark agreement on June 25, 1998, when thirty-five states and the European
Community signed a Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters.15 The Convention is the first
environmental treaty to incorporate and strengthen the language of Principle 1. The
Preamble expressly states that "every person has the right to live in an
environment adequate to his or her health and well-being, and the duty, both
individually and in association with others, to protect and improve the environment
for the benefit of present and future generations." 16 The following paragraph adds
that to be able to assert the right and observe the duty, citizens must have access to
information, be entitled to participate in decision-making and have access to
justice in environmental matters. 17 These provisions are repeated in Art. 1 where
states parties agree to guarantee the rights of access to information, public
participation, and access to justice.' 8 The Convention acknowledges its broader
13. Rio Declaration, supra note 12, at princ. 1.
14. Id. at princ. 10.
15. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to
Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 2161 U.N.T.S. 447 [hereinafter Convention on Access
to Information]. The Convention was sponsored by the United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe and is open for signature by the 55 members of the UNECE, which includes all of Europe as
well as the United States, Canada, and states of the former Soviet Union. States having consultative
status with the UNECE may also participate.
16. Id. at pmbl.
17. Id. at pmbl.
18. Id. at art. 1.
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implications, expressing a conviction that its implementation will "contribute to
strengthening democracy in the region of the UNECE." 19
A. The Right to Environmental Information
A "right to information" can mean, narrowly, freedom to seek information,
or, more broadly, a right to access to information, or even a right to receive it.
Corresponding duties of the state can be limited to abstention from interfering with
public efforts to obtain information from the state or from private entities, or
expanded to require the state to obtain and disseminate all relevant information
concerning both public and private projects that might affect the environment. If
the government duty is limited to abstention from interfering with the ability of
individuals or associations to seek information from those willing to share it then
little may actually be obtained. A governmental obligation to release information
about its own projects can increase public knowledge, but fails to provide access to
the numerous private-sector activities that can affect the environment. Information
about the latter may be obtained by the government through licensing or
environmental impact requirements. Imposing upon the state a duty to disseminate
this information in addition to details of its own projects provides the public with
the broadest basis for informed decision-making.
Informational rights are widely found in environmental treaties, in weak and
strong versions.20 The Framework Convention on Climate Change, Art. 6,
provides that its parties "shall... [p]romote and facilitate at the national and, as
appropriate, sub-regional and regional levels, and in accordance with national laws
and regulations, and within their respective capacities.., public access to
information [and]... public participation., 21 The Convention on Biological
Diversity similarly does not oblige states parties to provide information, but
Article 14 provides that each contracting party, "as far as possible and as
19. Id. at pmbl.
20. See e.g., Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic,
art. 9, Sept. 22, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 1069; Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from
Activities Dangerous to the Environment, arts. 13-16, June 21, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1228; North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, art. 2(1)(a), Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480; International
Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or
Desertification, Particularly in Africa, arts. 10(2)(e), 13(1)(b), 14(2), 19, 25, June 17, 1994, 33 I.L.M.
1328; Convention on Cooperation and Sustainable Use of the Danube River, art. 14, June 29, 1994,
available at http://www.icpdr.org/icpdr-pages/drpc.htm [hereinafter Danube Convention]; Energy
Charter Treaty, arts. 19(l)(1), 20, Dec. 17, 1994; 33 I.L.M. 360; Protocol Concerning Specially
Protected Areas and Biological Diversity in the Mediterranean, art. 19, June 10, 1995, 1999 O.J. (L
322) 3; Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, art. 15(2), Sept. 10, 1998, available at
http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/CM%206119.pdf, Protocol on Water and Health to the 1992
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, art.
5(i), June 17, 1999, available at http://www.euro.who.int/Document/Peh-ehp/ProtocolWater.pdf
[hereinafter Transboundary Watercourses Convention]; Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the
Convention on Biological Diversity, art. 23, Jan. 29, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1027; International Treaty on
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, art. 17, Nov. 3, 2001, available at
ftp://ftp.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/it/ITPGRe.pdf.
21. Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 6, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849.
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appropriate," shall introduce "appropriate" environmental impact assessment
procedures and "where appropriate, allow for public participation in such
procedures. 22  Broader guarantees of public information are found in regional
agreements, including the 1992 Helsinki Convention on the Protection and Use of
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (Art. 16), the 1992 Espoo
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context
(Art. 3(8)), and the 1992 Paris Convention on the North-East Atlantic (Art. 9).23
The last mentioned requires the contracting parties to ensure that their competent
authorities are required to make available relevant information to any natural or
legal person, in response to any reasonable request, without the person having to
prove an interest, without unreasonable charges and within two months of the
request.
Other treaties require states parties to inform the public of specific
environmental hazards. The International Atomic Energy Agency Joint
Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of
Radioactive Waste Management 24 is based to a large extent on the principles
contained in the IAEA document "The Principles of Radioactive Waste
Management., 25  The Preamble of the treaty recognizes the importance of
informing the public on issues regarding the safety of spent fuel and radioactive
waste management.26 This is reinforced in Arts. 6 and 13, on siting of proposed
facilities, which require each state party to take the appropriate steps to ensure that
procedures are established and implemented to make information available to
members of the public on the safety of any proposed spent fuel management
facility or radioactive waste management facility. 27
Regionally, the European Community generally guarantees the right of the
individual to be informed about the environmental compatibility of products,
manufacturing processes and their effects on the environment, and industrial
installations. 28 Two general directives address rights of information. First, Council
Directive 85/337 Concerning the Assessment of the Effects of Certain Public and
22. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 12, at art. 14.
23. Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International
Lakes, art. 16, Mar. 17, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1312; Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a
Transboundary Context, art. 3(8), Feb. 25, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 800 [hereinafter Environmental IA
Convention]; Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, art.
9, Sept. 22, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 1069.
24. Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste
Management, Sept. 5, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1431.
25. Id. at intro.
26. Id. at pmbl.
27. Id. at arts. 6, 13.
28 See, e.g. Council Directive 76/160, pmbl, art. 13, 1976 O.J. (L 31) 1 (stating that "public interest in
the environment and in the improvement of its quality is increasing... the public should therefore
receive objective information on the quality of bathing water.") Article 13 requires Member States to
submit regularly to the Commission "a comprehensive report to the Commission on the bathing water
and most significant characteristics thereof." The Commission publishes the information "after prior
consent has been obtained from the Member State concerned." However, the consent may limit the
information provided, undermining its "objective" nature.
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Private Projects on the Environment 29 makes explicit the duty to provide
information in connection with mandatory environmental assessment projects.
Second, the EC adopted in 1990 a Directive on Freedom of Access to Information
on the Environment, 30 replaced in January 200331 as a consequence of the
adoption of the 1998 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public
Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental
Matters.32 The Community also requires that information be provided to those
who may be particularly at risk from certain activities or products. For example,
framework directive 89/39133 on the protection of workers against risks at the
workplace, calls for employee information and consultation. Other directives
applicable to specific industries, such as mining and fishing or to specific hazards,
such as asbestos, 34 require information be given to workers about the risks they
face.
Other organizations have issued non-binding declarations proclaiming a right
to environmental information. The World Health Organization's European Charter
on the Environment and Health specifies that "every individual is entitled to
information and consultation on the state of the environment. ' ' 35  The states
participating in the OSCE have confirmed the right of individuals, groups, and
organizations to obtain, publish and distribute information on environmental
issues.36 The Bangkok Declaration, adopted October 16, 1990, affirms similar
rights in Asia and the Pacific37 while the Arab Declaration on Environment and
Development and Future Perspectives of September 1991 speaks of the right of
individuals and non-governmental organizations to acquire information about
environmental issues relevant to them. 3
Human rights texts generally contain a right to freedom of information or a
corresponding state duty to inform. The right to information is included in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Art. 19), the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (Art. 19(2)), the Inter-American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man (Art. 10), the American Convention on Human Rights
29 Council Directive 85/337, art. 2, 1985 O.J. (L 175) 40 (EC).
30 Council Directive 90/313, 1990 O.J. (L 158) 56 (EC).
31 Council Directive 2003/4, 2003 O.J. (L 41) 26.
32 Convention On Access To Information, supra note 15.
33 Council Directive 89/391, art.l, 1989 O.J. ( L 183) 1.
34 See Council Directive 83/477, arts. 3-4, 1983 O.J. (L 263) 25 (EC).
35 European Charter on Environment and Health, art. 1, Dec 7-8, 1989, available at
http://www.euro.who.int/AboutWHO/Policy/20010827_3.
36 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, On Conclusions and Recommendations of the
Meeting on the Protection of the Environment of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in
Europe, Sofia, Bulg., October-November, 1989, available at
http://www.osce.org/documents/eea/1989/11/13750-en.pdf.
37 Dinah Shelton & Alexandre Kiss, Judicial Handbook on Environmental Law 28-29 (United Nations
Env't Programme 2005) (noting that "para. 27 affirms 'the right of individuals and non-governmental
organizations to be informed of environmental problems relevant to them, to have the necessary access
to information, and to participate in the formulation and implementation of decisions likely to affect
their environment."').
381d. at29.
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(Art. 13), and the African Charter on the Rights and Duties of Peoples (Art. 9).
39
European states are generally bound by Art. 10 of the European Convention on
Human Rights, which guarantees the "freedom to... receive.., information." 4 In
the case of Leander v. Sweden, the applicant alleged violation of Art. 10 after he
was refused access to a file that was used to deny him employment. The Court
unanimously stated:
[T]he right to freedom to receive information basically prohibits a
Government from restricting a person from receiving information that
others wish or may be willing to impart to him. Article 10 does not, in
circumstances such as those of the present case, confer on the individual
a right of access to a register containing information on his personal
position, nor does it embody an obligation on the Government to impart
such information to the individual.41
The Court has applied its restrictive approach to Art. 10 in environmental
cases. 42  In Anna Maria Guerra and 39 Others against Italy43 the applicants
complained about the chemical factory "ENICHEM Agricoltura," situated near the
town of Manfredonia; specifically, pollution and the risk of major accidents at the
plant; and the absence of regulation by the public authorities. Invoking Art. 10 of
the European Convention on Human Rights, the applicants asserted the
government's failure to inform the public of the risks and the measures to be taken
in case of a major accident, prescribed by the domestic law transposing the EC
"Seveso" directive. 44 The European Commission on Human Rights admitted the
complaint insofar as it alleged a violation of the right to information. It did not
accept the claim of pollution damage. The Commission found that the government
had classified the factory as a "high risk" facility in applying the criteria
established by the directive and Italian law and that there had been accidents at the
factory. By a large majority, the Commission concluded that Art. 10 imposes on
states an obligation not only to disclose to the public available information on the
39 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 19, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1 plen.
mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]; ICCPR, supra note 1, at art.
19; American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. XVII, May 2, 1948, AG/RES. 1591
(XXVIII-O/98) [hereinafter American Declaration]; American Convention on Human Rights art. 13,
Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention]; African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights, art. 9, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 [hereinafter African Charter].
4 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 10, Sept. 3, 1953,
213 U.N.T.S. 222.
4' Leander v. Sweden, App. No, 9248/81, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 433, para. 74 (1987), See also Gaskin v.
United Kingdom, 160 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.A) at para. 51 (1989) (holding that the government did not
breach the Convention in failing to allow access to a personal file of former foster child).
42 See Stefan Weber, Environmental Information and the European Convention on Human Rights, 12
HUM. RTS. L.J. 177 (1991). Contrast the views of the former Commission which found that the right to
receive information envisages not only access to general sources of information, which may not be
restricted by state authorities, but also the right to receive information not generally accessible that is of
particular importance to the individual. X v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 8383/78, 17 Dec.
& Rep. 227, 228-29 (1980).
43 Guerra v. Italy, App. No. 14967/89, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 357 at para. 61 (1998).
44 Id. at para. 53.
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environment, but also the positive duty to collect, collate, and disseminate
information which would otherwise not be directly accessible to the public or
brought to the public's attention. In arriving at its conclusion, the Commission
relied upon "the present state of European law" which it said confirmed that public
information represents one of the essential instruments for protecting the well-
being and health of the populace in situations of environmental danger. The
Commission referred specifically to a resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe, relating to the Chemobyl nuclear accident, which the
Commission said recognized, at least in Europe, a fundamental right to
information concerning activities that are dangerous for the environment or human
well-being.45
A Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, in a judgment of
February 19, 1998, reversed the Commission on its expanded reading of Art. 10,
but unanimously found a violation of Art. 8, the right to family, home and private
life. The Court reaffirmed its earlier case law holding that Art. 10 generally only
prohibits a government from interfering with the ability of a person to receive
information that others wish or may be willing to impart. According to the Court,
"[t]hat freedom cannot be construed as imposing on a State, in circumstances such
as those of the present case, positive obligations to collect and disseminate
information of its own motion. 46  Although Art. 10 was found to be not
applicable to the case, eight of the 20 judges indicated through separate opinions a
willingness to consider positive obligations to collect and disseminate information
in some circumstances.47
The Court has also considered the applicability of Art. 10 to prosecutions for
defamation in the dissemination of environmental information. In a 1999 decision,
the European Court held that the state may not extend defamation laws to restrict
dissemination of environmental information of public interest. In the case of
Bladet TromsO v. Norway,48 a Grand Chamber of the European Court held 13-4
that Norway had violated the rights of a newspaper and its editor by fining them
both for defamation after they published extracts of a report by a governmental
seal hunting inspector.49 The report claimed among other things that seals had
been flayed alive and that there were other violations of seal hunting regulations.
The names of the crew were deleted from the publication but they successfully
sued for defamation. The European Court held that the judgment was an
unjustified interference with Art. 10 of the Convention. The Court found that the
reporting should have been considered in the wider context of the newspaper's
coverage of the controversial seal hunting issue, a matter of public interest. Its
4 Id. at para. 34.
46 Id. at para. 53.
47 Id. (Palm. J., concurring; Bernhardt, J., concurring; Russo, J. concurring; MacDonald, J. concurring;
Makarzyck J., concurring; Van Dijk, J. concurring; Jambrek J., concurring; Vilhjalmsson J., concurring
& dissenting.)48 Bladet TromsO v. Norway, App. No. 21980/93, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 125, at paras. 61, 71-73 (1999).
49 Id. at paras. 11, 72-73. (The government decided, based on Norwegian law, to not publish the report
because the contents alleged violations of law.).
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reporting conveyed an overall picture of balanced reporting. The Court also was
influenced by the fact that the report was an official one that the Ministry of
Fisheries had not questioned or disavowed. In the view of the Court the press
should normally be entitled, when contributing to public debate on matters of
legitimate concern, to rely on the contents of official reports without having to
undertake independent research, otherwise its public-watchdog role could be
undermined.50
In the subsequent judgment of Thoma v. Luxembourg (March 29, 2001), the
Court again considered the question of a conviction of defamation for reporting on
environmental matters. 51  In this case, a radio journalist presented a weekly
program dealing with nature and the environment. During one of his programs he
discussed a written article suggesting bribery in reforesting woodlands. He was
convicted of defamation in civil actions brought by fifty-four forest wardens and
nine forestry engineers. He appealed and then challenged his conviction at the
European Court as a violation of freedom of expression. The court noted the fact
that the criticisms were of public officials, not of private individuals and that
journalistic freedom allows recourse to a degree of exaggerations or even
provocation. Thus, while the state can limit speech by law to protect the rights and
reputation of others, this particular interference was not "necessary in a democratic
society," i.e. meeting a pressing social need, proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued and with relevant and sufficient reasons given. The Court noted in
particular that restrictions on freedom of expression are to be strictly construed
when they are directed at debate over a problem of general interest.
52
B. Public Participation in Environmental Decision-making
The major role played by the public in environmental protection is
participation in decision-making, especially in environmental impact or other
permitting procedures. Public participation is based on the right of those who may
be affected, including foreign citizens and residents, to have a say in the
determination of their environmental future.
The right to participate has two components: the right to be heard and the
right to affect decisions. Most recent multilateral and many bilateral agreements
contain references to or guarantees of public participation.53 The Climate Change
50 Id. at paras. 51, 59.
5' Thoma v. Luxembourg, App. No. 38432/97, at para. 3 (2001).
52 Id. at para. 58.
53 In addition to the treaties discussed in the text, other agreements referring to public participation are
the: Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Concerning the
Control of Emissions of Volatile Organic Compounds or Their Transboundary Fluxes, art. 2(3)(a)(4),
Nov. 18, 1991, 31 I.L.M 568; Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses
and International Lakes, art. 16, Mar. 17, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1312; Convention on the Transboundary
Effects of Industrial Accidents, art. 9, Mar. 17, 1982, 2105 U.N.T.S. 460; Convention for the Protection
of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, art. 9, Sept. 22, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 1072;
Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment,
arts. 13-16, June 21, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1228; North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation,
arts. 2(l)(a), 14, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480; Danube Convention, supra note 20, at art. 14; Protocol
Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Biological Diversity in the Mediterranean, art. 19, June 10,
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Convention, Art. 4(l)(i) obliges Parties to promote public awareness and to
"encourage the widest participation in this process, including that of non-
governmental organizations." 54 The Convention on Biological Diversity allows for
public participation in environmental impact assessment procedures in Art.
14(l)(a).2 8 Regionally, the 1991 Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact
Assessment in a Transboundary Context requires states parties to notify the public
and to provide an opportunity for public participation in relevant environmental
impact assessment procedures regarding proposed activities in any area likely to be
affected by transboundary environmental harm.29
The right to public participation is widely expressed in human rights
instruments as part of democratic governance and the rule of law. Art. 21 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirms the right of everyone to take part
in governance of his or her country, as does the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man (Art. 20) and the African Charter (Art. 13). 57 Art. 25 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that citizens have
the right, without unreasonable restrictions "to take part in the conduct of public
affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives... '  The American
Convention contains identical language in Art. 23.' 9
C. The Right to a Remedy for Environmental Harm
Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration provides that "effective access to judicial
and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided."
Some instruments make it explicit that the right to a remedy is not limited to
nationals of a state, e.g. the OECD Recommendation on Equal Right of Access in
Relation to Transfrontier Pollution. 60  International agreements may contain
obligations to grant a potential or de facto injured person a right of access to any
administrative or judicial procedure equal to that of nationals or residents. Equal
access to national remedies has been considered one way of implementing the
polluter pays principle. Implementing the right of equal access to national
remedies requires that states remove jurisdictional barriers to civil proceedings for
damages and other remedies in respect of environmental injury. Both the February
25, 1991 Espoo Convention and the March 17, 1992 Helsinki Convention on the
1995, 1999 O.J. (L 322) 3; Joint Communique and Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic
Council, pmbl, arts. l(a), 2, 3(c); Sept. 19, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1382; Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 6(3), Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22; Stockholm
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, art. 10(l)(d), Sept. 22, 2001,40 I.L.M. 532.
54 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 4(l)(i), May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S.
107.
28. Convention on Biological Diversity, art. 14(1)(a), June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818.
29. Environmental IA Convention, supra note 23, at art. 3.
57 Universal Declaration, supra note 39, at art. 21; American Declaration, supra note 39 at art. XX.
African Charter, supra note 39, at art. 13.
58 ICCPR, supra note 1, at art. 25.
" See American Convention, supra note 39.
60 Org. Econ. Cooperation & Dev., Council Recommendation: Equal Right of Access to Information,
Participation in Hearings and Administrative and Judicial Procedures by Persons Affected by
Transfrontier Pollution, app. 1, May 11, 1976, 15 I.L.M. 1218.
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Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents call for equality of access. 6 1 The
1997 U.N. Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, Art. 2, formulates the same principle under the title of "non-
discrimination.,
62
The right to a remedy when a right is violated is itself a right expressly
guaranteed by universal and regional human rights instruments. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights affirms that "[e]veryone has the right to an effective
remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental
rights granted him by the constitution or by law. 63 The International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights also obliges states to provide remedies. 64 The Human
Rights Committee, established pursuant to the Covenant, has identified the kinds
of remedies required, depending on the type of violation and the victim's
condition. The Committee has indicated that the state which has engaged in
human rights violations, in addition to treating and financially compensating the
victim, must undertake to investigate the facts, take appropriate action, and bring
those found responsible for the violations to justice.65 The International Labour
Organization Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries specifically refers to "fair compensation for any damages"
(Art. 15(2)), "compensation in money" (Art. 16(4)) and full compensation for "any
resulting loss or injury."' 66 (Art. 16(5)). Several other treaties refer to the right to
legal protection for attacks on privacy, family, home or correspondence, or attacks
67on honor and reputation.
Declarations, resolutions and other non-treaty texts also proclaim or discuss
the right to a remedy. In some instances, the issue is raised by UN human rights
treaty bodies as part of the mechanism of issuing General Comments. The third
General Comment of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
concerning the nature of state obligations pursuant to Art. 2(1) of the Covenant,
states that appropriate measures to implement the Covenant might include the
provision of judicial remedies with respect to rights which may be considered
justiciable. 68  It specifically points to the non-discrimination requirement of the
61 Environmental IA Convention, supra note 23, at art. 16 (calls for civil society participation in
transboundary Environmental Impact Assessments); Transboundary Watercourses Convention, supra
note 20, at art. 2 (requiring public access to information).
62 Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, art. 32, May 21,
1997, 36 I.L.M. 700.
63 Universal Declaration, supra note 39, at art. 4.
'4 ICCPR, supra note 1, at art. 2(3).
65 See Klint A. Cowen, International Responsibility for Human Rights Violations by American Indian
Tribes, 9 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 28 (2006).
66 Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, arts. 15-16, June
27, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382.
67 See Universal Declaration, supra note 39, at art. 12; ICCPR, supra note 1, at art. 17; American
Convention, supra note 39, at art. 11; African Charter, supra note 39, at art. 5; United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 16, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; American Declaration,
supra note 39, at art. V; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
6" U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ESOSOC], General Comment 3, The Nature of States Parties
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treaty and cross-references the right to a remedy in the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. 69 A number of other rights are cited as "capable of immediate
application by judicial and other organs., 7
0
Regional instruments also contain provisions regarding legal remedies for
violations of rights. Art. XVII of the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man guarantees every person the right to resort to the courts to ensure
respect for legal rights and protection from acts of authority that violate any
fundamental constitutional rights. 7' The American Convention entitles everyone
to effective recourse for protection against acts that violate the fundamental rights
recognized by the constitution "or laws of the state concerned or by this
Convention," even where the act was committed by persons acting in the course of
their official duties (Art. 25).72 The states parties are to ensure that the competent
authorities enforce remedies that are granted.
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights73 guarantees a fair
and public hearing before a tribunal for the determination of rights and duties.
74
Applicability of Art. 6 depends upon the existence of a dispute concerning a right
recognized in the law of the state concerned, including those created by licenses,
authorizations and permits that affect the use of property or commercial
activities.75 In Oerlemans v. Netherlands76 Art. 6 was deemed to apply to a case
where a Dutch citizen could not challenge a ministerial order designating his land
as a protected site.
In Zander v. Sweden, 77 the applicants claimed they had been denied a remedy
for threatened environmental harm. The applicants owned property next to a waste
treatment and storage area. Local well water showed contamination by cyanide
from the dump site. The municipality prohibited use of the water and furnished
temporary water supplies. Subsequently, the permissible level of cyanide was
raised and the city supply was halted. When the company maintaining the dump
site sought a renewed and expanded permit, the applicants argued that the threat to
their water supply would be sufficiently high and that the company should be
obliged to provide free drinking water if pollution occurred. The licensing board
granted the permit, but denied the applicants' request. They sought but could not
obtain judicial review of the decision. The European Court held that Art. 6 applied
and was violated. The applicability of Art. 6 was based on the Court's finding that
the applicants' claim concerned the environmental conditions of the property and
Obligations, para. 5, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990).
69 Id.. at para. 5.
70 Id. at para. 5.
71 See American Declaration, supra note 39, at art. XVII.
72 American Convention, supra note 39, at art. 25..
73 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 6, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
14 Id. at art. 6.
75 Benthem v. Netherlands, 97 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at para. 40 (1985).
76 Oerlemans v. Netherlands, 219 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at paras. 14, 49 (1991).
71 Zander v. Sweden, 279-B Eur.Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at paras. 6-11 (1993).
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the applicants "could arguably maintain that they were entitled under Swedish law
to protection against the water in their well being polluted as a result of VAFAB's
activities on the dump."'7 8
The right to a remedy extends to compensation for pollution. In Zimmermann
v. Switzerland,79 the Court found Art. 6 applicable to a complaint about the length
of proceedings for compensation for injury caused by noise and air pollution from
a nearby airport. Art. 6 does not, however, encompass a right to judicial review of
legislative enactments. In Braunerheilm v. Sweden, 80 the Commission denied a
claim that Art. 6 was violated when the applicant could not challenge in court a
new law that granted fishing licenses to the general public in waters where the
applicant previously had exclusive rights.
The African Charter contains a broad right to a remedy in Art. 7,
supplemented by the right to adequate compensation for the spoliation of resources
of a dispossessed people. 8 Article 26 also imposes a duty on states parties to the
Charter to guarantee the independence of the courts and to allow the establishment
and improvement of appropriate national institutions entrusted with the promotion
and protection of rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter.82
D. Right to Life and Right to Health
The eighteen independent experts on the U.N. Human Rights Committee
supervise state implementation of and compliance with the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, primarily through a system of state reporting. Each
state party submits periodic reports on the measures taken to give effect to the
rights in the Covenant, then sends a representative to answer questions of the
Committee members. 83 The Committee may make comments and
recommendations to the state individually or issue General Comments to all states
parties. In the latter context, the Committee has indicated that state obligations to
protect the right to life can require positive measures designed to reduce infant
mortality and protect against malnutrition and epidemics, implicating
environmental protection.
The Human Rights Committee also may hear individual complaints against a
state party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights if the state
has also accepted the first Optional Protocol to the Covenant that creates the
78 Id., at para. 24.
71 Zimmermann v. Switzerland, 66 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.A) para. 32 (1983).
8' Braunerheilm v. Sweden, App. No. 11764/85 (Mar. 9, 1989, unpublished). See Maguelonne Djeant-
Pons, Le Droit de 'homme a 'environnement, droitfondamental au niveau europeen dans le cadre du
Conseil de I 'Europe, et la Convention europeenne de sauvegarde des droit de 1 'homme et des libertes
fondamentales, 4 REV. JUR. DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT (1994).
8' African Charter, supra note 39, at art. 21(2).
12 Id. at art. 26.
83 Cindy A. Cohn, The Early Harvest: Domestic Legal Changes Related to the Human Rights
Committee and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 13 HUM. RTS. Q. 295, 296 (1991).
"' U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], General Comment 14, The Right to the Highest Attainable
Standard of Health, para. 36, U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000) [hereinafter General Comment
14].
2006
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
procedure. The Committee has received several complaints alleging that
environmental damage caused a violation of one or more civil and political rights.
First, a group of Canadian citizens asserted that the storage of radioactive waste
near their homes threatened the right to life of present and future generations. The
Committee found that the case raised "serious issues with regard to the obligation
of States parties to protect human life," but declared the case inadmissible due to
failure to exhaust local remedies. 
85
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights supervises
implementation of the Covenant guaranteeing these rights, also by means of
periodic reporting. In this context, states often report on environmental issues as
they affect guaranteed rights. The Ukraine reported in 1995 on the environmental
situation consequent to the explosion at Chernobyl, in regard to the right to life.
Committee members sometimes request specific information about environmental
harm that threatens human rights. Poland, for example, was asked to provide
information in 1989 about measures to combat pollution, especially in upper
Silesia. s6 The Committee may pose questions and make recommendations in
response to the state report. In respect to this as well as other UN treaty bodies,
NGOs and activists have often overlooked the importance of participating in
reporting procedures; they offer a public forum for challenging state action or
inaction on environmental protection as it affects the enjoyment of human rights.
The procedure has been strengthened through the recent addition of follow-up
procedures to monitor compliance.
On November 8, 2000, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights issued General Comment No. 14 on "Substantive Issues Arising in the
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights" (Art. 12). 87 The Comment states in paragraph 4 that "the right to health
embraces a wide range of socio-economic factors that promote conditions in which
people can lead a healthy life, and extends to the underlying determinants of
health, such as... a healthy environment., 88 General Comment 14 adds that "[a]ny
person or group victim of a violation of the right to health should have access to
effective judicial or other appropriate remedies at both national and international
levels [and]... should be entitled to adequate reparation."'8 9
Among UN Charter-based organs, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights
decided in 1995 to appoint a special rapporteur to study the adverse effects of the
illicit movement and dumping of toxic and dangerous products and wastes on the
enjoyment of human rights. 90 In addition to investigating the human rights effects
85 Communication No. 67/1980, EHP v. Canada, 2 Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee
(1990), 20.
86 E/1989/4/Add. 12.
7 General Comment 14, supra note 84, at para. 36.
8 Id. at para. 4.
89 Id at para. 59.
9o U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Report on the Fifty-first Session, para. 632, U.N. Doc
E/CN.4/1995/176, E/1995/23 (July 7, 1995) (The vote was 31 to 15, with six abstentions. The division
was geographic, with all developing countries of the South voting in favor of the proposal and all
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of illegal dumping of toxic and dangerous products and wastes in developing
countries, the Special Rapporteur was given authority to receive and examine
communications and undertake fact-finding concerning illicit traffic and dumping,
in effect creating an individual complaints procedure. The rapporteur may make
recommendations to states on measures to be taken and must produce an annual
list of the countries and transnational corporations engaged in illicit dumping, as
well as a census of persons killed, maimed or otherwise injured in the developing
countries due to the practice.
91
The 1998 report 92 of the Special Rapporteur contained information on
specific cases and incidents. Most of them involved chemical companies in
Europe exporting contaminated wastes to Asia and the Middle East. In many
cases, the government replies indicated that prosecutions were initiated and the
waste returned to the place of origin. The Special Rapporteur found that the
communications showed the right to life and security of person, health, an
adequate standard of living, adequate food and housing, work and non-
discrimination, were implicated by the acts denounced. In certain cases the
reported incidents had led to sickness, disorders, physical or mental disability and
death. In other instances, the rights of association and access to information were
ignored or curtailed, hampering the ability of individuals or groups to prevent
dumping or obtain a remedy. Most communications mentioned violation of the
right to information which led to often irreversible consequences to the
environment and rights of individuals. Information had been withheld not only
prior to but after incidents.
The UN Commission on Human Rights has appointed other special
rapporteurs whose mandates extend to environmental matters. In 2002, for
example, it named a special rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment
of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. This involves
consideration of environmental conditions and how they impact the right to health.
The World Health Organization, whose constitution proclaims a right to health,
has already begun to consider this issue.
Regional human rights bodies in Europe, the Americas and Africa have all
examined cases alleging violations of the right to life due to environmental harm.
In the Inter-American system, the Commission established a link between
environmental quality and the right to life in response to a petition brought on
Northern states expressing opposition. France, on behalf of the European Union, argued that the
question could be dealt with much more effectively through instruments such as the Basel Convention
on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal.)
9' U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Adverse Effects of the Illicit Movement and Dumping of Toxic and
Dangerous Products and Wastes on the Enjoyment of Human Rights, para. 7, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1995/81 (Mar. 8, 1995).
92 U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Question of the Realization in All Countries of the Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights Contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and Study of Special Problems Which
the Developing Countries Face in their Efforts to Achieve These Human Rights, Adverse Effects of the
Illicit Movement and Dumping of Toxic and Dangerous Products and Wastes on the Enjoyment of
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/1O/Add. I (Sept. 25, 1997).
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behalf of the Yanomami Indians of Brazil. The petition alleged that the
government violated the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
93
by constructing a highway through Yanomami territory and authorizing the
exploitation of the territory's resources. These actions led to the influx of non-
indigenous people who brought contagious diseases which remained untreated due
to lack of medical care. The Commission found that the government had violated
the Yanomami rights to life, liberty and personal security guaranteed by Art. 1 of
the Declaration, as well as the right of residence and movement (Art. VIII) and the
right to the preservation of health and well-being (Art. XI). 94
Apart from receiving and examining individual complaints, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights has the authority to study the human
rights situation generally or in regard to specific issues within an OAS member
state. The Commission devoted particular attention to environmental rights in
reports on Ecuador 95 and Brazil. 96 In regard to Ecuador, the Commission noted
that the human rights situation in the Oriente region had been under study for
several years, in response to claims that oil exploitation activities were
contaminating the water, air and soil, thereby causing the people of the region to
become sick and to have a greatly increased risk of serious illness. 97 After an on-
site visit, it found that both the government and inhabitants agreed that the
environment was contaminated, with inhabitants exposed to toxic byproducts of oil
exploitation in their drinking and bathing water, in the air, and in the soil. The
inhabitants were unanimous in claiming that oil operations, especially the disposal
of toxic wastes, jeopardized their lives and health. Many suffered skin diseases,
rashes, chronic infections, and gastrointestinal problems. In addition, many
claimed that pollution of local waters contaminated fish and drove away wildlife,
threatening food supplies.
The Commission identified relevant human rights law and emphasized the
right to life and physical security. It stated that:
[t]he realization of the right to life, and to physical security and integrity
is necessarily related to and in some ways dependent upon one's
physical environment. Accordingly, where environmental
93 American Declaration, supra note 39.
94 Resolution No. 1285, Case No. 7615, Brazil, Mar. 5, 1985, available at
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/84.85eng/Brazil7615.htm.
95 O.A.S., Inter-Amer. C.H.R., Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Ecuador, O.A.S. Doc. No.
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.96 Doc. 10 rev. I (April 24 1997).
96 O.A.S., IACHR, Informe Sobre La Situacion De Los Derechos Humanos En Brasil, O.A.S. Doc. No.
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.97 Doe. 29 rev. 1 (Sept. 29, 1997) (Among the problems discussed are those of
environmental destruction leading to severe health and cultural consequences. In particular indigenous
cultural and physical integrity are said to be under constant threat and attack from invading prospectors
and the environmental pollution they create. State protection against the invasions is called "irregular
and feeble" leading to constant danger and environmental deterioration).
17 Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Ecuador, supra note 95, at introduction (The
Commission first became aware of the situation in the Oriente through a petition filed on behalf of the
indigenous Huaorani people in 1990. The Commission decided that the problem was more widespread
and thus should be treated within the framework of the general country report.)
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contamination and degradation pose a persistent threat to human life
and health, the foregoing rights are implicated. 98
States parties may be required therefore to take positive measures to
safeguard the fundamental and non-derogable rights to life and physical integrity,
in particular to prevent the risk of severe environmental pollution that could
threaten human life and health, or to respond when persons have suffered injury.
The Commission also directly addressed concerns for economic development,
noting that the Convention does not prevent nor discourage it, but rather requires
that it take place under conditions of respect for the rights of affected individuals.
Thus, while the right to development implies that each state may exploit its natural
resources, "the absence of regulation, inappropriate regulation, or a lack of
supervision in the application of extant norms may create serious problems with
respect to the environment which translate into violations of human rights
protected by the American Convention."99 The Commission returned to the
procedural dimension, concluding that:
[c]onditions of severe environmental pollution, which may cause
serious physical illness, impairment and suffering on the part of the
local populace, are inconsistent with the right to be respected as a
human being... [t]he quest to guard against environmental conditions
which threaten human health requires that individuals have access to:
information, participation in relevant decision-making processes, and
judicial recourse. 100
The Commission called on the government to implement legislation enacted
to strengthen protection against pollution, clean up activities by private licensee
companies, and take further action to remedy existing contamination and prevent
future recurrences. In particular it recommended that the State take measures to
improve systems to disseminate information about environmental issues, and
enhance the transparency of and opportunities for public input into processes
affecting the inhabitants of development sectors. 101
The cases submitted in the African system initially invoked the right to
health, protected by Art. 16 of the African Charter, rather than the right to
environment contained in the same document. In Communications 25/89, 47/90,
" Id. at ch. VIII, Part 2: Relevant Inter-American Law.
99 Id. at ch. VIII, Analysis.
1oo Id. at Chapter VIII, Conclusion. The Commission also stated that the right to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas of all kinds is protected by Art. 13 of the American Convention.
According to the Commission, information that domestic law requires be submitted as part of
environmental impact assessment procedures must be "readily accessible" to potentially affected
individuals. Public participation is viewed as linked to Art. 23 of the American Convention, which
provides that every citizen shall enjoy the right "to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or
through freely chosen representatives." Finally, the right of access to judicial remedies is called "the
fundamental guarantor of rights at the national level." The Commission quotes Art. 25 of the American
Convention that provides everyone "the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective
recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his fundamental rights
recognized by the constitution or laws of the state concerned or by th[e] Convention."
1o0 Id. at Chapter VIII, Recommendations.
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56/91 and 100/93 against Zaire the Commission held that failure by the
Government to provide basic services such as safe drinking water constitute a
violation of Art. 16. More recently, applicants successfully alleged a violation of
the right to environment by Nigeria, as described later.
Oneryildiz v. Turkey, the first environmental case before the European Court
involving loss of life, was decided by a Grand Chamber on November 30, 2004.
The two applicants asserted that the national authorities were responsible for the
deaths of their close relatives and for the destruction of their property due to a
methane explosion at the municipal waste dump in an area of Istanbul. In addition
to asserting a violation of the right to life and to property, the applicants
complained that the administrative proceedings conducted in their case were unfair
and violated the European Convention on Human Rights, article 6. At Turkey's
request, the Grand Chamber took the case. In a significant development, the
judgment held Turkey responsible for the deaths under a negligence standard,
possibly rising to the level of gross negligence.
The waste disposal site had originally been selected when the area was
uninhabited, but over time dwellings were constructed. In 1991, experts were
appointed by the district council to determine whether the site met existing
regulations. The report alerted authorities to a number of dangers liable to give
rise to a major health risk for nearby inhabitants, particularly those living in the
slum areas. The experts concluded that the site exposed humans, animals and the
environment to many risks, including the spread of contagious diseases and the
formation of enough methane to explode. The report was transmitted to local
authorities, the governor and the Ministry of Health and Environment Office. The
Environment Office urged local authorities to remedy the problems, but no action
was taken. On April 28, 1993 a methane explosion occurred followed by a
landslide that destroyed ten dwellings and killed thirty-nine people. Two mayors
were prosecuted, found guilty and initially sentenced to three months in prison, but
the sentences were commuted and enforcement of fines of less than 10 euros that
had been imposed was suspended. The applicants won an administrative judgment
but the compensation was never paid.
In its judgment, the Court reiterated that the right to life provision of the
Convention contains not only a negative obligation to refrain from the use of force
by state agents, but also imposes a positive obligation on states to take appropriate
steps to safeguard the lives of those within their jurisdiction. This obligation
applies to any activity, whether public or not, "in which the right to life may be at
stake, and afortiori in the case of industrial activities, which by their very nature
are dangerous, such as the operation of waste-collection sites."'10 2 The primary
duty on the state is to put into place a legislative and administrative framework
designed to provide effective deterrence against threats to the right to life.
102 Oneryildiz v. Turkey, App. No. 48939/99, 2004-XlI Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 71.
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In determining state responsibility for deaths from such activities, the Court
identified several factors as relevant:
- the harmfulness of the phenomena inherent in the activity
- the contingency of the risk to which the applicant was exposed
- the status of those involved in bringing about the circumstances
- whether the acts or omissions attributable to them were deliberate.
In evaluating the circumstances of this case, the Court took particular note of
the dangerousness of the activity and indicated that when such activities are
undertaken, the state must enact regulations governing the licensing, setting up,
operation, security and supervision of the activity and must make it compulsory for
all those concerned to take practical measures to ensure the effective protection of
citizens whose lives might be endangered by the inherent risks.
The Court included the public's right to information among the preventive
measures that the state must take to protect the right to life. The Court found that
its interpretation of some substantive rights to include the right to information "is
supported by current developments in European standards," citing Parliamentary
Assembly Resolution 587 (1975) on problems connected with the disposal of
urban and industrial waste, Resolution 1087 (1996) on the consequences of the
Chernobyl disaster, and Recommendation 1225 (1993) on the management,
treatment, recycling and marketing of waste, as well as Committee of Ministers
Recommendation R (96) 12 on the distribution of powers and responsibilities
between central authorities and local and regional authorities with regard to the
environment. 103 The Court also mentioned the Convention on Civil Liability for
Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment10 4 and the
Convention on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law, 10 5
although neither was in force at the time of the judgment. Concerning dangerous
activities, Resolution 1087 (1996) makes clear that public access to clear and full
information is a basic human right. In the Court's estimation, the Turkish
authorities appeared to have a conflict of interest and were engaged in delaying
tactics that resulted in a failure to take necessary preventive measures or to inform
the public. In addition, the authorities allowed the waste collection site to operate
despite not conforming to the relevant technical standards.
The Court also found that Turkey violated its duties in the aftermath of the
explosion. Where lives are lost in circumstances potentially engaging the
responsibility of the state, article 2 requires "an adequate response" so that any
breaches are repressed and punished. The Court considered that the applicable
principles in this case were to be found in decisions concerning the use of lethal
force (most significantly, McCann v. United Kingdom). The duty to conduct an
103 Id. at para. 90.
104 Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment,
June 21, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1230.
'0' Convention on the Protection of the Environment Through Criminal Law, Nov. 4, 1998, Europ. T.S.
172, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/ I 72.htm.
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official investigation arises not only because criminal liability may be in question,
but because in the context of dangerous activities, public authorities "are often the
only entities to have sufficient relevant knowledge to identify and establish the
complex phenomena that might have caused such incidents."
10 6
Beyond the duty to investigate, the Court indicated that prosecution may be
necessary:
Where it is established that the negligence attributable to State officials
or bodies on that account goes beyond an error of judgment or
carelessness, in that the authorities in question, fully realising the likely
consequences and disregarding the powers vested in them, failed to take
measures that were necessary and sufficient to avert the risks inherent in
a dangerous activity... the fact that those responsible for endangering
life have not been charged with a criminal offence or prosecuted may
amount to a violation of Article2, irrespective of any other types of
remedy which individuals may exercise on their own initiative.. .this is
amply evidenced by developments in the relevant European
standards. 107
While individuals may not have a right to have responsible parties prosecuted
or sentenced, national courts should not allow life-endangering offenses to go
unpunished. In this respect, while the authorities were found to have acted with
exemplary promptness in investigating the circumstances of the accident and
ensuing deaths, the manner in which the Turkish criminal justice system operated
did not ensure accountability or the effective implementation of domestic law, in
particular the deterrent function of the criminal law. Thus, the procedural aspects
of article 2 were also violated.
In similar fashion, the Court found that the government had violated the
applicant's right to property contained in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the
European Convention on Human Rights. The Court found that there was no doubt
about the causal link between the gross negligence of the state and the property
losses suffered by the applicant.
Finally, the Court found a violation of the right to a remedy contained in
Convention article 13. The Court noted that whenever violations of the right to
life are alleged, compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage should in
principle be possible as part of the range of redress available. In this case,
compensation that was awarded to the applicant by a domestic proceeding had
never been paid, thus rendering ineffective the purported remedy. Moreover, the
manner in which the authorities discharged their procedural obligation to
investigate and prosecute failed to provide the applicant with an effective remedy.
106 Oneryildiz, supra note 102. at para. 93.
107 Id. at para. 93.
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The Court awarded pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, together with
costs and expenses to the applicant as well as non-pecuniary damages to each of
his two sons. 108
E. Right to an Adequate Standard ofLiving and the Fulfillment of Basic Needs
UN human rights treaty bodies and the UN Charter-based Human Rights
Commission and Sub-Commission have taken up the relationship between
environmental protection and the enjoyment of human rights in the context of
economic, social and cultural rights. The Human Rights Commission has
appointed a Special Rapporteur on the right to food. In considering his initial
report, the Commission asked that the study continue with specific attention given
to the issue of safe drinking water. 10 9 The Commission specifically linked
implementation of the right to food with sound environmental policies and noted
that problems related to food shortages "can generate additional pressures upon the
environment in ecologically fragile areas."'l°
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has pursued such
questions in monitoring state reports. In 1986, Tunisia reported to the Commission
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in the context of Art. 11 on the right to
an adequate standard of living, on measures taken to prevent degradation of natural
resources, particularly erosion and about measures to prevent contamination of
food."1  The Committee has referred to environmental issues in its General
Comment on the Right to Adequate Food 30 and its General Comment on the Right
to Adequate Housing.31 In the first, the Committee interpreted the phrase "free
from adverse substances" in Art. 11 of the Covenant to mean that the state must
adopt food safety and other protective measures to prevent contamination through
"bad environmental hygiene." 1 4 The Comment on housing states that "housing
should not be built on polluted sites nor in... proximity to pollution sources that
threaten the right to health of the inhabitants." 
11 5
The right to water has been recognized in a wide range of international
documents, including treaties, declarations and other international normative
instruments. Article 14(2) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (1979) stipulates that states parties shall ensure to
women the right to "enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in relation to...
081d. atparas. 166-75.
'09 U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, The Right to Food, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2001/25, para. 9 (Apr.
20, 2001).
"o Id. at para. 3.
. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc E/1990/6/Add.,14, paras. 211-86 (Oct. 8, 1996).
30. U.N. Econ, & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], General Comment 12,, The Right to Adequate Food,
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 para. 4 (May 12, 1999).
31. U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Forced Evictions and the Right to Adequate Housing, U.N.
Doc. U.N. Doc. E/1998/22, annex IV, para. 8 (May 20, 1997).
114 General Comment 12, supra note 112, at para. 10.
15 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], General Comment 4, The Right to Adequate Housing, U.N.
Doc. E/1992/23 para. 8 (1991).
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water supply." '116 Art. 24(2) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989)
requires states parties "[t]o combat disease and malnutrition.., through the
provision of adequate nutritious foods and clean drinking-water." 1
17
In late 2002, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted
General Comment No. 15 (2002) on the right to water. 118 The Committee, noting
that water is a limited natural resource and a public good fundamental for life and
health, calls it "a prerequisite for the realization of other human rights." 119
According to the Committee, the human right to water entitles everyone to
sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for personal
and domestic uses. The Committee finds that while Covenant Art. 11(1) does not
specifically mention water, it specifies a number of rights emanating from, and
indispensable for, the realization of the right to an adequate standard of living
"including adequate food, clothing and housing."' 120  The use of the word
"including" indicates that this catalogue of rights is not exhaustive. The right to
water clearly falls within the category of guarantees essential for securing an
adequate standard of living, particularly since it is one of the most fundamental
conditions for survival. The right to water is also inextricably related to the right
to the highest attainable standard of health (Art. 12(1)) and the rights to adequate
housing and adequate food (Art. 11(1)). The right should also be seen in
conjunction with other rights enshrined in the International Bill of Human Rights,
foremost amongst them the right to life and human dignity.
According to the Committee, the right to water contains both freedoms and
entitlements. The freedoms include the right to maintain access to existing water
supplies necessary for the right to water, and the right to be free from interference
such as the arbitrary disconnections or contamination of water supplies. In
contrast, entitlements include the right to a system of water supply and
management that provides equality of opportunity for people to enjoy the right to
water. States parties have a special obligation to provide those who do not have
sufficient means with the necessary water and water facilities and to prevent any
discrimination on internationally prohibited grounds in the provision of water and
water services.
The Committee specifies that there are three types of legal obligations
imposed on states parties: obligations to respect, to protect and to fu/fil. The
obligation to respect requires that states parties refrain from interfering directly or
indirectly with the enjoyment of the right to water. The obligation includes, inter
116 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, art. 14(2)(h), Dec.
18, 1979, 19 I.L.M. 33.
117 Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 24(2)(c), Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448.
118 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], General Comment 15, The Right to Water, U.N. Doc
E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], General Comment 6, The
Economic, Cultural, and Social Rights of Older Person, U.N. Doc. E/1996/22, para. 32 (1996). The
Committee had previously recognized that Art. 11 contains a right to water in its General Comment No.
6.
119 General Comment 15, supra note 118, at para. 1.
120 Id. at para. 3.
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alia, refraining from engaging in any practice or activity that denies or limits equal
access to adequate water; arbitrarily interfering with customary or traditional
arrangements for water allocation; unlawfully diminishing or polluting water, for
example through waste from state-owned facilities or through use and testing of
weapons; and limiting access to, or destroying, water services and infrastructure as
a punitive measure, for example, during armed conflicts in violation of
international humanitarian law. The obligation to protect requires states parties to
prevent third parties from interfering in any way with the enjoyment of the right to
water. Third parties include individuals, groups, corporations and other entities as
well as agents acting under their authority. The obligation includes, inter alia,
adopting the necessary and effective legislative and other measures to restrain, for
example, third parties from denying equal access to adequate water, or from
polluting and inequitably extracting water.
The obligation to fulfil is disaggregated into the obligations to facilitate,
promote and provide. The obligation to facilitate requires the state to take positive
measures to assist individuals and communities to enjoy the right. To promote, the
state party must take steps to ensure that there is appropriate education concerning
the hygienic use of water, protection of water sources and methods to minimize
water wastage. States parties are also obliged to fulfil (provide) the right when
individuals or a group are unable, for reasons beyond their control, to realize that
right themselves by the means at their disposal. The obligation to fulfil includes,
inter alia, according sufficient recognition to the right to water within the national
political and legal systems, preferably by way of legislative implementation;
adopting a national water strategy and plan of action to realize the right; ensuring
that water is affordable for everyone; and facilitating improved and sustainable
access to water, particularly in rural and deprived urban areas.
The lengthy General Comment goes on to discuss "core obligations" and the
state acts and omissions that may be deemed to violate the Covenant's guaranteed
right to water. 12 The text sets a precedent for future actions on the substantive
aspects of environmental rights.
F. Right to Privacy, Home and Family Life
In Europe, those who have suffered from environmental harm have often
complained that the resulting conditions violate the right to privacy and home
guaranteed by the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. Art. 8(1) provides that "[e]veryone has the right to respect for his...
[privacy,]... his home and his correspondence."' 1 2  Article 8(2) sets forth the
permissible grounds for limiting the exercise of the right. 1
23
121 Id. at paras. 37, 41-43..
122 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8(1), Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 222.
123 Id. at art. 8 (providing that "[t]here shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
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The former European Commission on Human Rights 124 and the European
Court have held that environmental harm attributable to state action or inaction
which has significant injurious effect on a person's home or private and family life
constitutes a breach of Art. 8(1). The harm may be excused, however, under Art.
8(2) if it results from an authorized activity of economic benefit to the community
in general, as long as there is no disproportionate burden on any particular
individual; i.e. the measures must have a legitimate aim, be lawfully enacted, and
be proportional. States enjoy a margin of appreciation in determining the
legitimacy of the aim pursued. Recent decisions of the court overtly balance the
competing interests of the individual and the community with considerable
deference to the state's decisions.
Many of the European privacy and home cases involve noise pollution. In
Arrondelle v. United Kingdom,1 25 the applicant complained of noise from Gatwick
Airport and a nearby motorway. The application was declared admissible and
eventually settled with the payment of 7500 pounds. Baggs v. United Kingdom, a
similar case, also was resolved by friendly settlement. 126 Settlement of the cases
left unresolved numerous issues, some of which were addressed by the Court in
Powell v. United Kingdom in which the Court found that aircraft noise from
Heathrow Airport constituted a violation of Art. 8 of the European Convention on
Human Rights, but was justified under Art. 8(2) as "necessary in a democratic
society" for the economic well-being of the country.127  Noise was acceptable
under the principle of proportionality, if it did not "create an unreasonable burden
for the individual concerned," a test that could be met by the state if the individual
had "the possibility of moving elsewhere without substantial difficulties and
losses." 128
The Court later revisited the question of noise at Heathrow because of
changes in flight patterns, in Hatton v. The United Kingdom. 129  The initial
Chamber judgment of October 2, 2001, found that the noise from increased flights
at Heathrow airport between 4 a.m. and 6 a.m. violated the rights of the applicants
to respect for their home and family life. 130 This judgment was overturned by a
freedoms of others.").
124 Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Restructuring the Control Machinery Established Thereby, Jan. 11, 1998, Eur. T.S. No. 155. With the
entry into force of Protocol 11 to the European Convention on Human Rights, the former Commission
and the European Court were merged into a new permanent European Court which was inaugurated on
November 1, 1998.
125 Arrondelle v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7889/77, 19 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 186 (1980).
126 Baggs v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9310/81, 44 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 13, paras. 14, 19-
20(1987).
127 Powell v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9310/81, 172 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 39 (1990).
128 Id. In a subsequent case, the Commission found that the level and frequency of the noise did not
reach the point where a violation of Art. 8 could be made out and the application was therefore
inadmissible. Veamcombe v. United Kingdom & Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 12816/87,
59 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 186, 196-97 (1989).
29 Hatton v. United Kingdom, App. No. 36022/97, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, paras. 3, 29.
30 Id. at paras. 85, 96.
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Grand Chamber decision (12-5) on July 8, 2003.'1 Both judgments considered
that as neither Heathrow airport nor the airlines that use it are owned, controlled or
operated by the government, the case raised an issue of the scope of a
government's positive obligations to secure respect for rights by non-state actors.
Both panels found that the applicable principles are broadly similar to those
applied when analyzing a direct state interference with a right. The two opinions
differ primarily on the degree of deference to be given the government on the
question of striking the appropriate balance between the competing interests of the
individual and of the community as a whole. The Chamber held that the state
cannot simply refer to the economic well-being of the country 132 "in the
particularly sensitive field of environmental protection."'' 33 Instead, the state is
required to minimize the interference with rights by trying to find alternative
solutions and by generally seeking to achieve their aims in the way least
burdensome to human rights. The Grand Chamber held this to be a new and
inappropriate test that failed to respect the subsidiary role of the Court and the
wide margin of appreciation (discretion) afforded to the state.
The Grand Chamber's lengthy decision provides guidance and a somewhat
higher threshold for applicants to succeed in future pollution cases. The Court
clearly continues to accept that "where an individual is directly and seriously
affected by noise or other pollution, an issue may arise under Article 8."134
Moreover, the Court will assess the government's actions on the substantive
merits, to ensure that it is compatible with Art. 8, and procedurally, "it may
scrutinise the decision-making process to ensure that due weight has been
accorded to the interests of the individual."' 135 It apparently will give some weight
to the compatibility of the state's actions or inactions with domestic law. 36
According to the Court, the government was acting to balance economic
interests of the country with the rights of the affected persons. The Court decided
that states should take into consideration environmental protection in acting within
their margin of appreciation. The Court will review the state's exercise of its
discretion, "but it would not be appropriate for the Court to adopt a special
approach in this respect by reference to a special status of environmental human
rights."' 137 Applying its "fair balance" test with deference to the government, the
Court assessed the economic contribution of the flights and the harm to the
individuals.138 It noted as an additional "significant" factor that the 2-3% of the
population specially affected can "if they choose, move elsewhere without
131 Id.
32 Id. at para. 86. Notably, British Airways filed comments in the case about the economic impact on it
of banning night flights. Id. at paras. 64, 91-93.
... Id. at para. 86.
134 Id. at para. 96.
131 Id. at para. 99.
136 Id. at para. 120. The Grand Chamber notes that the Hatton case is unlike either Lopez Ostra or
Maria Guerra, discussed infra, because in the latter two cases the government's actions were irregular
or incompatible with domestic law or procedures.
137 Id. at para. 122.
138 Id. at paras. 121-22.
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financial lOSS.' 139 It is not clear from the judgment that such an assumption was
warranted in this case, or would be warranted in any pollution case, because the
pollution is likely to have significant impact on property values.
On the procedural side, the Court agreed that the government must undertake
appropriate investigations and studies "in order to allow them to strike a fair
balance between the various conflicting interests", 140 but this does not require
"comprehensive and measurable data... in relation to each and every aspect of the
matter to be decided."' 14 1 Looking at the studies done, the Court found that the
government did not exceed its margin of appreciation in striking the balance, and
following the procedures it did to allow more night flights at Heathrow. Thus
there was no violation of Art. 8. The Grand Chamber (with one dissenting vote)
upheld the Chamber's judgment finding a violation of Art. 13 (right to a remedy)
and awarded some costs and fees to the applicants. 1
42
In the aftermath of the Hatton judgment, other cases based on noise pollution
have had mixed success. In Ashworth v. United Kingdom,32 an admissibility
decision taken 20 January 2004, the applicants complained that the noise caused
by low flying aircraft, including aerobatic activity and helicopter training,
amounted to an interference with the right to respect for their private and family
lives and their homes. They attempted to distinguish their circumstances from
those in Hatton in two respects. First, they argued that the economic value of the
private airport near Denham was far less than that of Heathrow and thus the
balance should be tipped in their favor as far as abating the noise nuisance, because
an airport serving no important national economic interests could not justify
infringement of their rights. Secondly, they specifically argued diminished
property values due to the noise. Neither argument was successful.
The Court agreed that the noise levels generated by flights at the airport were
sufficient to render article 8 applicable. As in Hatton, however, the Court found
that the state enjoys a wide margin of appreciation in balancing competing
interests, including economic and environmental ones. It noted that there was no
failure of compliance with the requirements of domestic law. The Court also
reiterated its decision in Hatton that it was reasonable to take into consideration
the individual's ability to leave the area. While one applicant asserted that
property values had fallen by one-third, the Court pointed to the absence of
139 Id. at para. 127. As several applicants in the case had moved away from Heathrow by the time the
Court heard the case, the record may have included information on the economic impact of the moves.
Id. at paras. 10-16.
140 Id. at para. 128. The dissent points out that the report on the economic well-being of the country
were prepared for the government by the aviation industry and no attempt was made to assess the
impact of the aircraft noise on the applicants' sleep. Id. at para. 15 (J. Costa, dissenting; J. Ress,
dissenting; J. Turmen, dissenting; J. Zupancic, dissenting; J. Steiner, dissenting.).
141 Id. para. 128.
142 Hatton, supra note 129, at paras. 153-54, (J. Kerr, dissenting).
32. Ashworth v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004),
http://www.richardbuxton.co.uk/reference/view.php?table-transcripts&id= 10&flag-name.
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evidence on this point. Taking these factors into consideration, the Court held the
application inadmissible. 3
In contrast to Hatton and Ashworth, the applicant in Moreno Grmez v. Spain
(judgment of 16 November 2004) succeeded in claiming a violation based on noise
pollution from 127 nearby bars, pubs and discotheques. 14 3  The Court again
examined whether a "fair balance" had been struck between the competing
interests of the individual and the community as a whole in respect to the state's
failure to take action to put a stop to third-party actions. The Court unanimously
held that the noise levels were such as to amount to a breach of the rights protected
by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The fact that the city
council did not enforce its own noise abatement measures was seen as contributing
to the repeated flouting of the rules which it had established. The fact that the
activities in question violated local law was a significant factor in the Court's
evaluation and holding. The applicant was awarded her full claim of damages as
well as costs and expenses. 144
L6pez Ostra v. Spain145 is the major decision of the Court on pollution as a
breach of the right to private life and the home. The applicant and her daughter
suffered serious health problems from the fumes of a tannery waste treatment plant
which operated alongside the apartment building where they lived (note that the
European Convention on Human Rights does not contain a right to health). The
plant opened in July 1988 without a required license and without having followed
the procedure for obtaining such a license. The plant malfunctioned when it began
operations, releasing gas fumes and contamination, which immediately caused
health problems and nuisance to people living in the district. The town council
evacuated the local residents and re-housed them free of charge in the town center
during the summer. Despite this, the authorities allowed the plant to resume
partial operation. In October the applicant and her family returned to their flat
where there were continuing problems. The applicant finally sold her house and
moved in 1992.
The decision is significant for several reasons. First, the Court did not require
the applicant to exhaust administrative remedies to challenge operation of the plant
under the environmental protection laws, but only to complete remedies applicable
to enforcement of basic rights. Mrs. Lrpez exhausted the latter remedies after the
Supreme Court of Spain denied her appeal on a suit for infringement of her
fundamental rights and the Constitutional Court dismissed her complaint as
manifestly ill-founded. Two sisters-in-law of Mrs. L6pez Ostra, who lived in the
same building, followed the procedures concerning environmental law. They
brought administrative proceedings alleging that the plant was operating
unlawfully. On September 18, 1991 the local court, noting a continuing nuisance
and that the plant did not have the licenses required by law, ordered that it should
33. Id.
143 Moreno G6mez v. Spain, App. No. 4143/02, paras. 49, 61-63 (2004).
4Id. at paras. 65-71.
4 Lrpez Ostra v. Spain, 303 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at paras. 17-22 (2004).
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be closed until they were obtained. However, enforcement of this order was stayed
following an appeal. The case was still pending in the Supreme Court in 1995
when the European Court issued its judgment. The two sisters-in-law also lodged
a complaint, as a result of which a local judge instituted criminal proceedings
against the plant for an environmental health offence. The two complainants
joined the proceedings as civil parties.
The European Court of Human Rights noted that severe environmental
pollution may affect individuals' well-being and prevent them from enjoying their
homes in such a way as to affect their private and family life adversely, without,
however, seriously endangering their health. As in the noise cases, it found that
the determination of whether this violation had occurred should be tested by
striking a fair balance between the interest of the town's economic well-being and
the applicant's effective enjoyment of her right to respect for her home and her
private and family life. In doing this, the Court applied its "margin of
appreciation" doctrine, allowing the state a "certain" discretion in determining the
appropriate balance, but finding in this case that the margin of appreciation had
been exceeded. 146 It awarded Mrs. Lopez damages, court costs, and attorneys
fees. 147
In Guerra v. Italy, 148 the Court reaffirmed that Art. 8 can impose positive
obligations on states to ensure respect for private or family life. Citing the Lpez
Ostra case, the Court reiterated that "severe environmental pollution may affect
individuals' well-being and prevent them from enjoying their homes in such a way
as to affect their private and family life."' 149 The Court found a violation of Art. 8,
noting that the individuals waited throughout the operation of fertilizer production
at the company for essential information "that would have enabled them to assess
the risks they and their families might run if they continued to live at Manfredonia,
a town particularly exposed to danger in the event of an accident at the factory."150
The Court's decision is strained and seemingly due to reluctance to extend Art. 10
on freedom of information to impose positive obligations on the state. The actual
basis of the complaint, as discussed below, was the government's failure to
provide environmental information, not pollution. The Court also declined to
consider whether the right to life guaranteed by Art. 2 had been violated,
considering it unnecessary in light of its decision on Art. 8. The decision seems
unwarranted, given that deaths from cancer had occurred in the factory and, at the
least, consideration of the loss of life would impact on the amount of compensation
due.
Finally, Art. 8 has been useful primarily when the environmental harm
consists of pollution. Issues of resource management and nature conservation or
biological diversity are more difficult to bring under this rubric.
1
46 Id. at paras. 51, 58.
141 Id. at paras. 65, 69-71.
148 Guerra, supra note 43, at para. 60.
149 Id. at para. 60.
150 Id. at para. 60.
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G. Freedom ofAssociation
Several cases in the European human rights system mark the first efforts to
address issues of nature protection through human rights law and procedures. All
of the cases were brought against France and concern a French law requiring
certain owners of small areas of land to belong to the local hunting association and
to permit hunting on their property. The applicants oppose hunting and
complained that the French legal obligations violated their right to peaceful
enjoyment of their possessions, their right to freedom of association, and the right
to freedom of conscience. They also maintained that the obligations are
discriminatory.
The Court decided the first of the cases, Chassagnou v. France, on April 29,
1999.151 It found a violation of all the rights except freedom of conscience, which
it decided it need not address because of the other findings. The report was
submitted to the Committee of Ministers. The other two cases, Dumont v. France
and Montion v. France, involved identical issues. 
152
H. Right to Property
Art. 1 of Protocol 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, ensures
that "[e]very natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his
possessions."'' 53  The former European Commission accepted that pollution or
other environmental harm may result in a breach of Art. 1 of Protocol 11, but only
where such harm results in a substantial reduction in the value of the property and
that reduction is not compensated by the state; in effect, both pollution and land
use regulations for the purpose of environmental protection are treated as raising
issues of expropriation. The case of Pialopoulos v. Greece, judgment of 15
February 2001, concerned planning restrictions that prevented applicants from
building a shopping center on their land.' 54 The case was filed after ten years of
delays and, according to the applicants, these delays and the restrictions amounted
to expropriation of property without compensation. The Court accepted that the
impugned measures aimed at environmental protection, and thus served a
legitimate state interest, but held that the applicants were entitled to compensation
and that without it their property rights had been violated.
I Cultural Minority and Indigenous Rights
Indigenous groups have invoked provisions of the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights to protect their land and culture from environmental degradation.
The United Nations Human Rights Committee has interpreted Art. 27155 of the
.51 Chassagnou v. France, App. Nos. 25088/94, 28331/95, and 28443/95, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 615, para. 1
(1999).
152 Id. at paras. 16, 18, 23-24, 28-29.
153 Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Restructuring the Control Machinery Established Thereby, art. 1,Jan. 11, 1998, Eur. T.S. No. 155.
154 Pialopoulos v. Greece, App. No. 37095/97, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 977, paras. 10-12 (2001).
' ICCPR, supra note 1, at art. 27 (providing that members of minority groups "shall not be denied the
right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and
practice their own religion, or to use their own language.").
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in a broad manner to encompass resource
and land rights:
With regard to the exercise of the cultural rights protected under article
27, the Committee observes that culture manifests itself in many forms,
including a particular way of life associated with the use of land
resources, especially in the case of indigenous peoples. That right may
include such traditional activities as fishing or hunting and the right to
live in reserves protected by law. The enjoyment of those rights may
require positive legal measures of protection and measures to ensure the
effective participation of members of minority communities in decisions
which affect them.... The protection of these rights is directed towards
ensuring the survival and continued development of the cultural,
religious and social identity of the minorities concerned, thus enriching
the fabric of society as a whole. 156
The invocation of Art. 27 presents the matter under the rubric of the right to
cultural life rather than the right to physical life, even though the survival of the
group, qua group, may be at stake. In a rare case decided on the merits, the
Committee decided that Art. 27 was not violated by the extent of stone-quarrying
permitted by Finland in traditional lands of the Sami. 157 The Committee explicitly
rejected the European doctrine of margin of appreciation, holding that measures
whose impact amounts to a denial of the right to culture will not be compatible
with the Covenant, although those which simply have a "certain limited impact on
the way of life of persons belonging to a minority" will not necessarily violate the
treaty. 158 The Committee concluded that the amount of quarrying which had taken
place did not constitute a denial of the applicants' right to culture. It noted that
they were consulted and their views taken into account in the government's
decision. Moreover, the Committee determined that measures were taken to
minimize the impact on reindeer herding activity and on the environment. In
regard to future activities, "if mining activities in the Angeli area were to be
approved on a large scale and significantly expanded" then it might constitute a
violation of Art. 27.159 According to the Committee, "[t]he State party is under a
duty to bear this in mind when either extending existing contracts or granting new
ones." 
160
156 U.N. Human Rights Comm. General Comment No. 23, The Rights of Minorities, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.I/Add.5,paras. 7,9 (Aug. 8, 1994).
... U.N. Human Rights Comm., Ilmari Lansman v. Finland, Communication No. 511/1992: Finland,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992, para. 10 (Nov. 8, 1994).
58 Id. at para. 9.4.
151 Id. at para. 9.8.
160 Id. at para. 9.8. Other cases involving Sami reindeer breeders include O.Sara. v. Finland and
Linsman v. Finland. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., 0. Sara v. Finland, Communication No.
431/1990: Finland, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/431/1990 para. 2(1) (Mar. 24, 1994); U.N. Human Rights
Comm., Ldnsman v. Finland, Communication No. 671/1995: Finland, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/58/D/671/1995 para. 2(l) (Nov. 22, 1996).
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The balance between minority rights and protection of marine living
resources was at stake in Apirana Mahuika v. New Zealand. 16' The petitioners
claimed violations of the rights of self-determination, right to a remedy, freedom
of association, freedom of conscience, non-discrimination, and minority rights as a
result of New Zealand's efforts to regulate commercial and non-commercial
fishing after a dramatic growth of the fishing industry. The government and the
Maori, whose rights are guaranteed by the Treaty of Waitangi, executed a Deed of
Settlement in 1992 to regulate all fisheries issues between the parties. The authors
of the communication represented tribes and sub-tribes that objected to the
Settlement, contending that they had not been adequately informed and that the
negotiators did not represent them. The government acknowledged its duty to
ensure recognition of the right to culture, including the right to engage in fishing
activities, but argued that the Settlement met the obligation because the system of
fishing quotas reflected the need for effective measures to conserve the depleted
inshore fishery, carrying out the government's "duty to all New Zealanders to
conserve and manage the resource for future generations... based on the
reasonable and objective needs of overall sustainable management." 162  The
Human Rights Committee held for the government and emphasized:
[T]he acceptability of measures that affect or interfere with the
culturally significant economic activities of a minority depends on
whether the members of the minority in question have had the
opportunity to participate in the decision-making process in relation to
these measures and whether they will continue to benefit from their
traditional economy. 
163
The process of consultation undertaken by the government complied with this
requirement, because the government paid special attention to the cultural and
religious significance of fishing for the Maori.
The case law of the Inter-American human rights system has contributed
considerably to recognizing the rights of indigenous peoples in respect to their
environmental and natural resources. The case of Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni
Community v. Nicaragua, decided by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
involved the protection of Nicaraguan forests in lands traditionally owned by the
Awas Tingni. 164 The case originated as an action against government-sponsored
logging of timber on native lands by Sol del Caribe, S.A. (SOLCARSA), a
subsidiary of the Korean company Kumkyung Co. Ltd.. The government granted
SOLCARSA a logging concession without consulting the Awas Tingni
community, although the government had agreed to consult them subsequent to
granting an earlier concession. The Awas Tingi filed a case at the Inter-American
Commission, alleging that the government violated their rights to cultural integrity,
161 See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Apirana Mahuika v. New Zealand, Communication No. 547/1993:
New Zealand, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993 para. 5(3) (Nov. 15, 2000).
1621d. at para. 7.5.
163 Id. at para. 9.5.
164 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.79,
para. 140 (Aug. 31,2001).
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religion, equal protection and participation in government. The Commission found
in 1998 that the government had violated the human rights of the Awas Tingni and
brought the case before the Court on June 4, 1998, alleging violation by Nicaragua
of Arts. 1, 2, 21 and 15 of the American Convention, due to the state's failure to
demarcate and to grant official recognition to the territory of the community. The
Commission requested that the Court award compensation.
On August 31, 2001, the Court issued its judgment on the merits and
reparations. The Court decided by 7 votes to 1 to declare that the state violated the
Convention right to judicial protection (Art. 25) and the right to property (Art. 21).
It unanimously declared that the state must adopt domestic laws, administrative
regulations, and other necessary means to create effective surveying, demarcating
and title mechanisms for the properties of the indigenous communities, in
accordance with customary law and indigenous values, uses and customs. Pending
the demarcation of the indigenous lands, the state was instructed to abstain from
realizing acts or allowing the realization of acts by its agents or third parties that
could affect the existence, value, use or enjoyment of those properties located in
the Awas Tingni lands. By a vote of 7 to 1, the Court also declared that the state
must invest US $50,000 in public works and services of collective benefit to the
Awas Tingni as a form of reparations for non-material injury and US $30,000 for
legal fees and expenses. 165
The Maya Indigenous Communities and their Members v. Belize 166 case
claimed that the state violated the rights of Mayan communities in relation to their
lands and natural resources by granting numerous concessions for logging and oil
development. The petition alleged that the state's actions violate rights guaranteed
by the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man: the right to life, the
right to equality before the law, the right to religious freedom and worship, the
right to a family and protection thereof, the right to the preservation of health and
to well-being, the right to judicial protection, the right to vote and to participate in
government, and the right to property. Although a case had been filed in Belize to
stop the logging and to affirm Mayan rights to the land and resources, no judgment
had been issued after more than three and a half years. Negotiations aiming at a
friendly settlement were unsuccessful. The Commission found violations of the
right to property, equal protection under the law, and the right to judicial
protection.
The Inter-American Commission's Third Report on the Situation in
Paraguay167 addressed environmental protection in Chapter V on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights and in Chapter IX on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
The Commission expressed concern about lack of protection for the habitats of
indigenous groups, specifically referring to deforestation and ecological
165 Id. at paras. 167-69.
166 Maya Indigenous Communities v. Belize, Case 12.053, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 40/04,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. 1 (2004).
167 Inter-Am. C.H.R., Third Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Paraguay,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.1 10, doc. 52, (2001),
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degradation, contrary to the provisions of Art. 64 of the Paraguayan Constitution.
According to complaints received, "[t]he environment is being destroyed by
ranching, farming, and logging concerns, who reduce the [indigenous people's]
traditional capacities and strategies for food and economic activity." 161 In addition
to pointing to the deforestation, the Commission noted that the waters had been
polluted and hydroelectric projects had flooded traditional lands and destroyed a
unique system of islands that contained invaluable biodiversity. The Commission
recommended that the state "[a]dopt the necessary measures to protect the habitat
of the indigenous communities from environmental degradation, with special
emphasis on protecting the forests and waters, which are fundamental for their
health and survival as communities." 1
69
III. THE RIGHT TO A SAFE AND HEALTHFUL ENVIRONMENT
The concept of a right to a healthy and safe environment has generated debate
and contradictory developments since the first efforts were made to use
international human rights law and procedures to enhance environmental
protection. Clearly, not every social problem must result in a claim becoming
expressed as a human right and there remains disagreement even about some of the
human rights already enunciated. The volume of the debate increases when further
claims are formally proposed for addition to the list of guaranteed human rights.
Nonetheless, the recognition that human survival depends upon a safe and healthy
environment places the claim of a right to environment fully on the human rights
agenda. Moreover, recognizing a right to environment could encompass elements
of nature protection and ecological balance, substantive areas not generally
protected under human rights law because of its anthropocentric focus.
An immediate, practical objective of international human rights law is to gain
international recognition of specific human rights. Successfully placing personal
entitlements within the category of individual human rights preserves them from
the ordinary political process. 170 Individual rights thus significantly limit the
political will of a democratic majority, as well as a dictatorial minority. In
attempting to attain a widely accepted policy goal, even a representative
democracy may not produce legislation that e.g. limits or abolishes the individual
right to be free from cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. This
absolute limitation on domestic political decisions is potentially an important
consequence of elaborating a right to environment, particularly given the high
short-term costs involved in many environmental protection measures and the
resulting political disfavor they experience.
Ultimately, the definition of a right to environment would have to include
substantive environmental standards to restrict harmful air pollution and other
types of emissions. Although establishing quality standards requires extensive
international regulation of environmental sectors based upon impact studies, such
168 Id. at ch. IX, para. 38.
169 Id. at ch. IX, para. 50.
70 In most legal systems, human rights are of constitutional status and override ordinary legislative or
executive acts.
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regulation is by no means impossible. Adoption of quality standards demands
extensive research and debate involving public participation, but substantive
minima are a necessary complement to the procedural rights leading to informed
consent. Otherwise, a human rights approach to environmental protection would be
ineffective in preventing serious environmental harm.
Establishing the content of a right through reference to independent and
variable standards is often used in human rights, especially with regard to
economic entitlements, and needs not be a barrier to recognition of the right to a
specific environmental quality. Rights to an adequate standard of living and to
social security are sometimes defined in international accords such as the European
Social Charter or Conventions and Recommendations of the International Labor
Organization. States implement these often flexible obligations according to
changing economic indicators, needs, and resources. The human rights treaties
provide a "framework" containing the basic guarantees on which international,
national and local laws and policies are elaborated.
A similar approach can be utilized to give meaning to a right to environment.
Both the threats to humanity and the resulting necessary measures are subject to
constant change based on advances in scientific knowledge and conditions of the
environment. Thus, it is impossible for a human rights instrument to specify
precisely what measures should be taken, i.e., the products which should not be
used or the chemical composition of air which must be maintained. These
technical requirements can be negotiated and regulated through international
environmental norms and standards, giving content to the right to environment by
reference to independent environmental findings and regulations capable of rapid
amendment. The variability of implementation demands imposed by the right to
environment in response to different threats over time and place does not
undermine the concept of the right, but merely takes into consideration its dynamic
character.
More than 100 constitutions throughout the world guarantee a right to a clean
and healthy environment, impose a duty on the state to prevent environmental
harm, or mention the protection of the environment or natural resources.171 Over
half of the constitutions, including nearly all adopted since 1992, explicitly
recognize the right to a clean and healthy environment. 172  Ninety-two
171 See e.g., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA art. 24(1) (providing "[alll citizens
shall have the right to live in a healthy and unpolluted environment."); CONSTITUTION OF THE
ARGENTINE NATION art. 41(1) (providing "[a]ll inhabitants are entitled to the right to a healthy and
balanced environment fit for human development..."); CONSTITUTION OF THE AZERBAIJAN REPUBLIC
art. 39(1) (providing "[e]veryone has the right to live in a healthy environment."); CONSTITUTION OF
BRAZIL art. 225 (providing "[aill persons are entitled to an ecologically balanced environment, which is
an asset for the people's common use and is essential to healthy life...").
172 EARTHJUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 30 available at
http://www.earthjustice.org/library/references/2004UNreport.pdf. Angola, Argentina, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Chechnya,
Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia,
Finland, Georgia, Honduras, Hungary, Kyrgyzstan Latvia, Macedonia, Mali, Moldova, Mongolia,
Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, Russia, Sao Tome and
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constitutions impose a duty on the government to prevent harm to the
environment. 173 Within federal systems, including those whose federal
constitution lacks mention of the environment, state or provincial constitutions
contain environmental rights. 
174
The constitutional rights granted are increasingly being enforced by courts. 1
75
In India, for example, a series of judgments between 1996 and 2000 responded to
health concerns caused by industrial pollution in Delhi. 176 In some instances, the
courts issued orders to cease operations. 177 The Indian Supreme Court has based
the closure orders on the principle that health is of primary importance and that
residents are suffering from health problems due to pollution. South African
courts also have deemed the right to environment to be justiciable. 178  In
Argentina, the right is deemed a subjective right entitling any person to initiate an
action for environmental protection. 179  Colombia also recognizes the
Principe, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Tajikistan, Togo, Turkey,
Ukraine, Yugoslavia. In addition to these, the constitutions of Comoros and Guatemala recognize a
right to health that is not explicitly tied to the state of the environment.
173 Id. at 30. Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Bahrain, Belarus, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Chechnya, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica,
Croatia, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea (draft), Finland, Georgia, Germany,
Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Laos,
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Micronesia, Mongolia,
Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Niger, Palau, Panama, Papa New Guinea,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia,
Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Switzerland,
Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan,
Venezuela, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, Zambia.
174 P.A. CONST. art. I, § 27 (providing that "The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania's
public natural resources are the common property of all the people, including generations yet to come.
As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all
the people." For a commentary see, John C. Dernbach, Taking the Pennsylvania Constitution Seriously
When it Protects the Environment: Part II -- Environmental Rights and Public Trust, 104 DICK. L. REV.
97 (1999); John C. Dernbach, Taking the Pennsylvania Constitution Seriously When It Protects the
Environment: Part I -- An Interpretative Framework for Article I, Section 27 103 DICK. L. REV. 693
(1999).
1" For a discussion of African cases, see Carl Bruch et al., Constitutional Environmental Law: Giving
Force to Fundamental Principles in Africa, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL L. 131 (2001).
176 Dr. Jona Razaque, Background Paper Number 4: Human Rights and the Environment: The National
Experience of South Asia and Africa (2002) available at http://www.unhchr.ch/environment/bp4.html.
As early as 1991, the Supreme Court interpreted the right to life guaranteed by Art. 21 of the
Constitution to include the right to a wholesome environment. In a subsequent case, the Court observed
that Article 21 's guarantee of right to life includes the right to enjoy pollution-free water and air.
...See, e.g., MC. Mehta v. Union of India (Calcutta Tanneries Matter), (1997) [Supreme Court] 2 SCC
441, para. 20, available at http://www.elaw.org/resources/printable.asp?id=l 043.
178 Anna R. Welch, Access to Water: Obligations of State and Non-State Actors Regarding the Human
Right to Water under the South African Constitution, SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 58, 58-61 (2005).
179 Adriana Fabra & Eva Arnal, Background Paper Number 6: Review of Jurisprudence on Human
Rights and the Environment in Latin America (2002) available at
http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/environment/environ/bp6.htm (discussing Argentinian
jurisprudence, the case of Kattan v. National Government, and the case of Irazu Margarita v. Copetro
S.A., in which the court stated that a fundamental right is the right to live in a healthy and balanced
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enforceability of the right to environment.'8 0 In Costa Rica, a court stated that the
right to health and to the environment are necessary to ensure that the right to life
is fully enjoyed. 181
Most international human rights instruments were drafted before the
emergence of environmental law as a common concern and, as a result, do not
mention the environment. On the global level the U.N. Convention on the Rights
of the Child, Art. 24, is unique in speaking of the provision of clean drinking water
and the dangers and risks of pollution.' 82 At present no global human rights treaty
proclaims a general right to environment.
On the regional level, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights wcvas
the first international human rights instrument to contain an explicit guarantee of
environmental quality (Art. 24). 183 Subsequently, the Protocol on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights to the American Convention on Human Rights included
the right of everyone to live in a healthy environment (Art. 11).184 In Europe,
neither the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms nor the European Social Charter contains a right to
environmental quality, and the former European Commission on Human Rights
held that such a right cannot be directly inferred from the Convention. Also within
Europe, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the
Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine185 takes a
human rights approach to biotechnology, but does not mention environmental
protection. Concerned with human dignity and respect for the human being, the
Convention requires prior informed consent before there is any intervention in the
health field.
Given the innovations in Africa, it is probably appropriate that the African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights should be the first international
human rights body to decide a contentious case involving violation of the right to a
general satisfactory environment. The case is a landmark not only in this respect,
but also in the Commission's articulation of the duties of governments in Africa to
environment and warned that aggression to the environment ends up threatening life itself, as well as
the psychological and physical integrity of the person).
IS0 Id. (citing Fundepublico v. Mayor ofBugalagrande, Juzgado Primero superior, Interlocutorio # 032,
Tulua, 19 Dec. 1991, in which the court stated that "It should be recognized that a healthy environment
is a sina qua non condition for life itself and that no right could be exercised in a deeply altered
environment.").
181 Id.
182 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 67, at art. 24.
183 African Charter, supra note 39, at art. 24.
1" Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, art. 11, Nov. 14, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 156. (guaranteeing the right to a healthy
environment in Art. 11: "(1) Everyone shall have the right to live in a healthy environment and to have
access to basic public services; (2) The States Parties shall promote the protection, preservation and
improvement of the environment"). Art. 11 is not, however, one of the rights in the Protocol that is
subject to the petition procedure established by the American Convention. See Dinah Shelton,
Environmental Rights, in PEOPLES' RIGHTS 185 (Philip Alston ed., 2001).
185 Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine and Explanatory Report, Apr. 4, 1997, 36 I.L.M.
817.
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monitor and control the activities of multinational corporations. Acting on a
petition filed by two non-governmental organizations on behalf of the people of
Ogoniland, Nigeria, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights found
Nigeria had breached its obligations to respect, protect, promote, and fulfill rights
guaranteed by the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.'86 The
Commission held that Nigeria had violated the right to enjoy Charter-guaranteed
rights and freedoms without discrimination (Art. 2), the right to life (Art. 4), the
right to property (Art. 14), the right to health (Art. 16), the right to housing
(implied in the duty to protect the family (Art. 18(1)), the right to food (implicit in
Arts 4, 16, and 22), the right of peoples to freely dispose of their wealth and
natural resources (Art. 21), and the right of peoples to a "general satisfactory
environment favorable to their development" (Art. 24). 187 Most of the violations
stemmed from actions taken by or involving the Nigerian National Petroleum
Development Company (NNPC) in a consortium with Shell Petroleum
Development Corporation (SPDC). 188
The Communication alleged that the military government of Nigeria was
involved in oil production through NNPC in consortium with SPDC and that the
operations produced contamination causing environmental degradation and health
problems; that the consortium disposed of toxic wastes in violation of applicable
international environmental standards and caused numerous avoidable spills near
villages, consequently poisoning much of the region's soil and water; that the
government aided these violations by placing the state's legal and military powers
at the disposal of the oil companies; and that the government executed Ogoni
leaders and, through its security forces, killed innocent civilians and attacked,
burned, and destroyed villages, homes, crops, and farm animals. The
Communication also alleged that the government failed to monitor the activities of
the oil companies, provided no information to local communities, conducted no
environmental impact studies, and prevented scientists from undertaking
independent assessments.
Assessing the claimed violations of the rights to health (Art. 16) and to a
general satisfactory environment (Art. 24), the Commission found that the right to
a general satisfactory environment imposes clear obligations upon a government,
requiring the state "to take reasonable and other measures to prevent pollution and
ecological degradation, to promote conservation, and to secure an ecologically
sustainable development and use of natural resources." 189 Moreover:
[g]overnment compliance with the spirit of Articles 16 and 24 of the
African Charter must also include ordering or at least permitting
86 The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v.
Nigeria, Communication No. 155/96, Case No. ACHPR/COMM/A044/1, paras. 1-9, 69 (Aft. Comm'n
Hum. & Peoples' Rts. May 27, 2002), available at
http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/comcases/allcases.html.
187 ld at para. 69.
188 Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cit. 2000). This lawsuit was directed against
Shell for its involvement in these activities.
189 The Social and Economic Rights Action Center, supra note 186, at para. 52.
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independent scientific monitoring of threatened environments, requiring
and publicising environmental and social impact studies prior to any
major industrial development, undertaking appropriate monitoring and
providing information to those communities exposed to hazardous
materials and activities and providing meaningful opportunities for
individuals to be heard and to participate in the development decisions
affecting their communities. 190
Applying these obligations to the facts of the case, the Commission concluded that
although Nigeria had the right to produce oil, it had not protected the Article 16
and Article 24 rights of those in the Ogoni region. 
191
The Commission found numerous other rights violated, as well, and
concluded its analysis by emphasizing that collective rights, environmental rights,
and economic and social rights are essential elements of human rights in Africa,
that the Commission intended to apply them, and that "there is no right in the
African Charter that cannot be made effective."' 192 While governments may labor
under difficult circumstances in trying to improve the lives of their peoples, they
must reconsider their relationships with multinational corporations if these
relationships fail to be mindful of the common good and of the rights of
individuals and communities. The Commission gave the right to environment
meaningful content by requiring the state to adopt various techniques of
environmental protection, such as environmental impact assessment, public
information and participation, access to justice for environmental harm, and
monitoring of potentially harmful activities. The result offers a blueprint for
merging environmental protection, economic development, and guarantees of
human rights.' 93
On the global level, a number of non-binding instruments include references
to environmental rights or a right to an environment of a specified quality. In
1988, the U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities, considering the question of the movement of toxic and dangerous
products and wastes, adopted resolution 1988/26 which refers to the right of all
peoples to life and the right of future generations to enjoy their environmental
heritage. It notes that the movement and dumping of toxic and dangerous products
endangers basic human rights, including the right to live in a sound and healthy
environment.
During its 1989 session, the Sub-Commission added the topic of human rights
and the environment to its agenda, adopting a resolution to undertake a study of
the environment and its relation to human rights. The Human Rights Commission,
190 Id. at para. 53.
191 Id. at para. 54.
192 Id. at para. 68.
113 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has adopted a similar approach in the context of
countrywide studies of the human rights performance of OAS member states. See Report on the
Situation of Human Rights in Ecuador, supra note 95; Report on the Situation of Human Rights in
Brazil, supra note 96.
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influenced in part by preparations for UNCED, approved the Sub-Commission
decision on March 15, 1990.194 The Sub-Commission thereupon appointed a
Special Rapporteur who presented reports on the subject between 1991 to 1994.195
In her 1993 report, the Special Rapporteur left open the question of the preparation
of a new international instrument on the right to a satisfactory environment or
environmental rights. However, the report acknowledged such a right in its
discussion, integrating it with a right to development, with action to ensure the
enjoyment of all human rights, and with a right to prevention of environmental
harm.
The Special Rapporteur annexed a set of Draft Principles on Human Rights
and the Environment to her final report in 1994. The Human Rights Commission
decided to request a report of the Secretary General on the issues raised by the
report and Draft Principles, based on the comments of states, intergovernmental
and non-governmental organizations. The Secretary-General submitted reports in
1997 and 1998. At its 1998 session, the Commission decided to appoint a review
committee to submit a revised version of the Draft Declaration. More recently, in
Res. 2001/65, the U.N. Human Rights Commission affirmed that "a democratic
and equitable international order requires, inter alia, the realization of... [t]he right
of every person and all peoples to a healthy environment." 196 The Commission's
resolutions on toxic and dangerous wastes similarly refer consistently to the human
rights to life, health and a sound environment for every individual and affirm that
illicit traffic in and dumping of toxic and dangerous products and wastes is a
serious threat to these rights. '97
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The interrelationship between human rights and environmental protection is
undeniable. Human rights depend upon environmental protection, and
environmental protection depends upon the exercise of existing human rights such
as the right to information and the right to political participation. Despite this
common core, the two topics remain distinct. Environmental protection probably
cannot be wholly incorporated into the human rights agenda without deforming the
concept of human rights and distorting its program. Also, some human rights are
not directly affected by environmental considerations, e.g. the right to a name or to
be free from ex post facto laws. Moreover, without the link of property or privacy,
health, conscience or association, it is difficult to see human rights tribunals
moving more broadly into nature protection, given the current human rights
"9 The United States and Japan both abstained on the resolution, stating that environmental issues
should be dealt with exclusively by environmental bodies.
195 Dr. Adriana Farba, Background Paper 3: The Intersection of Human Rights and Environmental
Issues: A Review of Institutional Developments at the International Level (2002), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/environment/environ/bp3.htm.
196 U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable International Order,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/L.1 /Add., art. 4(1) (Apr. 24, 2003).
'9' U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Adverse Effects of the Illicit Movement and Dumping of Toxic and
Dangerous Products and Wastes on the Enjoyment of Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2003/L.1 l/Add.3, pmbl. (Apr. 22, 2003).
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catalogue. Neither scenic areas, flora and fauna, nor ecological balance are viewed
as part of the rights to which humans are entitled, absent explicit recognition of the
right to a specific environment. No doubt debate will continue over whether such
a recognition serves to enhance environmental protection or simply to further the
anthropocentric, utilitarian view that the world's resources exist solely to further
human well-being.
If a right to environment becomes widely accepted as part of the human rights
catalogue, there remains the problem of balancing it with other human rights. The
General Assembly has pronounced itself many times on the indivisibility,
interdependence, interrelatedness, and universality of all human rights.198 In
December 1997 it reiterated its conviction of this reality and emphasized that
transparent and accountable governance in all sectors of society, as well as
effective participation by civil society, are an essential part of the necessary
foundations for the realization of sustainable development.199 Yet, the possibility
of collision or conflict between rights cannot be avoided. For example, among the
human rights guaranteed by international law is the right of each family to decide
on the number and spacing of their children. Demographic pressures have been
recognized as a threat to environmental quality and economic development,
leading to demands that national birthrates be lowered to achieve sustainable
development . 200 The possibility that some human rights may be limited to achieve
the right to environment is seen in the Constitution of Ecuador where Art. 23
establishes "the right to live in an environment free from contamination. 22° The
Constitution invests the state with responsibility for ensuring the enjoyment of this
right and "for establishing by law such restrictions on other rights and freedoms as
are necessary to protect the environment., 20 2 As noted by the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, the Constitution thus establishes a hierarchy
according to which environmental protection may have priority over other
entitlements.
Human health may be seen as the most significant bridge between human
rights and environmental protection, being a primary objective of both areas of
regulation. Human rights exist to promote and protect human well-being, to allow
the full development of each person and the maximization of the person's goals
and interests, individually and in community with others. This cannot occur
without basic conditions of health, which the state is to promote and protect.
Among the pre-requisites for health are safe environmental milieu, i.e. air, water,
and soil. Pollution destroys health and kills and thus not only destroys the
environment, but infringes human rights as well. From the perspective of the law
118 World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.157/24 para. 5 (1993).
"' G.A. Res. 52/136, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/136 (Mar. 3, 1998) available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/dhresguide/r52.htm.
200 See, Report of the International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo, September 5 -
13, 1994, U.N. Pub. E.95.XIII.18.
201 CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DEL ECUADOR, art. 23.
202 id.
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of state responsibility, there may be little difference between a state that arbitrarily
executes persons and a state that knowingly allows drinking water to be poisoned
by contaminants. In both instances, the state can be responsible for depriving
individuals of their life in violation of human rights law; in the second case,
international environmental law is also implicated. Implementing and enforcing
the latter will also help protect the former. Thus, the goal of human health
provides the basis for reinforcing both areas of law.
NGOs and individuals concerned with environmental deterioration and its
impact on the enjoyment of human rights may consider some of the following
strategies for furthering consideration of this issue by states and international
organizations.
1. Review state reports to human rights bodies to see whether there is
information about environmental conditions as they affect the enjoyment of
guaranteed rights. Prepare a shadow report and present it to the relevant human
rights body as well as to the state. Appear when the state report is scheduled for
review by the human rights body.
2. Develop better interdisciplinary fact-finding and modeling to demonstrate
the causal links between environmental deterioration and the enjoyment of human
rights. In particular work to establish the links between water and air pollution and
enjoyment of the right to health.
3. Build on the Oneryildiz and similar cases to emphasize risk analysis and
dissemination of information as a part of the right to life and other substantive
human rights.
4. Lobby the United Nations Human Rights Commission (or newly created
Council) for adoption of the Draft Declaration on Human Rights and the
Environment.
5. Continue litigating before national, regional and global human rights
bodies whenever resource use and/or pollution threatens the enjoyment of
substantive or procedural environmental rights.
6. Create and maintain a data base of national cases enforcing environmental
rights.
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THE HUMAN RIGHT TO ENVIRONMENT
AND THE PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY*
Luis E. RODRIGUEZ-RIVERA**
I. INTRODUCTION: THE 1959 INTER-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM ON ATOMIC ENERGY
AND LAW AND THE PUERTO RICO NUCLEAR REACTOR EXPERIENCE
Forty-six years ago, the University of Puerto Rico School of Law hosted the
Interamerican Symposium on Atomic Energy and Law, recognized as the first
meeting in the world focusing on the legal and administrative problems associated
with peaceful atomic energy programs. 1 Given the similarity in the subjects
covered in both the 1959 Puerto Rico Symposium and the present conference in
Salzburg, Austria, I will briefly discuss some of the remarks made during the 1959
symposium.
The first symposium speaker was Dr. Shields Warren, Professor of Pathology
at the Harvard Medical School. Dr. Warren began his presentation stating that
"[allthough atomic energy, misused, can be a menace to this and future
generations, although it deals with some of the most deadly poisons known to man,
the industry is one of the safest in the world, and with due attention can be kept
safe."2 This conclusion, however, seemed dramatically premature in light of the
scientific uncertainties posed by him and other scientists at the Puerto Rico
Symposium, and given how young the atomic energy industry was at the time. As
exemplified later in his presentation, Dr. Warren acknowledged that "[i]ntemal
absorption of radioisotopes, such as might occur through an accident, through
inadequate waste disposal, or through heavy fallout is possible. Usually the hazard
from external radiation from these sources is greater than that from internal, even
* This is a revised version of the paper I presented during the Conference of Legal Experts and NGOs
for the Updating of International Law in the Nuclear Energy Field sponsored by PLAGE (Plattform
gegen Atomgefahren), Salzburg, Austria (Oct. 2005).
** Associate Professor of Administrative, Environmental and International Environmental Law,
University of Puerto Rico School of Law. LL.M., University of Cambridge 1998; J.D., Harvard Law
School 1987; B.A., Yale University 1984.
1. The proceedings of this symposium were published in ATOMIC ENERGY AND LAW:
INTERAMERICAN SYMPOsIUM (Jaro Mayda ed., 1960); see also Jaro Mayda, Energia Nuclear y
Derecho, 29 REv. JUR. U.P.R. 81 (1959-60) (providing a brief summary of the symposium's objectives,
sponsors, participants and discussion issues).
2. Shields Warren, Medical and Biological Effects of Radiation Exposure, in ATOMIC ENERGY
AND LAW: INTERAMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 55, 55 (Jaro Mayda ed., 1960).
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under conditions of accident.",3 Thus, it was truly impossible to forecast accurately
the risks associated with events whose effects had not yet been adequately
measured, studied, or fully understood at the time.
A more honest assessment regarding the risks related to the atomic energy
industry was provided by Dr. Forest Western, Deputy Director of the United States
Atomic Energy Commission's Office of Health and Safety. Dr. Western
succinctly pointed out that,
The only known method of avoiding all risks associated with exposure
to radiation is to avoid the exposure. However, there are many things
that we wish to do which cannot be done without some exposure to
radiation. In some cases, the exposure to humans can be made as small
as we wish, if we are willing to pay the cost in materials and effort. Our
problem, then, is not how much exposure to radiation is safe, but how
much are we willing to accept.
4
Of course, the answer as to how much radiation exposure we are willing to accept
depends on who controls the decision-making process, what criteria is taken into
account, and whose interests deserve protection.
The Legal Advisor to the Mexican National Nuclear Energy Commission,
Francisco Torres Garcia, summarized the scientifically accepted conclusions of the
time as:
1) Excessive absorption of ionizing radiation by a human being is
dangerous for him and for his descendents.
2) The damage to him can be immediately obvious or delayed.
3) The nature of the damage and its extent are unforeseeable, which
further aggravates the problem.5
He also quoted the following statement from a partial report of the period prepared
by the Committee on Genetic Effects of Radiation, published by the National
Academy of Sciences in the United States:
We can not pretend to eliminate all the risks, for that would be
impossible; we can only try to establish some balance between the risks
on the one hand, and the various benefits on the other hand. The
troublesome and confusing matter is that humanity has to seek ways to
reach a balanced judgment without knowing exactly what the risks are.
3. Id. at 58.
4. Forest Western, Standards of Protection Against Radiation Exposure, in ATOMIC ENERGY
AND LAW: INTERAMERICAN SyMPOSIUM 59,61 (Jaro Mayda ed., 1960).
5. Francisco Torres Garcia, Some Legal Consequences of the Safety Problems Associated with
Widespread Use of Radiation Sources, in ATOMIC ENERGY AND LAW: INTERAMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 78,
80 (Jaro Mayda ed., 1960).
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The scientists can not determine exactly to what biological risks we
expose ourselves with respect to the various levels and types of
radiation. 6
Considering the high degree of scientific uncertainty surrounding the issue of
radiation exposure, as well as the catastrophic nature of the potential damages, it is
difficult to conceive of a moral framework, much less an international or regional
legal framework, which would provide the foundation for the expansion of the
atomic energy industry, albeit for peaceful use. In reading the proceedings of the
1959 Puerto Rico Symposium, one is inevitably confronted with many of the
participants' utilitarian views while evaluating the issues at hand. Mr. Torres
Garcia, for instance, boldly declared as follows:
Just as air law was born in its time, it has fallen to the contemporary
lawyers to witness the birth of a new legal branch which could be
christened 'nuclear law.' From the time a professional jurist begins to
approach the problems which this new source of energy presents, he is
immediately forced to revise all his doctrinal and normative knowledge
in law, as well as all the knowledge in the various fields which he has
studied during his university career. Fortunately, the legal edifice in
civilized countries rests on such solid pillars, and it has originated such
a high intellectual and spiritual level that, no matter how difficult and
novel is the attempt to adapt so old principles to so new problems, it
will always be possible to reach satisfactory results, if the scholar and
the professional lawyer in general are consciencious [sic] enough to
accept the task of creating this new and special legal structure, so that
the system of norms and principles of equity and justice, necessary for
this new source of energy to yield its benefits and cease to be a danger,
would be developed in the fields of private, public and, above all,
international law.
7
Some dissenting voices were present at the 1959 Puerto Rico Symposium,
such as that of Dr. Carlos Alberto Dunshee De Abraches, Legal Advisor to the
Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission, whose main concern at the time was the
third-party effects of the atomic energy industry's waste disposal practices:
Despite all these precautions, it is established that they are not sufficient
to eliminate totally and permanently the harmful characteristics of the
dangerous waste. A certain portion resists all the processing and has
contributed to the increase of the existing natural radioactivity in the air,
the water, and the soil. One aspect of this problem has begun to
concern Brazilian scientists because of the increased risk which it
represents for our country. It is known now that solid radioactive waste,
proceeding from United States installations located close to the Atlantic
coast, have been dumped into the sea in a region above a deep trough in
the ocean bottom. England has done the same thing.... So it is most
6. Id. at 79-80.
7. Id. at 78-79.
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important that American scientists, administrators and lawyers seriously
and urgently dedicate themselves to these problems, especially those
which may affect populations, as the mentioned fact situation
indicated. 8
However, the dissenting voices were drowned out by other scientists and lawyers
eager to articulate a legal system which would essentially transfer some, if not
most, of the inherent risks associated with the peaceful atomic energy programs to
other parties, including states, owners, operators, insurance companies, and
individuals around the globe.
Dr. Enrique Zaldivar, Professor of Law at the Universities of Buenos Aires
and La Plata and Legal Advisor to the Argentine National Atomic Energy
Commission, emphasized the international character of the nascent nuclear energy
law given that nuclear damages easily become extraterritorial. 9 He posited that the
following questions were fundamental to the development of a legal system for
atomic or nuclear energy the first five as primary questions, the next five as
secondary ones, and the last five as questions of procedural and economic issues:
1) Is it necessary to establish special rules of state responsibility for
these damages, or can we consider the positive international law as
already containing norms to solve the conflicts which can arise in this
connection?
2) Should states be considered liable in all cases for extraterritorial
damages caused by nuclear activities carried on within their
boundaries?
3) Or should this liability be limited to activities engaged in on basis of
a previous license by the state?
4) In each of the preceding situations, should the liability of the state be
joint with, or subsidiary to, the liability of the owner, operator, etc. of
the nuclear instalation which caused the accident?
5) Should state be internationally liable although the accident has not
been caused by fault either on the part of the state, or of the owner,
operator, etc. of the nuclear instalation? In other words, can the
doctrine of absolute liability, generally applied in other fields of law, be
extended to the liability of states?
1) Should states be considered internationally liable for extraterritorial
damages caused by carriage of nuclear materials, for means of
transportation with nuclear propulsion, or for disposal of radioactive
8. ATOMIC ENERGY AND LAW: INTERAMERICAN SYMPOSIUM, supra note 1, at 85-86.
9. Enrique Zaldivar, The Legal Framework of Atomic Energy Programs: Need for a Uniform
Legislative Action on National and International Levels, in ATOMIC ENERGY AND LAW:
INTERAMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 176, 180 (Jaro Mayda ed., 1960).
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materials on high seas, although all these acts have taken place outside
of their territorial limits?
2) Which type of damage would the state liability enclose: the
immediate ("darmnum emergens"), all the losses caused by the tortious
act ("lucrum cessans"), cost of measures preventing the damages, costs
of investigation, etc.; or only some of these items?
3) Should there be a limit on the liability of states?
4) Should these claims be subject to a statute of limitations?
5) Should there be special rules about joint liability of states for
damages caused jointly or cumulatively?
[C]onvenience or lack of convenience of establishing an obligatory
international adjudication and special tribunals which would decide
these disputes; if these tribunals are set up, the determination of their
powers and jurisdiction; the establishment of a permanent technical-
scientific body to determine nuclear damages, their causes, safety
measures, procedures; the conclusion of agreements about convertibility
of the indemnity payments; and finally, the adoption of all the rules
indicated at this stage. 
10
The answers to most of these questions, originally posed in the 1959 Puerto Rico
Symposium, have evolved into several international and regional conventions and
customary law norms to form an area of international law applicable to the
peaceful use of atomic or nuclear energy. I will return to this issue later.
I cannot conclude my summary of the 1959 Puerto Rico Symposium without
discussing Puerto Rico's unfortunate experience with nuclear energy. In the final
presentation at the above-mentioned symposium, a local government official
informed the audience that Puerto Rico and the United States Atomic Energy
Commission were close to completing a feasibility study "to construct a reactor of
an advanced type, using superheated steam."" The feasibility study was
completed soon thereafter, and a contract for the construction of the reactor was
signed less than two months after the 1959 Puerto Rico Symposium. 12
The prototype nuclear power plant BONUS (Boiling Nuclear Superheater)
reactor "first achieved a controlled nuclear chain reaction on April 13, 1964...
Operation at full power (50 megawatts of thermal energy) and full temperature...
was achieved in September 1965... Operation of the BONUS reactor was
terminated in June 1968 because of technical difficulties and the ensuing need for
10. Id. at 180-81.
11. Josd Vila Ruiz, Legal and Administrative Problems of Establishing a Power Reactor in Puerto
Rico, in ATOMIC ENERGY AND LAW: INTERAMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 231, 231 (Jaro Mayda ed., 1960).
12. Id.
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high-cost modifications."' 3  As part of the decommissioning of the BONUS
facilities,
[A]ll special nuclear materials (fuel) and certain highly activated
components (e.g., control rods and shims) were removed to the
mainland, all piping systems flushed, the reactor vessel and associated
internal components within the biological shield were entombed in
concrete and grout, and systems external to the entombment were
decontaminated. Many contaminated and activated materials were
placed in the main circulation pump room beneath the pressure vessel
and entombed in concrete. General decontamination of the reactor was
performed with the goal of meeting unrestricted use criteria in all
accessible areas of the building. Residual radioactive materials
remaining in the structure were isolated or shielded to protect site
visitors and workers. During subsequent years, more radioactive
contamination was identified in portions of the building, and additional
cleanup and shielding activities were conducted in the 1990s and early
2000s. 14
However, as reported by James Anderson of the Associated Press, "[o]ver the
years, residents and local press reports suggested that a radiation leak forced the
shutdown. Fishermen delivered tales of giant lobsters and crabs lurking
offshore."' 15  Puerto Ricans have been the last to know about the health and
environmental risks related to the BONUS facilities that they faced and may
continue to face.
For years, BONUS remained a faded memory kept alive by local story telling
amidst the backdrop of one of the most beautiful beaches on the island in the
northwestern municipality of Rinc6n, Puerto Rico. 16 Then, in September, 2000,
the Puerto Rican Legislature and the Governor approved the creation of a
technological museum in the BONUS reactor facilities.' 7 Later, in 2003, the
Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority announced the arrival of Jeffrey S.
Merrifield, Commissioner of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
who traveled to visit the BONUS facilities and learn more about Puerto Rico's
plans to convert them into a museum. 8 Recently, the United States Department of
13. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, OFF. OF LEGACY MGMT., BONUS, Puerto Rico, Decommissioned
Reactor: Fact Sheet, http://www.lm.doe.gov/documents/sites/pr/bonus.pdf.
14. Id.
15. James Anderson, Puerto Rico Nuke Museum Said Safe, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 29, 1999,
available at http://mailman.mcmaster.ca/mailman/private/cdn-nul-1/991 I.gz/msg00057.html.
16. See BONUS: Factsheet, supra note 13. The BONUS facilities, with its distinctive green dome
structure, are adjacent to and overlook the recently designated Tres Palmas Marine Reserve, and several
world class surfing beaches. See Surfrider Foundation, Reserva Marina Tres Palmas,
http://www.surfrider.org/rincon/rmtp.asp (2006).
17. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 23 § 188u (2000).
18. Press Release, Autoridad De Energia Electrica, AEE recibe primera visita a Puerto Rico de un
Comisionado Presidencial de la Nuclear Regulatory Commission, (Dec. 2, 2003),
http://www.prepa.com/noticias.asp?r-QlJHIUSNAR.
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Energy (DOE) reported that the BONUS facilities are expected to be transferred to
its Office of Legacy Management in 2006.
The Puerto Rico reactor facilities will become the Department's fifth
Decontamination and Decommissioning site "because the Bonus site contains an
entombed reactor that requires long-term surveillance and monitoring activities
similar to the entombed reactors at Piqua and Hallam, and the same DOE guidance
for long-term surveillance and monitoring activities apply." 19 Nonetheless, the
information provided by the U.S. Department of Energy on its web site confirms
that the Puerto Rico Government intends to use the main floor of the Bonus
building as a museum. As for the issue of public safety, the U.S. Department of
Energy's Fact Sheet on BONUS states, "DOE completed an environmental
assessment in 2003 that indicated no unacceptable risk to human health or the
environment if the main floor is used as a museum., 20 Regardless of this
statement, the museum serves as a constant reminder of the risks States impose on
their citizens in clear violation of the human right to life and dignity.
Today, in the year 2007, we are still debating what constitutes acceptable and
unacceptable radiation exposure risks.21 In essence, the same question that was
pervasive at the 1959 Puerto Rico Symposium remains salient today: Acceptable
risk to whom? We must ask ourselves, has anyone bothered to ask those whose
lives and dignity have been put at risk whether the risks are acceptable to them?
II. THE RIGHT TO A SAFE AND HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT AND ITS RELEVANCE TO
THE PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY
International environmental law includes the substantive, procedural, and
institutional norms that derive from: hundreds of multilateral environmental
treaties; over a thousand bilateral environmental treaties; and numerous
intergovernmental instruments addressing many environmental issues, such as
declarations, resolutions, and programs of action; and substantial juridical
principles applicable to environmental issues found in customary international law.
As a branch of general international law, international environmental law is
inherently interdisciplinary and shares with other international law areas concepts,
issues, and strategies.22
While the development of international environmental law has dramatically
altered international relations relating to environmental issues, there needs to be
further development in order to for the international community to cope properly
19. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, OFF. OF LEGACY MGMT, BONUS Decommissioned Reactor:
Regulatory Framework, http://www.1m.doe.gov/land/sites/pr/bonus/bonusframework.htm.
20. BONUS: Factsheet, supra note 13.
21. See Health Physics Society, Policy, Guidelines, and Regulations - Dosimetry and Exposure
Limits, http://www.hps.org/publicinformation/ate/ql 152.html (last modified Sept. 20, 2004).-
22. Luis E. Rodriguez-Rivera, Is the Human Right to Environment Recognized Under
International Law? It Depends on the Source, 12 COLO, J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 6 (2001).
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with the complexities of modem environmental problems. As I previously
expressed in a prior essay,
One obvious gap not covered by international environmental law
involves the protection of human life and dignity from threats
associated with environmental degradation, especially when such
threats result as a consequence of actions or inactions taken by an
individual's own national government. This is the area of international
law where international human rights issues overlap with international
and national environmental issues. It is also an area where much
scholarly debate has taken place, and where consensus is still lacking as
to the appropriate approach to be undertaken.23
It is precisely within this gap in public international law that the peaceful use of
nuclear energy or nuclear law intersects with international environmental law.
The use of nuclear weapons during armed conflict, as well as the peaceful use
of nuclear energy, poses potential catastrophic threats to all of humanity. The
International Court of Justice recognized the cataclysmic nature and the
environmental risks associated with the use of nuclear weapons in its 1996
Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons:
The Court recognizes that the environment is under daily threat and that
the use of nuclear weapons could constitute a catastrophe for the
environment. The Court also recognizes that the environment is not an
abstraction but represents the living space, the quality of life and the
very health of human beings, including generations unborn... In
applying this law to the present case, the Court cannot however fail to
take into account certain unique characteristics of nuclear weapons...
[The Court] also notes that nuclear weapons are explosive devices
whose energy results from the fusion or fission of the atom. By its very
nature, that process, in nuclear weapons as they exist today, releases not
only immense quantities of heat and energy, but also powerful and
prolonged radiation... These characteristics render the nuclear weapon
potentially catastrophic. The destructive power of nuclear weapons
cannot be contained in either space or time. They have the potential to
destroy all civilization and the entire ecosystem of the planet.
The radiation released by a nuclear explosion would affect health,
agriculture, natural resources and demography over a very wide area.
Further, the use of nuclear weapons would be a serious danger to future
generations. Ionizing radiation has the potential to damage the future
environment, food and marine ecosystem, and to cause genetic defects
and illness in future generations... [I]t is imperative for the Court to
take account of the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons, and in
23. Id. at 9.
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particular their destructive capacity, their capacity to cause untold
human suffering, and their ability to cause damage to generations to
24
come.
Even though the International Court of Justice could not find a principle in
international law to prohibit the threat or use of nuclear weapons, the tone it set in
describing the inhumane nature of its use established an excellent precedent for
applying a human rights or international criminal law approach to critiquing the
peaceful use of nuclear energy.
Since its inception in the late 1950's, the very legal system that has served as
the foundation for the development of the peaceful nuclear energy industry
(nuclear law) has ignored the human rights component of its international
character. The balancing of risks and benefits inherent in nuclear energy decision-
making ignores the preemptive nature of recognized human rights, and evinces a
complete violation of recognized human rights where decisions made or
acquiesced to by states create grievous threats to present and future generations of
its people, as well as the environment.
Moreover, the peaceful nuclear energy industry has also ignored the "untold
human suffering" it has the capacity to impose upon present and future generations
and the environment. 25 Every time humans and the environment are exposed to
significant radiation "untold human suffering" results.26 The threat of a radiation
exposure incident triggered by human or technological mistakes in a nuclear
energy plant or in the transportation and storage of radioactive fuel and wastes is
undeniable, expected, and catastrophic.2 7 Given the acknowledged and enormous
risks associated with the development and use of nuclear energy, even in times of
peace, any incident that causes significant radiation exposure to humans and the
environment should be considered an act against humanity that violates
international criminal law principles.
Although much has been discussed and agreed to regarding state
responsibility and liability for extraterritorial damages caused by the peaceful use
of nuclear energy has been analyzed extensively, academic and scholarly debate is
now focused on the best approaches for the allocation of risks and liabilities.28
Nonetheless, the human rights of individuals whose lives and dignity are
threatened by actions or omissions of their own national governments participating
in the peaceful use of nuclear energy remain ignored today. Also non-existent is
the use of an international criminal law approach to the peaceful use of nuclear
energy. However, I will focus my attention hereinafter on the application of a
24. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 241-44
(July 8) (emphasis added).
25. Id. at 244.
26. Id.
27. See Eric Pianin and Helen Dewar, In Nuclear Waste Site Debate, Visions of Transport
Disaster, WASH. POST, July 8, 2002, at A03, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp_
dyn?pagename=article&contentld=A36463-2002Jul7&notFound-true.
28. See, e.g., Michael Trebilcock & Ralph A. Winter, The Economics of Nuclear Accident Law, 17
INT'L REV. L. & EcoN. 215 (1997).
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human rights approach to nuclear law, leaving an exploration into the application
of international criminal law to the peaceful use of nuclear energy for a future
author. 29
At present, new threats to humanity stemming from the peaceful use of
nuclear energy continue to emerge, such as the discovery of radioactive pollution
in the Arctic Ocean linked to the former Soviet Union, 30 the use of low frequency
active sonar by military naval forces to locate submarines, and the continuous
shipment of ultra-hazardous radioactive materials between Europe and Japan.31
One possible mean of validating the rights of individuals imperiled by the threat of
radiation exposure is to enforce the human right to a safe and healthy environment
using international, regional, and national human rights mechanisms.
The best approach to understanding the strategic importance of recognizing an
expansive human right to environment is in the context of the trumping effect of
rights in our society.32 Professor J.G. Merrils expressed this phenomenon as
follows:
Although rights are a part and not the whole of morality, having rights
is significant in at least two ways. First, if I can show that I have a
moral right to, say, a clean environment I have something which has to
be taken into account in any discussion of the moral aspects of
environmental policy. I am, so to speak, a player in the morality game.
Secondly, and perhaps even more important, such is the value that
attaches to rights that if I am a rights-holder I am not just a player, but a
serious, indeed a privileged player in the game. That is to say my right
will tend to pre-empt not only preferences and other non-moral
considerations, but other moral considerations as well. What is true of
moral rights is true a fortiori of legal rights. Thus having
environmental rights, for example, incorporated in a constitution or
recognized in international law cannot guarantee that the putative
rights-holder will be successful in every dispute in which the right may
be relevant, but certainly creates a situation in which not only must the
right always be considered, but very good reasons will be needed for
denying it effect.
33
29. 1 believe that the International Court of Justice's reasoning in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on
the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons provides the necessary tools for the application of
an international criminal law analysis to nuclear law, both in times of peace and war. However, this is a
theory which needs further development and articulation. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, supra note 24.
30. See Lakshman D. Guruswamy & Jason B. Aamodt, Nuclear Arms Control: The
Environmental Dimension, 10 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 267, 268 (1999).
31. Jon M. Van Dyke, Active Sonar & Shipments of Radioactive Materials, 2002 COLO. J. INT'L
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1 (2002).
32. See generally RONALD DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
33. J.G. Merrills, Environmental Protection and Human Rights: Conceptual Aspects, in HUMAN
RIGHT'S APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 25, 26-27 (Alan E. Boyle & Michael R.
Anderson eds., 1996).
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When so used as a trump card, the effect of an expansive human right to
environment "is to demand a response rather than a silence and a response which
must be formulated in a way which takes account of the content of the right."' 34 I
will now proceed to briefly describe the content of the expansive human right to
environment.
III. CONTENT OF THE HUMAN RIGHT TO ENVIRONMENT
The expansive human right to environment contains three broad categories of
rights articulated by scholars: the substantive and anthropocentric right to
environment, the substantive and eco-centric right of environment, and the
procedural environmental rights. An exposition of the human right to environment
is necessary to address effectively modem environmental problems. I will now
address the three categories identified above.
A. Right to Environment
Many adjectives have been used to describe the term environment and provide
it with a substantive standard of environmental quality to which humans have a
right to live under international and national laws. The most frequently used
adjectives are: safe, satisfactory, secure, healthy, healthful, decent, adequate, clean,
pure, natural, viable, ecologically-sound, and ecologically-balanced.
These adjectives may provide a vague substantive description, but I refer to
the right to environment as a human right to live in an environment of minimum
quality that still allows for the realization of a life of dignity and well-being. Of
course, one may be confronted with the question of whether it is actually possible
to determine such a precise minimum standard of environmental quality.
However, uncertainty and ambiguity are common in the articulation of most
human rights, and should not act as obstacles to the implementation and
enforcement of recognized human rights. As Alexandre Kiss and Dinah Shelton so
aptly noted, "in the public conscience of a given society, these concepts can have
sufficient precision to permit a judge or administrator to apply them. For the most
part rights and liberties will be taken from the abstract and given meaning in a
concrete social and historical context."'
35
National and international tribunals have historically articulated substantive
standards from abstract norms. Thus, I have no doubt that specific environmental
qualitative standards may also be derived from vague, ambiguous, and abstract
general terms, such as the adjectives referenced above. In determining the
minimum qualitative standards contained in the right to environment, tribunals will
have to balance conflicting visions and values of human life. Arguably, it is
precisely the role of tribunals to interpret and enforce rights generally, and human
rights specifically.36 Once a tribunal determines the minimum qualitative standard
34. Wade Mansell & Joanne Scott, Why Bother About a Right to Development?, 21 J.L. & SOC'Y
171, 179 (1994).
35. ALEXANDRE KISS & DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 23 (1991).
36. See Franqois Du Bois, Social Justice and the Judicial Enforcement of Environmental Rights
and Duties, in HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 153, 153-54 (Alan
Boyle & Michael Anderson eds. 1996).
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encompassed in the right to environment, safeguarding the standard would preempt
the balancing test used in peaceful nuclear energy decision-making. Moreover, in
the public conscience today there is "a clear image of an environment which
should be preserved and from which each person should benefit. 37
B. Right of Environment
The right of environment articulates the philosophical theory that the
environment is entitled to rights based on its own intrinsic value, separate and
distinct from those attributed to it through human use. Read textually, the human
right to environment and the right of environment are incompatible concepts, given
that the former is anthropocentric and the latter eco-centric. However, Professors
Kiss and Shelton solved this conundrum by proposing that the right of environment
is in fact a fundamental element in the construction of the right to environment:
While this ultimate aim of human survival remains anthropocentric,
humans are not viewed as apart from or above the natural universe, but
as an interlinked and interdependent part of it. It follows that because
all parts of the natural web are linked, they must each be protected and
conserved. It is in this sense that "intrinsic value" may be understood.38
Viewing humans and nature as interconnected allows us to reach the
conclusion that both must be safeguarded. Thus, the right of environment (with its
eco-centric philosophical foundation) should be integrated as a substantive
component of the expansive right to environment.
C. Environmental Rights
Environmental rights are the procedural human rights necessary for
effectively implementing the substantive components of the expansive right to
environment. Among the recognized environmental rights are the following:
access to environmental information; participation in the decision-making process
of environmental policies; availability of legal remedies to redress environmental
harm; and general due process rights.3 9
Some scholars prefer to treat environmental rights as a separate category akin
to civil and political human rights. 40 However, I prefer to describe them as the
procedural component of the right to environment given that absent the substantive
components of the expansive right to environment, the environmental rights are
ineffective in impacting a state's decision-making process.
In sum, the content of the expansive formulation of human right to
environment includes qualitative environmental standards defined by the
substantive components of the right to environment and right of environment, as
37. KisS & SHELTON, supra note 35, at 24.
38. Id. at 11.
39. See Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, princ. 10, U.N. Doc A/Conf. 151/26 (Aug. 12, 1992).
40. See Alexandre Kiss, International Human Rights Law and Environmental Problems: An
Introductory Note on a Human Right to Environment,
http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu25ee/uu25ee0k.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2006).
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well as procedural guarantees provided by the recognized environmental rights. It
is to this formulation of the expansive right to environment that I will refer to in
discussing the existence or emergence of a human right to environment under
international law.
IV. THE SOURCES OF THE HUMAN RIGHT TO ENVIRONMENT
When evaluating the legal sources of the expansive formulation of the human
right to environment, one must begin chronologically with the international human
rights instruments that implicitly support its existence. I summarized these implicit
sources as follows:
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights contains several applicable
rights and entitlements: article 3 (right to life, liberty and security of the
person); article 22 (entitlement to the realization of economic, social
and cultural rights indispensable for dignity and the free development of
personality); article 24 (right to rest and leisure); article 25 (right to
standard of living adequate for health and well-being, including food
and housing); and article 28 (entitlement to social and international
order in which human rights can be fully realized). The International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in articles 1 (right
to self-determination and right to freely dispose of natural wealth and
resources), 7 (right to decent living, safe and healthy working
conditions, and rest and leisure), 11 (right to adequate standard of
living, including food and housing, and to the continuous improvement
of living conditions), 12 (right to health, including to improvement of
all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene), and 15 (right to
cultural life and to benefits of scientific progress and its applications),
contains implicit support for the right to environment. The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also supports implicitly the right
to environment in the following provisions: article 1 (right to self-
determination and right to freely dispose of natural wealth and
resources); article 6 (right to life); article 7 (protection from cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment); article 17 (right to privacy); and
article 20 (prohibition of propaganda for war). Of course, international
instruments covering specific environmental problems, as well as
human rights which are linked to environmental protection, also can be
interpreted as implicitly supporting the expansive formulation of the
human right to environment.
41
The first international instrument to incorporate a human rights approach to
environmental protection was the 1972 Stockholm Declaration.42 Principle 1 of
the Stockholm Declaration provides that "[m]an has the fundamental right to
freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality
41. Rodriguez-Rivera, supra note 22, at 23 (footnotes omitted).
42. See Conference on the Human Environment, June 5-16, 1972, Declaration of the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/14/Rev.1 (June 16, 1972),,
reprinted in II I.L.M. 1416 [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
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that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility
to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations. 43
In the 1980s, two regional instruments expressly recognized a substantive
human right to environment. First in 1981, Article 24 of the African Charter on
Human and People's Rights declared that "[a]ll peoples shall have the right to a
general satisfactory environment favourable to their development." 44 A few years
later, Article 11 of the 1988 San Salvador Protocol stated "[e]veryone shall have
the right to live in a healthy environment .... The States' Parties shall promote the
protection, preservation and improvement of the environment.
45
During the 1990s, more evidence on the emergence of a human right to
environment continued to accumulate. The United Nations General Assembly
emphasized several times during this period the link between environmental
protection and the realization of human rights. In 1990, the General Assembly
specifically recognized "that all individuals are entitled to live in an environment
adequate for their health and well-being.,
46
That same year, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights adopted
resolution 1990/41 reiterating the link between environmental protection and the
realization of human rights.47 Moreover, the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities' ("Sub-Commission") decision to
study the problems of the environment and the promotion of human rights was
received positively by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. This study was
undertaken by Special Rapporteur Mrs. Fatma Zohra Ksentini.4 8 In 1994, the
Draft Principles on Human Rights and the Environment ("Draft Declaration") were
prepared by a group of international experts, and incorporated into Mrs. Ksentini's
Final Report. 49  Both of these documents explicitly recognized an existing and
expansive human right to environment under international law.50  The Ksentini
Final Report indicated that there existed a "universal acceptance of the
environmental rights recognized at the national, regional and international
levels."'" Similarly, the Draft Declaration stated that "[a]ll persons have the right
to a secure, healthy and ecologically sound environment.' '52
43. Id. at princ. 1 [emphasis added].
44. African [Banjul] Charter on Human and People's Rights, art. 24, June 27, 1981, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5,1520 U.N.T.S. 217. reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58.
45. Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, art. 11, Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 156.
46. G.A. Res. 45/94, 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/94 (Dec. 14, 1990).
47. Id. at pmbl.
48. See U.N. Econ. And Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination &
Prot. of Minorities, Review of Further Developments in Fields with Which the Sub-Committee has been
Concerned, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9, (July 6, 1994) (prepared by Mrs. Fatma Zohra Ksentini,
Special Rapporteur) [hereinafter Final Report].
49. See Draft Principles on Human Rights and the Environment, May 16, 1994, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9.
50. See id., at 1-4; see Final Report, supra note 48, at 4-7.
51. Final Report, supra note 48, at 240.
52. Id. at Annex 1, 2.
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In the first of her two Background Papers to the 2002 Joint UNEP-OHCHR
Expert Seminar on Human Rights and the Environment held in Geneva, Prof.
Dinah Shelton identified dozens of international and regional treaties entered into
during the 1990s that incorporated environmental rights, and in a few cases the
right to environment.13  In her second Background Paper to the referenced
seminar, Prof. Shelton evaluated the significant decisions of human rights bodies
during the decade. In that paper's summary, she explained:
Nearly all global and regional human rights bodies have considered the
link between environmental degradation and internationally-guaranteed
human rights. In nearly every instance, the complaints brought have not
been based upon a specific right to a safe and environmentally-sound
environment, but rather upon rights to life, property, health,
information, family and home life. Underlying the complaints,
however, are instances of pollution, deforestation, water pollution, and
other types of environmental harm. 
54
The 1990's also witnessed an exponential growth of cases brought before
national courts to vindicate the right to environment. When a country's
constitution expressly guaranteed the right to environment (over 100 national
constitutions have incorporated specific provisions relating to the environment),
courts did not hesitate to interpret and enforce those constitutional provisions.
55
On the other hand, when a country's constitution failed to affirm the right to
environment, courts found support for the complaints by reinterpreting other
recognized constitutional rights such as the right to life, privacy, health, etc.56
The majority opinion issued by the International Court of Justice in the 1997
Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia)
addressed in dicta the importance of environmental issues and the development of
new norms in international law to address them:
The Court is mindful that, in the field of environmental protection,
vigilance and prevention are required on account of the often
irreversible character of damage to the environment and of the
53. See Off. of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Joint UNEP-OHCHR Expert
Seminar on Human Rights and the Environment, Human Rights and Environment Issues in Multilateral
Treaties Adopted between 1991 and 2001, §§ A, B (Jan. 14-16, 2002), (prepared by Dinah Shelton),
available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/environment/environ/bp 1 .htm.
54. Off. of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Joint UNEP-OHCHR Expert Seminar
on Human Rights and the Environment, Human Rights and Environment: Jurisprudence of Human
Rights Bodies, Summary, (Jan. 14-16, 2002), (prepared by Dinah Shelton), available at, (prepared by
Dinah Shelton), available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/environment/environ/bp2.htm.
55. See INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTS, VOL. 4: INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN NATIONAL COURTS xxxviii-xl (Alice Palmer and Cairo A.R. Robb eds.
2004).
56. See, e.g., Off. of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Joint UNEP-OHCHR
Expert Seminar on Human Rights and the Environment, Human Rights and the Environment: the
national experience in South Asia and Africa, Jan. 14-16, 2002, (prepared by Dr. Jona Razzaque),
available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/environment/environ/bp4.htm.
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limitations inherent in the very mechanism of reparation of this type of
damage.
Throughout the ages, mankind has, for economic and other reasons,
constantly interfered with nature. In the past, this was often done
without consideration of the effects upon the environment. Owing to
new scientific insights and to a growing awareness of the risks for
mankind - for present and future generations - of pursuit of such
interventions at an unconsidered and unabated pace, new norms and
standards have been developed, set forth in a great number of
instruments during the last two decades. Such new norms have to be
taken into consideration, and such new standards given proper weight,
not only when States contemplate new activities but also when
continuing with activities begun in the past.
57
The separate opinion submitted by the Court's Vice-President, Judge
Weeramantry, on the other hand, expressly recognized the existence of a human
right to environmental protection under modem international law.5 8 In 1999,
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights organized the International
Seminar of Experts on the Right to the Environment, which issued the Bizkaia
Declaration on the Right to the Environment. 59  Article 1 of the Bizkaia
Declaration recognizes that "[e]veryone has the right, individually or in association
with others, to enjoy a healthy and ecologically balanced environment... [which]
may be exercised before public bodies and private entities, whatever their legal
status under national and international law."
60
The events subsequently triggered by the drafting of the Bizkaia Declaration
on the Right to the Environment provide an example of how the modem
international legal order operates. Upon the approval of the Bizkaia Declaration
by the International Seminar of Experts in February 1999, the Bizkaia General
Assembly adopted the Declaration in April 1999.61 During that same month, the
Bizkaia Declaration was then submitted to the Sub-Commission of the Fiftieth
Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which issued a report
62describing the Declaration as a contribution possessing wide support.
Based on this last report, the Spanish Lower House voted unanimously to
support the Declaration.63 An official presentation of the Bizkaia Declaration was
57. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 78 (Sept. 25).
58. Id. at 90 (separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry).
59. International Seminar on the Right of the Environment, Feb. 10-13, 1999, Declaration of
Bizkaia on the Right to the Environment, U.N. Doc. 30C/INF.11 (Sept. 24, 1999), available at
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001173/117321E.pdf.
60. Id. at art. 1.
61. Declaration of Bizkaia on the right to the environment, Key Actions,
http://www.gurelurra.net/english/trayec.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2006).
62. Id.
63. Id.
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later presented to the President of the Swiss Confederation, who promised to
distribute it through his country's appropriate government channels.6 4 In June
1999, the Basque Parliament unanimously approved the adhesion to the Chamber
of the Bizkaia Declaration, and in September 1999, the Andalusia Parliament
announced its support.65  In October 2000, the Conference of Legislative
Assemblies of the Regions of Europe unanimously approved the Bizkaia
Declaration and expressed that "it understands that there is a fundamental right to
enjoy a healthy, ecologically balanced environment." 66
In January 2003, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe made
an appeal to "'political players of the member States of the European Union to
recognise the binding nature on an international level of the right to the
environment, since existing fundamental rights are insufficient on the subject of
the environment."'' 67  Subsequently, the Parliamentary Assembly proposed the
recognition of the human right to the environment through a protocol to the
European Charter on Human Rights. 68 A group of citizens from Bizkaia and
Spanish environmental groups spearheaded all these efforts.
In February 2003, Jean Michel Cousteau, a prominent environmentalist,
announced his adhesion to the Bizkaia Declaration and committed himself to
spreading and disseminating this proposal throughout the world. 69 Later in 2003, I
met Mr. Cousteau in Puerto Rico and learned of all the efforts related to the
Bizkaia Declaration undertaken by non-governmental organizations. Presently, the
Bizkaia Declaration has not received the approval of the Committee of Ministers of
the Council of Europe; nonetheless, its impact has been significant, and it is only a
matter of time before the Bizkaia Declaration or a similar statement on the right to
environment is accepted by the Council of Europe, as well other global actors.7 °
Finally, in January 2002, the Joint UNEP-OHCHR Expert Seminar on Human
Rights and the Environment met in Geneva and issued several conclusions. In
essence, the experts recognized a growing correlation between human rights and
environmental protection. This link was reflected "in developments relating to
procedural and substantive rights, in the activities of international organizations,
and in the drafting and application of national constitutions.,, 71 The experts also
noted a growing national and international acceptance of environmental rights, as
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id; EUR. PARL. Doc. (COM 9791) Summary (2003), available at
http://assembly.coe.int/documents/workingdocs/docO3/edoc9791.htm (proposing measures and action
items to be discussed with members).
71. Off, of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Joint UNEP-OHCHR Expert Seminar
on Human Rights and the Environment,, Conclusions, 4 (Jan. 14-15, 2002), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/environment/environ/conclusions.htm.
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well as a substantial body of national and international tribunal decisions
recognizing violations of human rights in response to environmental degradation.72
This overview of the sources of the human right to environment can be
supplemented with considerable amount of soft law under international law.
Although it is clear to me that we are dealing in a modem international legal
system that recognizes the existence of the human right to environment, I also
understand that the answer to the question of whether this right is recognized under
international law will ultimately depend on the criteria used in making this
determination. In other words, confirming the existence of a human right to
environment ultimately rests on whether one adopts a traditional or modem view
on the sources of international law.
V. TRADITIONAL SOURCES DOCTRINE VERSUS MODERN APPROACH
The formal or traditional sources of international law are articulated in article
38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(d) ... judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
deternination of rules of law. 7
According to the traditionalist interpretation doctrine, the above list contains
the only acceptable evidence of a state's consent or commitments. However, as I
have stated before, "this attitude towards the addition of other sources is
inconsistent with the evolution of modem international law, and does not reflect
the activities that contribute to the development of new norms, such as those
derived from acts of international institutions. 74
Professor Dinah Shelton has written about the new challenges we face in a
globalized world where powerful non-state actors may violate human rights in
ways not previously anticipated. 75 Likewise, non-state actors now have the tools
to protect individuals from human rights violations imposed on them by their own
governments. Modem international law has incorporated new players, and, more
importantly, new ways to corroborate the existence of new human rights.
76
Furthermore, as I explained before, a gap also exists in modem international law in
72. See id f 10.
73. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993,
arts. 38(1)(a) -(d), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm.
74. Rodriguez-Rivera, supra note 22, at 38.
75. Dinah Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 273 (2002) (discussing how the actions of non-state actors affect human rights).
76. See id.
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regard to the protection of human life and dignity from threats associated with
environmental degradation, especially when such threats are a consequence of
actions or inactions taken by an individual's own national government.
Maurice Cranston has described a human right as "a universal moral right,
something which all men, everywhere, at all times, ought to have, something of
which no one may be deprived without a grave affront to justice, something which
is owing to every human being simply because he is human." 77 Given that human
rights flow directly from the integrity and dignity of the human being, "[t]hey are
thus rights that cannot be given or withdrawn at will by any domestic legal
system. 78  In light of the universality of human rights, the traditionalists'
emphasis on substantiating the existence of a human right by confirming state
consent is misplaced.
The traditional or consensual sources doctrine curtails a priori the recognition
of new human rights. In fact, when a new human right is recognized, state
sovereignty on that matter must yield to international law. How can we ask the
violator of human rights whether they recognize the very same rights they are
violating? There is simply no logical way to support the continued defense of the
traditional or consensual sources doctrine when evaluating the existence of new
human rights. The source of human rights is not the will of the states as evidenced
by their consent; the source of human rights must be the will of humanity.
How then do we demonstrate the will of humanity? The task is not as easy as
merely looking for evidence of a state's consent. One must evaluate a myriad of
factors that together evidence the will of humanity. For instance, there are many
unmitigated sources for the recognition of the human right to environment in the
modem international legal order, such as
[T]he thousands of international environmental soft law instruments; the
many national constitutions and legislative acts; the dozens of
international, regional and national court decisions; the hundreds of
non-governmental international organizations; the thousands of local or
"grass-roots level" community organizations, and, more importantly,
the overwhelming and sweeping transformation in the [valuation] of
environmental concerns in all levels of society.79
Moreover, we cannot ignore the actions taken by citizens, grass-roots
movements, community groups and non-governmental organizations related to the
Bizkaia Declaration, or related to any of the thousands of other environmental
issues they face daily. Their actions are evidence of the will of humanity. We
must not waste any more time searching for state consent in order to anoint a new
human right. The right to environment either exits or it does not. State consent is
inconsequential.
77. MAURICE CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS? 36 (1962).
78. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 96
(1994).
79. Rodriguez-Rivera, supra note 22, at 45.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Once the human right to environment is recognized under international law -
either under the traditional or modem sources doctrine - its application to the
peaceful use of nuclear energy seems to be a natural and effective approach.
In a recent article, Professor Hari M. Osofsky proposes a new way of
categorizing or characterizing environmental harm to humans.80 He essentially
examines three major components of environmental damage: geographic scope,
severity and duration. First, "[t]he larger the scope of the environmental damage,
the higher the likelihood of it having deleterious impacts on human beings."
81
Second, "[t]he severity of the harm is central to the question of whether the human
impact constitutes a human rights violation. 82  Third, [t]he longer an
environmental incident lasts, the greater the likelihood that it will cause severe
damage and harm people. 83
Under this model, it is clear that both radiation exposure and the risk of such
exposure to humans would constitute a violation of the human right to
environment. Regarding the risk of exposure, some may argue that said risk is
low, and thus, acceptable. However, the catastrophic nature of the risk of exposure
makes any probability of the risk unacceptable to humanity. What makes it
unacceptable is precisely the unique characteristics of nuclear energy that can
potentially bring great destruction and untold human suffering to humanity and the
environment. Thus, what we must look for is evidence of humanity's intolerance
to the risk associated with the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The immorality of
disproportionately putting some individuals at catastrophic risk clearly shows signs
of intolerance around the globe. Picture, record, write, in essence capture the
human reaction to this issue, and you will have in your hands evidence of a
violation of the human right to environment under modem international law.
80. See Hari M. Osofsky, Learning from Environmental Justice: A New Model for International
Environmental Rights, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 71, 90-94 (2005) (proposing how the geographic scope,
severity and duration of environmental harm are factors that should be measured to determine how
harm to the environment impacts human rights).
81. Id. at 91.
82. Id. at 92.
83. Id. at 93.
84. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 24, at 244.
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THE NEW AUSTRIAN ACT ON THIRD PARTY LIABILITY FOR
NUCLEAR DAMAGE*
MONIKA HINTEREGGER**
I. INTRODUCTION
On 7 October 1998, the Austrian Parliament adopted the Federal Law on Civil
Liability for Damages caused by Radioactivity1 which completely re-examines the
principles governing liability for damages caused by ionising radiation. It governs
the operation of nuclear plants, the carriage of radioactive material and the
handling of radionuclides. The new liability law entered into force on 1 January
1999 and covers nuclear damages that are caused after this date. It replaces the
1964 Law on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (Atomhaftpflichtgesetz), 2 which,
however, will remain applicable for nuclear damages caused before 1 January
1999.
The deficiencies of the 1964 law, discovered by the public in the wake of the
Chernobyl disaster, have been the subject of legal 3 and political debate for the last
decade. In the first place, it was deemed bizarre that the law only applied to
nuclear installations situated in Austrian territory, in light of the fact that the
operation of nuclear power plants in order to produce electrical energy is, due to a
1978 referendum, prohibited by law.4 In Austrian territory there are only three
small research reactors, which present comparatively low risks to their
environment. The hazards of foreign nuclear power plants, however, were only
*This article was first published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
cited as Monika Hinteregger, The New Austrian Act on Third Party Liability for Nuclear Damage,
Nuclear Law Bulletin: December No. 62 Volume 1998 Issue 2, © OECD 1998.
** Monika Hinteregger is Professor of Law, Department of Civil Law at the University of Graz,
Austria. The facts contained and ideas expressed in this article are the responsibility of the author alone.
1. Bundesgesetz tiber die zivilrechtliche Haftung ftir Schaden durch Radioaktivitait [AtomHG
1999] Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I [BGB1 I] No. 170/1998 (Austria), available at
http://www.nea.fr/html/law/nlb/NLB-63/austria.pdf (unofficial English version).
2. Bundesgesetz vom 29 April 1964 tiber die Haftung fir nukleare Schaden
(Atomhaftpflichtgesetz), Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] No. 117/1964. This law was substantially amended
by Bundesgesetz Erweiterte Wertgrenzen-Novelle Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I [BGB1 I] No. 140/1997 that
entered into force on 1 July 1998.
3. 2 HELMUT KOZIOL, OSTERREICHISCHES HAFTPFLICHTRECHT 445-482 (Manz Wien) (2nd ed.
1984); Georg Wilhelm: Betreffs Atomhaftpflicht Handlungsbedarfl ecolex 1996, pp. 653-654; Monika
Gimpel-Hinteregger: Das 6sterreichische Atomhaftungsrecht, in: Umweltbundesamt, Atomare Risken -
Wirtschaftliche und rechtliche Aspekte, Vienna 1997, pp. 50-59.
4. Bundesgesetz Verbot der Nutzung der Kernspaltung fir die Energieversorgung in Osterreich
[AtomSG] Bundesgesetzblatt BGBI No. 676/1978 (Austria).
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covered by fault-based liability and nuisance law,5 originally intended to regulate
conflicts between neighbouring land owners.6 Extremely low liability amounts and
the fact that liability was restricted even in cases of negligence on the part of the
liable person were considered an unfair privilege granted solely to the nuclear
industry.
In the course of this discussion, heavy opposition was raised against the
principle of legal channeling as well. Although Austria has not yet ratified either
the Paris 7 or the Vienna Convention,8 the old Austrian law concentrated liability
for nuclear damage exclusively on the operator of the nuclear plant. Combined
with the operator's limited liability or limited resources, this inevitably meant a
detriment to the legal position of the injured person that was unique in Austrian
tort law. Furthermore, releasing every other person, especially the supplier of
services or products, from liability, involves the risk of inducing these persons to
reduce the level of care exercised.
It soon became quite clear that the field of third party liability for nuclear
damages needed radical change. In 1995 the Austrian Parliament adopted a
resolution 9 in which the Federal Government was requested to revise and
modernise the Austrian Nuclear Liability Law, and above all to adjust liability
amounts to reflect the hazardous nature of nuclear installations, to abate the
privileges operators of nuclear plants enjoy under fault-based liability and to
eliminate legal channeling. 1 0 In addition, the Federal Government was ordered not
to present the Paris Convention for ratification until essential improvements,
namely the elimination of legal channeling, were made. As legal channeling is also
indispensable for the accession to the Convention on Supplementary
Compensation for Nuclear Damage ("SCC"), 1 this option, temporarily taken into
consideration by some political pressure groups, was turned down too. Finally, the
Federal Government and Parliament decided to completely break away from the
approach toward nuclear liability law taken by the Paris and Vienna Convention.
5. Allgemeines borgerliches Gesetzbuch [ABGB] [Civil Code] Justizgesetzsammlung [JGS] No.
946/1811, as amended, § 364(a) (Austria).
6. See Monika Gimpel-Hinteregger: Das 6sterreichische Atomhaftungsrecht, in:
Umweltbundesamt, Atomare Risken - Wirtschaftliche und rechtliche Aspekte, Vienna 1997, pp. 55-56.
7. Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 29, 1960, 2 I.L.M.
685 (as amended by the Additional Protocol of January 28, 1964 and by the Protocol of November 16,
1982) [hereinafter Paris Convention], available at http://www.nea.fr/html/Iaw/nlparis-conv.html.
8. Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, 2 I.L.M. 727 (as amended
by the Protocol of September 12, 1997) [hereinafter Vienna Convention], available at
http://f40.iaea.org/worldatom/Documents/Legal/protamend-annex.shtml.
9. Verordnung des Bundesministers fir Landesverteidigung, mit der die Verordnung betreffend
die Gnndausbildung flr Stabsoffiziere gealndert wird Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] No. 89/1995
(Austria).
10. These requirements were repeated by Bundesgesetz, mit dem das Wasserrechtsgesetz 1959
und das Hydrographiegesetz gesmdert werden [Wasserrechtsgesetz-Novelle 1997 - WRG-Nov. 19971
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I [BGBI 1] No. 74/1997 (Austria).
11. Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, September 12, 1997, 36
I.L.M. 1473 [hereinafter SCC], available at
http ://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/supcomp.html.
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The outcome of this political process, the new Nuclear Liability Law, stands
in sharp contrast to the basic principles of international nuclear law. Liability is
unlimited in amount. Legal channeling is, to a great extent, eliminated and there is
no exclusive jurisdiction, as is provided for by international nuclear liability law.
The new law makes sure that an Austrian court has jurisdiction, and that Austrian
law is applicable, if nuclear damage occurs in Austria, regardless of where it was
caused. Further contents of the new law are a substantial extension of the definition
of nuclear damage and regulations in order to facilitate the proof of causality.
Although the Austrian legislature has decided not to be a part of the
international nuclear liability regimes for the moment, this is not necessarily meant
to be forever. The Austrian Parliament has taken an intense interest in the further
development of the international nuclear liability system. According to Section 30
of the new Nuclear Liability Act, the Federal Government is obliged to report
regularly to the Parliament on the development of the international instruments on
nuclear liability.12 In a simultaneously adopted resolution, 13 the Parliament holds
out the prospect of revising its decision if the international system of nuclear
liability improves to such an extent that it is able to ensure adequate compensation
for nuclear damages. For that purpose, the Federal Government is further requested
to continue participating actively in international negotiations in order to support
the development of this system.
II. MAJOR PROVISIONS OF THE NEW NUCLEAR LIABILITY ACT
A. Scope of Liability
The Nuclear Liability Act 1998 covers two different fields of liability:
liability for damages caused by radiation from nuclear plants and nuclear material
and liability for damages caused by radiation from radionuclides. The damage may
be caused by ionising radiation alone or in combination with the other hazardous
properties of the nuclear material or radionuclide. 14 The definition of nuclear
material follows the definition given by the Federal Law Establishing a Security
Control in the Field of Nuclear Energy,15 which itself is based on Article 18 of the
Convention on the Establishment of a Security Control in the Field of Nuclear
Energy.' 6 According to this definition the term nuclear material means "special
fissionable material"'17 and "source material".' 8 A nuclear plant is a plant
12. Bundesgesetz uber die zivilrechtliche Haftung fir Schaden durch Radioaktivitqt [AtomHG
1999] Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I [BGB II] No. 170/1998, § 30 (Austria).
13. Resolution of 7 October 1998, 1415 BIgNR XX.GP, annex 2.
14. See Section 5(1) of AtomHG 1999 concerning radioactive substances and Section 9(1) of
AtomHG 1999 concerning radionuclides.
15. Bundesgesetz fiber die Einrichtung eines Sicherheitskontrollsystems, die Sicherung von
Kemmaterial und Anlagen und fiber die Ausfuhrkontrolle zur Gewlihrleistung der friedlichen
Verwendung der Atomenergie [Sicherheitskontrollgesetz] Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] No. 415/1992
(Austria).
16. Convention on the Establishment of a Security Control in the Field of Nuclear Energy art. 18,
Dec. 20, 1957, 351 U.N.T.S. 235.
17. Art. II, § 1, 1 of Sicherheitskontrollgesetz: The term "special fissionable material" means
plutonium-239, uranium-233, uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233, any material containing one
or more of the foregoing, according to the statute of the IAEA.
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containing nuclear material in such an arrangement that a self-sustaining chain
process of nuclear fission can occur, such as nuclear reactors or facilities for the
production, processing, utilisation, storage, reprocessing or disposal of nuclear
material, including isotope isolation plants. Liable persons are the operator of a
nuclear plant, the carrier of nuclear substances and the holder of radionuclides.
The liability imposed on the operator of a nuclear plant and the carrier of
nuclear material is unlimited, is irrespective of fault, and does not depend on the
occurrence of a nuclear incident. The carrier is liable for damages caused during
the carriage of nuclear material by land, air or sea unless he or she proves that he
or she neither knew nor should have known that the goods transported were
nuclear material.' 9 The operator of a nuclear plant is the holder of the license and
any other person who is entitled to control the operation of the nuclear plant and
who actually derives or is at least in the factual or legal position to derive its
operating profits.20 This allows for the possibility of piercing the corporate veil in
cases where intercorporate regulations abusively exempt the controlling company
from liability by shifting the liability to an under-endowed operating company. The
operator of a nuclear plant is liable for all damage caused by the operation of the
plant including the dismantling of the plant and the disposal of radioactive
inventory. 21 The operator's liability also covers damages caused outside his or her
plant by radioactive material originating from the plant if the damage is caused
before another operator has taken charge of this material, or, where the material
was sent to the operator, if the damage is caused after the operator has got the legal
right to dispose of the material. 22
The operator's liability under the Nuclear Liability Act does not cover
damages to the nuclear plant itself and to any other nuclear plant, in operation or
under construction, situated on the same site, or to any property on the site of the
plant which is used or was used in connection with that plant. The carrier shall not
be liable for damages to the means of transport used to forward the nuclear
substances involved.23 Apart from this exemption, no grounds of exoneration from
liability are provided. Events like acts of armed conflict, hostilities, civil war or
insurrection, as provided for in the Vienna24 or the Paris Convention,25 do not
discharge the operator or carrier from liability. It is presumed that, even under such
circumstances, it is up to the liable person to take adequate precautions. The
operator of a nuclear plant situated on Austrian territory is required to maintain
18. Art. II, § 1, 3 of Sicherheitskontrollgesetz: The term "source material" means uranium
containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature, uranium depleted in the isotope 235, thorium,
any of the forgoing in the form of metal, alloy, chemical compound, or concentrate.
19. Bundesgesetz fiber die zivilrechtliche Haftung lar Schiden durch Radioaktivitat [AtomHG
1999] Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I [BGB 1 I] No. 170/1998, § 4 (Austria).
20. § 2, 4.
21. § 3(1).
22. § 3(2).
23. § 5(2).
24. See Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. IV(3).
25. See Paris Convention, supra note 7, art. 9 (providing that a grave natural disaster of an
exceptional character is a ground of exoneration, unless excluded by national legislation).
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insurance covering his or her liability for nuclear damage of at least 5.6 billion
ATS (approximately 400 million Euro) plus 560 million ATS (40 million Euro) for
interest and costs. For research and pilot plants, the minimum amount is fixed at
560 million ATS plus 56 million ATS for interest and costs. 26 The carrier of
nuclear material is obliged to maintain insurance coverage of at least 560 million
ATS plus 56 million ATS for interest and costs. For the carriage of source
material, the minimum amount is 56 million ATS plus 5.6 million ATS for interest
and costs.2 7 This insurance has to cover all damages that are caused during its term
of validity. Damages due to war, acts of armed conflict, hostilities, civil war, riot
or insurrection are excluded from the scope of the insurance policy.
28
The liability imposed on the holder of radionuclides is fault-based. 29 The
holder is exonerated from liability upon proof that due care was exercised by him
(her) and his (her) employees. The burden of proof lies with the holder. 30 If the
radionuclide was used for medical treatment, the holder's burden of proof is only
related to the technical circumstances of the utilisation of the radionuclide. The
proof of medical malpractice, on the other hand, is regulated by contractual
liability law. Liability is unlimited and must be covered by financial security in the
way and to the extent customary in the ordinary course of business.
3 1
All claims can also be brought directly against the insurer. Where there are
several insurers, the insurers are jointly and severally liable. The same holds true
concerning the liable person and the insurer(s).32
B. Concurrent Liability and Multiple Tortfeasors
Principally, liability for nuclear damage is not channeled to the operator of the
nuclear plant or to the carrier of nuclear material. The Nuclear Liability Law does
not restrict any liability obligation provided by other liability provisions. The
injured person is free to assert his or her claim for nuclear damages against the
operator of a nuclear plant or against the carrier of nuclear material pursuant to this
law or to another law as well as to another person. Claims may be based, for
example, on the general provisions of tort law, on products liability law or on state
liability law.
The right of the injured person to enforce a claim by legal action against the
supplier of products or services to a nuclear plant, however, is restricted. The
action will be dismissed if the defendant can prove that an action against the
operator will lead within a reasonable period of time to a decision, that this
decision can be enforced, and that there are sufficient funds available to ensure
26. Bundesgesetz Ober die zivilrechtliche Haftung fir Schilden durch Radioaktivitt [AtomHG
1999] Bundesgesetzblat Teil I [BGBI I] No. 170/1998, § 6 (Austria)..
27. § 7.
28. § 6(1) and § 7(1).
29. See § 9(l).
30. See § 9(2).
31. See § 10.
32. § 24.
2006
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
compensation on behalf of the operator.33 If this assumption proves false, the case
against the supplier can be reopened. This provision is intended to make sure that
responsibility for nuclear damages stays primarily with the operator, who is in the
best position to prevent the damage and to provide insurance if damage occurs.
Consequently, the operator's right of recourse is barred as well, unless, according
to the relevant provisions of the Paris and the Vienna Convention,34 the damage
was caused by an act or omission done with the intent of causing damage, or unless
the right of recourse is expressly provided for by contract. 35 With that, the costly
necessity to duplicate insurance is reduced, although not totally omitted as it is
under the scope of the Paris or Vienna Convention.
In cases of multiple causation, each tortfeasor is judged by the relevant
liability law applicable. Insofar as the damage cannot be attributed to one
tortfeasor, all of them will be held jointly and severally liable.3 6 Contributory
negligence on behalf of the injured party leads to apportionment of the loss. 37
C. Concept of Nuclear Damage
The definition of nuclear damage was significantly broadened.38 The
restrictions provided for by the old Nuclear Liability Law 39 were eliminated and,
according to the new concept of nuclear damage as provided by the SCC and the
revised Vienna Convention, 40 new categories of damage, such as environmental
damage or costs of preventive measures, were introduced.
Section 11(1) provides simply that compensation of property damage also
includes decontamination costs. Pursuant to this section, compensation for loss of
life or personal injury and loss of property or damage to property shall be regulated
by the general provisions of tort law. The person who has suffered such loss or
damage is also entitled to claim economic losses arising from these damages.4t In
this context it is worth mentioning that it is a general principle of Austrian tort law
that damage for personal injury covers compensation for pain and suffering, even
when liability is absolute.
If the damage to property presents a significant impairment of the
environment, costs of measures of reinstatement are to be reimbursed, even if these
33. § 16(2).
34. See Paris Convention, supra note 7, art. 6, f and Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. X.
35. Bundesgesetz Uiber die zivilrechtliche Haftung ffir Schaden durch Radioaktivitat [AtomHG
1999] Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I [BGB1 I] No. 170/1998, § 19(3) (Austria).
36. § 18.
37. § 15 in connection with Allgemeines btirgerliches Gesetzbuch [ABGB] [Civil Code]
Justizgesetzsammlung [JGS] No. 946/1811, as amended, § 1304 (Austria).
38. See§ 11.
39. Bundesgesetz vom 29 April 1964 fiber die Haftung far nukleare Schllden
(Atomhaftpflichtgesetz), Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] No. 117/1964, § 12 (granting compensation for pain
and suffering only on the condition of long infirmity. This restriction has already been eliminated by the
amendment of 1997.).
40. See SCC, supra note t1, art. 1, 1 f and Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 1(1), 1 k.
41. As is expressly provided by SCC, supra note 11, art. I, I (f)(iii) and Vienna Convention, supra
note 8, art. 1(1), (k)(iii).
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costs exceed the market value of the impaired good.42 The plaintiff may ask for
advance payment. The amount exceeding the market value of the impaired good,
however, has to be refunded if restoration to the original condition is not
performed within a reasonable amount of time. Impairment of the environment that
is not at the same time damage to property does not entitle one to damages.
Liability for nuclear damage also comprises the costs of preventive measures
taken to remove an imminent threat of causing damage. The entitlement to this
claim lies with the person who actually has paid the costs. 4 3 "Further loss or
damage caused by such measures", as provided for in Article 1(I) sub-paragraph
(k)(vi) of the Vienna Convention and in Article I sub-paragraph (f)(vi) of the SCC,
as well as "loss of income deriving from an economic interest in any use or
enjoyment of the environment, incurred as a result of a significant impairment of
the environment", 44 and "any other economic loss", 45 are only recoverable if that
damage can be classified as loss of income. Even then, the claim is limited in
amount. Together with compensation for nonpecuniary damage, pursuant to
section 11, subsection 3, the amount must not exceed ATS 560 000 (approximately
40 000 Euro) per person.46 Nonpecuniary damage will be awarded if a person, due
to preventive measures or radioactive contamination, is forced to undergo a radical
and unwanted change of life, for example, the giving up of a home, job or
business.
D. Proof of Causation
Personal injury due to nuclear radiation ranges from acute radiation exposure,
to only statistically registered damage, to genetic damage which will only come to
bear on future generations. If radiation does not immediately lead to a specific
radiation disease, the person affected by radiation will be in a difficult position to
establish the causal link. To ease the burden of proof in such cases, Section 12(1)
establishes a presumption of causality. If an injured person can submit reasonable
evidence of having been physically exposed to nuclear radiation originating from a
nuclear plant, from nuclear material or radionuclides, it will be presumed that the
injury was caused by nuclear radiation, provided that nuclear radiation is known to
be a cause of such damage. The presumption can be rebutted by the defendant by
proving that it is probable that the damage was not caused by nuclear radiation. For
the rebuttal it would be sufficient to show that in the case under consideration other
causes were more probable than nuclear radiation.
This presumption of causality cannot be applied by a patient if radionuclides
were used for the purpose of medical treatment. 47
42. Bundesgesetz Uber die zivilrechtliche Haftung fir Schaden durch Radioaktivitat [AtoinHG
1999] Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I [BGB1 I] No. 170/1998, § 11(2) (Austria).
43. § 11(3).
44. Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art.l(I), (k)(v) and SCC, supra note 11, art. I, (f)(v).
45. Vienna Convention, supra note 8, Art. 1(1), (k)(vii) and SCC, supra note 11, art. I, (f)(vii).
46. Bundesgesetz uber die zivilrechtliche Haftung flir Schaden durch Radioaktivitit [AtomHG
1999] Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I [BGB 1 I] No. 170/1998, § 11(4) (Austria).
47. § 12(2).
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Sections 13 and 14 regulate the right of the person who has suffered nuclear
damage to access to specific information held by the liable persons.
E. Jurisdictional Provisions and Applicable Law
As liability is not limited in amount there is no need for exclusive jurisdiction.
According to Section 22, the plaintiff has the right to bring the action or the motion
for a temporary injunction both before the court in the jurisdiction in which the
damage has been caused, as well as before the court in the jurisdiction in which the
damage has occurred. Claims concerning preventive measures can also be brought
before the court where the preventive measures were performed.
One main goal of the new law is to make sure that if nuclear damage, though
caused in a foreign state, occurs in Austrian territory, an Austrian court will have
jurisdiction and Austrian law will be applicable. Section 23, therefore, provides
that Austrian law is applicable if radiation from a foreign territory causes nuclear
damage in Austria. Under this precondition, the injured person has the right to
require the application of Austrian law. However, if nuclear damage has occurred
in a foreign territory the situation is different. If Austrian law is applicable - a fact
that is determined by the private international law of the state that has jurisdiction
- the plaintiff will only be able to benefit from the Austrian law insofar as his or
her national law would provide for compensation as well.a8 The plaintiff,
therefore, can not recover for the loss if the damage, for instance, has already
become statute-barred under this law, or if the required sum exceeds the provided
liability amount, or if the action against the defendant was barred because of legal
channeling. The main target of this provision, apart from the wish of providing an
incentive for other states to grant the same benefits as the Austrian law, is to
protect the Austrian suppliers to nuclear plants, as they are amongst the very few
suppliers in the world who, in future, will not be protected by legal channeling.
While it seemed fair enough to make them liable for the damages they cause to
Austrians and to nationals of states that do not provide for legal channeling, it was
deemed out of proportion to give the right of legal action against a supplier to
nationals of these states that reject such an action.
STUDIES
I. REGULATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES IN
THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC*
A. General Regulatory Regime
1. Introduction
On 1 January 1993, the former Czechoslovakia was divided into the Slovak
Republic and the Czech Republic. To ensure a smooth transition of legal regimes,
it was agreed that, inter alia, all acts, regulations and decisions in the field of
nuclear energy and ionising radiation would continue to apply until subsequent
legislation was enacted, provided that such laws were consistent with the
Constitution of the Slovak Republic.
48. § 23(2).
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On 1 April 1998, the National Council passed the Act on the Peaceful Use of
Nuclear Energy (and on alterations and amendments to Act No. 174/1968 Zb.49 on
State Supervision of Work Safety as amended by Act of the National Council of
the Slovak Republic No. 256/1994 Z.z.50)(hereinafter referred to as the "Act"). 51
It came into force on 1 July 1998 and provides a comprehensive framework for the
regulation of nuclear activities in the Slovak Republic.
Throughout the legislation there are provisions for implementing legal
regulations, some of which have been promulgated, with others under preparation
or still to be prepared. Until replaced by such implementing regulations, the
regulations in force in the former Czechoslovakia remain in force, provided that
such regulations are consistent with the new Act.
In the former Czechoslovakia, the principal authority regulating nuclear
activities was the Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Commission (Ceskoslovenska
Komisia pre at6movzenergiu - CSAEC). Its successor in the Slovak Republic is
the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic ((lrad Jadrovdho Dozoru
Slovenskej republiky - (JD-SR) (hereinafter referred to as the "Authority"). The
responsibilities and tasks of the Authority are identified in Act No. 2/1993 Z.z.,
which specifies its independent status in nuclear safety matters.52
The Slovak Republic is heavily dependent on external primary energy
resources, importing more than 80 per cent of its needs, particularly oil, gas and
nuclear fuel from the Russian Federation. This makes the efficient generation of
electrical power of crucial importance. The unit cost of electricity generated by
nuclear power plants in the Slovak Republic is half that of electricity generated by
its fossil power plants.
At Jaslovskd Bohunice there are two VVER 440/230 (first generation) and
two VVER 440/213 (second generation) nuclear reactors, representing nearly half
of the country's electricity production. Within Bohunice V-1 nuclear power plant
(NPP), units 1 and 2 were commissioned in 1978 and 1980, respectively, and
within Bohunice V-2 NPP, units 3 and 4 were commissioned in 1984 and 1985,
respectively. An earlier unit at the Bohunice NPP (Bohunice Al) is in the process
of being decommissioned. The Bohunice site includes an interim spent fuel storage
facility for spent fuel from the VVER reactors, as well as facilities for radioactive
waste treatment.
At Mochovce, an additional VVER 440/213 reactor was commissioned and
connected to the grid in 1998, with a further reactor still under construction and
due to be commissioned in 1999. Two more units of the same type are under
consideration for this site for the first decade of the next century. Also at
* This study was prepared by the NEA Secretariat in co-operation with the Slovak authorities.
49. Zb. (Zbierka), meaning from the collection of laws of the former Czechoslovakia.
50. zdkon 6. 130/1998 Z.z., available at http://www.ujd.gov.sk/NSSJRBe/NSSJRB98_ 6 6 ue.html
(English version).
51. Act No. 130/1998 Z.z.(remove)
52. z~kon 6. 2/1993 Z.z.
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Mochovce, there is a disposal facility for low and medium level radioactive waste,
which is currently in the process of being licensed.
2. Mining Regime
There has been no uranium mining in the Slovak Republic since its
discontinuation in 1990. There are, however, still in force, mining laws which
applied to the previous mining of uranium. These laws are as follows:
o Section 34(1)(b) of Act No. 44/1988 Zb. on protection and
utilisation of mineral resources (the Mining Act), as amended
by Act No. 498/1991 Zb.;
o Section 11 of Act No. 51/1988 Zb. on mining activities,
explosives and State mining, as amended;
o Section 5(c), Sections 6(1) and 6(2)(e) and annexes Nos. 9
and 10 to Decree of the Slovak Mines Inspectorate (Slovensky
bansky urad) No. 89/1988 Zb. on rational utilisation of
exclusive deposits, on permits for and registration of mining
activities, as amended by Decree of the Slovak Mines
Inspectorate No. 16/1992 Zb.
3. Nuclear Materials and Equipment
Section 9(1) of the Act defines "nuclear materials" as comprising the
following "source materials": natural uranium, depleted uranium, thorium and any
of these materials in the form of metal, alloy, chemical compounds or concentrates
and materials containing one or more of the aforementioned substances in a
minimum quantity of 0.005 kg; and the following "special fissionable materials":
plutonium-239, 241, uranium-233, uranium enriched in 235 or 233 isotopes and
materials containing one or more of the aforementioned isotopes in a minimum
quantity of 0.005 g.
The Act exempts from the definition of "nuclear materials" uranium and
thorium ore during mining and processing.
53
Nuclear materials may only be procured and used on the basis of a permit
issued by the Authority. 54 The permit may be for a specified period of time, but the
maximum period is ten years. 55
The general requirements for the issuance of an authorisation (both in respect
of nuclear materials and for nuclear installations) are set out in Sections 5, 6 and 7
of the Act. In brief, Section 5 sets out the qualifications required of the applicant,
Section 6 lays down the details required in the application form and Section 7
states when and in what form the decision must be issued by the Authority.
An authorisation is terminated on expiry of its period of validity, by a
decision of the Authority to withdraw the authorisation, by the holder of the
53. zdkon d. 130/1998, § 9(2) Z.z.
54. § 10(1).
55. § 10(2).
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authorisation being struck off the commercial register, or, in the case of a natural
person, by the death or declaration of death of that person. 56 An authorisation may
be withdrawn or restricted by the Authority if: the holder of the authorisation
ceases to meet the conditions under which it is issued; the holder of an
authorisation, while carrying out activities, in some significant way threatens the
life or health of persons or causes damage to the environment; or the Authority
subsequently ascertains that the authorisation was issued on the basis of incorrect
or incomplete information.57
If a person has procured or is using nuclear materials and does not observe the
obligations arising out of the permit and, further, does not remedy the breach
within the period stipulated by the Authority, the Authority may require the
nuclear materials to be transferred, at the expense of the person concerned, to
another person who has an authorisation.55 In the case of nuclear materials in
respect of which the owner is not known or which were procured in violation of
this Act, the Authority is required to order the holder of an authorisation to manage
such materials, with reimbursement of the consequent expenses being made in
accordance with Section 17(10) of the Act. 59
Under Section 12(1) any persons (legal or natural) who produce, process,
store or procure nuclear materials are obliged to:
o keep accounting and operational records of these materials
and submit reports of the accounting records to the Authority;
o appoint an employee with a special qualification, and his
deputy, to keep accounting and operational records of control
of nuclear materials, and notify the Authority of their names;
o notify the relevant police authorities, the Ministry of Health
and the Authority, without delay, of any loss or
misappropriation of nuclear materials;
o inform the Authority of any interference with equipment
under surveillance by the Authority or an international
organisation under an international safeguards agreement, and
of any accident which led to or could have led to violation of
the integrity of nuclear material; and
o enable access, in the presence of inspectors from the
Authority, of inspectors from international organisations
under an international safeguards agreement governing
nuclear substances, and to provide them with the necessary
support during their inspections.
Details of the requirements for accounting and operational records, and for the
control and notification of incidents relating to nuclear materials, are to be
56. § 8(1).
57. § 8(2).
58. zdkon L 130/1998, § 10(5) Z.z.
59. § 10(6).
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established by a regulation issued by the Authority.60 Until then, the legal
framework for nuclear material accountancy and control is set out in Regulations
issued by the Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Commission. 6 1 These are
comprehensive in nature and, inter alia, nominate who is responsible, 62 the details
to be kept,63 physical inventories to be taken,64 reports to be made to the
Authority 65 and various other provisions aimed at ensuring the accurate tracking of
nuclear materials.
The Authority plays a central role in the regulation of nuclear materials and
its powers in relation to nuclear materials are, inter alia, set out in Chapter 6 of the
Act. In particular, the Authority is empowered to issue permits for receiving
nuclear materials and their utilisation, the management of spent fuel and
radioactive waste, the import or export of nuclear materials and equipment, and the
transportation of nuclear materials.66 It performs State supervision of nuclear
materials and equipment and of the arrangements in place for their physical
protection. 67
4. Nuclear Installations
a. Licensing
Under Section 13(1) of the Act "nuclear installation" means:
o installations and facilities incorporating a nuclear reactor
utilising a controlled fission chain reaction;
o installations and facilities for the production, treatment and
storage of nuclear materials;
o installations and facilities for the disposal of spent nuclear
fuel;
o installations and facilities for the processing, conditioning,
storage and disposal of radioactive waste.
The general rule under the Act is that any use of nuclear energy requires an
authorization issued by the Authority.68 In particular, the Authority is responsible
for issuing authorisations, inter alia, for the siting, design, construction,
importation, commissioning, operation and reconstruction of nuclear installations
and their decommissioning; the design, planning, construction, manufacture,
importation, assembly, testing, maintenance, repair and reconstruction of selected
equipment; and the specialist training of nuclear installation employees at
specialist institutions.
60. § 12(2).
61. vyhldska . 28/1977 Zb.
62. Arts. 5 and 7.
63. Art. 6.
64. Art. 8.
65. Art. 9.
66. zdkon 6. 130/1998, § 31(b) Z.z.
67. § 32(1).
68. § 4(1).
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The general provisions governing who may apply for authorisations, the form
of applications and when and in what form the Authority's decision must be made
in respect of authorisations are set out in Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act.
69
Licensing for the construction of nuclear installations is dealt with separately
in Section 14 of the Act. First, the construction of nuclear installations is governed
by the Construction Act, 70 unless otherwise stipulated in the Act. 71 The
construction of a nuclear installation may only be carried out by a holder of an
authorisation (in the Act referred to as the "builder") on the basis of a permission
granted by the Authority.72 The Authority decides on whether to issue a permission
on the basis of a written application from the builder supported by the following
documents: safety analysis report; design specifications; provisional plan for the
management of radioactive waste and, if appropriate, of spent nuclear fuel;
conceptual plan for decommissioning of the nuclear installation; classification of
selected equipment by safety classes; preliminary physical protection plan; quality
assurance programme for construction; preliminary on-site emergency plan;
proposal of limits and conditions for safe operation; preliminary programme for
pre-operational inspection of the nuclear installation; and preliminary radiation
monitoring programme of the environment in the vicinity of the nuclear
installation.
As a condition to granting permission for construction, the Authority may
require the fulfillment of specified nuclear safety requirements. 73 Following the
issuance of a statement of intent by the Authority regarding permission for the
construction of a nuclear installation, there is a requirement for evaluation of the
proposal by the Ministry of Environment under Act No. 127/1994 Z.z. on
environmental impact assessment.74
In addition to the provisions governing construction in the Act, there are also
detailed regulations to be observed, which, at the moment, are those issued by the
former Czechoslovakian authorities.75
To commission and operate a nuclear installation, as with construction, the
holder of an authorisation ("operator") must obtain a permission from the
Authority. 76 To obtain a permission to commission a nuclear installation, the
operator is required to submit an application supplemented by the safety
documentation stipulated in Section 15(2) of the Act. This safety documentation
falls into two categories: that submitted for approval and that submitted for review.
69. See supra Section 3 of this Study in relation to Nuclear Materials and Equipment.
70. zdkon 6. 50/1976 Zb.
71. zdkon 6. 130/1998, § 14(l) Z.z.
72. § 14(2).
73. § 14(5).
74. § 14(6).
75. tiprava 6. 2/1978 Zb. on the assurance of nuclear safety in designing, approving and
constructing a nuclear power installation; tiprava 6. 4/1979 Zb. on the general criteria for the assurance
of nuclear safety in siting and constructing a nuclear power installation; and vyhiska 6. 378/1992 Zb.
of the Slovak Commission of the Environment.
76. zikon 6. 130/1998, § 15(1) Z.z.
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A permission to operate a nuclear installation is issued by the Authority on
submission of an application supplemented by a report evaluating the
commissioning stages of the nuclear installation. The permission for
commissioning or operating a nuclear installation may be made conditional upon
fulfillment of requirements relating to nuclear safety.78 The operator must adhere
to the assessed or approved documentation submitted under Section 15(2), which
may only be deviated from with the prior permission from the Authority. 79
As with construction of a nuclear installation, in addition to the provisions of
the Act there are also detailed regulations to be observed with respect to the
commissioning and operation of a nuclear installation. The regulations presently in
force derive from the former Czechoslovakia. 80
The Authority may extend the validity of a permission issued for the
operation of a nuclear installation, depending on the current state of the installation
and on the basis of supplementary safety documentation.
8 1
b. Inspection
The Authority is empowered under the Act to perform State supervision of:
nuclear safety at nuclear installations; management of radioactive waste and spent
nuclear fuel; nuclear materials, special materials and equipment; physical
protection of nuclear installations, nuclear materials and radioactive waste from
nuclear installations; and emergency planning. In carrying out State supervision,
the Authority is required under the Act to:
0 conduct inspections of workplaces, operations and facilities at
nuclear installations, to determine how applicable duties are
being fulfilled, and whether operating limits and conditions
and quality assurance systems are being adhered to;
0 inspect fulfillment of obligations arising out of international
agreements relating to nuclear safety and management of
nuclear materials and radioactive waste (including spent fuel);
0 investigate accidents, incidents and selected malfunctions at
their place of occurrence;
0 verify the conduct of obligatory reviews, surveys, operational
checks and tests on selected equipment at nuclear
installations;
0 order the corrective actions for deficiencies affecting nuclear
safety;
77. § 15(3).
78. § 15(4).
79. § 15(5).
80. uprava 6. 6/1980 Zb. on the assurance of nuclear safety in the commissioning and operation of
nuclear power installations.
81. zikon 6 130/1998, § 16(1) Z.z.
VOL. 35:1
THE NEW AUSTRIAN ACT ON THIRD PARTY LIABILITY
o assess nuclear safety at nuclear installations independently of
their operator; and
o inspect the content and practices of emergency plans.
There is an obligation on the part of the holders of authorisations, or other
persons responsible for nuclear materials, to submit all materials, documentation,
information and expert analyses required for State supervision. They must also co-
operate with the Authority, as required for it to carry out State supervision, and
apply the results of its findings in their activities. 82 The Authority is required to
make reports to the Governent and the relevant public service bodies, on
deficiencies identified and the measures taken to remedy them. 
83
Inspectors appointed by the Authority must have the required qualifications
and have passed an inspector's examination. 84 During the performance of State-
governed inspection, they are required to prove their identity using the
identification card issued by the Authority. 85 Under the Act an inspector is
authorised:
o to have access at any time to facilities and areas in nuclear
installations and to areas in which nuclear materials, special
materials and equipment are located, or radioactive waste
management is being conducted; to carry out reviews and
control actions in them; to require the submission of relevant
evidence and documentation, information and explanations;
o to ensure that employees have the appropriate professional
qualifications, and in particular, that the selected employees
are familiar with regulations; to control the implementation of
conditions for the performance of work; to identify the status,
causes and consequences of operating events; to check the
status of emergency planning;
o following discussion of identified deficiencies with the
operator, to give binding orders for the necessary steps to
eliminate such deficiencies; and
o to confiscate the certificate of a particular professional
qualification if the relevant employee has flagrantly or
repeatedly violated operating procedures or is unsuitable as
regards the particular professional qualification.
As a means of enforcement, the Authority is empowered to impose various
penalties for violations under the Act. 86 This includes the power to impose a
further penalty of up to double the amount of the initial penalty on a person who
has not remedied the deficiencies for which the initial penalty was imposed within
82. § 33(1).
83. § 33(3).
84. § 34(2).
85. § 34(3).
86. zdkon . 130/1998, § 36 Z.z.
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the given period. 87 A penalty may be imposed within a year of the date that the
Authority identified the breach, but no later than three years from the day when the
breach took place.88 The imposition of a penalty on a holder of an authorisation
does not impinge upon the criminal responsibility of the holder's employees.
89
Penalties are to be paid into the State Fund for Decommissioning of Nuclear Power
Plants and Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel and Radioactive Waste.
90
c. Emergency Response
Under the terms of the Act, an "event at a nuclear installation" means an
event in which there is a risk of an infringement of nuclear safety at the nuclear
installation during its commissioning, operation or decommissioning. 9'
Events at nuclear installations are divided into:
o a malfunction causing an infringement of nuclear safety
requirements, or identification of deficiencies which could
have led to the occurrence of an accident or emergency
situation;
o an accident which caused minor damage to a nuclear
installation or harm to the health of employees, which led
however to an automatic shutdown, or enforced shutdown for
maintenance, infringement of limits and conditions, release of
radioactive materials or contamination or irradiation of
employees;
o an emergency situation in which the nuclear installation was
seriously damaged or there was or might have been serious
harm to health due to the impact of ionising radiation or
release of radioactive materials into the environment.
An operator is obliged to take preventive and corrective measures in a timely
manner and eliminate without delay all situations which could pose a threat to
nuclear safety or to human life or health; to give notification of events to the
Authority, and, in the case of accidents or emergency situations, also to the
Ministry of the Interior; identify the causes of such events and take corrective
action based on the identified causes; to take steps in the operation of the nuclear
installation to prevent their recurrence; and to inform the public of the occurrence
of incidents and accidents.
In the event of a hazard arising, or if serious circumstances arise which are of
significance for nuclear safety, physical protection or emergency readiness, the
Authority may order the holder of an authorisation to take certain steps, including a
reduction in output or shutdown of a nuclear installation or cessation of its
87. § 36(6).
88. § 36(7).
89. § 36(9).
90. § 36(10).
91. zdkon 6. 130/1998, § 24(1) Z.z.
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construction, to cease using nuclear material or to cease radioactive waste
management. 92
Under the Act, the Authority is required to identify the causes and
circumstances of accidents, emergency situations and serious malfunctions. This
does not detract from the specific regulations which govern the investigation of
exceptional incidents. 
93
"Emergency planning", as defined in the Act, means a set of measures to
identify and bring under control accidents at nuclear installations and to identify
and bring under control releases of radioactive substances into the natural
environment during the use and transportation of nuclear materials or radioactive
waste. 94 An emergency plan is documentation, the content of which is a set of
technical and organisational measures required to bring events under control or to
mitigate their consequences. 95 Emergency plans fall into the following categories:
a emergency plan for nuclear installation ("on-site emergency
plan") which contains planned measures to be taken on-site,
linked to a plan for the protection of the public;
a a plan for protection of the public which contains measures to
protect public health and property and the environment in the
hazard area, also linked to the on-site emergency plan;
a emergency transport procedure in relation to the
transportation of nuclear materials or radioactive waste (see
under Section 9 of this Study, infra, in relation to Transport).
The operator is responsible for preparation of an on-site emergency plan,
96
which must be submitted to the Authority for approval and to the Ministry of
Internal Affairs for consideration six months prior to the planned commencement
of commissioning of a nuclear installation.97 The local authorities are responsible
for the plan for protection of the public within regions, districts and communities,
with the Ministry of the Interior being responsible for co-ordination. 98 The
Ministry of the Interior is responsible for civil defence during radiological
accidents and for assistance in case of a nuclear accident or radiological
emergency. 99
Prior to the commissioning of a nuclear installation, emergency plans must be
practiced, and during the operation of nuclear installations certain parts of
emergency plans must be practiced and evaluated at set intervals. 
100
92. § 35.
93. § 24(6).
94. § 25(I).
95. § 25(2).
96. zkon 6. 130/1998, § 25(5) Z.z.
97. § 25(9).
98. § 25(6).
99. zdkon 6. 42/1994 Z.z.
100. zdkon 6. 130/1998, § 25(14) Z.z.
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There is a general obligation on the part of operators and State authorities to
make available to the Authority data required to evaluate accidents and to forecast
their development. The data might consist of technological data from the nuclear
installation, radiation monitoring data, meteorological data and other data as
requested by the Authority. 101
The Slovak Republic succeeded to the 1986 Convention on Early Notification
of a Nuclear Accident and to the 1986 Convention on Assistance in Case of a
Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency on 10 February 1993.
d. Decommissioning
Under the Act it is the operator who is made responsible for the
decommissioning of a nuclear installation (which for the purposes of Section 19
does not include a radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel repository) and who
must ensure that the financial means are available to do so.102 Act No. 254/1994
Z.z. and Decree No. 14/1995 Z.z. establish a State Fund for the decommissioning
of nuclear power plants and the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste
arising from their decommissioning. The Act was adopted by the National Council
(Parliament) on 25 August 1994 and entered into force on 1 January 1995. The
Fund, which is established as a separate legal entity, is managed by the Ministry of
Economy which appoints the Fund's Director. The Ministry has also set up a
Steering Committee made up of seven members, experts in the fields of nuclear
energy, health, environmental protection, economy and public administration to
provide advice on the distribution of funds.
The operator must submit an updated conceptual plan for decommissioning,
together with an environmental impact statement (pursuant to Act No. 127/1994
Z.z. on environmental impact assessment). 10 3 Decommissioning may only
commence on the basis of a permit from the Authority, the issuance of which is
conditional upon an application from the operator supported by documentation on
nuclear safety during decommissioning. In the case of the nuclear installation
being decommissioned in several steps, a permit from the Authority is required for
each step. 104
e. Nuclear Safety
Nuclear safety and quality assurance are dealt with in Chapter 4 of the Act.
"Nuclear safety" is defined as meaning the status and ability of a nuclear
installation and its staff to prevent the uncontrolled development of a fission chain
reaction or the inadmissible release of radioactive substances or ionising radiation
into the workplace environment or the natural environment and to limit the
consequences of accidents. 105 The operator is responsible for nuclear safety and
101. § 25(18).
102. § 19(2).
103. §19(3).
104. § 19(4).
105. zidkon d. 130/1998, § 20(1) Z.z.
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must ensure that there are adequate financial and human resources to meet this
responsibility. 1
06
During the building and commissioning of a nuclear installation and
throughout its period of operation, the builder and operator must perform a
comprehensive and systematic evaluation of nuclear safety and take steps to
eliminate any deficiencies identified. The frequency and scope of the evaluations
are to be set out in regulations issued by the Authority. 10 7 The operator must
ensure that radiation exposure of employees and other persons to ionising radiation
caused by the operation of a nuclear installation is kept below the set limits and at
the lowest reasonably achievable level. 1
08
In addition to governing the safety aspects of radioactive waste
management, 109 Regulation No. 67/1987 Zb. stipulates the requirements for the
documentation on safety which must be provided with an authorisation application
for the siting, construction and operation of nuclear installations.
The Act contains detailed provisions regarding the need for training and
testing of employees with professional qualifications at nuclear installations." 0
The Act gives inspectors of the Authority the power to confiscate certificates of
professional qualification if there are grounds for doing so."'
As an element of nuclear safety, there are provisions in Chapter 4 of the Act
which deal specifically with the issue of quality assurance. 112 The operator, in
brief, must set up an appropriate organisational structure, procedures and sources
to define and adhere to quality assurance requirements for nuclear installations and
activities. 113
In addition to the Act, there are many decrees which regulate safety in the
design, siting, construction, commissioning and operation of nuclear facilities, 114
which regulate the quality assurance of classified equipment of nuclear
installations,15 which regulate evaluation of special professional abilities of
selected personnel from nuclear installations, 116 which ensure nuclear safety in the
course of radioactive waste management 1 7 and, finally, which ensure safety
during the testing of devices for nuclear materials transport and disposal. 118
Regulation No. 9/1985 Zb. deals with the assurance of nuclear safety at
nuclear research installations.
106. § 20(2).
107. § 20(6).
108. § 20(7).
109. See infra Section 7 of this Study.
110. z~kon 6. 130/1998, § 21 Z.z.
111. §34.
112. §22.
113. §22(1).
114. tiprava 6. 2/1978 Zb., iiprava .4/1979 Zb., and zakon 6. 6/1980 Zb.
115. vyhliska . 436/1990 Zb.
116. vyhliska 6. 191/1989 Zb.
117. vyhldska 6. 67/1987 Zb.
118. fiprava 6. 8/1981 Zb.
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The Slovak Republic ratified the 1994 Convention Nuclear Safety on 7 March
1995 and it entered into force on 24 October 1996.
5. Trade in Nuclear Materials and Equipment
The Act expressly precludes the issuance of an authorisation to a foreign
importer of nuclear installations, selected equipment or services. The receiver of
such equipment and services must be the holder of an authorisation under Section
4(2) (which can only be granted to a legal person with its registered head office in
the Slovak Republic or to a natural person with permanent or long term residence
in the country'1 9 or the holder of a license or permit issued in accordance with
specific regulations). 1 20 In respect of the latter, Section 10 of the Act provides that
a permit from the Authority is required for the import or export of nuclear
materials or equipment under specific regulations. Such specific regulations
include two Decrees, namely the Decree of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade
No. 50/1992 Zb., which implements Act No. 547/1990 Zb. (on the management of
special substances and their control), and the Decree of the Economics Ministry
No. 15/1998 Z.z. on conditions for the issuance of an official permit for the import
and export of goods and services. Act No. 547/1990 Zb. specifies that the Ministry
of the Economy is the authority with jurisdiction to issue export-import licenses for
nuclear materials and other sensitive items. The accounting and control aspects of
such trade are dealt with by Decrees No. 50/1992 Zb. and 505/1992 Zb.
6. Radiation Protection
Act No. 272/1994 Z.z. on protection of human health and Act No. 290/1996
Z.z. on the safety of the health of the population lays down the requirements for
radiation protection based on the International Commission for Radiological
Protection (ICRP) recommendations and IAEA standards in this area. In
implementation of these Acts a draft Governmental Decree on Radiation Protection
is under preparation by the Ministry of Health. The Decree will replace Regulation
No. 65/1972 of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Health governing the radiation
protection of workers, the public and the environment against ionising radiation
sources. As a matter of general principle, the main objective for radiation
protection is to keep the radiological consequences related to the use of ionising
radiation as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA).
Radiation protection is also addressed in the Act, first, in the statement of
general principles applicable to the peaceful use of nuclear energy12' and,
secondly, in relation to the safe operation of nuclear installations (see Section 4 of
this Study, supra, in relation to Nuclear Installations, (e) Nuclear Safety). In
respect of the latter, the operator must ensure that exposure of employees and other
persons to ionising radiation caused by the operation of a nuclear installation is
119. zakon 6. 130/1998, § 5(1) and (2) Z.z.
120. § 4(4).
121. zttkon 6. 130/1998, § 3(3) Z.z.
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kept below the set limits during all operational states and activities, and at the
lowest reasonably achievable level. 122
Generally, however, it is the Ministry of Health which is the regulatory
authority responsible for radiation protection at nuclear installations, medical
installations and other workplaces with ionizing radiation. The supervision of
workplaces is performed by the Institute for Hygiene and Epidemiology (under the
Ministry of Health), managed by the Chief Hygienist, with the Nuclear Regulatory
Authority also involved at nuclear installations as part of its responsibility for
nuclear safety.
The Slovak Republic succeeded to the 1960 Convention concerning the
Protection of Workers against lonising Radiation on 1 January 1993.
7. Radioactive Waste Management
Under the Act, the safe disposal of radioactive waste, including the disposal
of spent fuel, is the responsibility of a legal person appointed or entrusted for this
purpose by the Ministry of the Economy on the terms established in the Act and by
specific regulations. A radioactive waste repository may only be sited on land
owned by the State. 123 With respect to radioactive waste management, the
Authority is responsible under Sections 17 and 18 of the Act for supervising
radioactive waste originating from nuclear installations and for repositories for all
types of radioactive waste. The Ministry of Health is designated under Act No.
290/1996 Z.z. as the responsible authority for supervising radioactive waste
originating from all other sources until their treatment and transportation for final
disposal.
Regulation No. 67/1987 Zb. lays down the basic technical and organisational
requirements for ensuring nuclear safety and the prevention of releases of
radioactivity into the environment in the course of radioactive waste management.
It also sets out mandatory radioactive waste management procedures for
authorities, organisations and their staff involved in the design, commissioning,
operation or decommissioning of nuclear installations, including the basic safety
requirements for all steps of radioactive waste management, such as collection,
segregation, storage, treatment, conditioning and finally, the disposal of
radioactive waste.
Radioactive waste is defined under the Act as non-useable materials in
gaseous, liquid or solid form which may not be released into the environment
because of the content of radionuclides in them or because of contamination by
radionuclides.124 The levels of radionuclides which cause materials to be defined
as waste are laid down in Decree No. 65/1972 Zb. on the radiation protection of
workers, the public and the environment against ionising radiation (the Ministry of
Health is now preparing a draft Governmental Decree on Radiation Protection to
122. § 20(7).
123. § 17(12).
124. § 17(1).
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replace the decree from the former Czechoslovakia). "Spent nuclear fuel" means
irradiated nuclear fuel withdrawn from a nuclear reactor.' 
25
The generator of radioactive waste has a general obligation to manage its
generation in such a manner that its quantity and activity are kept to the lowest
reasonably achievable level. 1
26
Authorisations for the management of radioactive waste and spent nuclear
fuel are issued by the Authority. 127 "Radioactive waste management" means the
collection, segregation, storage, treatment, conditioning, handling, transportation
and disposal of radioactive waste from nuclear installations and conditioning for
transportation and disposal of institutional radioactive waste.' 28 "Management of
spent nuclear fuel" means storage, reprocessing, handling, transportation and
disposal of spent nuclear fuel in a spent nuclear fuel repository.12 9 "Storage of
radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel" means their temporary emplacement in
sites, facilities or equipment that enable them to be isolated and monitored and the
environment to be protected. 130 "Disposal of radioactive waste or spent nuclear
fuel" means their permanent emplacement in a radioactive waste or spent nuclear
fuel repository. 131
The generator of radioactive waste is responsible for the safe management of
the waste from its first occurrence until it is transferred to a radioactive waste
repository, unless the Authority specifies otherwise. 132 Similarly, the producer of
spent nuclear fuel is responsible for its management until its transfer to a spent
nuclear fuel repository. 133 A "radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel repository"
means a site, facility or equipment on the surface or underground used for disposal
of radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel, which enable them to be isolated and
monitored and the natural environment to be protected. 1
34
The provisions applying to the management of radioactive waste apply also to
the management of spent nuclear fuel. 1
35
The costs associated with the management of radioactive waste and spent
nuclear fuel, including monitoring of repositories after they have been sealed and
the relevant research and development, are to be reimbursed by the originator of
the waste. 136 Where the generator is not known or is not capable of managing the
waste, the Authority is required to appoint someone with a radioactive waste
management authorisation. In its decision the Authority must define the scope of
125. § 18(1).
126. zdkon . 130/1998, § 17(13) Z.z.
127. § 4(2)(d).
128. § 17(2).
129. § 18(2).
130. § 2(b).
131. zakon . 130/1998, § 2(c) Z.z.
132. § 17(6).
133. § 18(3).
134. § 2(d).
135. § 18(4).
136. zdkon 6. 130/1998, § 17(8) Z.z.
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management and the method of reimbursement of costs. 13 7 The costs of
management where the generator is not known are to be reimbursed by the State
Fund for Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Plants and Management of Spent
Nuclear Fuel and Radioactive Waste. A generator who is subsequently identified
must reimburse the costs arising from the management to the Fund. 
138
The Fund is regulated under Act No. 254/1994 Z.z. on the State Fund for
Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants and Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel
and Radioactive Waste. 139 For details of the management of the Fund, see Section
4 of this Study, supra, in relation to Nuclear Installations, (d) Decommissioning.
The Fund is financed by several means, including contributions by nuclear power
plant operators, bank and State funding and other sources.
Importation of radioactive waste into the Slovak Republic is prohibited,
except for the return of radioactive waste which arose during reprocessing and
conditioning of radioactive materials exported for this purpose, provided the re-
importation of this waste has received a permit in advance from the Authority. 1
40
The Slovak Republic signed the 1997 Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent
Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management on 30
September 1997.
8. Non-Proliferation and Physical Protection
The Slovak Republic succeeded to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons on 1 January 1993 and to the 1979 Convention on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material on 10 February 1993. The Authority is the
official contact point for international bodies dealing with non-proliferation
regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group or the Zangger Committee.
On 1 January 1993 the Slovak Republic succeeded to the Safeguards
Agreement with the IAEA, which had entered into force between the IAEA and
Czechoslovakia on 3 March 1972 (INFCIRC/173).
For details of the system of accountancy and monitoring of nuclear materials,
see supra, Section 3 of this Study, in relation to Nuclear Materials and Equipment.
Physical protection of nuclear installations and nuclear materials is dealt with
in Section 23 of the Act. "Physical protection" means a system of technical and
organisational measures, the aim of which is to prevent unauthorised activities with
nuclear installations or nuclear materials, especially their misuse or intentional
damage. 141 It is the operator who is responsible for the physical protection of a
nuclear installation. 142
137. § 17(9).
138. § 17(10).
139. See also vyhlAska 6. 14/1995 Z.z.
140. z~kon 6. 130/1998, § 17(14) Z.z.
141. § 23(1).
142. § 23(2).
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A consignor or carrier when nuclear materials are being transported, and legal
or natural persons who use nuclear materials, are responsible for the provision of
physical protection of the nuclear materials during these activities. 143
In cases of unauthorised access to a nuclear installation or unauthorised
handling of nuclear materials, assistance shall be rendered within the limits of their
competence by the Police and the Railway Police at the request of the builder,
operator, carrier or consignor or user of the nuclear materials. 144 When
unauthorised actions have been perpetrated with nuclear installations or nuclear
materials, or there is a threat of such actions, the operator, consignor or user of the
nuclear materials is required to take the necessary measures and notify the relevant
department of the Police and the Authority without delay. 145
The provisions of Section 23 also apply to the physical protection of
radioactive waste during its management. 
146
In addition to the detailed provisions in the Act, there is Regulation No.
100/1989 Zb. on the physical protection of nuclear installations and nuclear
materials. 147 Unlike the provisions in the Act which deal with physical protection,
the Regulation expressly excludes the transport of nuclear materials from its
scope. 148
9. Transport
Nuclear materials may only be transported on the basis of a transportation
permit issued by the Authority to the consignor or carrier. 149 Transportation of
nuclear material may only be carried out in transport equipment of types approved
by the Authority. Each transportation of nuclear material requires a separate
permit, although for transportation of nuclear material of the same type by the
same carrier, a permit may be issued for a longer period of time, but for no longer
than one year. 150 The same provisions in the Act apply to the transportation of
radioactive waste' 5' and spent nuclear fuel.
152
For the obligations of the consignor or carrier when nuclear materials are
being transported, see Section 8 of this Study, supra, in relation to Non-
Proliferation and Physical Protection. Legal and natural persons who take part in
the transportation of nuclear materials must observe the physical protection
requirements set by the consignor.' 
53
143. § 23(4).
144. § 23(6).
145. zdkon 6. 130/1998, § 23(7) Z.z.
146. § 17(15).
147. ztkon 6. 100/1989 Zb.
148. vyhlf.ska 6. 100/1989, § 1(2) Zb.
149. zdkon 6. 130/1998, § 11(2) Z.z.
150. § 11(3).
151. § 17(16).
152. § 18(4).
153. § 23(5).
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There are specific provisions in the Act dealing with accidents during
transportation of nuclear material, radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel. Thus, a
transport accident is defined as meaning an exceptional event which caused harm
to health, gave rise to a threat to the health of persons due to the impact of ionising
radiation, or caused damage to property as a result of a release of radioactive
substances into the natural environment. 154 The consignor must notify the
Authority, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Transport, Post and
Telecommunications of the transport accident, and must also inform the public. 1
55
As part of the emergency planning requirements under the Act, the carrier is
required to draw up emergency transport procedures on the basis of obligatory
principles from the consignor. 156 These emergency transport procedures must be
submitted by the carrier for consideration by the Authority and the public service
bodies affected two months prior to the transportation taking place. 157 The
emergency transport procedures are to be approved by the Ministry of Transport,
Post and Telecommunications. 158 Nuclear materials and radioactive waste may not
be transported without approved emergency transport procedures. 159
10. Nuclear Third Party Liability
Compensation for nuclear damage is covered by general regulations on
liability for damage e.g. Sections 415 to 450 of the Civil Code,' 60 except as
otherwise stipulated in the Act or an international agreement to which the Slovak
Republic is bound. 161 In fact, the Act contains very detailed provisions on third
party liability for nuclear damage, which largely reflect the provisions of the 1963
Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage. The Slovak Republic
acceded to the Vienna Convention and the 1988 Joint Protocol on the Application
of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention on 7 March 1995. Both the
Vienna Convention and the Joint Protocol entered into force for the country on 7
June 1995.
Section 26(1) of the Act defines "nuclear damage" as detriment to property,
loss of life or harm to health caused by an "emergency situation" (as defined in
Section 24(2)(c)) or by a "transport accident" (as defined by Section 24(3)). It is
also damage that has arisen through the expenditure of costs on measures
necessary to avert or reduce irradiation or to restore the natural environment to its
previous or an equivalent state, should such measures have been instigated as a
result of a nuclear incident. 162 If damage was caused jointly by a nuclear incident
and another event not dependent on the nuclear incident, the nuclear damage shall
be that part of the damage which was not demonstrably caused by the other event.
154. zdkon 6. 130/1998, § 24(3) Z.z.
155. § 24(5).
156. § 25(7).
157. § 25(11).
158. § 2 5(12)(c).
159. zhkon 6. 130/1998, § 25(14) Z.z.
160. fiprava 6. 40/1984 Zb., as amended.
161. zdkon 6. 130/1998, § 26(2) Z.z.
162. § 26(3).
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The operator has the burden of proving the scope of the damage which cannot be
categorised as nuclear damage. 
163
Liability for nuclear damage caused by a nuclear incident is channeled to the
operator. 164 Liability for nuclear damage caused during the transportation of
nuclear materials or radioactive waste rests with the carrier who applied for
recognition as operator of a nuclear installation and, with the consent of the
operator concerned, was recognised by the Authority as the operator.165 If an
operator operates a number of installations located on a territory for which a
common internal emergency plan has been approved, they will be taken as a single
nuclear installation for the purposes of liability for nuclear damage. More than one
nuclear installation on one site, where the operators are different holders of
authorisations, may not, however, be taken as a single installation, even if these
installations are technically linked together. 166
The operator's limit of liability under the Act for nuclear damage is 2 billion
Slovak crowns, 167 which does not include interest or costs. 168
Under the Vienna Convention, which has force of law in the Slovak
Republic, 169 liability for nuclear damage is strict. In meeting claims for
compensation for nuclear damage, an operator must meet them as follows:
Group I: Justified claims made within 12 months of the occurrence of
the nuclear incident shall be met within 60 days of the date the claim
was made. Seventy per cent of the limit of liability specified in Section
28 of the Act may be used to meet claims for compensation for damage
which fall within this group. If the damage compensation claims exceed
the sum that may be utilised for this Group, compensation claims for
damage to health and compensation for cases of death shall be met in
fill and other claims proportionately.
Group II: Other claims made between 12 and 36 months after the
occurrence of a nuclear incident shall be met within 60 days of the
claim, and include claims which were met proportionately in Group I.
Group III: When a period of 36 months has elapsed since the
occurrence of a nuclear incident, individual claims for compensation for
nuclear damage are to be met within 90 days of the claim, but only until
the sum specified in Section 28 is exhausted. These include claims
which were met proportionately in Groups I and II.
The operator must ensure that the liability for nuclear damage is covered by
insurance or some other form of financial cover, 170 which must be in place for the
163. § 26(4).
164. § 27(1).
165. § 27(2).
166. zdkon 6. 130/1998, § 27(3) Z.z.
167. § 28(1).
168. § 28(2).
169. § 26(2).
170. § 30(1).
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duration of operation of the nuclear installation and at least ten years after a
nuclear incident. 171 There is an exemption from nuclear damage liability cover for
nuclear incidents caused by small amounts of nuclear materials which are assumed
not to be capable of giving rise to nuclear damage.
7 2
B. Institutional Framework
1. Regulatory and Supervisory Authorities
a. Nuclear Regulatory Authority
The Nuclear Regulatory Authority (lirad Jadrov~ho Dozoru - JD) of the
Slovak Republic is the successor to the former Czechoslovak Atomic Energy
Commission. It was established on 1 January 1993 and its powers are based on Act
No. 2/1993 Z.z.. The Authority acts as an independent State regulatory body which
reports directly to the Government and is directed by a Chairperson appointed by
the Government.
Besides the Chairperson, the Authority comprises a small Secretariat and two
Departments, one for assessment and inspection activities and one for safety policy
assessment and international co-operation. The Inspection Activities Department is
headed by the Chief Inspector and based at Trnava, near the Bohunice nuclear
power plant, while the Safety Policy and International Co-operation Department is
headed by the Vice Chairman and is located at the Bratislava headquarters.
The Authority is responsible for regulation and supervision of the use of
nuclear energy. The Authority is also responsible for supervising radioactive waste
originating from nuclear installations and for repositories for all types of
radioactive waste.
The regulatory powers of the Authority cover the following areas:
o the safety of nuclear installations;
o radioactive waste management;
o safeguards and control over nuclear and dual-use materials;
o quality assurance programmes;
o international agreements and obligations in the field of nuclear safety
and nuclear materials.
Details of the tasks of the Authority relating to each of these areas are set out
in Chapter 6 of the Act. Of particular importance is the inspection function of the
Authority (see Section 4(b) of this Study, supra, in relation to Nuclear
Installations, Inspection).
b. Ministry of Health
The Regional Radiation Protection Body under the Ministry is responsible for
radiation protection and for the control of radiation protection measures inside
171. zikon 6. 130/1998, § 30(2) Z.z.
172. § 30(3).
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nuclear installations and off-site.1 73 It is also designated as the responsible
authority for supervising radioactive wastes from non-nuclear installations until
their treatment and transportation for final disposal. The Institute for Hygiene and
Epidemiology is responsible for providing technical support in the regulation and
supervision of radiation protection.
c. Ministry of the Environment
It has control over regional offices which grant site, construction and
operating licenses and operate the environmental radiation monitoring network, is
responsible for environmental impact assessments. The Minister for the
Environment also chairs the Government Commission for Radiological
Emergencies.
d. Ministry of the Interior
The Ministry is responsible for fire protection, for support of physical
protection of nuclear materials and nuclear installations in emergency situations,
civil defence during radiological accidents and for assistance in case of a nuclear
accident or radiological emergency.' 74 In the event of incidents or accidents, the
Ministry must be informed by the operator.' 
75
e. Ministry of Economy
The Ministry is responsible for promoting and developing a nuclear power
programme and for preparing related legislation. It issues export and import
licenses for nuclear materials and sensitive equipment.
Under the Act the Ministry appoints the legal person responsible for the safe
disposal of radioactive waste. 176
f State Office for Occupational Safety
The responsibilities of the Office are set out in Act No. 174/1968 Zb. on State
supervision of work safety as amended by Act No. 256/1994 Z.z.. The Office is an
independent agency which reports directly to the Government on matters of
industrial safety.
2. Public and Semi-Public Agencies
a. Nuclear Power Plant Research Institute
The Nuclear Power Plant Research Institute (Vyskumny Ustav Jadrovych
Elektrarni Trnava a.s. - VUJE) undertakes research and development in the field
of nuclear safety. The Institute also conducts training for the employees of the
nuclear power plants at Trnava.
The final training of operating personnel at the Mochovce plant is also carried
out with a full scale simulator which is located on-site.
173. zf.kon . 272/1994 Z.z.
174. zdkon 6. 42/1994 Z.z.
175. zdkon 6. 130/1998, § 24(4) Z.z.
176. § 17(12).
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THE MARSHALL ISLANDS NUCLEAR CLAIMS TRIBUNAL:
THE CLAIMS OF THE ENEWETAK PEOPLE*
DAVOR PEVEC**
I. BACKGROUND OF UNITED STATES NUCLEAR TESTING IN THE MARSHALL ISLANDS
The United States conducted sixty-seven nuclear tests in the Marshall Islands
in a twelve year period between 1946 and 1958. Forty-three of those tests
occurred on Enewetak Atoll; the remainder occurred on Bikini Atoll. The yield of
the tests in the Marshall Islands totaled 108 megatons which is equivalent to 7,200
Hiroshima bombs. During the twelve-year nuclear testing program, the Marshall
Islands was a United Nations Trust Territory administered by the United States,
which had pledged to the United Nations to "protect the inhabitants against the loss
of their lands and resources."1
Radioactive fallout from one of those tests - the March 1, 1954 Bravo shot at
Bikini - drifted in the wrong direction and irradiated the 236 inhabitants of
Rongelap and Utrok Atolls as well as the crew of a Japanese fishing vessel. Bravo
was the largest U.S. nuclear test in history with an explosive force equal to nearly
1,000 Hiroshima-type atomic bombs.
In the 1980's, the peoples of Enewetak, Bikini, Rongelap and Utrok Atolls
and other Marshall Islanders brought lawsuits against the United States in the
United States' courts for property and other damages resulting from the nuclear
tests, totaling more than $5 billion. During the litigation, the U.S. and Republic of
the Marshall Islands governments signed a treaty known as the Compact of Free
2Association. That Compact defines the relationship between the U.S. and the
Marshall Islands and included a subsidiary Section 177 Agreement, which
established a $150 million Nuclear Fund, income from which was earmarked for
the peoples of the four atolls as "a means to address past, present and future
consequences of the Nuclear Testing Program.... Income was also earmarked to
fund a Nuclear Claims Tribunal, which was to be established with "jurisdiction to
* Presented at the PLAGE Conference, Salzburg, Austria, October 20-23, 2005.
** Attorney at law, Legal Counsel to the Enewetak People.
I. Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands art. 6, July 18, 1947, 61
Stat. 3301, 8 U.N.T.S. 189.
2. The Compact of Free Association, U.S.-Marsh. Is., June 25, 1983, 99 Stat. 1770 (1986)
[hereinafter Compact].
3. Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Marshall
Islands for the Implementation of Section 177 of the Compact of Free Association pmbl,
http://www.nuclearclaimstribunal.com/177text.htm [hereinafter Section 177].
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
render final determination upon all claims past, present and future, of the
Government, citizens and nationals of the Marshall Islands which are based on,
arise out of, or are in any way related to the Nuclear Testing Program.... ,4
The Section 177 Agreement also provides that it constitutes the full settlement
of all claims, "past, present and future," of Marshall Islanders and their
government against the United States arising out of the testing program, and
another section provides that all such claims pending in U.S. courts are to be
dismissed. 5
The lawsuits against the U.S. filed in the 1980's are property rights protected
by the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 6 Can the
U.S. simply terminate the claims brought against it? The answer is yes. Under
well established U.S. Supreme Court decisions going back to 1890, Congress has
every right to close the doors of U.S. courts to lawsuits and take away those
property rights as long as it provided for an alternative method of compensation
and provided that at the time of the taking there is "reasonable, certain and
adequate provision for obtaining compensation."7
Faced with these provisions, the U.S. courts dismissed the nuclear cases after
the Compact went into effect. This dismissal was approved by the U.S. courts
because the 177 Agreement provided some compensation and provided for the
establishment of an alternative tribunal to determine damages and provide
compensation. The U.S. courts said that whether the $150 million settlement
amounted to just compensation for the Marshall Islanders whose cases were
dismissed, was an issue to be determined by the alternative tribunal-the Nuclear
Claims Tribunal.8 The Marshall Islands Nuclear Claims Tribunal was constituted
in 1988. 9
Left with no practical alternative, the Enewetak people filed their claim before
the Nuclear Claims Tribunal so that it could render final determination of all their
claims for property damage, past, present and future, relating to the nuclear testing
program.
The legal theories of the Enewetak property damage claim was based on
established constitutional principles and tort law. Those theories provided
damages for the cost to restore land, for loss of use of land, and for consequential
damages.
The following material presents in narrative form the evidence and arguments
presented to the Tribunal relating to the property damages suffered by the
Enewetak people as a result of the U.S. nuclear testing program.
4. Id. at art. IV, § 1 (a).
5. See id. at art. X, XlI.
6. See generally Juda v. U.S., 13 CI. Ct. 667 (1987); Nitol v. United States, 13 CI. Ct. 690
(1987); People of Enewetak v. U.S., 864 F. 2d 134 (Cir. 1988).
7. Blanchette v. Conn. Gen. Ins. Corp., 419 U.S. 102, 124-25 (1974), (citing Cherokee Nation v.
S. Kan. R.R Co., 135 U.S. 641, 659 (1890)).
8. See Juda, supra note 6, at 689.
9. Section 177, supra note 3, art. V, § 1.
VOL. 35:1
THE MARSHALL ISLANDS NUCLEAR CLAIMS TRIBUNAL
II. THE ENEWETAK PROPERTY DAMAGE CLAIM
The homeland of the Enewetak people was the site of forty-three of the sixty-
six nuclear tests conducted by the United States in the Marshall Islands. One of
the tests at Enewetak was especially significant as it was the first test of a
thermonuclear device, a precursor to the hydrogen bomb. This test occurred on
October 31, 1952 and was known as the "Mike" test. The test had a yield of 10.4
megatons (750 times greater than the Hiroshima bomb). The destructive power of
the Mike test was exceeded only by the Bravo test (15 megatons) in all the nuclear
tests conducted by the United States anywhere. The Mike test vaporized an island,
leaving a crater a mile in diameter and 200 feet deep. The Mike test detonation
and the detonation of the other forty two nuclear devices devastated the land of the
Enewetak people. The devastation is so severe that to this day, forty-seven years
after the last nuclear explosion, over half the land and all of the lagoon remain
contaminated by radiation. The damage is so pervasive that the Enewetak people
cannot live on their land without importation of food.
In our presentation before the Tribunal, it was important to stress that the
damages inflicted on the land of the Enewetak people be considered in the context
of the strong attachment that the people have for their land. The story of nuclear
testing on the land of the Enewetak people has many important aspects; however,
the most compelling aspect is the profound effect such testing had on the people.
Thus, in the presentation of the claim we emphasized the effect of the testing
program on the Enewetak people who, for century after century, developed a
unique relationship with their land. They worked the soil and nurtured the plants
on their land. They buried their dead on their land. They became a part of the land
and it became a part of them. Laurence Carucci, an American professor of
anthropology who testified before the Tribunal described the Enewetak people's
relationship with the land as follows:
For Marshall Islanders in general, and Enewetak people in particular,
land is a part of one's person and one's entire identity. It is an integral
part of a person's sense of who they are in the world and how their life
makes sense as part of a certain culture. One's sense of self, both
personal and cultural, is deeply embedded in a particular parcel of land
on a particular atoll.... Not only is land hyper-valued because it is
scarce, land is extremely highly valued because it represents the
collective labor of generations of people who have worked the land,
transforming it from bush into habitable space. Both one's labor and
one's physical person, at death, are embedded in land in a manner that
irrevocably erases any distinction European's [sic] or Americans might
make that would separate one's person and the clan or family land that
one inhabits. While Europeans live and die, Enewetak people are but
the most visible snippet of a very active group, a clan of relatives who
share a totem-like identity, a clan or jowi. Not only does that group
represent the continuity of life from ancient times until the current day
"owi), it is manifest in a second visible form, the family land that is the
realization of generation upon generation of continuous human
occupation that has made untended earth into soil through toil and the
2006
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physical substance of persons embedded in the molecular structure of
that soil.
When Enewetak people were moved to Ujelang in 1947, this sense of
communal origin, of land as the visible representation of centuries of
human labor, was lost.... Enewetak people were distraught,
heartbroken, and in a general state of mental and emotional trauma
when they were forced to leave their homeland. Their very
embeddedness in a place in the world, the very processes through which
the community had scratched their being into the physical contours of
the earth, and the historied place that gave them a sense of meaningful
connection with their communal past, were gone. 0
III. REMOVAL OF THE PEOPLE FROM ENEWETAK ATOLL AND U.S. PROMISES
This relationship of the Enewetak people with their land was severed when
the United States removed the people from their atoll so that the United States
could explode nuclear devices on their land. In effecting the removal, the United
States recognized that the people of Enewetak had constitutional rights with
respect to the use of their land by the United States. In addition, the United States
recognized that it had responsibilities and obligations to the people of Enewetak.
These rights, responsibilities and obligations ere described in the memorandum
attached to the Directive of President Harry Truman providing for the removal of
the Enewetak people from their land. President Truman's Directive to the
Secretary of Defense, dated November 25, 1947, reads as follows:
Dear Mr. Secretary:
You are hereby directed to effect the evacuation of the natives of
Eniwetok Atoll preliminary to the carrying out of tests of atomic
weapons early in 1948, and in accordance with the enclosed
memorandum addressed to me by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy
Commission.
Sincerely yours,
HARRY S. TRUMAN 1
The memorandum attached to President Truman's Directive described the
rights of the Enewetak people and the responsibilities and obligations to the
10. In the Matter of the People of Enewetak, et al., NCT No. 23-0902,
http://www.nuclearclaimstribunal.com/final.htm, (citing Laurence M. Carucci & Mary H Maifeld, len
Entaan im Jerata: Times of Suffering and Ill Fortune: An Overview of Daily Life on Ujelang and
Enewetak since 1946) (citation omitted); JACK A. TOBIN, THE RESETTLEMENT OF THE ENEWETAK
PEOPLE: A STUDY OF A DISPLACED COMMUNITY IN THE MARSHALL ISLANDS (1967) microformed on
University Microfilms PAC GEN GN 671 .M3 T6 1 (Univ. Microfilms 1970).("Land, the source of
sustenance, is considered by the Marshallese to be their most valuable asset. It is regarded as almost
sacred.").
11. Statement of the Enewetak/Ujelang Local Government: Hearing Before the Subcomm on Asia,
the Pacific and the Global Environmen of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007)
[hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Senator Jack Ading, Nitijela of the Marshall Islands), available at
http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/adi072507.htm.
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Enewetak people assumed by the United States. The memorandum reads in
relevant part as follows:
1. They will be accorded all rights which are the normal constitutional
rights of the citizens under the Constitution, but will be dealt with as
wards of the United States for whom this country has special
responsibilities.
2. The displacement of local inhabitants will be kept to a minimum
required for their own safety and well being and will not be
accomplished merely for considerations of convenience.
3. The displacement of local inhabitants will be effected by agreements
reached with them regarding resettlement, including fully adequate
provisions for their well being in their new locations.
The Atomic Energy Commission and the Secretary of Defense will
undertake to supply to the State Department evidence sufficient to
demonstrate in an international forum that in conducting such
experimentation in Eniwetok, the United States is not thereby subjecting
the local inhabitants of the Trust Territory of the Pacific to perceptibly
greater danger than, say, the people of the United States.' 
2
In a dispatch from Admiral Ramsey, the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 5
December 1947, the rights of the Enewetak people and the responsibilities and
obligations of the United States were summarized as follows:
PURSUANT TO ORDERS FROM THE PRESIDENT THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS DIRECTED SECNAV TO
EFFECT THE EVACUATION OF THE NATIVES OF ENIWETOK.
IN RECOMMENDING THIS ACTION THE ATOMIC ENERGY
COMMISSION STATED THAT THE INHABITANTS OF THE
ATOLL WOULD BE ACCORDED THE NORMAL
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ACCRUING TO U S CITIZENS
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND TREATED AS WARDS OF
THE UNITED STATES; AND THAT ADEQUATE PROVISION
WOULD BE MADE FOR THEM IN THEIR NEW LOCATION. 13
The Constitution provides that the owner of property used and damaged by
the government is entitled to just and adequate compensation. 14 In addition, the
Enewetak People were promised that they would be taken care of while they were
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. If government uses and damages private property it is constitutionally required to pay just
compensation to the owners of that property. U.S. Const. amend. V. It is well established that in cases
involving temporary takings, "just compensation" refers to the rental value of the property for the
period taken, together with any damage sustained by the property. Kimball Laundry Co. v. U.S., 338
U.S. 1, 7 (1949); U.S. v. Gen. Motors, 323 U.S. 373, 379 (1945). The United States Supreme Court has
stated that the purpose of just compensation is to put the owner in as good a position as he would have
occupied if his property had not been taken. U.S. v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
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away from Enewetak. Neither of these promises was kept by the U.S. The people
were not taken care of during their thirty three-year exile on Ujelang; and the
people have yet to receive the just and adequate compensation to which they are
entitled.
IV. U.S. USE OF ENEWETAK FROM 1947 TO 1980
The U.S. used Enewetak for a variety of purposes between 1947 and 1980.
U.S. use consisted of nuclear weapons testing, intercontinental ballistic missile
testing, high energy rocket testing, cratering experiments, and the study of marine
biology.
A. Nuclear Weapons Testing
As described above, Enewetak was used as a nuclear weapons test site.
Forty-three nuclear explosions occurred on Enewetak during that period, including
the world's first detonation of a hydrogen bomb, the Mike test, on October 31,
1952. The atoll was devastated by these explosions. The U.S. Department of
Energy described the devastating effects as follows:
The immense ball of flame, cloud of dark dust, evaporated steel tower,
melted sand for a thousand feet, 10 million tons of water rising out of
the lagoon, waves subsiding from a height of eighty feet to seven feet in
three miles were all repeated, in various degrees, 43 times on Enewetak
Atoll. 15
About 8% of the land mass of the atoll was vaporized, numerous nuclear
bomb craters doted the land mass, and much soil and most vegetation was either
removed or severely disturbed. In addition to such physical damage, the testing
left most of the atoll contaminated by radiation.
B. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Testing
During the 1960's, Enewetak was the target and impact area for tests of
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles fired from Vandenberg Air Force Base in
California. 16
C. High Energy Upper Stage (HEUS) Rocket Tests
In 1968 and 1978, two test firings of a developmental HEUS rocket motor
were conducted on Enjebi Island. 7 The rocket motors tested each contained 2,500
pounds of propellant of which 300 pounds was beryllium. Beryllium is toxic to
man when inhaled and lodged in the lungs. The first test, in April 1968, resulted in
an unexpected explosion which scattered propellant, including beryllium, over the
western tip of Enjebi. The second test in January 1970 fired successfully,
scorching the land, but did not result in an explosion.
15. Hearing, supra note 11.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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D. Pacific Cratering Experiments
This program occurred in the 1970's and involved the detonation of charges
of high explosives to provide a means of predicting the impact of nuclear
detonations upon strategic defense installations. 18  This resulted in twelve
detonations of 1,000 pound charges, drilling of over 190 holes into various islands
of the atoll from 200 feet to 300 feet in depth, movement of 185,000 cubic yards of
soil, and the digging of 86 trenches on various islands each seven feet deep.
E. Marine Biology Research Laboratory
The laboratory began operations in 1954 under the auspices of the Division of
Biology and Medicine of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. 19 Research
supported by the laboratory was chosen by an advisory committee which evaluated
written proposals concerning a broad spectrum of marine and terrestrial science.
This activity continued into the early 1980's.
V. REMOVAL TO UJELANG ATOLL
The U.S. removed the Enewetak people to the smaller, resource poor, isolated
atoll of Ujelang in December of 1947. The people were told by the U.S. that their
removal would be for a short time. In fact, Captain John P. W. Vest, the U.S.
Military Governor for the Marshall Islands told the Enewetak people that their
removal from Enewetak would be temporary and last no more than three to five
years. In describing his meeting with the Enewetak people prior to their removal
from Enewetak, Captain Vest recalled that he told them the following:
I told them they would be able to return to Enewetak fairly soon after
the tests were completed; perhaps in three to five years. It certainly was
not in my mind that it would be longer than that, or that the taking of
Enewetak for the testing program was permanent. At the time it was
my understanding, and I believe their understanding as well as a result
of our discussions, that the people of Enewetak would be able to return
to Enewetak Atoll after the testing was concluded, and that the likely
time frame for this return was three to five years.
20
Unfortunately, the Enewetak people remained exiled on Ujelang for a period
of over thirty three years.
VI. HARDSHIP ON UJELANG
The exile on Ujelang was particularly difficult, leading to hopelessness and
despair. During the thirty three-year exile on Ujelang the people endured the
suffering of near starvation. They tried valiantly to provide food for their children
but one meal a day and constant hunger were the norm. Malnutrition caused
illness and disease. Children and the elderly were particularly vulnerable. Health
care was woefully inadequate. In addition, children went largely uneducated in the
struggle for survival. The people became so desperate that in the late 1960's they
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. In the Matter of the People of Enewetak, supra note 10 (citing affidavit of John P.W. Vest).
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attempted to take over a visiting government field-trip ship, demanding that they
be taken off of Ujelang and returned to Enewetak.
The suffering and hardship of the Enewetak people while on Ujelang are well
documented and widely recognized. For example, the U.S. Department of Interior
in a letter to the President of the U.S. Senate dated January 14, 1978 said in
relevant part:
The people of Enewetak Atoll were removed from their home atoll in
1947 by the U.S. Government in order that their atoll could be used in
the atomic testing program. The people were promised that they would
be able to return home once the U.S. Government no longer had need
for their islands.
During the thirty years that the Enewetak people have been displaced
from their home atoll they have suffered grave privations, including
periods of near starvation, in their temporary home on Ujelang Atoll.
The people have cooperated willingly with the U.S. Government and
have made many sacrifices to permit the United States to use their home
islands for atomic testing purposes.21
These physical difficulties were exacerbated by the loss of their ancestral
homeland. The Enewetak people have unusually close ties to their home atoll of
Enewetak. After centuries of residing on Enewetak, the Enewetak people
developed a unique relationship with their land. They worked the soil and nurtured
the plants. They buried their dead on their land. They became a part of the land
and it became a part of them.
For Marshall Islanders in general, and Enewetak people in particular,
land is a part of one's person and one's entire identity. It is an integral
part of a person's sense of who they are in the world and how their life
makes sense as part of a certain culture.2 2
Thus, the hardship suffered by the Enewetak people was in the nature of the
extraordinary physical difficulties endured, compounded by the emotional and
spiritual distress caused by separation from their ancestral land. As the Enewetak
people say, these physical and spiritual hardships made life on Ujelang almost
unbearable.
VII. INITIAL CLEANUP ATTEMPT OF ENEWETAK ATOLL
In 1972, the U.S. said that it would soon no longer require the use of
Enewetak.23 The U.S. recognized that the extensive damage and residual radiation
at Enewetak would require radiological cleanup, soil rehabilitation, housing and
basic infrastructure before the Enewetak people could resettle their home atoll. An
21. Hearing, supra note 11.
22. In the Matter of the People of Enewetak, supra note 10 (citing Laurence M. Carrucci & Mary
H Maifeld, ten Entaan im Jerata: Times of Suffering and Ill Fortune: An Overview of Daily Life on
Ujelang and Enewetak since 1946).
23. See Joint Statement by High Commissioner Edward E. Johnston and Ambassador Franklin
Haydn Williams, Saipan Mariana Island (April 18, 1972), http://worf.eh.doe.gov/ihp/chron/C I1.PDF.
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extensive cleanup, rehabilitation and resettlement effort was undertaken between
1977 and 1980.24 The GAO estimated that the cost of such effort amounted to
between $100 million and $105 million.25
Unfortunately, the cleanup left over half of the land mass of the atoll
contaminated by radiation, confining the people to the southern half of the atoll.
This has prevented the Enjebi island members of the Enewetak community from
resettling their home island, and has prevented the Enewetak people from making
full and unrestricted use of their atoll. In addition, the cleanup and rehabilitation
was not effective in rehabilitating the soil and revegetating the islands. An
extensive soil rehabilitation and revegetation effort is still required to permit the
growing of food crops. The cleanup also left the Enewetak people with a
radioactive waste site on the island of Runit. Over 110,000 cubic yards of
radioactive waste, which consist of radiation-contaminated dirt scrapped off the
islands, are stored in a nuclear test-created crater on Runit Island.
VIII. ENEWETAK CLAIMS IN THE U.S. CLAIMS COURT
The Enewetak people filed a claim against the U.S. in the U.S. courts in 1982
for the following reasons: their homeland required further restoration (radiological
remediation, soil rehabilitation, and revegetation); the Enjebi island members of
the Enewetak community needed to be resettled on their home island; and the
Enewetak people were never adequately compensated for the loss of use of their
land and the hardship they endured.
In addition to the Enewetak lawsuit, thirteen other lawsuits were filed in the
U.S. Claims Court by Marshall Islanders seeking compensation from the U.S. for
damages as a result of the nuclear testing program. Thus, fourteen cases were filed
which involved three different groups of Marshall Islanders: the people of
Enewetak Atoll, 26 the people of Bikini, 27 and the peoples of other Northern
Marshall atolls and islands directly downwind from the test sites.28
Notwithstanding U.S. government motions to dismiss, the U.S. Claims Court
held that the complaints stated valid claims under the Court's jurisdictional law
(the Tucker Act), 28 U.S.C. Section 1491(a)(1), for takings in violation of the Fifth
Amendment and/or for breaches of implied-in-fact contracts.
After the Compact of Free Association went into effect, the United States
filed new motions to dismiss on the grounds that the claims were non-justiciable
because they involved political questions and that Article X and XII of the
24. See U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, FINAL REPORT: ENEWETAK RADIOLOGICAL SUPPORT PROJECT
NVO-213 (1982) (describing the cleanup, rehabilitation and resettlement program),
http://worf.eh.doe.gov/ihp/chron/C78.PDF; DEF. NUCLEAR AGENCY, THE RADIOLOGICAL CLEANUP OF
ENEWETAK ATOLL (1981), http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/reading-room/117.pdf.
25. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS: ENEWETAK ATOLL- CLEANING UP
NUCLEAR CONTAMINATION (1980), available at http://worf.eh.doe.gov/ihp/chron/C116.PDF.
26. See Peter v. U.S., 6 Cl. Ct. 768 (1984) (NO. 461-82L).
27. See Nitol v. U.S., 7 CI.Ct. 405 (CI.Ct. Feb 14, 1985) (NO. 543-81L).
28. Nitol v. U.S. supra note 6, at 690 (twelve cases consolidated for pre-trial preparations under
the lead case).
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Compact Section 177 Agreement divested the Claims Court of jurisdiction over
these claims. The Enewetak people opposed dismissal on several grounds, most
notably on the ground that the compensation provided under the Compact was
inadequate and did not constitute just compensation under the Constitution. In
1987, the Claims Court dismissed these cases holding that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over these claims because the consent of the U.S. to be sued on those
claims had been withdrawn by Congress pursuant to Article XH2 9 of the Compact
Section 177 Agreement and in conjunction with the establishment of a Marshall
Islands Claims Tribunal to provide just compensation. 30  The Claims Court
recognized that the adequacy of the amount provided to claimants under the
Compact was yet to be determined by the Claims Tribunal. The Court said:
Further, in none of these cases, has Congress abolished plaintiffs'
claims. The Compact recognizes the United States obligations to
compensate for damages from the nuclear testing program and the
Section 177 Agreement establishes an alternative tribunal to provide
such compensation.
The Court went on to say:
Whether the settlement provides "adequate" compensation cannot be
determined at this time... This alternative procedure for compensation
cannot be challenged judicially until it has run its course. 3 1
IX. APPEAL OF CLAIMS COURT DISMISSAL
Appeal of the Claims Court decisions were brought by the Enewetak people
and other Marshall Islanders (the Peter and Nitol plaintiffs).32 The people of
Bikini (the Juda plaintiffs) also appealed the Claims Court decisions, but during
the pendency of the appeal, they voluntarily dismissed the Juda case as part of a
$90 million settlement with the United States.
The Enewetak people appealed the dismissal on several grounds, again most
notably on the ground that the compensation provided under the Compact was
inadequate and did not constitute just compensation under the Constitution.
The United States Court of Appeals in People of Enewetak noted the
responsibility accepted by the United States under the Compact:
Under section 177 of the Compact, the United States government
accepted responsibility for the just compensation owing for loss or
damage resulting from its nuclear testing program.
33
29. Article XII states: "All claims described in Articles X and XI of this Agreement shall be
terminated. No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to entertain such claims, and any such
claims pending in the courts of the United States shall be dismissed." Section 177, supra note 3, at art.
XII.
30. Peter v. U.S., 13 Cl. Ct. 691 (1987); Juda, supra note 6; Nitol, supra note 6.
31. Juda, supra note 6, at 688-89.
32. See People of Enewetak v. U.S., 864 F. 2d 134 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
33. Id. at 135 (emphasis added).
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Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion as the Claims
Court:
... [P]ursuant to Article XII of the section 177 Agreement, the consent
of the United States to be sued in the Claims Court, on appellants'
claims arising from the nuclear testing program conducted by the
United States in the Marshall Islands, had been withdrawn in
conjunction with the estableshment of an alternative tribunal to provide
just compensation. 34
However, the Court of Appeals indicated that the challenge to the adequacy
under the Compact was premature. The Court said:
Congress intended the alternative procedure to be utilized, and we are
unpersuaded that judicial intervention is appropriate at this time on the
mere speculation that the alternative remedy may prove to be
inadequate. 
35
X. ENEWETAK CLAIMS IN THE MARSHALL ISLANDS NUCLEAR CLAIMS TRIBUNAL
After the claims of the Enewetak people were dismissed by the U.S. courts,
the only forum available to hear their just compensation claims was the Nuclear
Claims Tribunal. The claims of the Enewetak people before the Tribunal were for
the loss of use of their land, for the costs to restore their land to a condition of full
and unrestricted use, and for the hardship and suffering they endured while in exile
on Ujelang. The evidence presented to the Tribunal on these three categories of
damages is summarized and briefly described below:
A. Loss of Use
Enewetak Atoll is private property. The use of such private property by the
United States was temporary. The people of Enewetak are entitled to
compensation for the loss of use, occupancy and enjoyment of the entire atoll from
the period 1947 to 1980, plus loss of use, occupancy and enjoyment of those
portions of the atoll which remain unavailable from 1980 until the people once
again have full use of those portions.16 Loss of use was computed by two different
appraisal firms in Honolulu, Hawaii, each of whom has substantial experience in
valuations of Pacific island properties. The appraisers utilized a market
comparison approach. Loss of use was computed on the basis of estimated
historical annual rents plus interest. Subtracted from this loss of use was the prior
compensation received by the Enewetak people under the Compact and other
payments received plus the use value of Ujelang for the period 1947 to 1980. The
net loss of use amounted to an award of $244 million.
34. Id. at 136 (emphasis added).
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. It is important to note that loss of use (annual rental value) must be awarded until such time as
the land has been restored to a condition of full and unrestricted use. See generally State of Ohio v.
U.S. Department of Interior, 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989); See also, 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain
§ 283 (2007) ("The government has been found liable for the reasonable rental value of the premises,
for the full amount of time needed to place the owner back in possession, including the time needed to
accomplish restoration of the premises to their former condition, reasonable wear and tear excepted.").
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B. Cost to Restore
Over half the land area (approximately 1,000 acres) of Enewetak atoll remains
unavailable to the people for full use because of radiation contamination. In
addition, all the land of the atoll was severely damaged as a result of the weapons
tests, bulldozing and scrapping activities both before and after each of the tests, the
construction of support facilities (concrete building pads, asphalt runways and
roads), and the scrapping and soil removal activities of partial cleanup that
occurred between 1977 to 1980. Also, it must be noted that the Enewetak people
consist of two groups. One group, the people of Enjebi Island, has not been able to
resettle their island because it remains contaminated. The Enewetak people argued
that the construction of housing and necessary infrastructure is another element of
the cost to restore damages. Thus, the Enewetak people argued that cost to restore
can be best described as those costs necessary to accomplish three objectives:
remediation of radiologically contaminated land, soil and plant rehabilitation and
restoration, and resettlement of Enjebi Island.
1. Radiological Remediation
The Nuclear Claims Tribunal of the Republic of the Marshall Islands in its
ruling of December 21, 1998 adopted the U.S. EPA standard of 15 millirems per
year for cleanup of radiation-contaminated land. The rationale for the adoption of
the standard was that the Marshallese people are entitled to the same level of
protection from radioactive contamination created by the U.S. nuclear weapons
and testing program as is provided to U.S. citizens. This rationale is consistent
with a guidance issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency which states:
As a basic principle, policies and criteria for radiation protection of
populations outside national borders from releases of radioactive
substances should be at least as stringent as those for the populations
within the country of release. 
37
The rationale is also consistent with the declaration of the U.S. made in 1947,
and contained in the memorandum described above, which states:
[I]n conducting such experimentation in Eniwetok, the United States is
not thereby subjecting the local inhabitants of the Trust Territory of the
Pacific to perceptibly greater danger than, say, the people of the United
States.38
Although the establishment of a cleanup standard is necessary, the next
question is how to effect the necessary radiological remediation. To answer that
question, the Enewetak people asked the firm of Sanford Cohen & Associates, Inc.
(SC&A) to research, evaluate and describe the following: (1) the current
radiological conditions at Enewetak, (2) the current doses and health risks to the
people of Enewetak if one were to do no cleanup using U.S. methodologies, (3)
37. See INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, SAFETY SERIES NO. 67, ASSIGNING A VALUE TO
TRANSBOUNDARY RADIATION EXPOSURE (1985).
38. Hearing, supra note 11 (citing Memorandum from Chairman of the Atomic Energy
Commission to President Truman (Nov. 25, 1947)).
VOL. 35:1
THE MARSHALL ISLANDS NUCLEAR CLAIMS TRIBUNAL
collective health impacts under various remedial alternatives, (4) cleanup
alternatives to permit full use of the land using U.S. standards, and (5) the costs of
such alternatives. SC&A provided a thorough two volume report addressing the
above. In addition, Dr. John Mauro and Dr. Hans Behling, the principal authors of
the SC&A report, testified before the Nuclear Claims Tribunal, addressing all
aspects of the report. After analyzing thirty different cleanup options, Drs. Mauro
and Behling recommended an approach "consisting of a combination of soil
removal and application of potassium to soil as an integral part of a self-sustaining,
agricultural rehabilitation program." The total cost of the recommended
remediation strategy is estimated at $100 million.3 9
2. Soil and Plant Rehabilitation
All of the land of Enewetak was severely damaged as a result of the nuclear
testing program. What was once a productive atoll providing food to the Enewetak
people and sufficient surplus production for export of coconut products became a
land with soil devoid of any nutrients, unable to support food-bearing plants. This
removal of the rich atoll topsoil was the result of the nuclear tests, 40 the pre-test
and post-test activities that involved the bulldozing and clearing of land and laying
of asphalt on the land; the construction of support facilities to provide housing,
infrastructure, runways, roads, buildings, etc.; and the bulldozing, clearing,
scrapping and soil removal activities of the 1977-80 partial cleanup. These
activities devastated the ecology of Enewetak Atoll. The dark rich organic matter
that takes centuries to build up to levels of two to four feet in depth was gone.
Food-bearing plants could not survive in such an environment. An agriculture
program was initiated after the 1977-80 cleanup; however, that program has only
recently initiated an effective soil and plant rehabilitation method under the
direction of an agriculturalist. The method requires the digging of ditches and the
placing of layers of organic matter in the ditches along with a chicken manure and
copra-cake compost. This is followed by the planting of both food-bearing plants
and salt and wind-spray protecting plants. This is a very labor-intensive program.
All of the land in the northern part of the atoll requires such full rehabilitation,
including long-term monitoring, nurturing, and routine applications of potash,
biomass and manure. The cost of such full rehabilitation is estimated at $29,000
39. The United States Legacy in the Marshall Islands: Hearing on Consideration of Issues
Relating to the Changed Circumstances Petition Before the H. Comm. on Resources, 109th Cong.
(2005) (statement of John Mauro, PhD, CHP, Senior Vice President of S. Cohen & Associates),
http://www.yokwe.net/ydownloads/052505mauro.pdf; See also Letter from Davon Pevec, Counsel,
Republic of the Marshall Islands, to Geoffrey Judge, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of
Environment, Safety and Health, United States Department of Energy, (Aug. 1, 2007) available at
http://www.eh.doe.gov/health/ohp/nonsecure/2119.pdf.
40. See U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, FINAL REPORT: ENEWETAK RADIOLOGICAL SUPPORT PROJECT
NVO-213 (1982) available at http://worf.eh.doe.gov/ihp/chron/C78.PDF ("A nuclear detonation can
aptly be described as awesome.. Quite apparent are the immediate effects of the intensely hot fireball
which can consume a 300 foot steel tower or plate nearby objects with a thin film of plutonium and
fission products; of the giant waves that can wash over everything nearby if the device is detonated
under or near a water surface; of the massive cloud of radioactive particles that rise to great heights then
slowly drift to earth or wash out in a subsequent rain.").
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per acre. The southern islands of the atoll require similar, although less intensive
rehabilitation, because of some prior rehabilitation and because of the recent
implementation of a more effective rehabilitation program on those islands. The
total cost for soil and plant rehabilitation of all the islands of the atoll is estimated
at $18 million.4'
3. Resettlement Costs
As described above, one group of the Enewetak people, the people of Enjebi
Island, have not been able to return to their home island. Enjebi was ground zero
for a number of tests. In addition, it underwent bulldozing, scrapping and soil
removal during the 1977-80 partial cleanup activities. In order to make the island
habitable again, the radiological remediation and soil and plant rehabilitation
described above are required. In addition, the people require the housing,
infrastructure, and other buildings necessary to permit them to live on the island
while the rehabilitation is ongoing. The housing, rehabilitation-support buildings,
infrastructure, and community center, are consistent with resettlement housing,
buildings, and infrastructure currently underway for the communities of Bikini and
Rongelap. The cost for such housing, buildings, and infrastructure for Enjebi
Island is estimated at $30 million. In addition, the housing on Enewetak, Medren,
and Japtan islands constructed during the 1977-80 partial cleanup requires
upgrades, and the islands require infrastructure, such as power and water, to make
the living conditions consistent with those currently underway for Bikini and
Rongelap. The cost for such upgrades is estimated at $20 million. The above-
described resettlement costs were developed by Mr. Earl Gilmore of E.P.G.
Corporation, a construction consultant, who has extensive experience and expertise
in construction costs in the Marshall Islands.42
The Tribunal did not award any resettlement costs, saying that such costs
should be paid from the loss of use portion of the award.
C. Consequential or Hardship Damages
As described above, the Enewetak people suffered greatly during their exile
on Ujelang atoll. From the very beginning, they were told that their removal from
Enewetak would be temporary and that they would be taken care of on Ujelang.
For example, Captain John Vest, the U.S. military governor of the Marshall Islands
in 1947, along with Vice Admiral Salada, said the following to the Enewetak
people prior to their removal from Enewetak:
Vice Admiral Salada and I were asked some questions by the people at
this time. They wanted to know when they could return to Enewetak.
They also wanted to know what they could expect from the United
States in the way of ongoing support and care during the period of their
41. See, Teairki F. Mateariki, Initial Report, (March 1999), cited in In the Matter of the People of
Enewetak, supra note 10 (describing the soil and plant rehabilitation method, both initial phase and
long-term phase).
42. See E.P.G. CORPORATION, ENEWETAK ATOLL REVISED MASTER PLAN CONCEPT FOR ENJEBI
ISLAND AND UPGRADE AND RESTORATION OF FACILITIES AT ENEWETAK, MEDREN, AND JAPTAN
ISLANDS cited in In the Matter of the People of Enewetak, supra note 10.
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removal. Based on what I knew of the prevailing estimates of the
scientists, I told them they would be able to return to Enewetak fairly
soon after the tests were completed; perhaps in three to five years. It
certainly was not in my mind that it would be longer than that, or the
taking of Enewetak for the testing program was permanent. At the time
it was my understanding, and I believe their understanding as well as a
result of our discussions, that the people of Enewetak would be able to
return to Enewetak Atoll after the testing was concluded, and that the
likely time frame for this return was three to five years.
As to their care, I had been assured by Admiral Salada that the steps
necessary to move the Enewetak people and resettle them on Ujelang
would be provided by the Navy. While we hoped that they would
eventually become more or less self sufficient, the Navy agreed to
provide them with such supplementary food and necessities as they
required, to provide the means by which they could trade copra they
produced for small luxuries and necessities purchased from the field
trip's stores, to provide the health care they might need, to see to their
schooling, and the like. In other words, we agreed to make sure they
fared well on Ujelang.43
Neither event occurred. The exile from Enewetak lasted for a period of thirty
three years and the U.S. failed to take care of the Enewetak people on Ujelang.
The feelings of the Enewetak people on Ujelang are described by Dr. Carucci as
follows:
When Enewetak people were told they would have to leave their home
atoll, they were also told that the move would be temporary and that the
Americans would continue to watch over them. Not surprisingly, on
Ujelang they came to feel that they had been totally abandoned. For a
period of time, the Navy maintained a weather station on Ujelang that
kept people supplied with entertainment if not much food, but with the
departure of the Navy, serious hardship and suffering began to become
apparent. In thinking back on this era, people recall that the earliest
times of hardship began around 1950 or 1951, soon after the birth of
one of my siblings by adoption, Tallenja. Up until that time, life on
Ujelang was satisfactory, since the products of land and sea had not
been harvested for a decade or more. Throughout the remaining years
of the 1950s and throughout much of the 1960s, however, the
community was mired in despair, living through frequent periods of
famine and having given up all hope of being returned to Enewetak.
Not until 1969, after "the strike", did the sense of futility on Ujelang
began to abate and, even then, hunger was not unknown.
There are a number of forms of evidence that show how serious the
suffering was on Ujelang during these years. First, are many similar
43. See Captain John Vest Aff. 9-10 (on file with author).
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versions of the stories that elders told on the atoll in the mid-1970s.
While stories of suffering are virtually innumerable, those that are
repeated again and again focus on a number of core incidents including
famine and hunger, near starvation and death from illness, food shortage
and the limitations of the environment on Ujelang (fishing/collecting),
the polio epidemic, the measles epidemic, the rat infestation, the time of
the strike, an easing of suffering during the 1970s but with continued
homesickness and desire to return to Enewetak. In a concluding
section, then, I look at the disappointments of life on Enewetak,
disappointments that could not be foreseen on Ujelang. 44
Unfortunately, the hardships and sufferings did not end with the return of the
people to Enewetak in 1980. The severe damage to the land, the residual radiation
contamination on over half the land of the Atoll, the inability to resettle Enjebi, the
inability to grow adequate food crops for local consumption, the inability to use
their land for productive economic purposes, the required reliance on canned
imported foods, all continue to cause difficulty and hardship to the Enewetak
people. As Dr. Carucci describes:
Initially people were thrilled with the long-awaited return to Enewetak,
yet that return, in many ways, has involved a more serious, though
perhaps more subtle, form of suffering. Since their return in 1980,
Enewetak people have struggled with life on the New Enewetak, a place
reminiscent of their homeland yet, in so many ways, a radically
different location than the atoll on which people lived in the 1940s. On
the New Enewetak, people experienced cultural deprivation and rapid
de-culturation. In this new landscape, stripped bare of the materials
required for daily existence, most of the day-to-day activities of
Marshallese life were made irrelevant. Ironically, having been brought
back to the physical skeleton of their homeland, the long-standing
object of their desire, people were only able to witness firsthand, how
desiccated, distant, and unrecognizable their mother place had become.
As people struggled to fulfill their desires of reunification with their
primordial place, the more they recognized the foreign-ness of their
home. It is this contradiction of the grandest scale that has become the
source of incredible frustration for Enewetak people. They cannot be at
home in the very land that is their home since the contours of the land
are no longer the same, its productive capacity is lacking, and, without
those products, the wide array of day-to-day activities that allowed
people to make local products into canoes, and sleeping mats, and
foods, have lost their meaning. For nearly twenty years, people have
not been able to make themselves into "real Enewetak people" since the
materials required for this self-fashioning are not available to them.
This is the grand contradiction of life on Enewetak. The most cohesive
community in the Marshall Islands has, in one generation, been thrown
44. In the Matter of the People of Enewetak, supra note 10.
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into disarray by placing them in a situation where their most heartfelt
desires could not possibly be realized.45
These past and continuing hardships deserve compensation in addition to
compensation for loss of use and cost to restore. The U.S. Congress has had
occasion to address compensation for the relocation of other peoples. For
example, in 1988 the Congress enacted the Civil Liberties Act, Pub. L. 100-383 to
compensate (1) the persons of Japanese ancestry living in the U.S. who were
forcibly relocated to internment camps from March 1942 to January 1946 and (2)
the Aleutian islanders who were relocated from their home islands during and after
World War 11.46 The range of hardships damages per year can be calculated as
between $7,000 per year per person to $10,000 per year per person. The Enewetak
people argued that such, and other, comparisons demonstrate that the Enewetak
people should receive $10,000 per year for each of the years they lived on Ujelang.
The Tribunal awarded $4,500 per year per person resident on Ujelang for
sixteen of the most difficult years and $3,000 per year per person resident for the
remaining seventeen years.47
X1. NUCLEAR CLAIMS TRIBUNAL AWARD TO THE ENEWETAK PEOPLE
The total award to the Enewetak people for damages they suffered as a result
of the nuclear testing program is $386 million. This includes the original award of
$325 million plus an amendment to include $16 million for soil rehabilitation and
revegetation that was inadvertently omitted from the original award, and a
subsequent amendment to include $45 million for interest at the rate of 7% per
annum on the past loss of use portion of the award to the date of the award.
To summarize, the Tribunal awarded the following as full and just
compensation:
48
1. Cost to Restore: $108 million
2. Loss of Use: $199 million
3. Hardship: $34 million
Total: $341 million
Although the $341 million award is a significant amount, it is only a fraction
of the amount that was expended to create the damage at Enewetak. It is also a
fraction of the amount necessary to cleanup sites in the U.S., contaminated as a
result of the nuclear weapons testing program. The U.S. Department of Energy
recently revised its cleanup estimates upwards of $168 billion to $212 billion. 49
45. Id.
46. See generally Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, Personal
Justice Denied 117-133, 318, 355-359 (reprinted by House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
March 1992).
47. In the Matter of the People of Enewetak, supra note 10.
48. These amounts have been subsequently adjusted by post-judgment proceedings. Nuclear
Claims Tribunal - Enewetak Decision Summary, http://www.nuclearclaimstribunal.com/enewetak.htm
(last visited Oct. 24, 2007)
49. Hearing, supra note 11.
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It is also noteworthy that a few years ago the U.S. Congress appropriated over
$400 million for the cleanup of Kahoolawe Island, yet that site is affected by
material that is non-nuclear and non-toxic.
50
The citizens of the U.S. benefited greatly by having the nuclear testing
conducted far from the U.S. mainland, thereby avoiding the damaging health and
environmental consequences of radioactive fallout. Enewetak's land, lagoon and
reef were sacrificed for the benefit of the people of the United States. The
Enewetak people bore, and continue to bear, the burden of a damaged and
radiation-contaminated homeland. They also endured suffering and hardship, the
consequences of which continue to affect their community to this day. The U.S.
accepted responsibility for the damages it caused at Enewetak and it agreed that
the Tribunal was to determine just compensation. The Tribunal has done so.
However, the Tribunal has limited funding. Consequently, the Tribunal was able
to pay the Enewetak people only $1.7 million which is less than one-half of one
percent of the award. The Enewetak people are in the process of attempting to
have their award addressed and paid by the U.S. government. If that fails, the
Enewetak people will bring an action in the U.S. courts to enforce the award.
XII. FUNDING OF THE AWARD
Since the Tribunal does not have the funding to pay the award made to the
Enewetak people and the subsequent award made to the Bikini people, the
Republic of the Marshall Islands included the payment of the Enewetak and Bikini
awards as part of a Changed Circumstances Petition presented to the U.S. Congress
pursuant to Article IX of the Compact Section 177 Agreement.5 1 Article IX allows
the Republic of the Marshall Islands to petition Congress for additional
compensation if damage resulting from the U.S nuclear tests is discovered after the
Compact became effective and "could not reasonably have been identified as of the
effective date of this Agreement, and if such injuries render the provisions of this
Agreement manifestly inadequate. 52 While the Marshall Islands has the right to
petition under Article IX, Congress is under no obligation to authorize and
appropriate such funds.
This political process is underway: hearings on the nuclear legacy occurred
before Congress in May and July of 2005. Although the petition process is a
possible vehicle to fund the awards, the property damage claims are also
50. Id.
51. Nuclear Claims Tribunal - History and Activities,
http://www.nuclearclaimstribunal.com/hist.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2007).
52. Section 177, supra note 3, at IX.
If loss or damage to property and person of the citizens of the Marshall Islands, resulting from the
Nuclear Testing Program, arises or is discovered after the effective date of this Agreement, and such
injuries were not and could not reasonably have been identified as of the effective date of this
Agreement, and if such injuries render the provisions of this Agreement manifestly inadequate, the
Government of the Marshall Islands may request that the Government of the United States provide for
such injuries by submitting such a request to the Congress of the United States for its consideration. It is
understood that this Article does not commit the Congress of the United States to authorize and
appropriate funds. Id.
VOL. 35:1
2006 THE MARSHALL ISLANDS NUCLEAR CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 239
independent of the petition process because they involve property rights protected
by the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Nonetheless we are proceeding at the moment with the political process for a
variety of reasons. However, the political process may be too slow or prove
unsuccessful in addressing the payment of the awards, causing the filing of actions
in the U.S. courts to enforce the awards.

